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Abstract
The diplomatic and political deadlock in what has come to be known as 
the Palestine/Israel  conflict,  has led to  the re-emergence of  an anti-partition 
discourse that draws its arguments from the reality on the ground and/or from 
anti-Zionism.  Why  such  a  re-emergence?  Actually,  anti-partitionism  as  an 
antagonism  depends  on  its  corollary,  partitionism,  and  as  such,  they  have 
existed for  the same period of  time.  Furthermore,  the debate between anti-
partitionists  and  pro-partitionists  –  nowadays  often  referred  to  as  a  debate 
between the one-state and the two-state solution – is not peculiar to the period 
around 2000. It echoes the situation in the late 1910s when the British were 
settling in  Palestine and authorising the Zionist  settler  colonial  movement to 
build a Jewish homeland thus introducing the seeds of partition and arousing 
expressions of anti-partitionism.
This dissertation aims to articulate a political history of the anti-partitionist 
perspectives against the backdrop of an increasing acceptance of Palestine's 
partition as a solution. This account runs from 1915 and the first partition – that 
of  the Arab territories of the Ottoman Empire – to 1988 and the Palestinian 
recognition of the principle of partition. Thus, I argue that the anti-partitionist 
perspectives have persisted throughout history.
Such a historical perspective enabled me to consider the acceptance of 
partition as the result of a shift from a “national and territorial liberation” strategy 
to  the  search for  “sovereignty and national  independence”,  a  shift  that  was 
operated  in  the  Palestinian  national  movement  as  well  as  in  the  Zionist 
movement, and which made statehood the main objective. 
In this regard, the Palestinian acceptance of the principle of partition and of a 
two-state  solution  may be  regarded  as  a  legitimation  of  the  Israeli  colonial 
settler state.
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Introduction: The Road to partition
A. Objectives and context of the study
Objectives
This dissertation aims to highlight the persistence of the anti-partitionist 
perspectives  in  Palestine  from  World  War  One  to  the  Palestine  Liberation 
Organisation’s  decision  in  1988  to  accept  the  principle  of  the  partition  of 
Palestine and to embrace the dominant two-state discourse. For that purpose, I 
aim  to  articulate  the  history  of  the  anti-partition  perspective  as  a  vector  of 
Unitarian solutions to the Palestine question against the backdrop of the gradual 
acceptance  of  partition.  I  will  study  the  anti-partition  perspective  and  the 
alternatives it proposes during that period. 
 We have seen a strong resurgence of anti-partitionism in the form of 
one-statism  or  bi-nationalism  since  Oslo  and  especially  at  the  turn  of  the 
Century. This thesis argues that anti-partitionism has existed for a long time but 
that  it  has never  been dominant  in  the  decision-making circles.  Indeed,  the 
debate  between  anti-partitionists  and  pro-partitionists,  often  characterised  in 
contemporary  literature  as  the  debate  between  the  one-state  and  two-state 
solutions, is not recent or peculiar to the period around 2000, but rather echoes 
and  reminds  us  of  the  situation  in  the  late  1910s:  the  division  of  the  Arab 
territories under Ottoman rule, the partition of Syria and the establishment of the 
British mandate in Palestine, a mandate which authorised and supported the 
installation of a Jewish National Home in Palestine. With the Balfour Declaration 
and  the  mandate,  the  British  authorities  were  introducing  the  seeds  of 
separation and indeed the seeds of partition. 
The last fifteen years have seen a proliferation of studies on the “one-
state  solution”.  However,  these  usually  focus  on  one  anti-partitionist 
organisation  and/or  one  specific  moment  in  the  rise  of  anti-partitionism. 
Moreover, they mostly deal with anti-partitionism within the ranks of one of the 
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factions  on  the  Palestine  scene  and/or  on  one  moment  of  anti-partitionist 
history.  Indeed,  they  usually  concentrate  on  the  discourse  of  bi-nationalist 
groups present in the Zionist movement during the mandate, or on the Arab 
anti-partitionist position as one of refusal but rarely on the Unitarian propositions 
whether before the UN partition plan or after. Indeed, what I propose here is a 
focus  on  those  anti-partitionist  proposals  with  a  unitarian  programme.  The 
precision is important as anti-partition was a position common to all actors in 
Palestine  even  pro-Zionist  British  members  of  the  Parliament  and  Zionist 
maximalists who pursued the goal  of  a Jewish Palestine with a separate or 
better absent indigenous population. 
So, most of the work on the subject has focused either on Brit Shalom and/or 
the Ihud1, or on resolution 181, or on the PLO and its strategies and objectives. 
I will return to the existing studies in detail in the literature review2 below. 
Just as there seems to exist no study covering the diverse actors who have 
proposed  an  anti-partitionist approach  –  within  the  ranks  of  the  British 
authorities  (the  colonial  power),  the  Zionist  movement  and  Israel  or  the 
Palestinian  Arabs.  Neither  does  there  seem to  be  any study –  narrative  or 
comparative - that aims to present a wider historical approach and understand 
why anti-partitionism, with its roots in the early 19th Century, has never ceased 
to exist and has even seen remarkable resurgences over the decades. Indeed, 
most  of  the  works  tend  to  analyse  the  diverse  Unitarian  propositions  as 
moments in history despite the fact  that there is continuity.  This means that 
even  the  works  on  anti-partition  tend  to  partition  the  issue  and  isolate  the 
various attempts. 
What I  propose, is to adopt a historical  perspective to understand the 
shift from the demand for national liberation and independence to the demand 
for political sovereignty, even if it means accepting partition. Indeed, at some 
point, the attitude towards partition changed in both movements – the Zionist 
movement as well as the Palestinian resistance movement – and we can see 
that this shift was taking place in the late 1930s for the Zionist movement and in  
1 Brit  Shalom and the Ihud are two Zionist  groups that  advocated bi-nationalism under  the British 
mandate and they will be the object of Chapter Five. 
2 Here is a short account of the existing works: Among the works we could cite Shalom Ratzabi's The 
Radical circle in Brith Shalom; Joseph Heller's From Brith Shalom to Ihud, Judah Leib Magnes and  
the  struggle  for  a  binational  state  in  Palestine;  Tamar  Hermann's  “The  binational  idea  in 
Israel/Palestine: Past and present”, Nations and Nationalism 11 (3), July 2005etc... 
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the 1980s for the Palestinian resistance movement. This shift, I argue, is in fact  
a  shift  from an idealist  programme to  a pragmatic  acknowledgement  of  the 
situation,  from  “national  and  territorial  liberation”  to  a  strategy  of  gaining 
“sovereignty and national independence”. 
Context of the study
 “The PLO will  seek a comprehensive settlement among the parties  
concerned in the Arab-Israeli conflict, including the State of Palestine,  
Israel, and other neighbours, within the framework of the international  
conference for peace in the Middle East on the basis of resolutions 242  
and 338 and so as to guarantee equality and the balance of interests,  
especially our people’s rights, in freedom, national independence, and  
respect the right to exist in peace and security for all”3.
These words were pronounced by Yasser Arafat, in his speech to the United 
Nations (UN) in Geneva during the Intifada, on 13th December 1988. He was 
then  the  chairman  of  the  Palestine  Liberation  Organisation  (PLO),  the  sole 
legitimate  representative  of  all  Palestinians  –  those  living  in  the  Occupied 
Palestinian  Territories  (OPT),  those  living  in  Israel  and  all  the  refugees 
dispersed around the world. 1988 constitutes a turning point in the history of the 
Palestinian  liberation  movement  as  it  marked  the  PLO's  recognition  of  UN 
resolutions 242 and 338. UN resolution 242 was adopted in 1967 and it called 
for the withdrawal of Israel's army from territories4 occupied during the six days 
war  and “the respect  and acknowledgement”  of  all  the states of the region. 
Chairman Arafat's speech meant recognition of the principle of resolution 181, 
the UN partition plan of 1947, that is to say the acceptance of the partition of  
Palestine. As for resolution 338, it was adopted in 1973 to call for the end of the 
war,  reiterate  the  need  to  apply  resolution  242  and  called  for  “immediate 
negotiations”.
3 Excerpt from Yasser Arafat's speech before the General Assembly of the United Nations in Geneva,  
13th December  1988.  The  text  of  the  speech  is  available  on  the  English  page  of  Le  Monde  
Diplomatique: http://mondediplo.com/focus/mideast/arafat88-en.
4 The text of the resolution said territories without the article and as such it stayed vague as to which 
territories it referred to whereas the French version stated “les territoires”, suggesting all the territories 
occupied in 1967.
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And  indeed,  Chairman  Arafat's  speech  opened  the  way  for  future 
diplomatic contacts. In 1991, the Americans convened a meeting in Madrid with 
the Israelis, Jordanians, Syrians and Palestinians to discuss the steps towards 
peace. These and other secret negotiations led to the Oslo agreements with the 
signature of the Declaration of Principles in Washington on the 13th September 
1993. These agreements eventually prefigure the acceptance of the two-state 
scenario as a solution for the conflict. 
“The  Government  of  the  State  of  Israel  and  the  PLO team (in  the  
Jordanian-Palestinian delegation to the Middle East Peace Conference  
-  the  "Palestinian  Delegation"),  representing  the  Palestinian  people,  
agree that  it  is  time to  put  an end to  decades of  confrontation  and  
conflict, recognise their mutual legitimate and political rights, and strive  
to  live  in  peaceful  coexistence  and  mutual  dignity  and  security  and  
achieve  a  just,  lasting  and  comprehensive  peace  settlement  and  
historic reconciliation through the agreed political process”5.
The  Oslo  agreements  and  the  Declaration  of  Principles'  signify  the 
recognition  of  the  PLO  by  Israel  and  the  United  States,  as  well  as  the 
recognition  of  the  state  of  Israel  by  the  Palestinians.  Nevertheless,  these 
agreements were elaborated as interim agreements and were supposed to be 
followed by other discussions about the final status and, eventually, to lead to 
the creation of a Palestinian state within five years. However, in 1998, five years 
after the signature of the Declaration of Principles between the PLO and Israel, 
no agreement about the final status was reached. Moreover, Israel had been 
expanding the building of settlements and the occupation and colonisation of 
Jerusalem, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Meron Benvenisti  the former 
Deputy Mayor of Jerusalem and political scientist analyses the Oslo Agreement 
results as follows:
“The  Oslo  framework,  which  ostensibly  was  aimed  at  creating  the  
conditions for separation and establishment of a Palestinian state, was  
nothing  more  than a  bi-national  regime,  in  which  there  was defined  
division  of  authority  and  responsibility  between  the  dominant  Israeli  
element and the PA. The latter was controlled indirectly while Israel was  
allowed to continue its integration of the territories, turning the entire  
Mandatory Palestine into an indivisible geopolitical entity”6. 
5 Excerpt  of  the  Declaration  of  Principles  on  Interim  Self-Government  Arrangements. 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/in_depth/middle_east/israel_and_the_palestinians/key_documents/1682727
.stm 
6 Benvenisti,  Meron,  “The  Binational  option”,  Haaretz,  November  2,  2002: 
http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/opinion/the-binational-option-1.29032 . 
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Whereas the reality on the ground was undergoing dramatic changes, 
the terms of negotiations did not take these into account and remained as they 
had  been  at  the  beginning  of  the  process.  So  when,  in  July  2000,  the 
Palestinians met the Israelis and the Americans around the negotiating table, 
the latter still  based their demands and conditions on the pre-Oslo situation. 
Two months later, in September 2000, the second Intifada broke out and this 
time the harsh repression was extended to the Palestinian population in Israel; 
the Israeli authorities increased their control over the Occupied Territories, re-
creating and inter-weaving this control at all levels – geographic, demographic, 
political, administrative, economical and social, leading to a bi-national reality as 
described, in 2007, by Meron Benvenisti.  
“One must therefore seek a different paradigm to describe the state of  
affairs  more  than  forty  years  after  Israel/Palestine  became  one  
geopolitical unit again, after nineteen years of partition. The term 'de  
facto  bi-national  regime'  is  preferable  to  the  occupier/occupied  
paradigm,  because  it  describes  the  mutual  dependence  of  both  
societies, as well as the physical, economic, symbolic and cultural ties  
that  cannot  be  severed  without  an  intolerable  cost.  Describing  the  
situation  as  de  facto  bi-national  does  not  indicate  parity  between  
Israelis  and  Palestinians  –  on  the  contrary,  it  stresses  the  total  
dominance of  the  Jewish-Israeli  nation,  which  controls  a  Palestinian  
nation that is fragmented both territorially and socially. No paradigm of  
military occupation can reflect the Bantustans created in the occupied  
territories, which separate a free and flourishing population with a gross  
domestic  product  of  almost  30  thousand  dollars  per  capita  from  a  
dominated population unable to shape its own future with a GDP of  
$1,500 per capita. No paradigm of military occupation can explain how  
half  the  occupied  areas  (”area  C”)  have  essentially  been  annexed,  
leaving the occupied population with disconnected lands and no viable  
existence.  Only  a  strategy  of  annexation  and  permanent  rule  can  
explain the vast settlement scheme and the enormous investment in  
housing and infrastructure, estimated at US$100 million”7.
The changing situation on the ground and the lack of progress in the 
negotiations has led firstly, to the diplomatic milieu reinforcing their support for 
partition and asserting the urgency of implementing a two-state solution8 and, 
Meron Benvenisti was in charge of the planning programme within the municipality of Jerusalem.
7  Benvenisti, Meron, “The inevitable bi-national regime”, Haaretz, January 22, 2010, translated from 
the  Hebrew  by  Zalman  Amit  and  Daphna  Levitt  for  The  American  Task  Force: 
http://www.americantaskforce.org/daily_news_article/2010/01/22/1264136400_13 
8 As shown in  President  Georges  W.  Bush's  speech  on  the  occasion  of  the  UN  Security  Council  
Resolution  1397,  adopted  on  March  12,  2002.  The  text  of  the  resolution  is  available  at: 
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secondly, to the resurgence of an anti-partitionist discourse – which had been 
marginalised and dismissed for decades due to the dominance of the two-state 
discourse. 
This  has  also  led  to  two  phenomena  –  first,  many  observers,  both 
Palestinians and Israelis, who were in favour of the partition and its corollary – 
the two-state solution – have started to adhere to the anti-partitionist discourse 
on  the  basis  of  the  changing  reality  on  the  ground.  This  is  the  case  of 
personalities such as the former president of the Israeli parliament, Avraham 
Burg.  In  fact,  the  continuous  colonisation  of  the  West  Bank  has  been 
progressively  fragmenting  the  geographical  and  demographical  dimensions, 
leading to a situation whereby the spaces and populations are so intermingled 
that partition would not be possible without a massive transfer of population. 
Second, those who advocated anti-partition on the basis of anti-Zionism were 
provided with new arguments such as the facts on the ground.
Anti-partitionism finds its expression in two main perspectives, the one 
geopolitical and “realistic”, the other an anti-Zionist perspective.  It is noteworthy 
that Edward Said made the link between the two when he strongly criticised the 
Oslo Agreement from its inception. He addressed the impossibility of finding a 
solution to the Palestine question as long as Zionism prevails and advocated 
the development of the concept and the practice of citizenship as it is “the main 
vehicle for coexistence”9.  This is generally a position shared by Palestinians 
advocating the end of  the two-state solution.  The geopolitical  perspective is 
based on an approach that defines itself as the one drawing its arguments from 
reality. Among its proponents, some adhere to the analysis of the Israeli regime 
being  an  ethnocracy  and  others,  using  facts  on  the  ground,  assess  the 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3d5281714.html 
It reads as follows:“ The Security Council, recalling all its previous relevant resolutions, in particular  
resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973), affirming a vision of a region where two States, Israel and  
Palestine, live side by side within secure and recognised borders”. 
Then, on June 4, 2009, President of the United States Barack Obama reiterated the US commitment to 
a two-states solution in a speech he delivered in Cairo: "For decades, there has been a stalemate: two 
peoples with legitimate aspirations, each with a painful history that makes compromise elusive. It is  
easy to point fingers – for Palestinians to point to the displacement brought by Israel’s founding, and  
for Israelis to point to the constant hostility and attacks throughout its history from within its borders  
as well as beyond. But if we see this conflict only from one side or the other, then we will be blind to  
the truth: the only resolution is for the aspirations of both sides to be met through two states, where  
Israelis  and  Palestinians  each live  in  peace and security."  The text  of  the  speech is  available  at:  
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-by-the-President-at-Cairo-University-6-04-09/ 
9 Said, Edward, “The One-state solution”, The New York Times, January 10, 1999. His arguments would 
find echoes by Azmi Bishara, Omar Barghouti, Leila Farsakh and numerous others.
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irreversibility of the situation and arrive at the conclusion that the prevailing bi-
national situation as acknowledged by Meron Benvenisti should be translated at 
the level of political representation10.  
The  Jewish  perspective,  if  one  can  call  it  that,  advocates  the  de-
colonisation and de-Zionisation of  Judaism and the development of  an anti-
Zionist bi-national vision as well as the return to the roots of the conflict – in 
opposition to those who consider the 1967 occupation as the central historical 
point of departure– – and to the “Question of Palestine”11. 
 
B. Conceptual framework and literature review
Conceptual framework
The purpose of this study being to highlight the persistence of the anti-
partitionist discourses and perspectives in Palestine from 1915 to 1988, it  is 
necessary to discuss the concepts of partition and anti-partition. 
Like  all  antagonisms,  anti-partitionist  discourse  only  exists  when  there  is  a 
dominant partitionist discourse and vision.  According to Thomas G. Fraser, it 
was only during the eighteenth century with the partition of Poland that the term 
partition  came  to  “assume  a  political  meaning”  and  entered  the  political 
lexicon12.  Despite  the  difficulty  of  defining  the  term,  both  Irish  researchers, 
Brendan O'Leary and Joe Cleary, analysing partition, defined it in their works. 
The former announced:
“A  partition  should  be  understood  as  an  externally  proposed  and  
imposed fresh border cutting through a least one community’s national  
homeland,  creating  at  least  two  separate  units  under  different  
10 Oren  Yiftachel  and  Meron  Benvenisti  can  be  considered  as  the  principal  proponents  of  this 
perspective.
11 This perspective finds supporters such as Amnon Raz Krakotzkin, Azmi Bishara, As'ad Ghanem, Ilan 
Pappe and most Arab supporters of a “one-state solution” in Palestine-Israel.
12 Fraser, Thomas G., Partition in Ireland, India and Palestine. Theory and practice, New York 1984; KJ 
Rankin, “Theoretical concepts of partition and the partitioning of Ireland”, IBIS Working Paper N°67, 
Institute for British-Irish Studies, University College Dublin, 2006, 25pp.
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sovereigns and authorities (original emphasis).”13 
As for Cleary, he borrows Robert Schaeffer's definition:
“Partition can be said to have occurred when two or more new states  
are created out of what had previously been a single (administrative)  
entity and when at least one of the new units claims a direct link with  
the prior state”14.
Just as there is antagonism, there is also a debate about the relevance of 
partition as a solution to ethnic and nationalist conflicts which, quite surprisingly, 
is relatively recent. On that subject, it is noteworthy that the question of partition 
and anti-partition has always provoked a debate within the societies subjected 
to a partition plan whereas the theory of partition and academic debate around 
the question of partition as a relevant tool to end ethno-nationalist competitions 
has been timidly developing since the fall of the Soviet Union.  From then on, it 
has  raised  more  interest,  notably  among  South  Eastern  Asians  and  Irish 
scholars.  This  interest  reached  its  paroxysm  just  after  the  Dayton  Peace 
Agreement  for  former  Yugoslavia,  drafted  in  1995.  One  of  the  main 
contributions in the field is Thomas G. Fraser's 1984 study on the partitions of  
Ireland, India and Palestine as part of the sphere of control and/or influence of  
the  United  Kingdom:  Partition  in  Ireland,  India  and  Palestine,  theory  and  
practice15. His work itself acknowledged the profusion of studies on those three 
countries but the lack of major studies on the question of partition. Thomas G. 
Fraser  introduces  his  study  by  stating  that:  “where  partition  has  been 
implemented  in  the  twentieth  century,  it  has  never  been  separable  from 
controversy”.  Although as John Coakley points  out  in  an article  on the Irish 
experience of partition16, whilst there are numerous dissimilarities between the 
examples Fraser chose to focus on, there is an important common factor.  As a 
matter of fact, according to him, what makes those three entities similar is that 
they were all part of the “British system”17. “But the crucial point of similarity”, 
13 O'Leary, Brendan, Ian S. Lustick & Thomas Callaghy (eds.),  Right-sizing the state: the politics of  
moving borders, Oxford 2001, p.54.
14 Cleary, Joe, Literature, Partition and the Nation-State,  Culture and conflict in Ireland, Israel and  
Palestine, Cambridge 2002, p. 19.
15 Fraser, Thomas G., Partition in Ireland, India and Palestine. Theory and practice, New York 1984.
16 Coakley, John, “Ethnic conflict and the two-state solution: the Irish experience of partition”,  IBIS  
Working Paper N°42, Institute for British-Irish Studies, University College Dublin, 2004, 21pp.
17 Fraser, Thomas G., Partition in Ireland, India and Palestine. Theory and practice, op.cit., p. 2
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Fraser continues, “is that in each case partition became the 'problem-solving' 
device  adopted  in  an  attempt  to  meet  the  claims  of  conflicting  political 
aspirations” as indeed, partition is also often closely linked to nationalism, and 
more  precisely  to  the  expression  within  a  single  territory  of  competing 
nationalisms.
Settler colonialism, a vector of exclusion
A few  scholars,  such  as  Radha  Kumar  and  Joe  Cleary,  have  since 
started to study political partition as a major issue in its own right – as opposed 
to as a minor issue dealt with in succinctly in the context of nationalism. They 
observe  that  partition  has  not  occurred  in  all  competing  ethno-nationalist 
conflicts but usually in areas that have known colonisation and that are subject  
to  ethno-nationalist  conflicts.  This  observation  leads  them  to  consider  that 
partition does not find its roots directly and solely from the strength of ethnic 
nationalism  but  is  intrinsically  bound  to  colonisation  and  more  specifically 
colonisation  by  settlement.  And  indeed,  as  far  as  Palestine  is  concerned, 
colonialism and more specifically settler colonialism was involved. The question 
of whether Zionism is a settler colonial movement has been one of the major 
focal  points  in  the  debate  over  Zionism  and  continues  to  be  strongly 
controversial.  This  is,  as  maintained  by  Maxime  Rodinson,  mainly  due  to 
general assumptions linked with colonialism, colonisation and its product, the 
colony.  Indeed,  it  is  generally  assumed  and  supported  by  the  definitions 
available in various dictionaries that a colony is necessarily a territory linked to 
and depending on a metropole or a capital18. This has been used by the Zionist 
movement to dismiss comments about its colonial character, indeed, whilst it 
acknowledged the fact that colonisation was part of the Zionist project, Zionist  
leaders and scholars would refuse to acknowledge the Zionist movement as a 
colonial movement19.
This has however been deconstructed by a number of scholars who have 
come to study settler colonialism as a global and distinct phenomenon: distinct 
18 Rodinson, Maxime, “Israël, fait colonial?”, in Peuple juif ou problème juif?, Paris 1981, p. 233.
19 On  this  subject  read  Massad,  Joseph,  “The  'post-colonial'  colony,  time,  space  and  bodies  in  
Palestine/Israel”,  in  The  Persistence  of  the  Palestinian  question,  essays  on  Zionism  and  the  
Palestinians, London 2006, pp. 13-40. 
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from metropole colonialism20. David Fieldhouse, one of the leading historians of 
the  British  Empire  identified  a  typology  based  on  four  kinds  of  colonies: 
occupation  (involving  the  control  of  strategic  territories  mostly  for  economic 
interests), mixed settlement (involving the presence of settlers who, by means 
of  coercion,  obtain  a  native  work  force),  plantation  (characterised  by  the 
acquisition of land by the settlers who will import the labour force from outside 
the  colony)  and  pure  settlement  (involves  the  development  of  a  separate 
economy and the elimination of the native population). However, in analytical 
terms,  plantation,  mixed  settlement  and  pure  settlement  colonies  are 
subcategories of settlement colonies21. This typology is augmented by another 
kind introduced by Gershon Shafir, the ethnic plantation colony. 
Patrick Wolfe cited by Gabriel Piterberg, would define settler colonies as 
follows: 
“settler colonies were not primarily established to extract surplus value  
from  indigenous  labour.  Rather,  they  are  premised  on  displacing  
indigenes from (or replacing them on) the land […] it is difficult to speak  
of an articulation between coloniser and native since the determinate  
articulation is not to a society but directly to the land, a precondition of  
social organisation”22. 
In the lineage of Maxime Rodinson, these scholars have come to identify 
Zionism as a form of settler colonialism and to acknowledge the exclusionist 
potential of settler colonialisms and a fortiori of Zionism. For Patrick Wolfe, the 
process of exclusion is inherent to that form of colonialism, he even goes further 
and evokes a process of elimination, he however specifies: “Settler colonialism 
is  inherently  eliminatory  but  not  invariably  genocidal”.  For  him,  “destroy  to 
replace”  is  what  best  characterises  settler  colonialism23.  Gershon  Shafir, 
working on the specific case of Zionism and Israel, focused on the relationship 
20 Scholars who have concentrated their works on settler colonialism usually analyse it through five  
clusters. First, the environmental and geopolitical one which covers “the potential or actual wealth of  
a given territory”, second, demography, third, the relationship between land and labour which also 
dictates the “race relations and policies”, fourth, the race and finally, “the issues pertaining to the 
political history of the triangle formed by the indigenous people/the settlers. This short presentation 
largely relies on Gabriel Piterberg's account included in his  The returns of Zionism. Myths, politics  
and scholarship in Israel, London 2008, pp. 54-62.
21 Piterberg, Gabriel,  The returns of Zionism. Myths,  politics and scholarship in Israel,  op.cit., p.59; 
Shafir,  Gershon,  “Zionism and  colonialism.  A comparative  approach”,  in  Pappe,  Ilan  (ed.),  The 
Israel/Palestine question, London 1999, pp. 81-96.
22 Piterberg, Gabriel, The returns of Zionism. Myths, politics and scholarship in Israel, op.cit., p.61.
23 Wolfe, Patrick, “Settler colonialism and the elimination of the native”, Journal of Genocide Research  
8(4),  2006, pp. 387-409.
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between land and labour in Zionist doctrine and in the Jewish community in 
Palestine, then constructing a materialist  analysis  of  the development of  the 
Yishuv  (the  Jewish  community  in  Palestine). For  Shafir,  this  development 
simultaneously  depended  on  and  promoted  the  “massive  exclusion  of  less-
expensive  indigenous  Arab  labour  from employment  in  all  segments  of  the 
Jewish sector of the local economy”24. He goes even further and argues that 
this economic separatism was essential in the construction of an autonomous 
and homogeneous settler society and eventually in the acceptance of partition. 
Zionism being  a  settler  colonial  movement,  Shafir  argues  that  Israeli 
colonization  could  only  be  exercised  in  two  ways:  "maximalist  territorial 
exclusivism, the logical conclusion of which is the removal of the Palestinian 
Arabs; and the territorial partition of Eretz Israel/Palestine, leading to separate 
Israeli and Palestinian national development”25. However,  Zionism as a settler 
colonial movement – without a metropole – would have been unable to settle in 
Palestine without the support of a colonial super-power26, so it was to push for 
an alliance with an Imperial Power, Great Britain, an alliance that produced the 
Balfour  Declaration,  the  establishment  of  the  British  mandate  and  the 
introduction by right of the Zionist settlers into Palestine.
In search of a superpower: the alliance with Imperialism
Radha Kumar, states: “historically, ethnic partitions have occurred either 
under a colonial policy of divide and rule or in the context of colonial transfer of 
power”27. Joe Cleary, for his part, further explains that: 
“Ireland, India, Palestine and Cyprus were British colonies; at the end of  
World War II, Korea was Japanese and Vietnam a French colony. The  
situations in Germany and China were in most respects quite different  
from these, but much of China had been annexed by Japan or was  
under  Japanese  rule  in  the  period  leading  up  to  its  division,  and  
Germany was occupied by four military powers when it was sundered.  
24 Lockman,  Zachary,  “Land,  labor  and  the  logic  of  Zionism:  a  critical  engagement  with  Gershon  
Shafir”, Settler Colonial Studies 2(1), 2012, pp.9-38.
25 Ram,  Uri,  “The  colonization  perspective  in  Israeli  sociology”,  in  Pappe,  Ilan  (ed.),  The 
Israel/Palestine question, op.cit., pp.55-80.
26 Hilal,  Jamil,  “Imperialism  and  settler  colonialism  in  West  Asia:  Israel  and  the  Arab  Palestinian  
struggle”, Utafiti 1(1), 1976, Journal of the faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, University of Dar Es 
Salam, pp.52-69
27 Kumar, Radha, “The partition debate”, The Brown Journal of World Affairs 7(1), Winter/Spring 2000, 
pp.3-11. 
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As a general rule, then, it would seem that partitions are most likely to  
occur where – as a consequence of  colonial  rule or of  total  military  
collapse in times of war – societies have lost control  over their own  
political  destinies  and  are  vulnerable  to  the  wills  of  external  
superpowers”28. 
This  is  particularly  relevant  in  the  Palestinian  case;  indeed,  the  Zionist 
movement  –  as briefly mentioned above – has been,  since its  inception,  in 
search of support from a super-power. First, its leadership tried to obtain back-
up from the Ottoman Empire authorities, and then, when the latter was on the 
eve of collapse, the Zionist leadership turned to the United Kingdom. There, it 
has been arguing that a Jewish entity in Palestine would be in the interest of  
Western powers. And after many negotiations, the movement secured a positive 
statement on Zionism – the Balfour Declaration. 
When  referring  to  Irish  Unionists’  and  Zionists'  affiliation  with  British 
Imperialism, Cleary writes: 
“Both perceived themselves as frontier peoples of empire, as chosen  
peoples  who had already made or  who would  make  the  wilderness  
regions they inherited bloom; both were also consistently anxious about  
their  demographic  insufficiency  vis-à-vis  what  they  deemed  as  
backward civilisations,  majority  communities that  inhabited the same  
territory. […] Interestingly, despite their close ties with and considerable  
dependence on the British establishment, both Northern Irish Unionists  
and Zionists  showed them themselves willing  to  go  to  war  with  the  
British  rather  than  to  chance  their  fortunes  in  independent  states  
controlled  by  the  majority  communities  in  the  respective  colonial  
units”29.
The alliance with the British Empire pursued by the Zionist leadership was 
to  constitute  the  official  policy of  the  Yishuv as  long  as  the  colonial  power 
supported its activities and objectives.  As a matter  of  fact,  this was later  to 
bereversed when dissensions among the different British agencies rose up and 
pushed the British authorities to control Jewish immigration in Palestine. 
This is best expressed by the Palestinian-American scholar Joseph Massad:
“The  Zionist  movement  was  and  presented  its  project  of  creating  a  
Jewish State through colonization as part of the European colonizing  
world, while “socialist” variants of it were presenting the Zionist project  
as one assisting in combating imperialism and the world capitalist order.  
28 Cleary, Joe,  Literature, Partition and the Nation-State,  Culture and conflict in Ireland, Israel and  
Palestine, op.cit., p. 3.
29 Ibid., p. 5
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Later, the Zionist establishment itself, which had initially presented its  
project  as colonial,  was presenting itself  as a movement  of  national  
liberation constituting its project  as anti-colonial  in nature, albeit  one  
established through colonization but not colonialism!”30
Partition was evoked for the first time in an official public report by the 
Palestine Royal Commission. The commission’s recommendations are based 
on the incompatibility of the Arab and Jewish aspirations:
“An irrepressible conflict has arisen between two national communities  
within the narrow bounds of one small country. There is no common  
ground between them. Their national aspirations are incompatible. The  
Arabs desire to revive the traditions of the Arab golden age. The Jews  
desire  to show what  they can achieve when returned to  the land in  
which the Jewish nation was born. Neither of the two national ideals  
permits a combination in the service of a single State. […] 
Partition seems to offer at least a chance of ultimate peace. We can  
see none in any other plan.”31. 
As a matter of fact, most partitions have been imposed according to a number 
of assumptions, among which the argument of the lesser evil and the belief that 
the  nationalist  demands  of  the  competing  ethnic  groups  are  inextricable. 
However,  within  the Zionist  movement,  there  were  indeed groups that  were 
cautious  towards  the  British  authorities  and  heavily  criticised  the  alliance 
between the Zionist Movement and European imperialism. An important faction 
of the Zionist movement fought partition, the majority of them on the basis of 
their  aspiration  to  a  Jewish  State  over  the  whole  of  Palestine  and  another 
smaller  group  on  the  grounds  that  the  Jews  –  represented  by  the  Zionist 
movement – and the Arabs could find a way to cooperate towards a bi-national 
society. 
The philosopher Martin Buber, who left many writings on the Palestine question, 
expressed his worries on the alliance with imperialism as follows:
“The loyalty of our movement [Zionism] and our settlement [in Palestine] 
to the League of Nations and its agents is understandable. We must,  
however,  make it  clear  that  we have nothing  to  do  with  its  present  
system of values, with imperialism masquerading as humanitarianism.  
We must  therefore  abstain  from all  “foreign policy”  except  for  those  
steps and actions which are necessary for the achievement of a lasting  
and amicable agreement with  the Arabs in all  aspects of  public  life;  
30 Massad, Joseph, The Persistence of the Palestinian Question, New York 2006, p. 14. 
31 National Archives, CAB/24/270, Report of the Palestine Royal Commission, July 1937, Summary of 
the report of the Palestine Royal Commission: Chapter XX, “The force of circumstances”, p. 18.
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indeed, only those steps which would bring about and sustain an all-
embracing fraternal solidarity with the Arabs”.32
However, the Zionist movement, just like the Irish Unionists, did not intend to 
live with the majority but separately, and partition in the frame of a demand for  
self-determination could only lead to a transfer of population33.  Nevertheless, 
argue the advocates of partition, transfer is unavoidable in situations of ethno-
nationalist conflicts and partitions avoid wars by permitting a smooth transfer of 
populations. 
Partition vs anti-partition: circumstances and justifications
Partitions however depend on specific circumstances, but they also seem 
to respond to a “common structural logic” or set of justifications. 
In “Debating partition:  Justification and critiques”,  the political  scientist 
Brendan  O'Leary34 offers  a  comprehensive  analysis  of  the  justifications  and 
critiques of partition as a solution to national, ethnic and communal conflicts. He 
presents the main arguments in favour of and against the principle of partition, 
arguments collected through a critical reading of works in political science and 
history on the cases of political partitions such as Ireland, India and Palestine. 
The  main  arguments  in  favour  of  partition  generally  point  out  the 
irreversibility of certain situations and view partition as the most realistic solution 
– in terms of consequences and benefits. He goes on to argue that, generally 
speaking,  the  partitionists  are  either  proceduralists,  or  paternalists  or  both. 
Proceduralists  tend  to  establish  rules  to  which  reasonable  partitions  should 
conform and to  obtain  the involvement  of  the concerned parties.  As for  the 
paternalists,  they  consider  the  concerned  parties  not  fit  to  decide  for 
themselves,  and as  such,  they advocate  that  the  decision  should  lie  in  the 
hands of a third party.  According to O’Leary, the proceduralist British Empire 
and the pro-partition belligerents in Ireland, Palestine and India used the “cost-
32 Buber, Martin, “Avant la décision (1919”, in Mendes Flohr, Paul (ed.), Buber, Martin,  Une terre et  
deux peuples, Paris 1985, pp.59-60. 
33 The transfer of population was indeed envisaged by the Royal Commission to secure partition. 
See Brendan O'Leary,  “Debating partition: justifications and critiques”,  IBIS Working Paper N°78, 
Institute for British-Irish Studies, University College Dublin, 2006, 35pp.; Chaim Kaufmann, “When 
all  else  fails:  ethnic  population  transfers  and  partitions  in  the  twentieth  century”,  International  
Security 23(2), Fall 1998, p. 120-56.
34 O'Leary,  Brendan,  “Debating  partition:  justifications  and  critiques”,  IBIS  Working  Paper  N°78, 
Institute for British-Irish Studies, University College Dublin, 2006, 35pp. 
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benefit  argument”  to  enable  the  partition  of  these  countries.  Concerning 
Palestine,  he  states  that  “Among  Zionists,  the  tactical  judgement  was  that 
partition would help the formation of a Jewish state, and need not preclude the 
formal abandon of the ambition of eventual control of all of 'Eretz Israel'”35.
In  Contested Lands: Israel-Palestine, Kashmir, Bosnia, Cyprus and Sri Lanka,  
the  professor  of  International  and Comparative Politics  and specialist  in  the 
study of  ethnic  and national conflicts and their  management,  Sumantra Bose, 
portrays five ethno-national conflicts implying competing claims to territories and 
tries to find out how peace can be reached in each case. Attempting to show a 
realistic point of view, S. Bose makes an account of the historical roots of the 
conflicts and then presents elements of the peace negotiations. He argues that, 
first, “the Israeli-Palestinian conflict can be defused only by the establishment of 
a sovereign Palestinian state alongside Israel”; second, to reach peace a third 
party is necessary and third, that these steps have to be fulfilled quickly to avoid 
the “spoilers” such as “extremists” and unilateral steps36. Usually very critical of 
the partitionist discourse – which, according to him, is becoming obsolete and 
rarely  “provides the  basis  for  a  satisfactory,  let  alone  desirable  solution”37 - 
Sumantra Bose justifies partition in the Palestinian-Israeli case. Nevertheless, 
Bose is  neither  a  proceduralist  nor  a  paternalist  but  he considers that  after 
decades of “conflict”, the sole solution is partition.
In the face of this discourse, which is mainly based on arguments that 
intend to be realistic, we find the anti-partition discourse, which according to B. 
O'Leary, can be the prerogative of multi-nationalists as well as nationalists. He 
then identifies seven major arguments against partition: 
• the “rejection of the rupturing of national unity”;
• the existence of  “possibilities of constructive bi- and multi-nationalism”; 
•  the “practical impossibility of just partitions”; 
•  the “high likelihood of worsening rather than reducing violence”; 
•  the “possible mirage of homogenisation”; 
•  the “damage that partitions cause to the successor states”;
35 Ibid.
36 Bose,  Sumantra,  Contested  Lands.  Israel-Palestine,  Kashmir,  Bosnia,  Cyprus,  and  Sri  Lanka, 
Cambridge 2007, pp.297-298.
37 Bose,  Sumantra,  “The  partition  evasion”,  Open  Democracy,  August  23,  2007: 
http://www.opendemocracy.net/article/conflicts/india_pakistan/partition_peoples 
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• the “failure to make a clean cut”38.
Literature review 
The literature review presented here is divided into two sections, the first 
aims at introducing critically a sample of the literature dealing with partition in 
the context of Palestine, and the second for its part presents works focused on 
anti-partitionism in Palestine.
 Brendan O'Leary, as we have seen, argues that most of the partitionists 
are proceduralists and paternalists – in this respect, the Israeli historian Benny 
Morris, whose essay The Birth Of The Palestinian Refugee Problem39 has been 
classified amongst the most comprehensive works on the 1948 Arab-Israeli war 
– gives us the most striking example of partitionist discourse and arguments in 
his One state-two states, resolving the Israel/Palestine conflict40. Indeed, at the 
risk of signing a semi-academic work, semi-pamphlet, he depicts the one-state 
solution as both impracticable and unwanted. At best, he and other authors who 
positioned in favour of partition, see the idea as a utopia but most of the time,  
they see it as a dangerous proposition that would signify the end of Zionism and 
indeed the end of Israel as a Jewish state. 
Whereas the author proposes to critically analyse the diverse one-state and 
two-state proposals, in reality, he is far more strongly critical of the advocates of 
a one-state solution than he is of the idea itself. Indeed, he simply dismisses the 
idea by painting it as no more than a fantasy that could not find ground because 
–  amongst  other  things  –  of  the  unwillingness  of  the  Arabs  and  their  anti-
Semitism. Benny Morris does not then re-visit to the two-state solution, and call 
for  the  establishment  of  a  Palestinian  state  but  rather  proposes  the  re-
annexation  of  the  West-Bank  by  Jordan.  That  proposition  is  as  old  as  the 
conflict  itself;  moreover  and  above  all,  he  thus  re-defines  the  borders  of 
Palestine and, in doing so not only does this deny the existence of a particular 
Palestinian identity and nation, in the pure tradition of revisionist Zionism, it also 
denies the right of that nation to sovereignty.
38 O'Leary, Brendan, “Debating partition: justifications and critiques”, op.cit.
39 Morris, Benny, The Birth of the Palestinian refugee problem, Cambridge 1989.
40 Morris, Benny, One state, two states, New Haven and London 2009.
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Partition is a pure product of the Zionist tradition, as both authors Itzhak 
Galnoor and Joseph Heller show. They tackle the politics and internal debates 
of the Zionist movement. Galnoor draws the history of the partition of Palestine 
and uses mainly secondary sources to look at the principal “internal decisions of 
the pre-1948 Zionist movement on the question of territory and boundaries and 
the  arguments  and positions underlying  these decisions”41 and,  as  J.  Heller 
demonstrates, Ben Gurion, who was head of the Zionist executive power, had 
his own ideas on the future of Zionism. Indeed, even if he was conscious that 
the Palestinians would not renounce their rights42, yearning for a Jewish State, 
he succeeded in manoeuvring in favour of partition43. Avi Shlaim, using primary 
sources, shows that the Zionists were not the only ones to praise pragmatism 
as he reveals the role of King Abdullah of Transjordan – a role however, that 
should not be over-estimated44 – in the partition and the outcome of the 1948 
war45.
Regarding  the  works  and  positions  cited  above,  it  is  interesting  to 
question the road taken by the PLO which,  after calling for the liberation of  
Palestine, then for a democratic and secular state, decided out of pragmatism – 
as it has acknowledged – to adopt the  phased programme or plan in 1974, a 
programme according to which the PLO would establish a Palestinian authority 
in any liberated territory of the Watan46. It was later to recognise resolution 242 
–  a  resolution  that  appeals  for  the  withdrawal  of  Israel  from the  Occupied 
Territories and calls for the institution of peace – in 1988: 
“The situation in our Palestinian homeland can bear no more waiting  
[…]  For  this  reason,  the  Palestine  National  Council,  taking  into  
consideration the circumstances of the Palestinians and the Israelis and  
the need for a spirit of tolerance between them, built its resolutions on  
foundations of realism”47. 
41 Galnoor, Itzhak, The Partition of Palestine. Decision crossroads in the Zionist Movement, New York 
1995, p.2.
42 Cited in Edward Said, ''There is no example in history, of a people saying we agree to renounce our 
country, let another people come and settle here and outnumber us.''
43 As we will see in Chapter III. 
44 Avi Shlaim was criticised for over-estimating the role of the King of Transjordan and by doing so  
minimising the other  factors  that  led to the partition, namely the political  context  created by the 
British in Palestine. See Simha Flapan and Ilan Pappé.
45 Shlaim, Avi, Collusion across the Jordan: King Abdullah, the Zionists and the partition of Palestine , 
New York 1988;  The Politics  of  Partition. King Abdullah,  the Zionists and Palestine 1921-1951, 
Abridged Ed. New York/Oxford 1990. 
46 Gresh, Alain, L'OLP, histoire et stratégie, Paris 1983.
47 Excerpt from Yasser Arafat's speech at the United Nations General Assembly in Geneva, on the 13 th 
December, 1988.
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It  was later to explicitly accept  the UN partition resolution and the two-state 
solution, with the Oslo Agreement in 1993.
Focusing only on those anti-partitionist discourses that propose Unitarian 
solutions in the framework of the Palestine question, we see that most of the 
arguments against partition that have been identified by the scholars working on 
partition  processes,  have  been  used  within  the  framework  of  the  Palestine 
question by the anti-partitionists. This is the case whether among the ranks of 
anti-partitionists  within  the  British  authorities,  or  in  the  bi-nationalist  circles 
within  the  Zionist  movement  or  the  Arab  Palestinian  resistance  movement 
during the mandate era and later, in a more constructive fashion, in the late 
1960s and early 1970s . 
Both  Susan  Lee  Hattis  and  Shalom  Ratzabi  focused  their  works  on 
examples  of  anti-partitionist  discourses  and  propositions  within  the  Zionist 
movement. Susan Lee Hattis wrote her doctoral dissertation on the bi-national 
idea during the British mandate. Her work was published in 1970, at a moment  
when a secular and democratic state was the official objective of the PLO. She 
concentrated her study on the different Jewish groups advocating a bi-national 
solution but also on the Yishuv's policy towards the partition proposals. S. Lee 
Hattis argues that pragmatism was a guiding principle in their thoughts.  Her 
study  provides  an  interesting  and  well-furnished  documentation  –based 
essentially on archives and correspondence – that is quite extensive, choosing 
to focus on telling the story without any critical analysis48. 
More than twenty years later, in 2002, in the heart of the second Intifada, the 
historian Shalom Ratzabi,  published what  was to  be the first  of  a  series of 
writings on the Zionist anti-partitionist groups –  Brit Shalom and  Ihud. Having 
himself found the idea of a bi-national entity as unrealistic, he wrote on what he 
defines  as  the  “radical  circle”  in  Brit  Shalom,  which  was  the  first  Zionist 
association  to  advocate  a  bi-national  society  in  1925.  Ratzabi  offers  a 
remarkable  analysis  of  the  roots  of  the  bi-national  idea  –  namely  eastern 
European nationalisms, and romanticism – and of the political and philosophical 
48 Lee Hattis, Susan, The Bi-national idea in Palestine during mandatory times, Haifa 1970. 
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debates within the association49. As they advocated a humanistic universalism, 
they rejected the nation-state model and the realpolitik that was at the core of 
the Zionist movement's policy.
Focusing on the actors of Zionist internal opposition to the partition plan, and 
particularly on Gershom Scholem, Walter Benyamin and Hannah Arendt,  the 
Israeli historian of Jewish thought Amnon Raz-Krakotzkin argues the possibility 
of a “constructive bi-nationalism” and introduces the idea of bi-nationalism as an 
element of the de-colonisation of Judaism from Zionism; by doing so, he may 
have written the most comprehensive book on Jewish bi-national thought. He 
indeed thinks outside the box and through his approach, he places the concepts 
of the negation of exile and the return to history at the core of Zionist thought as 
they serve to nationalise Judaism. He recalls that exile is a pillar of Judaism and 
that the idea that the Jews are outside history is a Christian protestant one. He 
then argues that  bi-nationalism is an alternative intellectual  frame, which he 
considers  closer  to  Judaism  than  messianic  politics  –  i.e.  Zionism.  Bi-
nationalism is  the  only  “future-oriented  vision”  and  the  only  alternative  that 
“enables one to consider oppressed people in an egalitarian orientation”50. Raz-
Krakotzkin  agrees  with  Hannah  Arendt,  who  supported  the  bi-national 
alternative  proposed  by  the  anti-partitionist  Zionists  in  the  1940s.  In  her 
fundamental article Zionism Reconsidered published in 1944,  first she strongly 
criticised what she called the assimilation of Zionism, that is to say the adoption 
by the Zionist movement of values that led to the exclusion of the Jews from 
their  countries,  and second,  the  nation-state  as  a  model  that  contained the 
seeds  of  exclusion  and  was  soon  to  be  out-dated  and  replaced  by 
confederations51. 
As mentioned above, since the late 1990s, there have been many works, 
debates and conferences52 and above all  hundreds of articles that share the 
distinction of presenting an anti-partitionist position. Among these, we could cite: 
49 Ratzabi, Shalom, Between Judaism and Zionism, the radical circle in Brit Shalom, Leyden 2002.
50 Raz-Krakotzkin, Amnon, Exil et souveraineté. Judaïsme, sionisme et pensée binationale, Paris 2007, 
p. 219.
51 Arendt, Hannah, “Zionism Reconsidered”, in Kohn, Jerome and Ron H. Feldman (eds.), The Jewish 
writings, Hannah Arendt, New York 2007, pp. 343-374. On Hannah Arendt's analysis of the nation-
state, read Kupiec, Anne, Martine Leibovici, Géraldine Muhlmann and Etienne Tassin (dir.), Hannah 
Arendt, crises de l'État -nation, Paris 2007. 
52 Jaffa–Tel Aviv (1996, 2008, 2009), Basel (1997), Bethlehem(2003), Bilbao (2003, 2004), Nazareth 
(2005), Geneva (2006), Bil’in (2007), Madrid (2007), London (2007), Haifa (2008, 2009), Toronto 
(2009), Boston (2009, 2010), Dimona (2010).
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Ghada Karmi's  Married to another man53; Ali Abunimah's  One Country, a bold  
proposal to end the Israeli-Palestinian impasse54 or Virginia Tiley's The one-
state solution: a breakthrough for peace in the Israeli-Palestinian deadlock55...  
Most of them present the conflict through a historical perspective, analyse the 
current situation and finish up finding that  the traditionally invoked two-state 
solution has either become inapplicable because of the facts on the ground or 
does not represent a just resolution of the conflict whilst not questioning the 
Israeli colonial and discriminatory policy56. 
To  sum  up,  numerous  works  exist  on  the  strategies  of  the  Zionist 
movement to reach partition, on the Arab and Palestinian refusal of partition and 
resistance to the British authorities and to the Zionist movement, others on the 
Unitarian  alternative  propositions  and  even  works  starting  from  the  anti-
partitionist  perspective;  however,  there  is  no  articulated  history  of  the  anti-
partitionist perspectives within the framework of the Palestine question. Such a 
comparative  study  of  the  history  of  anti-partitionism  is  what  enables  us  to 
identify the passage from Homeland to Statehood.  In effect, there seems to be 
no work that tackles the question of the passage from a strategy of liberation 
involving  a  Unitarian  discourse  to  the  demand  of  sovereignty  and  national 
independence in a given territory through the anti-partitionist  discourses that 
implicate the Zionist movement, the British authorities and the Arab-Palestinian 
milieu as well as the Palestinian liberation movement all together.
C. Methodology, sources and structure
Methodology
Whereas numerous works have been written on the Arab and Palestinian 
53 Karmi, Ghada, Married to another man, London 2007.
54 Abunimah, Ali, One Country, A bold proposal to end the Israeli-Palestinian impasse, New York 2006.
55 Tilley, Virginia, The one-state solution: A breakthrough for peace in the Israeli-Palestinian deadlock , 
Ann Arbor 2005.
56 We could cite among others, Ilan Pappe's contribution in Gaza in Crisis: Reflections on Israel’s War  
Against the Palestinians; Ghada Karmi's Married to another man; Ali Abunimah's One Country, a bold 
proposal  to  end  the  Israeli-Palestinian  impasse  or  Virginia  Tiley's  The  one-state  solution:  a  
breakthrough for peace in the Israeli-Palestinian deadlock...
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rejection of partition and of the creation of the State of Israel, only a few focus 
on the alternatives proposed by the Arabs and the Palestinians. An exception 
would be Alain Gresh who dedicated a chapter to the democratic and secular 
state advocated by the PLO in the late 1960s and early 1970s when analysing 
the strategies of the PLO57. In fact, we find ourselves, on the one hand, with 
Arabic works which are scarcely used as references - an example is the work of 
Kamal Al-Khalidi who wrote a history of the bi-national idea among the Arab 
Palestinians and tackled the idea within the Zionist movement, and is one of the 
rare attempts to discuss bi-nationalism and/or the one-state solution58; and, on 
the other hand, with  sources that are studied in Western scholarship from an 
angle  that  does  not  reveal  their  anti-partitionist  dimension.  Once  again,  we 
encounter  separation,  only  this  time  it  is  between  Arab  and  Western 
scholarships as well as a rupture in history.
Continuing  in  this  direction,  I  have  decided  to  focus  on  sources 
emanating from the ranks of the three main actors in Palestine at the time of the 
Balfour  Declaration.  Firstly,  the  British  authorities  –  the  Foreign  Office,  the 
Colonial Office and above all the Cabinet as the seat of decision-making – who 
issued  the  Balfour  Declaration  and  were  then  granted  the  mandate  over 
Palestine.  It was the British who promised recognition of independence to the 
Arabs and a Jewish national home to the Jews (through the Zionist movement) 
and who were  the  first  to  propose partition.  They introduced division  in  the 
Ottoman  Empire  and  the  principle  of  partition  in  the  Arab  territories  of  the 
Empire to eventually separate Palestine from the rest of the Arabs. 
Secondly,  the  bi-nationalists  within  the  Zionist  movement,  which  claimed 
Palestine in order to establish Jewish National autonomy and then a Jewish 
state. These, as we will see, were among the sole Zionists to acknowledge the 
existence and rights of the Arab Palestinians and aimed at establishing a bi-
national society – Jewish and Arab-Palestinian.
Thirdly,  the Palestinian Arab leaders and those in the resistance movement, 
who,  as  members  and  representatives  of  the  indigenous  population  in 
Palestine, opposed partition in all its forms. 
57 Gresh, Alain, OLP histoire et stratégies. Vers l'État palestinien, Paris 1983.
58 Al-Khalidi, Kamal, The Palestinian-Israeli conflict... what perspective?, Beirut 1998. (Arabic)
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As for the sources, Zionism, the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Palestinian-
Israeli  conflict  are among the most documented subjects and this in various 
fields  of  research,  history,  political  sciences,  sociology,  anthropology and so 
forth.  The history of  the  region  is  also,  however,  the  subject  of  competitive 
narratives. In their will to expand the debate over the question of Palestine and 
to open it up to the Jewish Zionist and non-Zionist circles in Europe and the 
United States, the anti-partitionists have written mostly in English, so that today 
one can say that the corpus is essentially in English. The rare key documents 
that were not translated into English are some of those treating internal debates 
within  the  Palestinian  national  movement  –  but  reading  Arabic,  these  are 
accessible  to  me  –  and  some  documents  in  Hebrew for  which  I  have  the 
logistics necessary for their analysis. 
As  outlined  above,  the  purpose  of  this  study  is  to  point  out  the 
persistence of the anti-partitionist perspectives. To be able to bring this study to 
a successful conclusion, I have taken the acceptance of partition as a historical 
point  of  reference,  and then researched and focused on the  anti-partitionist 
discursive moments on the road to the acceptance of partition. Secondly, I have 
researched those places where there has been a debate about partition leading 
to Unitarian propositions.
This study therefore, begins in 1915, when the separation of Palestine 
from the rest of the Arab territories that were part of the Ottoman Empire was 
first mentioned by the British. It ends in 1988, when the PLO finally accepted 
the principle  of  partition.  After  thirty years  of  British direct  implication in  the 
Middle  Eastern  arena,  the  finding  is  that  the  partitionists  within  the  British 
authorities and the Zionist movement succeeded in imposing their views. The 
British  quit  their  responsibilities  in  1947,  handed  over  their  mandate  to  the 
United Nations and decided to accept any decision it might make. And indeed, 
the UN was to decide on the partition of Palestine at the end of that year, and 
the  British  left  in  1948.  The  Zionists  succeeded  in  overcoming  the  anti-
partitionist voices and accepted partition, eventually proclaiming the creation of 
the state of Israel in 1948, which however, included part of what was supposed 
to  be  the  Arab  state  and  this  after  massive  ethnic  cleansing.   As  for  the 
Palestinians, they rejected the partition plan and continued to struggle for the 
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liberation of all of Palestine until 1988, when Yasser Arafat made his speech in 
Algiers,  a speech that was to be followed by another at  the United Nations 
General Assembly that took place the same year in Geneva and was referred to 
as the Historical compromise. Arafat, in the name of the PLO, recognised in a 
semi-explicit way the state of Israel and the partition59.
This is why I have chosen to structure the following dissertation into six thematic 
chapters  dealing  with  the  roots  of  partition  and separation;  the  international 
perspective and its evolution across time and alliances – from a unitarian vision 
to a partitionist one;  the Zionist drive to partition; the Palestinian perspective 
towards partition; the bi-nationalist perspective in the Zionist camp and finally 
the  rise  and  demise  of  the  democratic  and  secular  state  proposal  in  the 
Palestinian camp. 
Sources
The chapters (chapters I, II, III and parts of chapters IV and V) covering 
the anti-partitionist perspectives and the Unitarian propositions during the period 
of  the  British  mandate  are  supported  firstly  by  British  official  documents  – 
mainly from the Cabinet – and the correspondence dealing with the Hussein-
Mac-Mahon agreements, the Balfour Declaration, the partition and the Unitarian 
propositions  made  by  the  Zionist  opposition  and  the  Arab  and  Palestinian 
leaderships. Secondly, besides these archives, there are personal biographies, 
published and non-published correspondence – some of which is classified in 
the  Zionist  Archives  –  and  political  programmes  emanating  from Zionist  bi-
nationalist groups and personalities60. Third, there also are numerous secondary 
sources on Zionism, Palestinian nationalism and British policy in Palestine.
The chapters devoted to the anti-partitionist perspective after the United 
Nations resolution 181, are covered by studies analysing the political strategies 
of  the  Palestinian  leadership,  political  groups  and  the  Palestine  Liberation 
59 Muslih, Muhammad, “Towards coexistence: An analysis of the resolutions of the Palestine National  
Council”, Journal of Palestine Studies 19(4), Summer 1990, pp.3-29.
60 The members of  Brith Shalom and the  Ihud left numerous documents and correspondence, this is 
notably the case of  Martin Buber whose texts on the “Arab question” were translated and edited by 
Paul  Mendes  Flohr;  or  Judah  Leon  Magnes  whose  correspondence  was  edited  under  the  title  of 
Dissenter in Zion by Arthur Goren.
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Organisation as well as the political programmes of different Palestinian political 
parties and groups – the Charter and memorandums of the PLO, the Fatah, 
PFLP, PDFLP – since their inception. The Palestinians have also had a few 
encounters with Israeli anti-colonialists – most of them members of Matzpen61, 
the Socialist Organisation in Israel, a prominent but very marginal Israeli Marxist 
organisation; this is why I will also look into the documents that emanated from 
these meetings to assess the extent of the discussions and the role of Matzpen. 
As to the conclusion, which deals with a more contemporary period, it is  
useful to stress that writings referring to alternatives to the two-state solution 
have flourished since the late 1990's. Many position papers and analyses of the 
situation in Israel/Palestine by both Israelis and Palestinians are available on 
the Internet. These documents are opinion pieces will be considered as primary 
sources. I will also use a set of interviews of Palestinian and Israeli scholars and 
community organisers in favour of a one-state solution, conducted by the film-
maker  and  Reader  at  the  University  of  East  London, Eyal  Sivan  in  the 
framework of a project on the “Common State”. 
Structure
The first chapter argues that three major documents have contributed to 
seal the future of Palestine (the McMahon-Hussein correspondence, the Sykes-
Picot agreement and the Balfour Declaration). We find out first, that the seeds 
of  partition  in  the  Middle  East  were  contained  in  the  text  of  these  three 
documents and that the McMahon-Hussein correspondence already introduced 
separation of Palestine and Lebanon from the rest of the region. Second, the 
Balfour Declaration did definitely plant the separation principle in the region and 
officially introduce it in Palestine, moreover, it established the partition of Syria. 
Chapter Two argues that the mandate for Palestine which on the one 
hand re-affirmed the Balfour Declaration and on the other hand was officially 
aimed at preparing the Arabs of Palestine for self-determination, sanctioned the 
61 Matzpen literally means the Compass. Matzpen was an anti-capitalist and anti-Zionist organisation, 
founded in Israel in 1962 and stayed active until the 1980s. Matzpen was also the name of the monthly 
publication of the Organisation. The documents and writings of Matzpen can be found on the website 
of the Organisation: http://98.130.214.177/index.asp?p=100 
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partition of Syria. Furthermore, the British simultaneously implemented policies 
leading to (the emergence of the conditions for) the partition of Palestine and 
advocated  a  unitary  state.  Torn  between  partition  and  a  unitary  state  as 
solutions, they appealed to the Americans and the international instances that 
finally  advocated territorial partition – but economic union – on ground of the  
incompatibility of the nationalist demands in presence. From then on, the United 
States would replace G.B on the Middle East scene and they would contribute 
to the imposition of partition as the only solution that could bring in peace. 
Chapter Three argues that separation has been a guiding principle in 
Zionist ideology and that this has contributed to the emergence of partition as a 
solution to the Palestine question. Though the leading idea had always been to 
establish  a  Jewish  State  in  all  of  Palestine  (officially  voiced in  the  Biltmore 
programme in 1942 through the demand of a unitary state), pragmatism and 
tactics pushed the Zionist leadership to accept partition. However, we find out 
first, that nominal acceptance of partition has not led to its implementation and 
second,  that  the  debate  over  Greater  Israel  would  re-emerge  in  the  official  
discourse notably with the 1967 war. The latter would then be challenged by the 
two-state movement among the Zionist left-wing which developed a discourse 
of peace through separation.
Chapter  Four  shows  that  the  Palestinians  have  been  torn  between 
Qawmiyya  and  Wataniyya  but  had to  adapt  to  the  de facto partition  of  the 
Middle East by espousing Wataniyya as a way to struggle against the foreign 
powers. It argues that the Palestinians have been consistent in their rejection of 
the partition of Syria first, then of Palestine to the point that they were ready to 
establish a unitary state (based on proportionality provided Jewish immigration 
and purchase of land would cease) including the Jews. 
The Palestinians later rejected the UN Partition plan but consented – thanks to  
an effort by some UN members – to offer a unitary state in Palestine. In vain, as 
Israel was created in May 1948 leading the Palestinian leadership in exile to 
proclaim the Government of All Palestine. 
Chapter Five presents the bi-national idea as it was developed by the 
advocates of spiritual Zionism. It argues that immediately after the issuance of 
the Balfour Declaration, an opposition has grown within the Zionist movement, 
an opposition that rejected separatism and the dialectics of majority/minority as 
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developed by mainstream Zionists and advocated cooperation with the Arabs in 
order to establish a bi-national society and state. We find out that this opposition 
based its thought on Jewish morals and as such their discourse provides a new 
anti-partitionist argument. However, the bi-nationalists' failure to acknowledge 
Zionism  as  a  settler  colonial  movement  compromised  their  chance  of  an 
agreement  with  the  Palestinians.  Furthermore,  once Israel  was born  the  bi-
nationalist option declined.
Chapter 6 shows that even after the adoption of the two-state solution by 
the  United  Nations and  the  Nakba,  the  Palestinians continued  to  reject  the 
partition of Palestine notably through the development of the debate over the 
Kiyan.  I then  argue  that,  recognising  the  facts  on  the  ground,  notably  the 
existence  of  an  Israeli  Jewish  community  and  inspired  by  the  revolutionary 
processes in the Third World, the Palestinians elaborated a one-statist solution 
under  the  slogan  “democratic  state”.  In  this  shift  in  their  position,  the 
Palestinians also called the Israeli Jews to join them in their struggle and moved 
closer with some small Israeli anti-Zionist groups such as Matzpen. However, 
the  facts  on  the  ground and the  evolution  of  the  Palestine  Question  at  the 
international  level  led  the  PLO  to  adopt  a  phased  programme  with  the 
immediate objective of establishing a Palestinian national autonomy and then 
state over part of Palestine. Then, the temporary became permanent in 1988 
when the PLO made its “historic compromise”.
The  conclusion  examines  the  outcome  of  the  PLO's  acceptance  of 
partition and the two-state solution. It also shows that the reluctance of Israel to 
recognise  national  rights  to  the  Palestinians  translated  into  an  exacerbated 
colonisation policy and occupation, to the point that it created an inextricable 
situation  of  extreme  intermingling  of  the  territories  and  populations  making 
unviable any Palestinian national sovereignty impossible to achieve.
Then, I argue first, that partition could never be a valid solution for the Palestine 
question.  Indeed,  the  colonial  fact  has  come  to  invalidate  the  geographical 
criteria and contributed to bring  back the Palestine Question (with the right of 
return,  the  question  of  the  Palestinians  in  Israel  at  the  centre  of  the 
questioning). Second, that this situation had led to the resurgence of an anti-
partitionist  discourse,  which  highlights  the  persistence  of  anti-partitionism in 
Palestine/Israel. 
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Chapter One: The Origins of partition and separation in 
Palestine 1882-1918
Palestine,  within  the  borders  drawn  by  the  British  and  the  French 
between  1916  and  1922  –  from  the  Jordan  River  in  the  east,  to  the 
Mediterranean in the west, had been a province of the Ottoman Empire for four 
centuries. However, in 1922, the League of Nations would not only sanction the 
dismantlement  of  the  Ottoman  Empire  but  also  the  division  of  the  Arab 
territories and above all the partition of Syria. The latter was to leave space for 
four Arab countries under western influence: Syria, Lebanon, Transjordan and 
Palestine.  Some  fifteen  years  later,  invoking  partition  as  a  “problem-solving 
device”, Great Britain would propose the partition of Palestine into two states, a 
Jewish one and an Arab one. The purpose of this chapter is to investigate the 
process of division of the Arab Ottoman world and the partition of Greater Syria,  
and it  argues that  in these events lie  the seeds of  separation,  division and 
ultimately partition.
And indeed, we can observe three moments that were to lead to the 
partition of Syria, which will  punctuate this chapter. Firstly the dismantlement 
followed by the installation of Western zones of interest according to artificial 
boundaries, secondly, the partition of Syria against the will  of the indigenous 
people  and  thirdly,  the  introduction  of  a  separatist  settler  movement  into 
Palestine, leading to the extreme polarisation of the two communities (Zionists 
and Arabs). 
These moments find their significance in three major events. Firstly, the 
McMahon-Hussein correspondence and British pledges to the Arabs. Secondly, 
the French-British reorganisation of the Arab territories that were part  of  the 
Ottoman Empire and their self-attribution of zones of influence. Last but not 
least, the Balfour Declaration and the British pledge to the Zionist movement 
that was to leave space for a new actor on the Arab Palestinian scene. 
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A. Arabism and Zionism
The  nineteenth  century  introduced  political,  economic  and  social 
developments  all  over  the  world  and  the  Ottoman Empire  would  not  come 
through it unscathed. The Ottoman government would also implement liberal 
reforms – the Tanzimat 1– aiming at the “modernisation” of the empire. With the 
Tanzimat, the Ottoman government introduced decentralisation as well as new 
landowning laws, which enhanced the role and consequently the powers of the 
notables in the Ottoman provinces. At the same time, western influence was 
growing in the Levant and more generally in the territories of the Empire, this 
influence showed itself in the development of missionary schools and the use of 
foreign languages particularly French2. 
The  measures  taken  also  favoured  the  development  of  ethnicity  and 
indeed distinctions between Arabs, and other ethnic groups of the Empire, and 
the Turks. Whilst one could note the growth of an ethnic consciousness, there 
was,  strictly  speaking,  still  no  sign  of  Arab  nationalism  and  even  less  of 
separatism. These distinctions became dissensions with the arrival of the Young 
Turks – who had overthrown Sultan Abdul Hamid – and their unilateral will for 
re-centralisation,  unification  and  secularisation  of  the  Empire3.  In  concrete 
terms,  the  Young  Turks  government  established  a  policy  of  preferential 
treatment  for  the  Turks.  The  latter  was  part  of  a  process  identified  as 
“Turkification” by some scholars of the field4. As part of the Turkification policy, 
the new government decided to use the Turkish language in diplomatic and 
administrative fields and to replace all Arabs in governmental positions across 
the Empire with Turks.5. 
1 Stands for “reorganisation”, this reorganisation process started in 1839 and ended in 1876 with the  
adoption of the constitution. One of the first measures was the establishment of equality for Muslims 
and non-Muslims alike before the law. The reorganisation concerned sectors as different as finance, 
justice, military, education etc...
2 Laurens, Henry, L'Orient arabe. Arabisme et Islamisme de 1798 à 1945, Paris 2000, p. 109.
3 Khader, Bishara, L'Europe et la Palestine des croisades à nos jours, Louvain la neuve 1999, p.99.
4 This Turkish nationalist move was, according to scholars Muhammad Muslih and Sukru Hanioglu,  
already  present  in  the  Young  Turks  circles  long  before  their  empowerment,  as  the  private  
correspondence of some of the leaders shows. Muslih, Muhammad, “The rise of local nationalism in 
the Arab East”, pp. 167-188 & Sukru Hanioglu, “The Young Turks and the Arabs before the revolution 
of  1908”,  pp.  31-49,  in  Khalidi,  Rashid,  Lisa Anderson,  Muhammad Muslih and  Reeva S.Simon 
(eds.), The Origins of Arab nationalism, New York 1991. 
5 The reader  should  know that  there  are  polemics  over  the  term of  Turkification,  the  latter  is  for  
example not used by the scholar Ernest Dawn.
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As a result of the Turkification policy, by the end of the 19 th century and 
early 20th century, movements demanding the autonomy of the Arab provinces 
emerged. The “earliest significant manifestation of political Arabism”6 was the 
Ottoman  Arab  Brotherhood,  based  in  Constantinople,  which  was  soon 
suppressed  by  the  Ottoman  authorities.  However,  other  movements  and 
newspapers were set up and they were followed by the introduction of texts in 
schoolbooks that started disseminating Arab nationalist ideas7. Even though the 
Young Turks outlawed autonomist Arab groups and associations, on the eve of 
World War I,  the official  position of the Arab nationalists  within the Ottoman 
Empire was to continue considering the Ottoman Empire as the political unified 
framework within which they longed for equal rights and duties. 
An  event,  however,  introduced  a  qualitative  change.  An  organisation 
based in Egypt, the Ottoman Decentralisation Organisation (ODO), convened a 
meeting in Paris on June 21st, 19138. This meeting was the occasion for  Arab 
nationalists to consider the need for reforms within the Ottoman empire and 
demand 1) equal rights with the Turks and as such to exercise their political 
rights  and participate  in  the  central  administration,  2)  the  recognition  of  the 
Arabic language in the Ottoman parliament, 3) the implementation of military 
duty  within  the  region  of  the  candidates  for  military  service.  They  also 
expressed sympathy for  the  demands of  the  Ottoman Armenian reformists9. 
Their position was not only motivated by Arabism, but they also demonstrated a 
nationalist vision as a general political principle. However, even then, they were 
still demanding equal rights within the framework of the Ottoman Empire 
The discourse on equal rights rapidly showed its limits, and was replaced 
by a far more radical one when Turkish repression increased in 1914, and when 
the Ottoman Empire entered into war as a German Ally.  This discourse was 
theorised  and  implemented  by  secret  societies  amongst  which  the  most 
significant  were  Al-Fatat (the  Young  Arab Society),  founded  around 1911 in 
Paris by Syrian, Lebanese and Palestinians students and Al-'Ahd (the Covenant 
6 Dawn, Ernest, “The rise of Arabism in Syria”, Middle East Journal 16(2), Spring 1962, pp. 145-168.
7 Dawn, Ernest, “The formation of pan-Arab ideology in the Inter-war years”, International Journal of  
Middle East Studies 20(1), February 1988, pp. 87-91.
8 Muslih,  Muhammad,  “The  rise  of  local  nationalism in  the  Arab  east”,  in  Khalidi,  Rashid,  Lisa 
Anderson, Muhammad Muslih and Reeva S.Simon (eds.), The Origins of Arab nationalism,  op.cit., p. 
168.
9 Carré, Olivier, Le mouvement national palestinien, Paris 1977, pp. 16-17.
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Society mostly composed of army officers). Both societies were later to play a 
significant role in the establishment of the first Arab government in Damascus10. 
All the changes depicted above, together with the war, shook the nature of the 
government as well as the loyalty of the different ethnic and religious groups 
that made up the Empire. And even though it is clear that most Arabs remained 
loyal to the Empire during the war11, this situation would eventually lead to the 
demand of autonomy as a first step towards independence. No concept, neither 
that of nationhood, nor that of sovereignty as applied at the Ottoman empire 
level – in the sense of a sovereign Ottoman nation – could prevent the coming 
dismemberment12.
Parallel to that, in Eastern Europe, in the late 1890's and early 1900's 
nationalism was emerging amongst minorities. As a matter of fact, following the 
emergence of nationalism(s) in Eastern Europe and drawing inspiration from 
them, Zionism emerged as the Jewish nationalism. It was first advanced and 
theorised by intellectuals13 and was far  from raising  a  consensus within  the 
Jewish populations of Europe. Indeed, this movement, which sought a solution 
to the “Jewish question” (anti-Semitism), and which, it was thought, would put a 
stop to the feared assimilation of Jews in ‘host countries’, was seen with rather 
a suspicious eye.
However, the Zionist movement was starting to organise and in 1897, the 
First  Zionist  Congress  took  place,  giving  an  official  stamp  to  Zionism  and 
appealing for the establishment of a home in Palestine. The congress founded 
the  Zionist  Organisation  (which  was  later  to  become  the  World  Zionist 
Organisation) and adopted the Basel programme: 
“Zionism aims  at  establishing  for  the  Jewish  people  a  publicly  and  
legally assured home in Palestine. For the attainment of this purpose,  
the Congress considers the following means serviceable:
1.  The promotion of  the settlement of  Jewish agriculturists,  artisans,  
and tradesmen in Palestine.
10 Dawn, Ernest, “The rise of Arabism in Syria”, op.cit., pp.145-168; Muslih, Muhammad,  “The rise of 
local nationalism in the Arab east”, op.cit., pp. 167-188.
11 Ibid.
12 Muslih,  Muhammad, “Arab politics and the rise of Palestinian nationalism”,  Journal of  Palestine 
Studies 16(4), Summer 1987, pp. 77-94. 
This dismemberment was not only due to internal threats, on the contrary, one should not dismiss the 
“external threats” and the role of the Western Colonial Powers in the decline of the Ottoman Empire. 
On that subject read: Fieldhouse, D.K, Western Imperialism in the Middle East 1914-1958, op.cit.
13 Following the constant developed by Miroslav Hroch in his essay: “From national movement to the 
fully formed nation: the nation-building process in Europe”, in Balakrishnan, Gopal (ed.),  Mapping 
the nation, London 1999, pp. 78-97.
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2. The federation of all Jews into local or general groups, according to  
the laws of the various countries.
3. The strengthening of the Jewish feeling and consciousness.
4. Preparatory steps for the attainment of those governmental grants  
which are necessary to the achievement of the Zionist purpose”14.
Zionism and its programme raised polemics and anxiety among many 
Jews,  especially  orthodox  and  socialist  Jews.  Zionism  sought  not  only  to 
represent all Jews, but it would erase their historical significance and Jewish 
explanations.  Secular Jews who provided an example for the socialist group, 
the Bund15, rejected Zionism as a solution to the “Jewish question”. As in the 
case of Arabs who consider the Christians and the Muslims as part of the same 
national group, the Bundists refused to establish a dichotomy between the Jews 
and the non-Jews and preferred fighting for their rights as a national minority 
within  their  countries.  In  that,  the  Bund  emerged  as  an  anti-separatist 
movement and for that purpose, they proposed to integrate the paradigm of 
cultural autonomy in diaspora instead of territoriality, which they refused, as it 
would create an ethnic and territorial separation – while minimizing the class 
struggle.  The  Bundists  also  argued  that  Zionism,  which  by  essence  is 
inseparable from the territory, would only recreate in Palestine the same models 
of exploitation that existed everywhere else.
As  for  orthodox  Jews,  large  parts  of  them  saw  Zionism  as  false 
messianism and, as such, as a threat to their redemption.
In  fact,  the idea of  a Jewish colonisation of  Palestine was not  very popular 
among the Jewish communities and, whilst appeals for immigration to Palestine 
were indeed made, these were rarely followed. Moreover, the majority of the 
Jews already present in Palestine had come there for religious purposes. And 
members of the Jewish community in Palestine were themselves rather wary. 
“The Neturei  Karta,  a Hassidic  sect  whose men wear the traditional  
long  beards and ear ringlets, were the first Jews to move outside the  
walls of Jerusalem in the 19th century. Like the Arabs, they viewed the  
first aliyah (wave) of Jewish immigrants in the 1880's with suspicion”16. 
14 The Basel Programme can be found on the Jewish Virtual Library: 
http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Zionism/First_Cong_&_Basel_Program.html 
15 Algemeyner Yidisher Arbeter Bund in Lyte, Poyln un Russland in Yiddish the language used by most 
of the Jewish workers in Western Europe and the Russian Empire. The General Jewish Labour Bund 
of Lithuania, Poland and Russia  was a secular Jewish socialist party in the Russian Empire, active 
between 1897 and 1920.
16 Glass, Charles, “Jews against Zion: Israeli-Jewish anti-Zionism”, Journal of Palestine Studies 5(1/2), 
Autumn 1975 – Winter 1976, pp. 56-81.
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Anti-Semitism  and  the  pogroms  in  Russia  brought  further  support 
however, to the Zionist movement. From the end of the 19th Century and under 
the influence of Moses Hess, Léon Pinsker, Bernard Lazare and Theodor Herzl,  
Zionism  developed  into  a  national  political  and  settlement  project17. In  Der 
Judenstaat -  The  State  of  the  Jews –  published  in  1896,  Theodor  Herzl 
developed his idea of Zionism and formulated a programme with the aim of 
gaining political sovereignty for the Jews. 
From  then  on,  Zionism  was  to  launch  its  offensive  and  appeal  to 
traditional colonial powers for support, such as Great Britain and France but 
also the Sultan. However, the latter refused to support the Zionist enterprise18. 
More than a national Homeland, the Zionist movement held as an objective the 
establishment of a state as argued by  Avi Shlaim : “from the Basel congress 
onward the clear and consistent aim of the Zionist movement is to create a state 
in Palestine for the Jewish People”19. And indeed, creating their own institutions 
or  a  state  in  the  state  was  part  of  the  strategy  developed  by  the  Zionist  
movement as the basis for its control over Palestine. At the turn of the century, 
the World Zionist Organisation had founded three bodies that were to form the 
basis of the future state and contribute to its development from its inception. 
First, the Jüdische Kolonial Bank – the Jewish Colonial Bank – in 1899, that 
was to become Bank Leumi LeIsrael (Israel National Bank). Second, the Keren 
Kayemet LeIsrael – the Jewish National Fund – in 1901, whose role was, and 
still  is,  to  “purchase,  take on lease,  or  in  exchange,  or  receive on lease or 
otherwise  lands”  in  Palestine  and the  surrounding areas for  the  purpose of 
“settling Jews on such lands”20.Finally, the Keren Hayesod – the Reconstruction 
Fund - which is in charge of the nationalisation of real estate21.
17 Zionism marked a break in history and in Jewish tradition. It developed parallel to nationalisms in 
Eastern Europe and it took inspiration from them. Among its objectives lied the modernisation and 
secularisation of Judaism, even the term “Israel” was to be emptied of its traditional sense, from a 
congregation, it became the name of the country.
18 Benbassa, Esther, “Le sionisme dans l'empire ottoman à l'aube du 20è siècle”, Vingtième siècle, revue  
d'histoire 24, Oct-Dec 1989, pp.69-80.
19 Shlaim, Avi, The Iron Wall, Israel and the Arab World, London 2001, p.3; Bose, Sumantra, Contested  
Lands, op.cit., p.212.
20
21 Catherine, Lucas, Palestine. La dernière colonie?, Berchem 2003,  p. 34.
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B.  Ottoman  and  Arab  reactions  to  the  Zionist  settlement 
enterprise
Despite  its efforts, the Zionist movement did not succeed in creating a 
mass movement. Nevertheless, Ottoman administrations had been trying since 
the  early  1880s  to  ban  the  immigration  of  foreign  Jewish  entrepreneurs  to 
Palestine  –  and  to  encourage  them to  immigrate  to  other  provinces  of  the 
Ottoman Empire and become Ottoman subjects – however, as the newcomers 
kept their nationality, and by virtue of capitulations, this legislation was difficult to 
implement22. As for the Palestinian notables, they looked unfavourably on the 
new  Zionist  immigrants  whom  they  saw  as  competing  with  them  on  an 
economic  and  social  level.  Palestinians  complained  to  the  Ottoman 
authorities23, and the Governor of Nazareth for example considered the newly 
immigrating  Jews  as  having  separatist  tendencies.  However,  the  authorities 
proved to be inefficient in their struggle against Zionist immigration24. This lack 
of efficiency attracted further grievances against the Ottoman administration, as 
well as distrust and hostility.
Muhammad Muslih traces the first acts of violence between Palestinian 
Arabs  and  Jews  to  1886,  in  Petah  Tikva  where  Palestinian  peasants  and 
villagers were prevented grazing access “to the neighbouring Muslim village of 
Al  Yahudiyya”25.  At  the  same  time,  there  were  attempts  to  stop  Jewish 
immigration and land sales. In 1897, Muhammad Tahir al-Hussayni26, the mufti 
of Jerusalem, put in place a commission whose role was to be vigilant regarding 
land sales and prevent as many as possible. 
Nevertheless,  the  second  wave  of  immigration  started  moving  into 
villages and functioning in closed exclusively Jewish circles27. Thus, it became 
clear  that  the  immigrants  were  no  longer  pilgrims  or  Jews  immigrating  for 
personal reasons and willing to be part of the Empire, so from then on, the 
22 Benbassa, Esther, “Le sionisme dans l'empire ottoman à l'aube du 20è siècle”, op.cit.,  pp.69-80.
23 Caplan, Neil, Futile diplomacy. Early Arab-Zionist negotiations attempts, 1913-1931, London 1983, p 
14. 
24 Carré, Olivier, Le mouvement national palestinien, op.cit., p. 18.
25 Muslih, Muhammad, The Origins of Palestinian nationalism, op.cit., p. 71.
26 Father of Kamel and Amin al-Hussayni.
27 This has  been identified as  being one of the main characteristics  of  the second wave of Zionist 
immigration between 1903 and 1914.
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Ottoman  administration,  as  well  as  the  Arabs,  became  hostile  to  Jewish 
immigration.
The political “instability” of the Empire internally made it unable to face external 
factors such as British and French colonial ambitions and Zionist aspirations at 
the  same time.  In  1913,  the  Committee  of  Union and Progress (CUP) took 
power  over  the  Empire  and their  attitude to  Zionist  efforts  in  Palestine  was 
marked  with  indifference28.  Facing  more  important  threats,  such  as  western 
seizures of the empire's territories, the CUP was considering various responses. 
Hence,  they even  made arrangements  with  the  Zionist  movement  aimed at 
abolishing  the  immigration  laws  and  shutting  down  three  anti-Zionist 
newspapers – al-Karmil in Haifa, Filastin in Jaffa, and al-Muqtabas in Damascus 
– in exchange for money. 
No organised protest  movement  against  Zionism emerged in  the  late 
1890's and early 1900's, however, Zionism was not unnoticed and resistance 
quickly developed. Indeed, it first started with resistance against land purchase 
by Jews. On June 24th 1891, a group of notables from Jerusalem sent a letter of 
protest  to  the  Ottoman Government  in  Istanbul  requesting  that  the  Russian 
Jews be banned from purchasing Palestinian land and immigrating to Palestine 
as they “behave like real settlers”29. 
In  Le réveil de la nation arabe in 1905, Najib Azuri, a Christian Arab, made a 
quite premonitory observation:
“the awakening of the Arab nation, and the latent effort of the Jews to  
reconstitute, on a very large scale, the ancient kingdom of Israel. These  
two movements are destined to fight continually until one is victorious  
over  the  other.  The  fate  of  the  entire  world  will  hinge  on  the  final  
outcome  of  this  struggle  between  two  peoples  representing  
contradictory principles”30.
Numerous examples of protests against Zionist activities exist, many pointing to 
the Zionists' communitarian ways. A significant account can be found in a letter 
written by the governor of Nazareth in 1910, in which he remarks that the Jews 
tend to live apart and possess their own banks, “ in each village, they have their 
28 Muslih, Muhammad, The Origins of Palestinian nationalism, op.cit., p. 84.
29 Catherine,  Lucas,  Palestine.  La  dernière  colonie?,  op.cit.,  p.  32;  Carré,  Olivier,  Le  mouvement  
national palestinien, op.cit., p.18.
30 Quoted in Neil Caplan,  Futile diplomacy. Early Arab-Zionist negotiations attempts, p. 12; Muslih, 
Muhammad, The Origins of Palestinian nationalism, op.cit., pp. 77-78, Carré, Olivier, Le mouvement  
national Palestinien, op.cit., pp.19-20.
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own  administration  and  school.  They  have  their  own  flag  and  deceive  the 
Ottoman administration concerning their true intentions”31. 
The reaction among Arab intellectuals was inconsistent. Some thought 
that  the  Zionist movement  was  targeting  economic  sectors  other  than 
agriculture,  on  which  Palestine  essentially  relied,  and  that  they  would  be 
unsuccessful.  Others  thought  that  it  would  bring  tools  permitting  the 
development of  Palestine and enable the region to enter the modern world. 
Others again foresaw a real economic and political danger for the empire and 
the Arab nation. The latter usually based their arguments on the Jews' lack of  
loyalty  to  the  Empire  and/or  were  fed  by Arabism,  Palestinian  patriotism or 
religion32. 
These views were conveyed in books and local or national newspapers 
such as  Al-Ahram in Cairo, or later in  al Karmil, in Haifa and  Filastin in Jaffa, 
and they sometimes showed real perspicacity33, at least when they were not 
shut down by the Ottoman authorities. 
The years preceding the First World War witnessed the deepening of the 
Turkish/Arab antagonism and the exercise of a severe repression towards the 
Arab  nationalists.  The  willingness  of  the  Ottoman  government  to  depose 
Sayyed Hussein bin Ali, the Sharif of Mecca, only made the gap between the 
Hashemites and the Turks wider. Parallel to this growing hostility, a more sound 
opposition to Zionism and its settlement policy also started to develop. 
C.   The  First  World  War  and  the  McMahon-Hussein   
correspondence   
In February 1914, Sharif Hussein's son, Abdullah, stopped in Cairo and 
31 Catherine, Lucas, Palestine. La dernière colonie?, op.cit., p.32
32 Muslih, Muhammad, The Origins of Palestinian nationalism, op.cit.
33  In his study on Palestinian identity, Rashid Khalidi shows quite exhaustively the impact of Zionism in 
the Arabic press and in the intellectual milieux. As we have seen above, commentators did not show a 
united position towards Zionism, some of them praising the movement for its achievements and level  
of development others noticing the danger in it. 
47
on that occasion, paid a visit to Horatio Herbert Kitchener, a British agent34. The 
discussion  broached  the  subject  of  the  Arab-Turkish  relations  and  Abdullah 
confided in Kitchener and Ronald Storrs,  who was the Oriental  Secretary in 
Cairo, about the troubled relations and the eventuality of an Arab revolt in the 
Hejaz. He then tried to enquire about the position of the British Government 
regarding a possible Arab revolt against the Ottoman authorities.  Kitchener's 
first response was dictated by caution and was at first negative. Indeed, the 
British were still willing to continue cordial relations with the Ottoman authorities. 
However, the Ottomans' rallying to Germany during the First World War gave 
the British the pretext to break away and consider supporting an Arab revolt in 
order to help defeat Germany and its allies. 
Besides opening the way to the Arab war effort on the side of the allies,  
Abdullah's discussion with British officials in Cairo would introduce the Western 
powers on the Middle Eastern scene and provide them with a pre-eminent role 
on that same scene. Thus, it would pave the way to the reconfiguration of the 
Arab territory previously under Ottoman Rule. 
This  section  examines the  occurrence of  the  partition  principle  in  the 
McMahon-Hussein correspondence and its corollary anti-partition in the Sharif's 
discourse about Arab unity. 
The Ottoman government, allied to Germany, was expecting the Arab tribes to 
join them and declare their participation in the conflict as part of the Ottoman 
war effort and most of them did. However, Sharif Hussein was avoiding taking 
sides as long as he could and he sent his son, Faisal, to Istanbul to confront the  
Grand Vizir.  On that occasion, while he was staying in Damascus, the latter 
became acquainted with the secret societies  al-Fatat and  al-'Ahd.  They held 
numerous discussions about the situation of the Arabs and the possibilities of 
organising a revolt to gain independence but also about their lack of confidence 
towards the Imperial powers. 
Indeed, Europe had become more present in the region as a confirmed 
colonial  power  (North  Africa had been amputated from the Ottoman Empire 
through the establishment of protectorates, mandates or simply by colonisation) 
34 Lord Kitchener was an officer of the British Army. He had been appointed Consul General in Egypt 
from 1911 to 1914, at which date he became member of the Cabinet as the Secretary of State for War, 
until his death in 1916. As a member of the Royal Engineers, he had  been assigned to a mapping-
survey of Palestine in the early 1870s. 
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and  through  economic  and  cultural  penetration  –  this  had  in  a  way  been 
facilitated by the reforms implemented by the Turks. The French and British had 
already  started  to  develop  their  influence  through  education  –  numerous 
schools were opened, which were mostly attended by Christians – and through 
the development of literary circles, and societies35. Moreover, the French and 
the British had been discussing the possibility of an Ottoman collapse, in which 
case they would seize the opportunity to expand their respective empires and 
secure their  interests in the area, notably the route through Palestine to the 
Suez Canal for the British36. 
During the encounters with Faisal,  they found out from him about the 
contacts made by Sharif Hussein with the British Government's envoy in Cairo. 
Faisal  shared  with  them  his  reservations  and  doubts  concerning  British 
intentions.  This  piece of  news allowed the members of  the two societies to 
come up with the basis on which an agreement with the British Government 
could be made. For them, if such an agreement was concluded, the Arabs had 
to get the highest level of guarantees from British authorities. They were well 
aware that the British – as well as other imperial powers such as France and 
Russia – were keen to set foot in the Middle East and expand their empires or 
at  least  their  zone  of  influence  and  they  were  conscious  that  the  principle 
obstacle  for  them  was  the  Ottoman  Empire.  Whilst  wanting  to  gain 
independence, they were also unwilling to become pawns in the hands of other 
powers. Following that encounter, al-Fatat and al-'Ahd drafted a document that 
was later to be known as the Damascus Protocol and they presented it to Faisal 
on his way back from Constantinople. The text made clear the borders of the 
Arab territory then under Ottoman rule : 
“The  recognition  by  Great  Britain  of  the  independence  of  the  Arab  
countries lying within the following frontiers: 
North: The Line Mersin-Adana to parallel 37N. Thence along the line  
Birejek-Urfa-Mardin-Midiat-Jazirat  (Ibn  'Unear)-Amadia to  the  Persian  
frontier; 
East: The Persian frontier down to the Persian Gulf; 
South: The Indian Ocean (with the exclusion of Aden, whose status was  
to be maintained).
35 Laurens, Henry, L'Orient arabe. Arabisme et Islamisme de 1798 à 1945, op.cit., p. 109.
36 Fieldhouse, D.K, Western Imperialism in the Middle East 1914-1958, op.cit., pp. 45-47. 
Plans  were  being  elaborated  since  1912  which  viewed  new  configuration  for  the  Middle  East,  
however, there was still no discussion about the spoils. Pappe, Ilan,  A history of modern Palestine:  
one land two peoples, Cambridge 2004, p. 65. 
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West: The Red Sea and the Mediterranean Sea back to Mersin. 
The abolition of all  exceptional privileges granted to foreigners under  
the Capitulations. 
The conclusion of a defensive alliance between Great Britain and the  
future independent Arab State. 
The grant of economic preference to Great Britain”37.
This document was drafted while  the Ottoman government was launching a 
harsh repression against the Arab nationalist leaders, some of whom were even 
executed. 
After Kitchener's return to England, Henry McMahon was appointed High 
Commissioner in Egypt in January 1915. From then on, the negotiations that  
had started between the Hashemites and Kitchener continued with McMahon in 
the form of a correspondence. Sharif Hussein sent his first letter to McMahon in 
July 14, 1915. It made the terms of the agreement quite clear: England was to 
acknowledge the independence of the Arab countries. Then, it gave a rather 
precise idea of the territories that would be concerned by the agreement – these 
were the exact same boundaries as those proposed in the Damascus Protocol.
According to the terms of Sharif Hussein, the Arabs – the whole of the 
Arab nation – were longing to gain independence and sought the support of the 
British Empire in this matter as well as recognition of future Arab independence. 
Britain had a month to reply to his letter, otherwise, Sharif Hussein would 
not be bound by previous exchanges and the Arabs would proceed as they saw 
fit:
“if this period should lapse before they receive an answer, they reserve  
for themselves complete freedom of action. Moreover we (the Sharif's  
family) will consider ourselves free in word and deed from the bonds of  
our previous declaration which we made through Ali Eff.”38.
However, Britain was not willing to tie its hands, and so, in his answer on 
August  30th 1915,  Henry  McMahon  tried  to  postpone  the  discussion  about 
borders. Instead, he chose to gratify the Sharif with pompous titles and to put 
him in his place by suggesting that the Sharif did not represent all the Arabs 
37 Quoted in: Antonius, Georges,  The Arab Awakening, Beirut 1938,/London 1985, pp. 157-158. It is 
noteworthy to stress that George Antonius was a Greek Orthodox Christian who had been educated at  
the King's College in Cambridge. During WWI, he acted as a press censor and was in contact with  
British Intelligence.
38 National Archives, CAB 24/89, “Copy of letter from Lord Curzon to Colonel Cornwallis, covering 
copies of correspondence between the Sherif of Mecca and Sir H. McMahon for communication to  
H.H Emir Feisal”, Memorandum by the War Cabinet, 28 September 1919. 
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from the areas covered by the agreement.
“With regard to the questions of limits, frontiers and boundaries, it would  
appear to be premature to waste our time in discussing such details in  
the heat of war, and while, in many of its regions, the Turks are for the  
moment  in  effective  occupation;  especially  as  we  have  learnt,  with  
surprise and regret, that some of the Arabs in those areas mentioned,  
far from assisting us, are neglecting this, their supreme opportunity, and  
are  lending  their  arms  to  the  German  and  the  Turks,  to  the  new 
despoiler and the old oppressor”39.
This letter and its “ambiguity” distressed the Sharif who took only nine 
days – on September 9, 1915 – to reply by putting things in order. First, he was 
not negotiating on his own behalf but was representing the Arabs, second, the 
question of the frontiers was not a secondary matter quite the opposite, that 
was the “essential point”. Moreover, he stressed that the Arabs were a united 
front when claiming these borders.
“[…] your Excellency will pardon me and permit me to say clearly that  
the coldness and hesitation which you have displayed in the question of  
the limits and boundaries, by saying that the discussion of this subject  
at present is of no use and is a loss of time, and that they are still in the  
hands of the Government which is ruling them, and this might be taken  
to infer an estrangement or something of the sort. As these limits and  
boundaries demanded are not those of one person whom we should  
satisfy, and with whom we should discuss them after the war is over,  
but our peoples have seen that the life of their new proposal is bound at  
least by these limits, and their word is united on this”40.
It took nearly a month and a half for McMahon to answer. Indeed, this 
time the British government had to make a statement on the territory claimed by 
the Arabs and it required extended consultation and caution. In the meantime, a 
deserting Arab Ottoman officer – Muhammad Farouqi – had reached Cairo and 
there,  he  met  with  McMahon  and  made  an  (exaggerated)  account  of  the 
nationalist groups operating in Syria41. Thus the raging war, the contacts with 
the Sharif of Mecca and the meeting with Muhammad Sharif al Farouqi were 
reasons enough to engage in a discussion regarding the boundaries of the Arab 
territories.  However,  the  British  government  would  not  commit  themselves 
without reservations and conditions, so, in McMahon’s reply dated October 24, 
39 National Archives, CAB 24/89, “Copy of letter from Lord Curzon to Colonel Cornwallis, covering 
copies of correspondence between the Sherif of Mecca and Sir H. McMahon for communication to  
H.H Emir Feisal”, Memorandum by the War Cabinet, 28 September 1919. 
40 Ibid.
41 Laurens, Henry, L'Orient arabe. Arabisme et Islamisme de 1798 à 1945, op.cit., p. 109.
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1915, they demanded the exclusion of the territories to the west of the districts  
of  Damascus,  Homs  and  Aleppo,  from  the  Arab  claims.  Of  even  greater 
significance, was the reason why they considered these territories could not be 
recognised in due course under Arab sovereignty: they were not “purely Arab”. 
These  exclusions  aside,  the  British  were  ready  to  accept  the  limits  and 
boundaries proposed by the Sharif.
“With  the  above  modification  and  without  prejudice  to  our  existing  
treaties  concluded  with  Arab  Chiefs,  we  accept  these  limits  and  
boundaries, and in regard to the territories therein in which Great Britain  
is free to act without detriment to interests of her ally France […]
Subject  to  the  above  modifications,  Great  Britain  is  prepared  to  
recognise  and  support  the  independence  of  the  Arabs  within  the  
territories  in  the  limits  and  boundaries  proposed  by  the  Sharif  of  
Mecca”42.
The  not  “purely  Arab”  territories  were  ones  that  were  home  to  large 
Christian minorities such as Lebanon, which was also under the jurisdiction of 
France.  As  for  Palestine,  and  without  entering  the  polemics  concerning 
McMahon's will and intentions, it was not mentioned as such and geographically 
speaking, lay to the south-west of the districts mentioned. However, even with 
these  exceptions,  McMahon  left  no  doubt  as  to  the  British  government's 
willingness to “recognise” and “support” the independence of the Arabs. This 
letter  reveals  the  ethnic  dimension  behind  the  partition  of  Syria  and  its 
translation on the ground that would serve as the basis for a partition with a 
double  dimension:  geographical  and  demographical.  Secondly,  the  British 
government placed itself in the position of negotiating territories lying outside of 
its scope. 
To  the  surprise  of  the  British  government,  the  Sharif  replied  promptly  –  on 
November 5th – to facilitate the discussions by excluding the vilayets of Mersina 
and Adana from the Arab Kingdom, but, above all to make clear that there was 
no difference between Christians and Muslims and that all the peoples residing 
in the areas they claimed were Arabs.
“ But the provinces of Aleppo and Beirut and their sea-coasts are purely  
Arab provinces, and there is no difference between a Moslem and a  
42 National Archives, CAB 24/89, “Copy of letter from Lord Curzon to Colonel Cornwallis, covering 
copies of correspondence between the Sherif of Mecca and Sir H. McMahon for communication to  
H.H Emir Feisal”, Memorandum by the War Cabinet, 28 September 1919.
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Christian Arab; they are both descendants of one forefather.
We Moslems will follow the footsteps of the Commander of the Faithful,  
Omar Ibn Khattab, and other Khalifs succeeding him, who ordained in  
the laws of the Moslem faith that Moslems should treat the Christians  
as  they  treat  themselves.  He,  Omar,  declared,  in  reference  to  the  
Christians, "they will have the same privileges and submit to the same  
duties as ourselves." They will thus enjoy their civic rights in as much  
as it accords with the general interest of the whole nation”.
Approaching the question of Iraq, Sharif Hussein made sure to explain 
that whatever the interests of the British government, Iraq was by definition part 
of the Arab territory and that no independence could be complete without it. He 
did,  however,  suggest that a consensual solution including a short  period of 
British administration could be reached43.
It is on this note that the discussions over the “essential point” ended by mid-
1916, they were then to be followed by a more practical correspondence on 
strategic moves on the ground and material needed to conduct the revolt. 
McMahon's promises were considered by the Sharif of Mecca and his 
followers, as a formal agreement between the Arabs – he claimed to represent 
– and the United Kingdom. And it is on the basis of that understanding that they 
established a military force under the command of Sharif Hussein's son, Faisal.  
The war started on July 28th on the Western front and later that year on the 
eastern front. The Arabs participated in the capture of Aqaba and the severing 
of the Hejaz railway, a vital strategic link through the Arab peninsula, which ran 
from Damascus to Medina. These Arab interventions enabled the British forces 
to  advance  and  reach  Palestine  and  Syria.  A decisive  battle  was  fought  in 
Meggiddo in September 1918 and Turkey capitulated on October 31st of that 
same year. 
Britain, however, did not lend the same importance to the agreement, 
and furthermore, McMahon had been wise enough to subject the agreement to 
the condition of respecting the “interests of her (UK's) ally France”, interests that 
rested specifically on the partition of the Arab territories for colonial purposes. 
As a matter of fact, it  was rather seen as a strategic move and this is best 
shown in a memo written in January 1916, by Thomas Edward Lawrence, best 
43 National Archives, CAB 24/89.“Copy of letter from Lord Curzon to Colonel Cornwallis, covering 
copies of correspondence between the Sherif of Mecca and Sir H. McMahon for communication to  
H.H Emir Feisal”, Memorandum by the War Cabinet, 28 September 1919.
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known  as  Lawrence  of  Arabia,  who  held  several  functions;  a  British 
archaeologist,  writer,  army  officer  but,  above  all,  a  spy  for  her  Majesty's 
government. In this memo, he explained his view of the revolt in an Orientalist 
tone, calling it a “beneficial event” for the British authorities.
“because  it  marches  with  our  immediate  aims,  the  break  up  of  the  
Islamic 'bloc' and the defeat and disruption of the Ottoman Empire, and  
because the states [Sharif Hussein] would set up to succeed the Turks  
would be … harmless to ourselves… The Arabs are even less stable  
than the  Turks.  If  properly  handled they would  remain  in  a  state  of  
political  mosaic,  a  tissue  of  small  jealous  principalities  incapable  of  
cohesion”44 
D.  The Sykes-Picot  agreements  –  phase two of  the  partition 
process
In 1916, expecting the imminent collapse of the Ottoman Empire, and to 
expand their spheres of influence in the Middle East, the United Kingdom and 
France concluded a secret agreement with the assent of Tsarist Russia45. This 
accord known as the Sykes-Picot agreement,  the names of  the negotiators, 
François  Georges-Picot46 and  Sir  Mark  Sykes47,  defined  the  partition  and 
dismemberment of the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire and the future 
zones of control of each country. 
The agreement was signed on May 16, 1916, and it allocated the control  of 
south-eastern  Turkey,  northern  Iraq,  Syria  and  Lebanon  to  France  and  the 
coastal strip between the sea and the Jordan River (Palestine), today's Jordan, 
southern Iraq, Egypt and a small area including the ports of Haifa and Acre, to 
the  United  Kingdom –  Jerusalem was  intended  to  become  an  international 
zone48. 
“It  is  accordingly  understood  between  the  French  and  British  
governments: That France and Great Britain are prepared to recognise  
44 Quoted in: Dreyfuss,  Robert,  Devil's game: How the United States helped unleash fundamentalist  
Islam, New York  2005, p.41.
45 After the revolution of October 1917, the Bolsheviks were to expose the agreement. 
46 François Georges-Picot (1870-1951), Diplomat, he was the French Consul in Beirut before WWI and 
was to continue his activities in Cairo as soon as the War started. Member of the French Colonial  
Party, he was an advocate of the “Syrie intégrale” or Greater Syria but under French Colonial Power. 
47 Mark Sykes (1879-1919),  Traveller,  he was also a diplomatic adviser  and member of the British 
Conservative Party. 
48 Catherine, Lucas, Palestine. La dernière colonie?, op.cit., p.35.
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and protect an independent Arab state or a confederation of Arab states  
(a) and (b) marked on the annexed map, under the suzerainty of an  
Arab chief. That in area (a) France, and in area (b) Great Britain, shall  
have priority  of  right  of  enterprise  and local  loans.  That  in  area (a)  
France, and in area (b) Great Britain,  shall  alone supply advisers or  
foreign functionaries at the request of the Arab state or confederation of  
Arab states”49.
Whereas the terms of Sharif Hussein seemed clear concerning the Arab 
territory,  which  he  considered  as  a  whole,  the  Sykes  –  Picot  agreement 
envisaged the dividing up and the partition of that territory even if it was to lead 
eventually – as stated in the text – to the independence of the Arabs. 
These agreements could hardly mask the British government's bad faith in its 
negotiation with the Arabs and above all its colonial aims in the Middle East. 
The  question  about  the  incompatibility  of  the  Hussein-McMahon 
correspondence and the Sykes-Picot agreement has been raised by numerous 
scholars and the debate it has provoked is far from over. Seen from the Arab 
perspective,  these  secret  agreements  were  inconsistent  with  the  McMahon-
Hussein correspondence. As indeed, the Arabs had no idea that Britain had 
been  in  discussions  with  France  regarding  the  Ottoman  Empire's  territories 
since  the  1900s,  British  officials,  however,  maintained  that  there  was  no 
contradiction  between  the  two  agreements,  at  least  in  their  public 
communications. Nevertheless, this inconsistency was raised and used among 
the British government as soon as the Sykes-Picot Agreement was signed, as 
attested by a note written by William Ormsby Gore in the Eastern Report dated 
May 31st 1917 : 
“French intentions in Syria are surely incompatible with the war aims of  
the Allies as defined by the Russian Government. If self-determination  
of nationalities is to be the principle, the interference of France in the  
selection of advisers by the Arab Government and the suggestion by  
France of the Emirs to be selected by the Arabs in Mosul, Aleppo, and  
Damascus would seem utterly incompatible with our ideas of liberating  
the Arab nation and of establishing a free and independent Arab State.  
The British Government, in authorising the letters despatched to King  
Hussein before the outbreak of the revolt by Sir Henry McMahon, would  
seem to raise a doubt as to whether our pledges to King Hussein as  
head of the Arab nation are consistent with French intentions to make  
not only Syria but Upper Mesopotamia another Tunis. If our support of  
King Hussein and the other Arabian leaders of less distinguished origin  
49 The text of the Sykes-Picot agreement is available at:   
http://www.britishonlinearchives.co.uk/9781851171507.php 
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and  prestige  mean  anything,  it  means  that  we  are  prepared  to  
recognise the full sovereign independence of the Arabs of Arabia and  
Syria. It seems to be the moment to acquaint the French Government  
of our detailed pledges to King Hussein, and to make it  clear to the  
latter  whether  he  or  someone else  is  to  be  the  ruler  of  Damascus,  
which  is  the  only  possible  capital  for  an  Arab  State,  which  could  
command the obedience of the other Arabian Emirs”50.
Whether the British government really believed the pledges to be incompatible 
and contrary to the self-determination principle or whether Gore's comment was 
mainly aimed at finding a tool to disregard the agreement with the French is not 
an essential  question to  our  study.  However,  what  it  says  is  that  there was 
sufficient doubt, right from their inception. 
The Arabs, for their part, were not aware of the Sykes-Picot agreements until  
December  1917  through  the  Turkish  Government,  which  received  the 
information from the newly empowered Soviet government.  So, whereas the 
Hashemites and Arab nationalist groups based in Syria were fighting for their 
future independence in a unified territory, Britain and France were partitioning 
the non-Turkish areas of the Ottoman Empire and granting themselves these 
territories. This was, however, not the end of the matter; indeed, at the same 
time discussions were taking place within the offices of the British government 
about possible official support for the Zionist movement in its claim to a national  
home in Palestine.
Many reasons have been evoked to explain the choice of Great Britain to 
endorse the  Zionist  movement's  demands.  Indeed,  having on the one hand 
promised to acknowledge Arab independence and on the other hand worked 
out  an  agreement  with  the  French,  granting  them  parts  of  the  Ottoman 
territories, why would they introduce a fourth actor? This question has been the 
subject of numerous – and sometimes contradictory – analyses that I will not 
develop in detail here51. However, it seems that there was not one single reason 
but  rather  conflicting  factors  that  can  help  us  understand  the  eventual 
endorsement of such a document. 
50 National Archives, CAB/24/143, “Eastern Report N°XVIII”, 31 May 1917.
51 On that subject, read  Stein, Leonard,  The Balfour Declaration. New York 1961, p.470 ;  Friedman, 
Isaiah, Palestine, a Twice-promised Land?: The British, the Arabs & Zionism, 1915-1920, New Jersey 
2000, p.171.
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First, since the 19th century, messianism and the concomitant idea of the return 
of the Jewish people to Palestine which had existed since the 16 th Century, was 
growing  in  Great  Britain,  especially  because  of  a  convenient  religious 
environment and through literary circles52. Indeed, one could expect the return 
of  ideas  of  the  re-conquest  of  Palestine,  whether  directly  by  Christians  or 
indirectly by the Jews53. According to protestant millenarianism, the return of the 
Jews to Palestine is supposed to represent the accomplishment of prophecies. 
This messianism was particularly expressed in the literary production during the 
19th century,  and  one  of  the  most  striking  examples  of  this  millenarian 
enthusiasm and “idealisation  of  the  Jews”  is  to  be  found in  Georges Eliot's 
novel, Daniel Deronda54. 
Second, and it may be linked with the first, it was thought that the Jews had 
some influence in Russia and in the United States, and that they could help 
Britain  to  get  those  two  countries'  support  in  the  war  effort.  This  vision 
undoubtedly rested on the anti-Semitic  idea of  Jewish financial  and political 
power.
Third,  the  British  government  had  engaged  in  the  Sykes-Picot  Agreements, 
which divided the Arab territories into areas of control for each of the contracting 
powers. However, Britain was seeking to gain control of Palestine in order to 
secure its economic interests in Egypt – the Suez Canal. A pro-British Zionist 
implementation was then seen as a tool to assure Britain's control55.
Last  but  not  least,  one  cannot  dismiss  the  work  of  the  Zionist  movement's 
leaders,  including  Haim  Weizmann56.  Zionist  interests  had  already  been 
discussed  a  number  of  times  during  the  previous  decade  and  a  half  by 
members of the British Government. One has to recall the discussions between 
Theodor Herzl and Joseph Chamberlain – then Colonial Secretary – in the early 
52 Friedman, Isaiah,  The Question of Palestine, British-Jewish-Arab relations 1914-1918, New Jersey, 
1992. The author dedicated the introduction of this second Edition to the “British schemes for the 
Restoration of Jews to Palestine, 1840-1880”.
53 Catherine, Lucas, Palestine. La dernière colonie?, op.cit., p.35.
54 Eliot, George, Daniel Deronda, London 1876.
55 Catherine, Lucas, Palestine. La dernière colonie?, op.cit., p.35.
56 Haim Azriel  Weizmann (1874-1952),  Born  in  the  Russian  Empire  in  what  is  now known as  the  
Belarus,  Weizmann  was  a  chemist  and  in  1904,  he  took  a  position  of  chemistry  lecturer  at  the 
University of Manchester. He was later to become one of the leaders of the British Zionists. At that 
time in Manchester, Arthur Balfour was a Conservative MP representing the district, as well as Prime 
Minister, and the two met during one of Balfour's electoral campaigns. President of the World Zionist 
Organisation from 1920 to 1931 and for a second mandate from 1935 to 1946, he became the first 
president of the state of Israel and stayed in office until his death.
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1900s  about  the  possibility  of  the  implementation  of  Jewish  settlements  in 
Uganda – which was then part of the British Empire. The Uganda option was 
rejected by the sixth Zionist Congress in 1905 but by 1906, Arthur Balfour – 
former Prime Minister and Head of the Opposition – and Winston Churchill – 
then Liberal MP for North-West Manchester constituency – continued to express 
their support for Haim Weizmann and a “settled Home” for the Jews. Churchill 
then adopted the idea of a “strong, free Jewish State astride the bridge between 
Europe and Africa” in Palestine (Jerusalem being the goal in the text)57. A few 
years later, Weizmann made contact with Lord Balfour and he seems to have 
had constant contact with members of the British government, notably David 
Lloyd George who was Prime Minister from December 7 th 1916 to October 22nd 
1922. According to Charles D. Smith58, if one cannot underestimate the role of 
Weizmann and above all  his  skill  in  “keeping British  statesmen apprised  of 
Zionist concerns and Zionism's supposed value to the war effort”59, the turning 
point was indeed the formation of David Lloyd George's cabinet. 
E. The Balfour Declaration and the British internal critics
Contacts between the Zionist leadership and British officials, which had 
started at the beginning of the century, escalated as WWI began. On October 
31, 1917, the British government adopted a declaration supporting the aims of 
the  Zionist  movement  that  was  addressed,  on  November  2,1917,  by Arthur 
James Balfour to Lord Rothschild in the following terms:
“Dear Lord Rothschild,
I have much pleasure in conveying to you, on behalf of His Majesty's  
Government, the following declaration of sympathy with Jewish Zionist  
aspirations,  which  have  been  submitted  to,  and  approved  by,  the  
Cabinet:
'His  Majesty's  Government  view  with  favour  the  establishment  in  
Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use its best  
endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly  
57 Friedmann, Isaiah, The Question of Palestine, British-Jewish-Arab relations: 1914-1918, New Jersey 
1992, pp.6-7.
58 Smith, Charles D., Palestine and the Arab-Israeli conflict. A history with documents, Boston 2010. 
59 Smith,  Charles  D.,  “The historiography of  World War  I  and  the  emergence  of  the  contemporary 
Middle  East”,  in  Gershoni,  Israel,  Amy  Singer  &  Y.  Hakan  Erdem  (eds.),  Middle  East  
historiographies, narrating the twentieth century, Seattle 2006, pp. 39-69.
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understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and  
religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the  
rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country'. 
I should be grateful if you would bring this declaration to the knowledge  
of the Zionist federation.
Yours sincerely,
Arthur James Balfour”60
This section examines the process that led to the adoption of the Balfour 
Declaration and the arguments raised by the opposition to a British support to 
Zionism. The Declaration intended to provide the Jews with a national home as 
well as secure British control over Palestine – which was in the area put under 
international  jurisdiction  by  the  Sykes-Picot  agreement61.  Moreover,  it  did 
finalise the partition of Syria by linking Palestine to the Jews and separating the 
fate of Palestine from the rest of Syria. I  do argue that the British and non-
Zionist Jewish opponents to the declaration had foreseen the dangers of such a 
policy and tried to shed light on the separatist and exclusionary tendencies and 
real  motive  of  the  Zionist  movement,  namely  Jewish  dominance  and 
sovereignty  and  thus,  provide  strong  anti-separatist  arguments  which  would 
serve as a basis for anti-partitionism.
As  we  have  seen,  the  climate  had  been  favourable  to  the  Zionist 
aspirations, however, although there had been contacts over a long period, the 
time taken to review the terms of the declaration and the consultations prior to 
its release were rather short. The exact and immediate origins of the Balfour 
Declaration  are  difficult  to  trace  and  there  seems  to  be  no  trace  of  the 
exchanges that preceded the Declaration62.
Nevertheless,  when  the  first  text  was  drafted,  it  was  circulated  among  the 
Government members. Edwin Montagu – then Secretary of State for India and 
member of the War Cabinet – received it on August 23 rd 1917. The draft was 
60 Litvinoff, Barnett (ed.), The letters and papers of Chaim Weizmann, August 1898 – July 1931, Volume 
I, New York 1983, pp. 165-166.
61 Laurens, Henry, “L’identité palestinienne d’hier à aujourd’hui”, in Heacock, Roger (dir.),  Temps et  
espaces en Palestine. Flux et resistances identitaires, ”, Beirut 2009, pp.43-54
62 National Archives, CAB/23/4/, “Minutes of a Meeting of the War Cabinet held at 10, Downing Street, 
S.W., on Thursday, 4 October1917”.
“Upon the origins of the Declaration, little exists in the way of official records; indeed, little is known  
of how the policy represented by the Declaration was first given form. Four, or perhaps five, men were  
chiefly concerned in the labour—the Earl of Balfour, the late Sir Mark Sykes, and Messrs. Weizmann  
and Sokolov, with perhaps Lord Rothschild as a figure in the background. Negotiations seem to have  
been mainly oral and by means of private notes and memoranda, of which only the scantiest records  
are available, even if more exist”.
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only  a  few  lines  long  and  made  no  mention  of  Palestine’s  Arabs  who 
represented the overwhelming majority of the country's population – more than 
95%. Of course, as the British authorities never recognised that Palestine was 
part  of  the  territory  claimed  by  the  Arabs  in  the  McMahon-Hussein 
correspondence, the text reflecting that view alone:
“His Majesty's Government accept the principle that Palestine should  
be reconstituted as the national home of the Jewish people, and will  
use their best endeavours to secure the achievement of this object, and  
will  be  ready to  consider  any suggestions on the  subject  which  the  
Zionist Organisation may desire to lay before them”63.
Edwin Montagu was shocked by the text and moved by a sense of urgency, he 
immediately  replied64.  Depicting  Zionism  as  a  “mischievous  political  creed, 
untenable by any patriotic citizen of the United Kingdom”, Montagu feared that 
by supporting the  Zionist  Movement,  British policy would fuel  anti-Semitism. 
Making his case against Zionism, he first fought the idea that there existed a 
distinct Jewish nation: 
“I assert that there is not a Jewish nation. The members of my family,  
for instance, who have been in this country for generations, have no  
sort or kind of community of view or of desire with any Jewish family in  
any other country beyond the fact that they profess to a greater or less  
degree  the  same  religion,  It  is  no  more  true  to  say  that  a  Jewish  
Englishman and a Jewish Moor are of the same nation than it is to say  
that  a  Christian  Englishman  and  a  Christian  Frenchman  are  of  the  
same  nation:  of  the  same  race,  perhaps,  traced  back  through  the  
centuries -  through centuries of the history of  a peculiarly adaptable  
race”.
Second, he argued that the declaration was a potential vector of exclusion. As a 
matter of fact, declaring that the Jewish national home was in Palestine would 
give anti-Semites all over the world an argument to preach their exclusion of the 
Jews as non-nationals in their countries. 
63 National Archives, CAB/24/4, “Memorandum on the Zionist movement by the War Cabinet”, October 
17, 1917.
64 National Archives, CAB/24/24/, “The Anti-Semitism of the present Government”, circulated by the 
Secretary of State for India, August 23, 1917.
“Lord Rothschild's letter is dated July 18th and Mr. Balfour's answer was dated August 1917.- I fear  
that my protest comes too late, and it may well be that the Government was practically committed  
when  Lord  Rothschild  wrote  and  before  I  became  a  member  of  the  Government,  for  there  has  
obviously been some correspondence or conversation before this letter”. 
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“When the Jews are told that Palestine is their national home, every  
country will immediately desire to get rid of its Jewish citizens, and you  
will  find a population in  Palestine driving out  its  present  inhabitants,  
taking all the best in the country, drawn from all quarters of the globe,  
speaking every language on the face of the earth,  and incapable of  
communicating with one another except by means of an interpreter. […]  
I claim that the lives that British Jews have led, that the aims they have  
had before them, that the part that they have played in our public life  
and our public institutions, have entitled them to be regarded, not as  
British Jews, but as Jewish Britons. I would willingly disfranchise every  
Zionist. I would be almost tempted to proscribe the Zionist organisation  
as  illegal  and against  national  interest.  But  I  would  ask of  a  British  
Government  sufficient  tolerance  to  refuse  to  endorse  a  conclusion  
which makes aliens and foreigners by implication, if not by law, of all  
their Jewish fellow citizens”.
On that occasion, he also criticised Zionism as false messianism: 
“I have always understood, by the Jews before Zionism was invented,  
that to bring the Jews back to form a nation in the country from which  
they were dispersed would require a Divine leadership. I have never  
heard it suggested, even by their most fervent admirers, that either Mr.  
Balfour or Lord Rothschild would prove to be the Messiah”. 
Third,  considering  that  Palestine  represented  as  much  for  the  Jews  as  it 
represents for the Christians and Muslims, he denied the Jews any right over 
Palestine. 
Finally,  he  expressed  his  worries  that  the  Government  may  become  the 
“instrument of a Zionist organisation largely run by men [...](who) have dealt a 
severe blow to the liberties, position and opportunities of service of their Jewish 
fellow-countrymen”. In response to Mr Rothschild and the Zionist organisation, 
he proposed that the Government should engage itself simply “to do everything 
in their power to obtain for Jews in Palestine complete liberty of settlement and 
life  on  an  equality  with  the  inhabitants  of  that  country  who  profess  other 
religious beliefs. I would ask that the Government should go no further”.
E. Montagu's memorandum was not the first expression against Zionism, 
indeed, Jewish circles in Great Britain had expressed their rejection of Zionism 
in the press. However, E. Montagu's call for discussions on the opportunity and 
the content of a declaration sympathetic to the Zionist aims was raised during 
the War Cabinet of September 3rd 1917 (two months before the Declaration was 
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issued).  That  meeting  was  an  opportunity  for  the  pro  and  anti-declaration 
factions to debate and develop their cases. Arthur Balfour made his case in 
favour of the declaration by arguing firstly, that the German government was 
doing its  best  to  attract  the  sympathies  of  the Zionist  movement.  Secondly, 
Balfour purported that although the Zionist movement was “opposed by many 
wealthy Jews in England”, it enjoyed the support of a majority of Jews at least in 
Russia and the United-States, and thirdly, that the movement was based upon 
the "intense national consciousness" of the Jews, who "regarded themselves as 
one of the great historic races of the world, and who had "a passionate longing 
to regain once more their ancient national home in Palestine”65. 
However, Arthur Balfour's arguments were mostly based on myths and fantasy 
tainted with anti-Semitism. Indeed, as Edwin Montagu was to argue in a later 
memorandum on  Zionism,  which  he  wrote  to  the  Minister  of  the  blockade, 
Robert Cecil, no poll had been made of the Jews regarding Zionism and that as 
such no one could claim to know what the majority of the British Jews' thought 
of the question66. Moreover, major studies on Zionism show on the contrary that 
Zionism was a minority movement. Thus, the third argument presents a mixture 
of ethnic policy and nationalism well known and used by A. Balfour as he was 
well aware of the situation in Ireland. It should be emphasised that the concept  
of nation, which was quite new at the time, is used here in a fundamental sense 
to  refer  to  an  ancient  situation  –  “namely,  the  ancient  national  home  in 
Palestine”. In his task, Bafour was aided by France's and the United States'  
positions as both the French government and President Wilson had declared 
themselves in favour of a Jewish National Home in Palestine. 
The subject was discussed further during the War Cabinet of October 4, 1917. It 
was another opportunity for Edwin Montagu to express once again his position 
and to advance other arguments such as the origins of the Zionist movement 
and its incompatibility with the situation of the “Jewish Britons”.
“He specially urged that the only trial of strength between Zionists and 
anti-Zionists in England had resulted in a very narrow majority for the  
Zionists, namely, 56 to 51 of the representatives of Angle-Jewry on the  
Conjoint Committee. He also pointed out that most English-born Jews  
were opposed to Zionism, while it was supported by foreign-born Jews,  
65 National Archives, CAB/ 23/4, “Minutes of a Meeting of the War Cabinet on September 3 rd” ; and 
“Minutes of a Meeting of the War Cabinet on October 4th 1917”.
66 National Archives, CAB/24/27/, “Edwin Montagu to Lord Robert Cecil”, September 14, 1917.
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such as Dr. Caster and Dr. Herz, the two Grand Rabbis, who had been  
born in Romania and Austria respectively, and Dr. Weizmann, President  
of  the  English  Zionist  Federation,  who  was  born  in  Russia.  He  
submitted that the Cabinet's first duty was to English Jews, and that  
Colonel  House had declared that  President  Wilson is  opposed to  a  
declaration now”67.
Montagu was backed by George Curzon, then a member of the War Cabinet, as 
Leader of the House of Lords, who presented two major arguments against the 
Zionist movement. First, having had significant first hand experience of colonial 
policy and partition processes68, he reasoned in terms of interests for the British 
government and as such, he considered that it would have grave implications.
Second, G. Curzon was aware of the significance of such a decision and he 
was actually among the only ones to consider the future of the existing Arab 
population of Palestine. For him the Balfour Declaration opened the way to the 
replacement of the Arab population by a Jewish one:
“How did  they propose to  get  rid  of  the  existing  majority  of  Muslim  
inhabitants and to introduce the Jews in their place? How many would  
be willing to return and what pursuits would they engage in? To secure  
for the Jews already in Palestine equal civil and religious rights seemed  
to him a better policy than to aim at repatriation on a large scale. He  
regarded  the  latter  as  sentimental  idealism,  which  would  never  be  
realised, and that His Majesty's Government should have nothing to do  
with it”69.
Following the discussion, Lord Milner proposed an alternative draft taking into 
account some of the points that Lord Montagu and Lord Curzon had stressed:
“His  Majesty's  Government  views  with  favour  the  establishment  in  
Palestine of a National Home for the Jewish Race, and will use its best  
endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object; it being clearly  
understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and  
religious rights of the existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or  
the rights and political status enjoyed in any other country by such Jews  
who are fully contented with their existing nationality and citizenship”70.
67 National Archives, CAB/23/4/, “Minutes of a Meeting of the War Cabinet held at 10, Downing Street, 
S.W. on Thursday, 4 October1917”.
68 George Nathaniel Curzon was a British Conservative statesman who was Viceroy of India from 1899 
to 1905 and Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs from October 23, 1919 to January 22, 1924. As 
Viceroy of India, he took part in the partition of Bengal – between the West with its Hindu majority 
and the East with its Muslim majority – in 1905. That partition finally ended six years later in 1911 as 
a result of anti-partition protests on the side of Bengali Hindu. See Fraser, Thomas, op.cit., p. 13; 
69 National Archives, CAB/23/4/, “Minutes of a Meeting of the War Cabinet held at 10, Downing Street, 
S.W. on Thursday, 4 October1917”.
70 Ibid.
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It was then also decided that before making any decision, the Cabinet should 
seek President Wilson's opinion and hear the arguments of the leaders of the 
Zionist movement, and of the representatives of the “anti-Zionist Anglo-Jewry”71, 
thus excluding any consultation with the Arabs. Palestine became from then on 
a Zionist-Jewish matter and on that account, and without saying as such, they 
extracted Palestine from its environment as well as from its inhabitants, laying 
the foundations of the coming partition.
As requested by the Cabinet, the draft was sent to nine “Jewish personalities”, 
including Lord Montagu, to obtain their comments. The latter were Minister of 
Parliament Herbert Samuel, the Chief Rabbi, Lord Rothschild, Sir Stuart Samuel 
Bart (Chairman of the Jewish Board of Deputies),  Haim Weizmann (Chairman 
of the World Zionist Organisation), Nahum Sokolow (Chairman of the London 
section of the World Zionist Organisation), Minister of Parliament Philip Magnus, 
C.G.  Montefiore  (President  of  the  Anglo-Jewish  Association),  L.L.  Cohen 
(Jewish Board of Guardians), and Secretary of State for India Lord Montagu. 
The first six expressed themselves in favour of the spirit of the declaration, on 
the basis that it met the beliefs and demands of the majority of the Jews in the 
world and in Great Britain, even though, themselves, they were not planning on 
moving to Palestine.
The three others expressed themselves against the declaration, on the basis of 
two main arguments. First,  Jews do not constitute a distinct nation. Second, 
considering them as a nation is inaccurate and creates the ground for  anti-
Semitism. They argued that such a declaration as the one proposed would have 
negative consequences on Jews in their current countries of residence as well  
as in the Ottoman Empire and more particularly in Palestine. They all refused 
the separation that this postulate infers as shown in their memorandums:
“I do not gather that I am expected  to distinguish my views as a Jew 
from those I hold as a British subject. Indeed, it is not necessary, even if  
it were possible. For I agree with the late Chief Rabbi, Dr. Hermann  
Adler, that "ever since the conquest of Palestine by the Romans, we 
have ceased to be a body politic"; that "the great bond that unites Israel  
is not one of race but the bond of a common religion"; and that we have  
no national aspirations apart from those of the country of our birth. […] I  
cannot  agree that the Jews regard themselves as a nation, and the  
term "  national"  as  applied  to  a  community  of  Jews in  Palestine  or  
elsewhere seems to me to beg the question between Zionists and their  
71 Ibid.
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opponents,  and  should,  I  suggest,  be  withdrawn from the  proposed  
formula.  Indeed,  the inclusion  in  the  terms of  the  declaration of  the  
words  "a  national  home  for  the  Jewish  race"  seems  to  me  both 
undesirable and inferentially inaccurate.”72.
“I deprecate the expression "a national home". For it assumes that the  
Jewish race constitutes a "nation," or might profitably become a nation,  
both which propositions I deny. The phrase "a national home for the  
Jewish  race"  appears  to  assume and imply  that  the  Jews generally  
constitute a nationality. Such an implication is extremely prejudicial to  
Jewish interests, as it is intensely obnoxious to an enormous number of  
Jews”73.
As for L. Cohen, 
“The  establishment  of  a  "national  home  for  the  Jewish  race"  in  
Palestine, presupposes that the Jews are a nation, which I deny, and  
that they are homeless, which implies that, in the countries where they  
enjoy religious liberty and the full rights of citizenship, they are separate  
entities, unidentified with the interests of the nations of which they form  
parts, an implication which I repudiate”.
Philip Magnus and Leonard Cohen went further and stressed the fact that if a 
declaration had to be issued, this should not confer the Jews privileges that 
would not be shared by all the citizens of Palestine.
“On  the  other  hand,  a  statement  to  the  effect  that  the  British  
Government would  take steps to secure to the Jews now or hereafter  
resident in Palestine freedom to develop their religious culture and to  
observe their religious rites would be welcomed by the Jews and would  
be consistent with the traditional policy of the British Government. It is  
essential,  however,  as  stated  in  the  proposed  formula,  that  any  
privileges granted to the Jews should be shared by their fellow-citizens  
of other creeds”74.
Moreover, Philip Magnus expressed his worries as to the “rumours” circulating 
on the objectives of the Government concerning Palestine. Acknowledging the 
fact  that  Great  Britain  had  interests  in  Palestine,  he  also  recalled  the 
declarations  made  by  the  Government  according  to  which  the  “existing 
inhabitants” had to be consulted. However, it should be pointed out that whilst  
they were to be consulted there was no question of them governing themselves, 
rather they would choose which power would govern them. 
“I know not what may be the real objective of the War Cabinet's military 
operations in Palestine. It is, however, rumoured in Zionist circles that  
72 National  Archives,  CAB/24/4,  “Memorandum  on  the  Zionist  movement”,  October  17th 1917, 
Response made by Sir Philip Magnus, Minister of Parliament.
73 Ibid.,, Response made by Claude Montefiore.
74 Ibid., Response made by M.P Philip Magnus.
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the  conquest  of  Palestine  by  Great  Britain  is  desired  in  order  that  
Palestine may become an independent  buffer  State between Turkey  
and Egypt; and that having regard to the declared policy of the Allies to  
annex no new territories, the country would be restored to the Jews  
under a British protectorate. Whether this be so or not, I feel sure that  
our  Government,  in  accordance  with  repeated  declarations,  would  
deem it necessary to consult the existing inhabitants of Palestine as to  
the  ruling  power  under  which  they  would  desire  to  live;  and,  in  all  
probability, they would elect to be governed by Great Britain or by one  
of our Allies, who would hold the balance fairly between the Christian,  
Jewish, and Mahommedan communities”.
These were not  the only opponents  to  Zionism; the Conjoint  Committee75 – 
made  up  of  the  Board  of  Deputies  of  British  Jews  and  the  Anglo-Jewish 
Association76 had been among the first critics of Zionism and had been very 
active during the years 1916 and 1917. Its activities had contributed to a pitched 
battle between the Zionists and their opponents on many fronts. First, on the 
diplomatic  front,  both  groups had taken their  case to  the British  authorities. 
Then, on the media front, both the Board of Deputies of British Jews and the 
Anglo-Jewish Association had shared their positions in numerous newspapers 
such as the Times. 
Nevertheless, neither the arguments of E. Montagu and G. Curzon, who were 
members of the Cabinet, nor the arguments raised by the  asked anti-Zionist 
personalities , could reverse the momentum. The anti-Zionists would not stand 
a chance against the Prime Minister Lloyd George, the Secretary for Foreign 
Affairs Arthur Balfour and Lord Milner, all of whom energetically supported the 
declaration. Indeed, Lloyd Georges was rather sympathetic to the aspirations of 
the Zionist movement, probably because he despised the Arabs. Some twenty 
years later, he would explain his engagement in favour of Zionism as an alliance 
of interest with a very influential political organisation77. 
So all the anti-Zionists managed to obtain was a sentence on the protection of 
the civil  and religious rights of the non-Jewish communities in Palestine and 
another on the rights of the Jews in countries other than Palestine.
75 Lucien Wolf, a journalist, served as Foreign Secretary of the Conjoint Committee and he was a fierce 
opponent of Zionism.
76 The Anglo-Jewish Association was presided by Claude Montefiore.
77 Shlaim, Avi, “The Balfour declaration and its consequences”,  in Wm. Roger Louis,(ed.),  Yet More  
Adventures with Britannia: Personalities, Politics and Culture in Britain, London 2005, pp. 251-270. 
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This simple letter, sent by A.J. Balfour, the Secretary of State for Foreign 
Affairs,  to  Lord  Rothschild,  constituted  the  first  official  public  statement  of 
support  for  Zionist  aspirations  by  a  nation-state  and  this  was  to  provoke 
dramatic  consequences on the future of  Palestine,  the Middle East  and the 
World. The Arabs were notably absent during the entire process, confirming the 
expropriation of the Palestinian Arabs and the separation of Palestine from the 
rest of the Arab area according to territorial as well as demographic lines, and 
also, consecrating the separation and antagonism of the Jews and the Arabs. 
Moreover, from then on, the Zionist leaders would consider the declaration as a 
founding act that would justify their rights to Palestine. 
However,  far  from  ending  the  internal  polemics,  the  publication  of  the 
Declaration  inflamed the  debate,  which  continued to  develop and  was  later 
reinvigorated during the drafting of the mandate. 
Soon  after  the  release  of  the  Declaration,  on  December  9th 1917,  British 
imperial forces, led by General Allenby, arrived in Jerusalem and prepared to 
occupy the city.  Thereafter,  the Zionist  movement was permitted to organise 
Jewish  immigration  in  Palestine,  to  purchase  land,  develop  agriculture,  and 
establish  industries  and  banks,  in  short,  to  construct  the  infrastructure 
necessary  for  an  autonomous  and  independent  existence.  Tom  Segev 
commented the declaration as follows:
“The  British  allowed  them  to  set  up  hundreds  of  new  settlements,  
including several towns. They created a school system and an army;  
they had a political leadership and elected institutions; and with the help  
of  all  these  they  in  the  end  defeated  the  Arabs,  all  under  British  
sponsorship, all in the wake of that promise of 1917. Contrary to the  
widely held belief of Britain's pro-Arabism, British actions considerably  
favoured the Zionist enterprise”78.
F. C  onclusion:  
When in the middle of WWI, the Sharif of Mecca and his sons agreed to 
revolt against the Turks in coordination with the British, they believed that out of 
this alliance,  the Arabs would gain independence from the Ottoman system. 
Joining  forces  with  the  Arab  nationalists  essentially  based  in  Syria,  Sharif 
78 Segev, Tom, One Palestine, complete, New York 2000, p. 5
67
Hussein and his sons were, however, far from understanding Western interests 
and  intentions  in  the  Middle  East,  or  the  connexion  with  Zionism.  So,  in 
exchange, the latter were ready to grant privileges and powers to those who 
would help them in their battle. Moreover, they were ready to grant a special 
status for Lebanon, respect the status quo for Aden and find a formula for Iraq 
thus enabling the seeds of a separation to be planted. What mattered was the 
ultimate goal, namely independence for the Arab territories that had been for 
four  centuries part  of  the Ottoman Empire,  either within  the framework of  a 
grand Arab state or  of  a  confederation of  states.  Believing in  the Wilsonian 
ideals and thinking they had secured the principle of their independence they 
went to war with confidence.  
However,  as  we  have  seen,  other  alliances  were  made,  each  involving  the 
British Government deeper in Arab matters and territories. The first concerned 
the French with whom the British were dividing the Ottoman Empire into zones 
of influence so as to preserve their respective economic interests. And, whilst 
this  agreement  would not  be completely respected later  on,  the principle  of 
partition it  introduced would be. The second was contracted with the Zionist 
movement to whom it promised a Jewish National Home in Palestine, which 
was then part of the Ottoman Empire and claimed by the Arab nationalists as 
part of Syria. Although the Balfour Declaration did not include nor even tackle 
partition in its terms, it consecrated the separation of the fate of Palestine and 
introduced  the  Jews  as  by  right  in  Palestine  thus  opening  the  way  for  the 
coming conflict.
The consequences of these multiple pledges while not fully acknowledged and 
apprehended  by  the  British  Government,  were  however  the  subject  of 
numerous debates and met with opposition from within its ranks, from the Arabs 
but also from the non-Zionist Jewish personalities who were consulted. 
The news of  the Sykes Picot  Agreement and the Balfour Declaration raised 
strong  oppositions  among  the  Arabs  who  understood  they  questioned  and 
threatened their own agreement. From then on, the Arabs started to organise 
themselves in order to be more efficient. Reiterating their 'natural' right over the 
Arab territories and McMahon's promises,  they also called on the Wilsonian 
principles  to  oppose  and  reject  the  French  presence  and  the  Balfour 
Declaration.  They  presented  numerous  petitions  to  the  Occupied  Enemy 
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Territories  Administrations  (OETA),  sent  memoranda  to  the  sessions  of  the 
Peace Conference and organised demonstrations and riots. Although they were 
organising  a  forceful  and  coherent  political  voice,  they  eventually  had  to 
acknowledge  the  political  and  military  presence  of  both  the  British  and  the 
French. This led them to organise through local organs and, in a tactical move, 
they integrated local patriotism to the growing Arabism and adapted to the de 
facto  partition  of  Syria  imposed  by  the  French  and  the  British.  The 
fragmentation of their struggle eventually contributed to open the way for the 
territorial fragmentation and partition. Partition that was to be later sanctioned 
by the League of Nations as a result of the discussions and conclusions of the 
Peace Conference. 
Parallel  to  that,  heated  debates  took  place  in  the  ranks  of  the  British 
Government as well as among the non and anti-Zionist Jewish British leaders. 
Three main arguments emerged to oppose the Balfour Declaration. First,  an 
alliance with Zionism was counter-productive and lacked any interest for the 
British Empire. Second, the Balfour declaration, as well as the implementation 
of  the  Sykes-Picot  agreement,  were  contrary  to  the  principle  of  self-
determination  to  which  they had committed  themselves.  Third,  Zionism was 
developed on the false postulate that the Jews were a nation and for the British 
Government  to  support  the  Zionist  movement  was  to  acknowledge  that 
postulate and all the consequences that could result from it: the exclusion of 
Jews as non-nationals and the growth of anti-Semitism leading to separation 
and violence. Many members of the British Government also saw the separatist 
tendencies of Zionism and predicted an inextricable situation that only eviction 
could eventually solve.
It  is  clear  therefore,  that  whilst  the  partition  of  Palestine  was  not  yet 
relevant,  the  opponents  to  the  Balfour  Declaration  foresaw  the  separatist 
potential of the Zionist movement as attested by the arguments raised by both 
E. Montagu and G. Curzon, but also the Jewish opponents to Zionism and of 
course the Arabs.  Unable to correctly estimate the dangers and the force of 
Zionism  and  anti-Semitism  or  philo-Semitism,  the  opponents  to  the  Balfour 
Declaration were also unable to present a united opposition front.
So, despite all oppositions, the British Government continued in its policy, which 
was to be endorsed by the international institutions. 
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Within only five years,  the Middle East had been redrawn by the traditional 
colonial  powers,  who  besides  establishing  an  artificial  territorial  partition, 
introduced settler colonialism, thus providing the conditions for the polarisation 
of  both  communities:  by  treating  the  Zionist  movement  as  a  partner  in 
enterprise, by authorizing it  to establish its own institutions, and by failing to 
stop separate development. Indeed, the arguments raised later by the British 
Government  in  proposing the partition of  Palestine were already taking root 
during the years leading up to 1922. As we have seen, separate economic, 
educational and social development was favoured by British policy. 
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Chapter Two: The International Perspectives on 
partition: 1917-1988
World War One introduced dramatic changes at numerous levels 
and  in  various  areas  that  relate  directly  to  our  subject.  First,  the  Ottoman 
Empire was dismantled and its territories left  under  foreign Western control. 
Then the United States, which had been involved in the war,  introduced the 
principle  of  self-determination on the international  political  scene.  A principle 
which  was  to  be  first  applied  during  the  Versailles  Peace  Conference.  And 
finally, the Balfour declaration, which was a mere promise made by the British to 
the Zionist movement, was endorsed by all the Great Powers during the Peace 
Conference. 
So there  were  already conflicting  promises and decisions,  as  the  people  of 
Palestine, who had now theoretically obtained their right to self-determination, 
opposed  Zionism,  which  had  been  endorsed  by  the  powers  in  control  of 
Palestine. Moreover, self-determination had a price and the Peace Conference 
had  also  decided  that  some  peoples  were  not  mature  enough  to  exercise 
political  control  over their  territories and needed to be prepared to  self-rule. 
Having opposed colonization, the United States could not possibly advocate 
such a regime for the Arab territories of the Ottoman Empire, so, colonies being 
obsolete in view of the principle of self-determination, they were replaced with a 
mandate system in June 1919. Contrary to the colonies, the mandates officially 
aimed at preparing peoples for independence and self-rule. As a consequence, 
Palestine  and  Syria  were  placed  respectively  under  British  and  French 
mandates in the early 1920s. 
This  chapter  examines the international  positions towards Palestine and the 
solutions to the situation that were created by the implementation of the Balfour 
Declaration, namely separation and partition.
Firstly, I will  present and analyse the process that led to the final text of the  
mandate being to Zionist advantage. How the mandate contributed to separate 
the fate of Palestine from that of Syria and thus impose a correlation between 
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Zionism and Palestine. 
Secondly, I will examine how the interpretation of the Balfour Declaration and 
the  administration  of  Palestine,  particularly  the  Arab  population,  through  a 
typically colonial mode has produced such a gulf between the Arabs and the 
Zionists and a competition for nationhood, that they were unable to administer 
Palestine as unitary state any more,  leading them to propose partition as a 
solution.
Partition  having  been eventually  abandoned,  the  persistence  of  the  political 
status  quo  made  it  even  more  difficult  to  continue  the  mandate.  As  a 
consequence, Great Britain would appeal to the United States as a partner to 
solve  the  Palestine  Question.  So,  thirdly,  I  will  examine  British-American 
collaboration on a scheme presenting itself as one that would avoid distorting 
the terms of the mandate.
After World War II,  the United States, which was to play a major role in the 
United  Nations  General  Assembly's  (UNGA's)  decision,  would  replace  the 
United Kingdom on the Middle East scene. It would contribute to the imposition 
of  partition  as  the  only  solution  that  could  bring  in  peace becoming  the  all  
dominant discourse. A discourse that would not be followed by any concrete 
action in the sense that the United States would prove to be an unswerving ally 
for Israel.  
A. The mandate for Palestine: partition or one-state?
In 1918 and 1919, the Peace Conference had aimed at establishing a 
settlement  according  to  the  principle  of  self-determination  as  developed  by 
President Wilson. It  started on January 18th 1919 and Faisal  was invited by 
Britain to take part as the Arab delegate and the Zionist Movement was also 
invited to make its views known – namely to support Britain's claims. On that 
occasion, Britain had been keen to encourage a rapprochement between the 
Amir  Faisal  and the Zionist  leadership,  this  briefly occurred but  once Faisal 
understood that  he  could  not  obtain  what  he  was seeking,  he  annulled  the 
agreement. 
The Paris Peace Conference finally ended without having ruled on the Arab and 
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Palestine questions, however, the hearings that were held served as a basis for 
future deliberations that were to take place at the San Remo conference in April  
1920. 
Meanwhile,  the  organizing  powers  of  the  Paris  peace  conference  – 
France,  Great  Britain,  Italy and the United States,  had agreed to  appoint  a 
commission of inquiry in the region to investigate and ascertain the wishes of 
the populations. However,  France and Britain knew that the Arab populations 
aspired to independence and were hostile to them, rejecting the Zionist position. 
This  risked  threatening  Franco-British  accession  to  the  statute  of  mandate 
powers in the region and could compromise their interests. So, France, Great 
Britain  and  Italy  finally  decided  not  to  send  representatives  in  the  Peace 
conference  commission  of  inquiry  and  only  the  United  States  appointed 
members – Henry King,  President  of  Oberlin College and Charles Crane,  a 
philanthropist with an experience of the region. The commission of inquiry, also 
known as the King-Crane Commission, arrived in Jaffa on June 10 th 1919 and 
visited the region during six weeks1. It organised hearings and was presented 
with numerous petitions most of which made a case for Arab independence, 
Syrian  unity  and,  according  to  the  members  of  the  commission,  more  than 
seventy  two  percent  of  these  petitions  “were  directed  against  the  Zionist 
programme”2.  In  Jaffa,  they  indeed  met  with  representatives  of  the  Syrian 
National Congress (SNC) but also with the Arab Muslim-Christian Association. 
Furthermore,  the  Commission  was  also  presented  nineteen  petitions  by the 
Zionist movement – a relatively small number in comparison with the number of 
petitions handed over by the Arabs. “Six of the  nineteen pro-Zionist petitions 
asked  for  a  separate  Palestine”,  although  the  commission's  members 
considered separation was implied in the other thirteen3. By August, they were 
back in Paris where they handed in their report on the 28th. 
The report argued against the continuation of the Zionist programme as it had 
been defined by the Zionist Organisation. As a matter of fact, the commission 
considered the Zionist programme as extreme and feared that if it was carried 
out,  it  would  lead  to  a  Jewish  State  which  was  contrary  to  the  indigenous 
1 Stannard Baker,  Ray,  “Against  Palestine as a Jewish State”,  first  publication of the report  by the 
American Commission to Palestine and Syria – would include Holy Land in a United Syria. America  
and the World Peace, New York Times, August 20, 1922.
2 Crane, Charles R., and Henry C. King, Report of the King-Crane Commission, August 28, 1919.
3 Ibid.
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population's desire as well as to the principles underlined on the eve of WWI4. 
Thereafter, it also recommended that “the unity of Syria (with the inclusion of 
Palestine) be preserved” and that “Iraq be treated as one country”.
“We recommend, as most important of all, and in strict harmony with  
our Instructions, that whatever foreign administration (whether of one or  
more Powers)  is  brought  into  Syria,  should come in  not  at  all  as  a  
colonising Power; in the old sense of that term, but as a Mandatory  
under the League of Nations with a clear consciousness that "the well-
being and development," of the Syrian people form for it a "sacred trust.  
[…] We recommend, in the second, that the unity of Syria be preserved,  
in  accordance  with  the  earnest  petition  of  the  great  majority  of  the  
people of Syria. 
[…]  There  would  then  be  no  reason  why  Palestine  could  not  be  
included in a united Syrian State, just as other portions of the country,  
the holy places being cared for by an international and inter-religious  
commission, somewhat as at present under the oversight and approval  
of the Mandatory and of the League of Nations. The Jews, of course,  
would have representation upon this Commission. 5" 
As  expected,  these  conclusions  were  acclaimed  by  Faisal  and  the  Arab 
nationalists.  However,  this  was  not  to  alter  Wilson's  support  for  the  Balfour 
Declaration and for the Zionist movement6. Furthermore, the report was not sent 
to  the  Peace  Conference  and  it  was  not  taken  into  account  during  the 
deliberations  that  followed.  It  was  made  public  only  two  years  after  being 
issued7. In the meanwhile, the San Remo International Conference, which took 
place from April 19th to 26th 1920 in Italy, dealing with the dispositions and future 
of the Ottoman Empire, had already stated and recommended the attribution of 
a mandate over Palestine to the United Kingdom – thus deciding to respond to 
the Zionist  and British demands – and a mandate over the rest  of  Syria  to  
France,  meaning  that  the  Balfour  Declaration  and  the  principle  of  colonial 
division  called  for  by  the  Sykes-Picot  agreement  had  been  internationally 
sanctioned. These decisions were reaffirmed by the signature of the Treaty of 
Sèvres, and in 1921, British policy in Palestine was again asserted at the Cairo 
Conference8. 
4 UNISPAL, “Recommendations of the King-Crane Commission with regard to Syria-Palestine and 
Iraq”, August 29, 1919. 
5 Ibid.
6 Christison, Kathleen, “U.S policy and the Palestinians: bound by a frame of reference”,  Journal of  
Palestine Studies 26(4), Summer 1997, pp.46-59.
7 Stannard Baker, Ray, “Against Palestine as a Jewish State”, op.cit., August 20, 1922.
8 A conference during which Winston Churchill, then Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs laid out his 
ambitions for Britain's role in the Arab world for the following generations.
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Drafting the mandate
Whilst the political decision had been made, it still remained to formulate 
the mandate, a task for the mandatory power itself, which was soon confronted 
with  the fate of  Palestine's  Arab inhabitants9.  But,  at  this  stage,  despite  the 
partition of Syria for Britain's and Jewish interests, there was still no hint of a 
partition plan for Palestine. On the contrary, both the British government and the 
Zionist movement considered Palestine as an undivided territorial unit and they 
drew their policies from that premise.
It took a long and arduous struggle and numerous drafts to finalise the 
text  of  the mandate and obtain the League of Nations'  ratification10.  Several 
months of renewed controversy ensued within the British administration on the 
subject  of  the Balfour Declaration and its compatibility with the rights of  the 
indigenous  population,  but  also  with  the  prior  engagements  of  the  British 
government with King Hussein, Sharif of Mecca. However, besides the internal 
pressures, the British government had to deal with constant pressure from the 
Zionist Organization which participated in the drafting process as attests a note 
by Lord Curzon :
“Weizmann comes to see me every other day and says that he has a  
right to do this, that or the other in Palestine! I won't have it!”11.
A few months after the drafting of the mandate began, Lord Curzon had become 
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs12. As we know, he had been one of the 
main opponents to the Balfour Declaration and he was generally unsympathetic 
to the Zionist movement and its aims in the Middle East. Considering that the 
British  government  had  made  many  mistakes  in  its  prior  engagements,  G. 
Curzon was determined to make adjustments by writing a general  draft  and 
avoid  making  any promise that  would  provide  the  Zionist  movement  with  a 
means of claiming sovereignty over Palestine. 
However, the Zionist Organization was far-sighted; by December 1918, it had 
9 SEE Chapter I.
10 McTague, John J., “Zionist-British negotiations over the draft mandate for Palestine, 1920”,  Jewish 
Social Studies 42(3-4), Summer/Autumn 1980, pp.281-292.
11 Shlaim, Avi, “The Balfour Declaration and its consequences”, op.cit., pp. 251-270.
12 He became Secretary of Foreign Affairs in the Autumn of 1919.
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already produced a draft constitution in anticipation of its appearance before the 
Versailles Peace Conference. This draft stressed the necessity for the “historic 
title” of the Jewish People in Palestine to be recognized, as well as “the right of 
the Jews to reconstitute in Palestine their National Home”. It also supported the 
British in their pursuit of the mandate and the constitution of a government. The 
draft was presented to the Peace conference but was discussed later, in April, 
within the Foreign Office. The latter then proposed some changes. One of the 
expressions that was causing problems was the "historic title" of the Jews to 
Palestine;  actually,  the  Foreign  Office  proposed  to  modify  it  with  "historic 
connection". They also proposed to replace the "right of the Jews" to establish 
their National home with "the claim which [their historical title] gives them" to 
establish a National home. 
In July 1919, discussions with the Zionist Organisation over the wording of the 
text  continued  through  Eric  Forbes-Adam,  the Foreign  Office  Junior  Clerk 
attached to the political section of the British Empire Delegation to the Paris 
Peace Conference at the time. The draft produced by the Foreign Office did not 
satisfy the Zionist  leadership who made counter-proposals13.  First,  the  latter 
insisted  on  recognition  in  the  preamble,  of  the  Jews'  claim  "to  reconstitute 
Palestine as their national home”14. Second, they required the establishment of 
an "appropriate Jewish Agency" to advise and cooperate with the government in 
all  matters concerning the National Home, and the recognition of the Zionist 
Organization as the Jewish Agency in question. Third, they enumerated a series 
of specific privileges for the Zionists among which: 
“the  right  of  consultation  before  beginning  any  projects  for  the  
development of resources; acceptance of the principle that the growth  
of  the  National  Home  would  be  made  the  chief  objective  of  all  
governmental  projects;  designation  of  the  Zionist  Organization  as  
responsible for Jewish education; and recognition by the Mandatory of  
the Sabbath and all Jewish holidays”15. 
In  order  to  push for  these demands to  be integrated into  the mandate,  the 
Zionist Organization appointed Benjamin Cohen – an American attorney who 
had served as a counsellor for the Zionist Organisation in 1919 – to deal with 
13 Mentioned in  McTague, John J., “Zionist-British negotiations over the draft mandate for Palestine, 
1920”, op.cit., pp.281-292.
14    SEE the text of the Balfour Declaration in Chapter I, p. 19.
15 Shlaim, Avi, “The Balfour Declaration and its consequences”,  op.cit., pp. 251-270.
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these matters. The discussions were pursued with Forbes-Adam as well as a 
legal adviser from the Foreign Office in Paris in December of that same year. 
After  a  few  meetings,  the  three  of  them  finally  agreed  to  redraft  the  text 
according to the changes proposed by the Zionist Organization. 
Despite  being Secretary of  State  for  Foreign Affairs,  Lord  Curzon was then 
isolated  in  his  position  vis-à-vis  the  Zionist  movement  and  the  Balfour 
Declaration. However, the draft was too pro-Zionist for Curzon who rejected it. 
He understood that it called for a Jewish State under the terminology “a self-
governing commonwealth” and that  was “the very thing they accept and we 
disallow”16.  He  distrusted  H.  Weizmann,  whom  he  thought  used  a  double 
standard:
“I feel tolerably sure ... that while Weizmann may say one thing to you,  
or while you may mean one thing by a national home, he is out for  
something quite different.  He contemplates a Jewish state,  a Jewish  
nation, a subordinate population of Arabs etc. ruled by Jews; the Jews  
in possession of the fat of the land, and directing the Administration. He  
is trying to affect this behind the screen and under the shelter of British  
trusteeship”17.
However,  he  was  even  more  critical  vis-à-vis  his  government's  lack  of 
consistency  and  honesty  concerning  its  policy  in  Palestine.  He  feared  the 
Government was indeed formulating the text of the mandate so that it would 
provide  Jews  the  right  to  eventually  establish  a  Jewish  State  in  Palestine. 
Ironically, he stated: “Seeing as we do not mean Arab or Syrian Commonwealth 
- why not be honest and come right out and say Jewish Commonwealth?”
Indeed, maybe the main interest in Curzon's criticism was that he was one of 
the sole members of the government to approach the Arab dimension of the 
Palestine question and refer to the Palestinians as a major given:
“Here is a country with 500,000 Arabs and 30,000 or is it 60,000 Jews  
(by no means all  Zionists).  Acting upon the noble principles of  self-
determination  and  ending  with  a  splendid  appeal  to  the  League  of  
Nations,  we  then  proceed  to  draw  up  a  document,  which  reeks  of  
Judaism in every paragraph and is an avowed constitution for a Jewish  
State.  ...  It  is  quite  clear  that  this  mandate  has  been  drawn  up  by  
someone reeling under the fumes of Zionism. If we are all to submit to  
that intoxicant, this draft is all right”. 
16 McTague, John J., “Zionist-British negotiations over the draft mandate for Palestine, 1920”,  op.cit., 
pp.281-292.
17 Quoted  in  David  Gilmour,  “The  unregarded  prophet:  Lord  Curzon  and  the  Palestine  question”, 
Journal of Palestine Studies 25(3), Spring 1996, pp.60-68.
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He was persuaded that the Zionist movement was aiming for a Jewish State on 
all of Palestine and that it considered the Balfour Declaration as giving them the 
right to do so. He was also well aware of the separatist tendency of the Zionist  
movement as well as its will to dominate. He even tried to draw the attention of 
other members of the Government to the issue and to raise their awareness of  
the  fact  that  in  pursuing  this  direction,  they  faced  with  the  inevitable 
establishment of a Jewish State in Palestine, but his alerts remained in vain. 
“The Zionists are after a Jewish State with the Arabs as hewers of wood  
and drawers of water. ... I want the Arabs to have a chance and I don't  
want a Hebrew State”. 
Willing  to  put  Britain’s  commitments  to  the  Zionist  movement  in  another 
perspective, G. Curzon asked for a new version on June 10th, when he was 
presented with a draft that finally met his approval. The preamble removed any 
mention of a Jewish “title to”, “connection to” or “rights to” Palestine, however, it  
still  contained the pledges of the Balfour Declaration.  Then,  the terms “self-
governing Commonwealth” were replaced by “self-governing institutions” which 
he considered more neutral. In this version, the Arabs were no more mentioned 
as the “present non Jewish population” but as the “native population”18. Finally, 
some of the privileges attributed to the Zionist movement in previous drafts, 
such as the right of prior consultation, were removed. However, , the Zionist 
Organization  was  still  paradoxically  being  consulted  in  the  drafting  of  the 
mandate. 
The  draft  was  eventually  presented  to  the  Zionist  Organization,  which  was 
highly unsatisfied to find out that the changes questioned and removed their 
historic title to Palestine19. So, a new round of negotiations started, involving the 
French government20.  The latter,  considering  the  draft  too  favourable  to  the 
Zionist  Organisation,  expressed  its  hostility.  A new draft  was  produced  that 
whilst  suppressing  all  the  privileges  proper  to  the  Zionist  Organization,  re-
18 This change is due to Sir John Tilley, secretary to Lord Curzon, who remarked that the reference to the  
Arabs underlined that the Arabs were a minority. However, this was not to figure in the final draft  
where the Arab Palestinians were referred to as “the existing non-Jewish population”.
19 The programme of the Zionist Organization stressing the “historical title to Palestine” was presented 
in  1919  during  the  Peace  Conference  and  it  is  available  at: 
http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/History/zoparis.html 
20 French involvement was through the intervention of Robert Vansittart who then acted as the British 
envoy in Paris, dealing in affairs concerning negotiations in the Middle East.
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integrated the mention of the historical rights of the Jews in Palestine, to “water 
down  the  mandate”21.  When  presented  with  the  draft,  Weizmann's 
dissatisfaction  to  see  that  their  privileges  were  once  again  reduced  was 
counterbalanced by the restoration of the controversial phrase of the preamble 
on the historical ties with Palestine. Finally, to accelerate the implementation of 
the mandates, an Interdepartmental Committee on Mandates was created with 
the task of finalising the draft. By doing so, the latter added the recognition of 
the  Zionist  Organization as  the  Administration's  partner  “so  long  as  its 
organisation and constitution are in the same opinion as the Mandatory”. The 
Committee also retained the phrase about historical ties in the preamble but 
deleted mention of the right it gave them to “reconstitute their national home”, a 
sentence that Lord Curzon, for procedural reasons, chose to re-integrate22. Lord 
Curzon  was  isolated  in  the  government  and Zionism gained the  support  of 
Prime Minister Lloyd George for the inclusion of this phrase in the preamble of  
the mandate. Arthur Balfour, who had become Lord President of the Counsel, 
and thus no longer dealt directly with Palestine, did however propose a sort of  
compromise, which still was in the Zionist movement's interest. Two of the most 
influential personalities had once more supported the Zionist Organization in its 
claims.  The amendment proposed by Lord Balfour  ultimately constituted the 
version of the preamble that was adopted by the cabinet and then approved by 
the League of Nations in July 1922. The mandate was ratified under the Treaty 
of Lausanne in autumn 1923, and if there were a few minor changes in the 
text23,  it  contained  the  full  reaffirmation  of  the  Balfour  Declaration  in  its 
preamble: 
“Whereas  the  Principal  Allied  Powers  have  also  agreed  that  the  
Mandatory should be responsible for putting into effect the declaration  
originally  made on  November  2nd 1917,  by  the  Government  of  His  
Britannic Majesty,  and adopted by the said Powers,  in favour of  the  
establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, it  
being  clearly  understood  that  nothing  should  be  done  which  might  
prejudice  the  civil  and  religious  rights  of  existing  non-Jewish  
21 McTague, John J., “Zionist-British negotiations over the draft mandate for Palestine, 1920”,  op.cit., 
pp.281-292.
22 It made no sense for him to remove it if the first part of the sentence remained intact.
23 “It was also embodied verbatim in the draft Mandate for Palestine which was submitted to the League 
of Nations in December 1920. The terms of the draft Mandate were eventually approved with some 
modifications (not affecting the policy of the Declaration) by the Council of the League of Nations in 
July 1922”. Quoted in National Archives, CAB/24/159/, “Memorandum by the Secretary of State for 
the Colonies,” February 17th 1923. 
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communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by  
Jews in any other country […]”
The Zionist Organisation had put such pressure on the various parties involved 
in  the  drafting  process  that  eventually,  the  text  of  the  mandate,  went  even 
further  than  the  text  of  the  Declaration,  as  it  stated  a  historical  connexion 
between  the  “Jewish  people”  and  Palestine  which  entitled  the  Jews  to 
reconstitute their national home in Palestine24. 
Not only did the League of Nations agree to the mandate of Palestine, but it  
also  conferred  the  right  of  the  mandatory  powers  to  draw  the  frontiers  of  
Palestine. The mandate also called for the establishment of a Jewish Agency to 
assist in the governance of the country but it made no mention of any connexion 
of  the Arabs to Palestine,  or  their  right  to sovereignty nor did it  call  for  the 
formation of a Palestinian Arab political organ. 
 
B. British Policy Between Partition and a Unitary State 
Whilst  they were  drafting  the  mandate,  Britain  tried  to  implement  the 
Balfour  Declaration  while  soothing  the  Palestinian  Arabs.  Nevertheless,  the 
problems in Palestine where not the sole source of concern for the government 
which had to face renewed controversy about previous pledges. And part of the 
government's strategy to resolve these problems, was to appear consistent in 
its policy. Having to juggle with various pledges, the British government decided 
to minimize the meaning of the Hussein-McMahon correspondence: Palestine 
had, according to them, always been excluded from the British pledges, which 
meant that it could not be part of Greater Syria. This is well expressed in the 
White Paper of June 3rd 1922. 
“It is not the case, as has been represented by the Arab Delegation that  
during  the  war  His  Majesty's  Government  took  efforts  for  an  
independent  national  government  to  be  established  at  once,  in  
Palestine. This representation mainly rests upon a letter dated October  
24th  1915,  from  Sir  Henry  McMahon,  then  His  Majesty's  High  
24 UNISPAL, League of Nations: Mandate for Palestine, August 12, 1922.
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Commissioner  in  Egypt,  to  the  Sharif  of  Mecca,  the  present  King  
Hussein of the Kingdom of the Hejaz. That letter is quoted as conveying  
the  promise  to  the  Sherif  of  Mecca  to  recognise  and  support  the  
independence of the Arabs within the territories proposed by him. But,  
in the same letter, this promise was subject to reservation because it  
excluded from its scope, among other territories, the portions of Syria  
lying  to  the  west  of  the  District  of  Damascus.  This  reservation  has  
always been regarded by His Majesty's Government as covering the  
Vilayet  of  Beirut  and  the  independent  Sanjak  of  Jerusalem.  All  of  
Palestine to the west of the Jordan River was thus excluded from Sir  
Henry McMahon's pledge”25.
In  March  1921,  a  special  department  under  orders  from the  Colonial 
Office dealing with the Middle East had been created and the Palestine file had 
been transferred from the Foreign Office to the Colonial Office. On February 
17th  1923,  the  Colonial  Secretary  of  State  for  the Colonies  issued  a 
memorandum – written by the Middle East Department – seeking the resolution 
once and for all of the question of the “contradicting” pledges. For five years, 
British policy in Palestine, as remarks the author of  the memorandum, Lord 
Devonshire, had been dictated by the Balfour Declaration and he proposed to 
review the main questions of the debate by evoking the various reactions on the 
British side to pledges and previous investigations.  For that purpose, he set 
three main questions:
• “Is there anything in the British Government’s pledges to the Arabs that  
precludes  effect  being  given  to  the  Balfour  Declaration  in  favour  of  
setting up a National Home for the Jews in Palestine?
• If  the  answer  is  negative,  are  we  to  continue  the  policy  of  the  late  
Government by giving effect to the Balfour Declaration on the lines laid  
down in the White Paper of June 1922?
• If not, what alternative policy are we to adopt?”26.
Assessing the “vital importance” of maintaining Palestine under British scope for 
Imperial  reasons,  the  Middle  East  Department  developed  twenty-nine 
arguments that could be summed up as follows. 
First,  Palestine  was  excluded  from  the  pledges  given  to  Sharif  Hussein. 
Furthermore, these pledges were given to Sharif Hussein and not to the Arabs 
and even less the Arabs of Palestine. 
The  memorandum  completely  excluded  the  fact  that  the  conditions  of  the 
25 British White Paper of June 1922, available at: http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/brwh1922.asp 
26 National  Archives,  CAB  24/159/,  “Palestine.  Memorandum  by  the  Secretary  of  State  for  the 
Colonies”, 17 February 1923.
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correspondence required having Sharif  Hussein as the representative of  the 
Arabs. Moreover, on repeated occasions, the Sharif made clear that he was not 
negotiating for himself but for the Arabs; this was accepted by the British, as 
they relied on him to raise an Arab army. 
Second,  the pledges to  the Zionists  could not be abandoned,  as they were 
contracted in times of war – when they were in need of the Jews - and not 
respecting them would be considered as “an act of baseness”27.
Moreover,  given that  the Zionists  could obtain  the support  of  many powers, 
amongst which the United States, and that the text of the Declaration had been 
included in the conclusions of the San Remo conference and the draft mandate, 
the  advocates  of  the  declarations  argued  that  the  British  Government  was 
“committed to the Zionist policy before the whole world”.
Third,  we understand from the document that no one was able to provide a 
clear answer to the question of the Balfour Declaration, which conflicted with the 
previous  pledges  to  the  Arabs  in  the  McMahon-Hussein  correspondence. 
Nevertheless,  the  authors  acknowledged  the  government's  explanation 
according to which Palestine had always been considered as being outside the 
Arab territory, seeing as it was intended to lie under international control. The 
question was however underlined by the Palestine Arab Delegation that visited 
London in 1922. To find out whether or not Palestine was excluded from the 
Arab territory that was promised recognition of independence, the Cabinet had 
directly  asked  McMahon,  who  stated  that  he  had  no  intention  to  include 
Palestine  in  the  above-mentioned  territory.  Furthermore,  the  memorandum 
continues by stressing that the McMahon pledges were not in binding terms, as 
no treaty was signed, and excluded Palestine from the territories mentioned in 
Allenby's proclamation dealing with self-governing in the Arab territories. 
Fourth, stating their arguments in a speech given by Arthur Balfour in the House 
of the Lords on June 21st 1922, the authors went even further and explained 
that  whatever  the  wording  may  be  of  McMahon's  letter,  the  British  did 
“substantially” fulfil their promise to “promote Arab independence”. 
“Hussein reigns as an independent sovereign at Mecca; Feisal rules in  
Baghdad;  Abdullah  in  Trans-Jordan.  Ibn  Saud,  through  his  vast  
territories, is free from all  fear of  Turkish interference or aggression.  
Further south, the Imamin, the Yemen and the Idrisi in Asir, rule over  
27 Ibid.
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independent States”. 
The Middle-East department's contempt is palpable in the following sentences, 
when it states that Britain provided the Arabs more than they could ever have 
dreamed of, and for that the latter were indebted. A debt that the Arabs could 
pay by letting the British “have their way” in Palestine:
“The Arabs as a whole have acquired a freedom undreamed of before  
the war. Considering what they owe to us, they may surely let us have  
our way in one small area, an area that we do not admit is covered by  
our  pledges,  and that  in  any case,  for  historical  and other  reasons,  
stands  on  a  wholly  different  footing  from  the  rest  of  the  Arab  
countries”28.
To adjust to the interests of the British Empire and end the discussion of the 
pledges, the British government decided – out of the four alternatives proposed 
by the Middle East Department 29 – to maintain the status quo and encourage 
the  Zionist  movement  to  further  its  imprint  on  the  country  and  develop  its 
institutions. Whilst  they  were  amputating  Greater  Syria  from  its  southern 
province, they still regarded Palestine as an undivided entity where there were 
certainly Arabs but also where there would be Jews. At this stage, no official  
project  was  drawn  as  to  the  future  of  Palestine,  its  government  or  its 
demographic and geographical frontiers.
In the early years of the mandate, Palestine or to be more precise, the 
Palestinian  Arabs  were  considered  through  a  “typical  colonial  mode  of 
28 Ibid.
29  These alternatives were formulated as follows:
“1) They might say in effect: "We have examined our predecessors' commitments” and find that they  
gave contradictory promises to the Arabs and to the Jews. As the Arab promise was made first, we feel  
bound to maintain it, and consequently declare the Jewish pledge to be null and void."
2) They might say: "We are not satisfied with any pledges that were given to the Arabs regarding  
Palestine. The language used was inconclusive. On the other hand, the pledge to the Jews was clear  
and unequivocal. But the Jewish pledge provided not only for a National Home for the Jews, but also  
for the maintenance of the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine.  
Experience has shown that the two parts of the pledge are wholly incompatible. We do not propose to  
continue with this experiment.”
3) They might say; "Whatever pledges may or may not have been given, either to Jews or to Arabs, we  
find that the commitments incurred by our predecessors are more than we are able to honour. This is  
not a case of argument, but of sheer necessity. We have no alternative but to abandon the task."
4) They might take the same ground as the late Government, viz., “that, looking at the pledges as a  
whole, they find that there is nothing in what was said to the Arabs to preclude the due fulfilment of  
the Balfour Declaration; that they regard the policy of the White Paper as adequately safeguarding  
both parts of that Declaration and see no reason for making any departure from it”.
84
thought”30.  So,  the  Arabs  who  constituted  the  overwhelming  majority  in 
Palestine were rather seen with contempt by the British officials. In contrast to 
the Jews, to whom the British promised Palestine, and recognized their right to  
self-determination, the Palestinians were seen as a conglomerate of religious 
communities that could not form a nation31. 
Britain's vision of the indigenous people was such that it influenced its political 
conduct towards them and towards the Jewish settlers. As a consequence, the 
Palestinian  Arabs  were  under-represented  in  the  governmental  posts.  In 
contrast,  Britain  was  supporting  the  Zionist  will  for  the  organisation  and 
implementation of an autonomous Jewish agency, and often consulted them on 
important matters. According to Charles D. Smith, “Zionist officials had access 
to nearly all secret documents drawn up both in Jerusalem and in the Colonial  
Office  in  London,  either  through  their  own  spies  or  through  British  officials 
sympathetic to their cause”32. Moreover, when Palestinian Arabs were appointed 
to administrative positions – although these were never high level or political 
positions  –,  it  was  used as  a  way to  implement  a  divide-and-rule  policy or  
“emasculate Arab nationalist opposition to the mandatory system”33. 
In  addition  to  these  obstacles,  due  to  the  inequality  of  their  treatment,  the 
Palestinian leadership, made up of members of the main notable families, was 
the theatre of rivalries. The question of Palestinian social organisation has been 
the  subject  of  numerous  studies,  from  newspaper  articles  to  books  and 
academic theses, with a focus on rivalries among notable families, especially 
among the Jerusalem families. However, these rivalries have often been over-
estimated and pointed at as the major if not the sole cause of the inability of the 
Palestinians to struggle against the Zionist movement and the British colonial 
authorities34. 
Actually, the divisions amongst the Palestinian leadership were well used and 
even exacerbated by both the British authorities and the Zionist Executive. The 
divide and rule precept was implemented through the attribution of titles, new 
30 Smith, Barbara Jean, The roots of separatism in Palestine: British economic policy 1920-1929, New 
York 1993, p.7.
31 Khalidi, Rashid, The Iron cage, the story of the Palestinian struggle for statehood, Oxford 2006, p.8.
32 Ibid., p. 123.
33 Smith, Charles D.,  Palestine and the Arab-Israeli conflict, a history with documents, Boston 2001, 
Fourth Edition, p.122.
34 Khalidi, Rashid, The Iron cage, the story of the Palestinian struggle for statehood, op.cit., p.8.
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religious positions or stipends to only some of the notables. The policy they 
used was in many ways similar to that used in Egypt and Syria, or even India.
The Royal Commission of Enquiry and the first official proposal for  
partition
British  policy  of  laissez-faire encouraged  the  Zionist  movement  to 
develop its  activities  and its  colonization  in  a  more  systematic  way so  that 
Jewish immigration reached a peak in the years 1934-1935. This,  combined 
with  the paternalistic British policy,  favoured the emergence of a great  Arab 
Palestinian protest movement all around the country, which turned into riots and 
a call for a general strike. This was to be the first general and organised  revolt. 
As we will see in chapter four, this revolt would also encourage the Palestinian 
leaders  to  gather  and  organise  in  the  Arab  Higher  Committee  (AHC). 
Proceduralists35 as they were, and despite the failure of their previous attempts, 
the British authorities were convinced that they would find a solution with the 
help of “experts” through discussions with the Zionist leadership and the Arabs. 
So, after the Arabs agreed to call off the strike, the British Government decided 
to send a Royal Commission to evaluate and determine the causes of the Arab 
revolt. 
The commission (present in Palestine from November 11, 1936 to January 18, 
1937), was to hear British government officers as well as the “protagonists” in 
Palestine. However, neither the Zionist movement nor the Arabs were at first 
willing to participate to the hearings. The commission was not welcomed by the 
Zionist Executive, which feared its recommendations and argued to the British 
authorities  that  this  would  be  perceived  as  “a  concession  to  violence”36. 
However, knowing that boycotting the commission would do more harm than 
participating  to  the  hearings,  Ben  Gurion  finally  decided  that  the  Zionist 
35 This  typology  is  borrowed  from  Brendan  O'Leary  who  defines  “proceduralists”  as  follows: 
“Proceduralists advocate the involvement of the “affected parties”, to achieve as  much reciprocal  
consent on the new border as possible.  They try to establish rules to which reasonable partitions  
should conform. They see roles for commissions, and particularly judges and technical experts, in  
appraising  the  claims  for  appropriate  boundaries”,  in  “Debating  partition.  Justifications  and 
critiques”, p. 5.
36 Haim Weizmann quoted in Rose, Norman, “The debate on Partition, 1937-1938: the Anglo-Zionist 
Aspect”, Middle Eastern Studies 6(3), October 1970, pp. 297-318.
86
Organisation should participate. 
On the Arab side, the intervention of Arab and Muslim leaders such as King Ibn 
Saud and the King of Iraq led the AHC to present before the commission37.
So, the Arabs of Palestine presented their case before the Commission and 
they did not wave an inch in their considerations and demands. For them, the 
strikes and the revolt were caused by two main issues, first, the Arabs were 
prevented from enjoying their natural and political rights in Palestine, second, by 
pursuing a policy favouring the creation of a Jewish National Home, the British 
were destroying the Arab identity and presence in Palestine38. 
It seems that the Zionist Executive was ready to find a compromise with 
the British authorities.  An interesting account of the discussions between the 
members of the commission and the Zionist leadership, in the person of Haim 
Weizmann,  is  given  by  Norman  Rose39.  According  to  N.Rose,  the  idea  of 
partition arose quite early and was first developed as a “cantonisation” scheme 
and  discussed  in  brief  terms  with  Weizmann during  his  hearing.  Under  the 
impulse of Reginald Coupland, the members of the Commission would move 
from “cantonisation” to “partition”. Reginald Coupland was a fervent Zionist, but 
also a Professor of Colonial History at Oxford, notably specialising in the study 
of the national conflicts, and as such was familiar with the schemes for Ireland's 
partition although he did not support Ireland's division40. H.Weizmann was not at 
all reluctant at the idea of partition, and he was not the sole Zionist leader to feel 
so, but he feared that the Yishuv was not yet in a position where it could sustain 
autonomy, finding itself  facing the Arabs alone.  He is to  have said during a 
meeting :
“we  should  make  it  clear  that  we  did  not  look  favourably  upon  the  
scheme. We were keeping an open mind, but the details were of the  
greatest  importance,  and  we  would  be  prepared  to  consider  the  
scheme if these details were not obviously unsatisfactory”41.
37 Al-Kayyali, Abdulwahab (ed.),  Documents of the Arab Palestinian Resistance against the UK and  
Zionism, Beirut 1988,  p.462.
38 Arab Higher committee, “Memorandum by the Arab Higher Committee to the Royal Commission of  
Inquiry”, in Al-Kayyali, Abdulwahab (ed.), Documents of the Arab Palestinian Resistance against the  
UK and Zionism, op.cit., pp.463-469. 
39 Rose, Normann, “The debate on Partition, 1937-1938: the Anglo-Zionist  Aspect”, Middle Eastern  
Studies 6(3), October 1970, pp. 297-318.
40 Fraser,  Thomas,  Partition in Ireland, India and Palestine.  Theory and Practice,  op.cit.,  p.2; Katz, 
Yossi, Partner to partition. The Jewish Agency's partition plan in the mandate era, London 1998, pp. 
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If Lloyd George did not evoke the question of partition during his hearing, he did 
nevertheless evoke the state of  mind in which he was when supporting the 
Balfour Declaration. And for him this was clear: 
“The idea was, and this was the interpretation put upon it at the time,  
that a Jewish State was not to be set up immediately by the Peace  
Treaty without reference to the wishes of the majority of the inhabitants.  
On the other hand, it was contemplated that when the time arrived for  
according  representative  institutions  to  Palestine,  if  the  Jews  had  
meanwhile responded to the opportunity afforded them by the idea of a  
national home and had become a definite majority of the inhabitants,  
then Palestine would thus become a Jewish Commonwealth”42.
So, in other words, the idea was to provide the Zionists with the opportunity to 
make their best to become a majority and thus establish their sovereignty. 
The Commission’s report was more than 400 pages long and included a 
lengthy presentation of the situation and its historical roots. It was mostly written 
and inspired by Reginald Coupland. It positioned the causes of the Arab revolt 
in  their  desire  for  national  independence  and  the  fear  of  Zionism.  It  also 
presented the background of two totally different populations with competing 
national aspirations and who had no common ground to share:
“What  are  the  existing  circumstances?  An  irrepressible  conflict  has  
arisen between two national communities within the narrow bounds of  
one small country. About 1,000,000 Arabs are in strife, open or latent,  
with some 400,000 Jews. There is no common ground between them.  
The Arab community is predominantly Asiatic in character, the Jewish  
community  predominantly  European.  They  differ  in  religion  and  in  
language.  Their  cultural  and  social  life,  their  ways  of  thought  and  
conduct, are as incompatible as their national aspirations. These last  
are the greatest bar to peace. Arabs and Jews might possibly learn to  
live and work together in Palestine if they would make a genuine effort  
to reconcile and combine their national ideals and so build up in time a  
joint or dual nationality. But this they cannot do. The War and its sequel  
have inspired all Arabs with the hope of reviving in a free and united  
Arab world the traditions of the Arab golden age.
The Jews similarly are inspired by their  historic past.  They mean to  
show what the Jewish nation can achieve when restored to the land of  
its birth. National assimilation between Arabs and Jews is thus ruled  
London on March 15, 1937, in Norman Rose, “The debate on Partition, 1937-1938: the Anglo-Zionist  
Aspect”, Middle Eastern Studies 6(3), October 1970, pp. 297-318.
42 National Archives, CAB/24/282/, “Memorandum by the Secretary of State for the Colonies”,  January 
18, 1939.
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out.  In  the  Arab picture  the Jews could only  occupy the  place they  
occupied in Arab Egypt or Arab Spain. The Arabs would be as much  
outside the Jewish picture as the Canaanites in the old land of Israel.  
The National Home, as we have said before, cannot be half-national. In  
these circumstances to maintain that  Palestinian citizenship has any  
moral meaning is a mischievous pretence. Neither Arab nor Jew has  
any sense of service to a single State”43.
So, according to the British officials,  Arabs and Jews could possibly not live 
together or share power in a united national state, their claims irreconcilable. 
This was further explained by Herbert Samuel, though the latter did not reach 
the same conclusions as the Royal Commission:
“The  obligations  Britain  undertook  towards  the  Arabs  and  the  Jews  
some twenty years ago .  .  .  have proved irreconcilable,  and,  as far  
ahead as we can see, they must continue to conflict. . . . We cannot – in  
Palestine as it now is – both concede the Arab claim to self government  
and secure the establishment of the Jewish National Home”44. 
Believing that, given the situation, there was no possibility of a Jewish-
Arab  common  agreement,  thus  appealing  to  “historicist”  and  “cost-benefit” 
arguments45,  the  only solution that  appeared feasible  and applicable  for  the 
members  of  the  commission  was  the  end,  in  the  long  term,  of  the  British 
mandate and the partition of Palestine into two states, a Jewish state, an Arab 
state linked to Transjordan and the conservation under a British mandate of 
Jerusalem, Nazareth, the port of Haifa as well as a corridor linking the cities to 
the sea and the harbour. This was the first official proposition of partition and it 
would be immediately accepted by the government, which  announced that “it 
would approach the League of Nations with a view to the ending of the present  
Mandate, and the substitution of a new one on the lines proposed”46. 
This  first  partition  scheme  proposed  and  adopted  by  the  British 
government would change the entire situation. Until then, Palestine had always 
been  administered  as  one  undivided  and  indivisible  land.  Even  those  who 
supported the Zionist demands and wished for a Jewish State (such as Balfour, 
Lloyd George, Winston Churchill etc.) had never envisaged the partition of the 
43 National Archives, CAB/24/270, Palestine: Report of the Royal Commission 1936, June 1937, pp.370-
371.
44 Viscount Samuel, “Alternatives to partition”, Foreign Affairs 16(1), October 1937, pp.143-155. 
45 See the typology identified by Brendan O'Leary in “Debating partition: justifications and critiques”,  
Ibis Working Paper (78), op.cit.
46 National Archives, CAB/24/270, Palestine: Report of the Royal Commission 1936, op.cit.
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country as a means to an end47. However, by 1937, partition seemed to Britain 
the only “way out […] from the existing deadlock in Palestine”48. All in all, first, it 
meant that British policy had failed in Palestine, which they had always wanted 
to  keep  intact  as  a  geographical  and  political  unit.  Second,  they  were 
responding  to  the  pressure  of  the  Zionist  movement  that  refused  any 
compromise to achieve an agreement with the Arabs by granting them a State 
of their own. Third, they knew such a stance would probably dramatically alter 
their  relations with  the Arabs and Muslims.  Last  but  not  least,  partition was 
contravening to the terms of the mandate which meant that the British had failed 
in  their  mission vis  à  vis  the League of  Nations and had to  terminate their 
mandate.  Furthermore, from then on, the Zionist  movement would not falter, 
launching its second offensive,  namely to obtain more favourable conditions 
(frontiers) as we will see in Chapter three. 
Internal criticism of the 1937 partition plan 
News  of  the  plan  would  raise  numerous  reactions  within  the  British 
offices and parliament, within the Zionist movement and of course among the 
Arabs. 
When the cabinet presented its proposition to the parliament, the latter revealed 
its divisions over the question of partition. Discussions started on 20 th July in the 
House of Lords and a significant discussion was held between Lord Peel and 
former High Commissioner in Palestine, Viscount Herbert Samuel, who offered 
one of  the  most  sound criticisms of  the  partition  scheme.  He  opposed any 
partition  of  Palestine and was in  favour  of  alternatives,  which  he presented 
during the debate. His arguments were later to be published in an article in 
October 1937 in Foreign Affairs. Though agreeing to the analysis of the situation 
and then acknowledging the need of a new start, Viscount Samuel developed 
strong criticism of the proposed plan:
“I  could not but agree with their  judgement that it  was necessary to  
make a fresh start.  Undoubtedly the present situation is a deadlock.  
47 Galnoor, Itzhak, The partition of Palestine. Decision crossroads in the Zionist Movement, New York 
1995, p.72.
48 National Archives, CAB/24/270/, Palestine: Report of the Royal Commission, June 1937, p.374. 
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There  is  no  reason  why  a  British  Government  should  consent  to  
engage in a policy of repression and coercion; to sacrifice the lives of  
British soldiers and policemen; to be exposed to active, and sometimes  
bitter, criticism from the Jewish side, while they found that they were  
alienating at the same time the whole of the Arab world and offending  
Moslem opinion in India and elsewhere”49. 
Not only did he criticise the scheme, which proposed an imperfect partition as 
the Jewish state would not include all of the Jewish population and would count 
one  fourth  of  the  Arab  population,  but  he  rejected  the  transfer  of  the  Arab 
population. He then proposed an alternative plan in five points, which depended 
upon cooperation between Arabs and Jews and contained similar measures as 
those that would be later proposed by Judah Magnes: 
“First, a recognition by the Jews that they must make some sacrifice in  
order  to  reassure  the  Arabs  and  arrive  at  a  reconciliation;  and  this  
sacrifice should take the form of a limitation of the Jewish population of  
Palestine,  during a period of  years,  to  an agreed percentage of  the  
whole. (I suggested, tentatively, forty percent; the present percentage is  
about thirty.) Secondly, the aspirations of Arab nationalism should be  
recognized and should be assisted, and efforts made to promote the  
formation  of  a  great  Confederation  in  the  Middle  East,  in  which  
Palestine should be included,  to which it  would bring wealth,  and in  
which the industries of Palestine would find a vast and valuable market.  
Thirdly, Transjordan should be opened by agreement to the settlement  
of both Jews and Arabs and a loan arranged to promote that object. 
Fourthly, the ownership of the Moslem Holy Places in Palestine should  
be guaranteed by the League of Nations in perpetuity. 
Fifthly, the Jewish Community in Palestine as now organized, and the  
Arab Community,  provided with  a new organization,  should each be  
given large powers over the education of their own peoples and over  
public  health  and  other  matters,  and  be  provided  with  adequate  
revenues from taxation. A new Advisory Council should be established,  
in which each Community would be represented as such; the Council  
should also contain the principal British officials: it would be consulted  
by the High Commissioner on all matters of common concern”50.  
For Samuel, this would be the only means to avoid partition, and he  also stated 
that if the Jews and the Arabs could not reach an agreement along these lines,  
then partition would be the only remaining alternative “with all its disadvantages 
and risks”.
The debate was extended to the Parliament, which proved divided and 
whose members raised a number of questions. It finally endorsed the principle 
49 Viscount Samuel, “Alternatives to partition”, Foreign Affairs 16(1), October 1937, pp.143-155. 
50 Ibid. 
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of partition under the condition that they were presented with a detailed plan 
and proper argumentation on the feasibility of the scheme. It also ended with 
the majority deciding to authorise the government to bring the question before 
the League of Nations before re-submitting the plan to the parliament – after 
deeper  investigation51.  Eventually,  Samuel's  remarks,  together  with  other 
arguments against partition and the interventions of Winston Churchill and Lloyd 
Georges, who asked for a more detailed study and proposition, led to the non 
definitive adoption of the plan. To further investigate, the government appointed 
an Inquiry Commission, the Palestine Partition Commission.  
However,  British  policy  did  not  raise  a  consensus  within  the  British 
agencies  and  in  November  1937,  the  Foreign  Office  led  by  Anthony  Eden 
expressed its doubts and reservations as to the merits of partition and to their 
consequences in the Arab region. He took very seriously the note of King Ibn 
Saud and the various comments sent by the British Ambassador in Iraq, the 
authorities in Transjordan and the British envoy in Jeddah52. 
This  was  to  keep  the  debate  about  partition  alive,  especially  between  the 
Foreign Office, which clearly rejected partition, and the Colonial Office with the 
intervention of the Secretary of State for India. Indeed, the news of partition 
caused disturbances in India notably among the Muslim League. The question 
was then the subject of contradictory debates within the Cabinet53. 
As we have seen, whereas Weizmann and Ben Gurion were in favour of 
partition, which offered a concrete perspective, contrary to the hope for Eretz 
Israel, the rest of the Zionist movement was rather opposed to such a solution 
but  they had agreed to  mandate  the  Executive  for  further  investigation  and 
negotiations. Thus, the Zionist Organization did not issue a clear statement. All 
the public statements made by the Arabs as well as the Zionist movement were 
in  opposition of partition and this led Eamon De Valera, the former president of 
the Irish Republic and then President of the Irish Executive Counsel, to deliver a 
speech in the House of Commons against Palestine's partition. This episode 
51 Galnoor,  Itzhak,  The Partition of  Palestine:  decision crossroads in  the Zionist  movement,  op.cit., 
pp.52-53.
52 National Archives,  CAB/24/273, George William Rendell, “Letter of November  8, 1937,  from the 
Foreign Office to the Colonial Office”, Annex to the “Memorandum by the Secretary of State for  
Foreign Affairs”. 
George William Rendell was head of the Eastern Department of the Foreign Office, 1930-1938. 
53 National  Archives,  CAB/23/90A, “Conclusions of  a  meeting of the Cabinet  held at  10,  Downing 
Street, S-W. 1. , on Wednesday, the 8th December, 1937”, pp.5-15.
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was reported in a note by the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, Malcolm 
McDonald54. 
Finally, by the end of 1937, the Palestinian leadership was dispersed all  
over the Middle East area, but as we will see, they did manage to preserve a 
certain unity in decision-making. The sole clear rejection of partition was to be 
heard in Arab ranks and neither the Zionist movement, nor Britain adopted a 
clear position, although the latter was divided about the subject on the higher 
level of the government's administration with the colonial Office favouring it and 
the Foreign Office rejecting it. The Zionist movement was willing to see what 
agreement it could reach with Britain, that decided to continue on the partition 
scheme and appointed a commission to find out the technical possibilities.
As we will see in the following chapters, the recommendation of partition 
contained in the Royal Commission's report provoked intense debates among 
the three actors on the Palestinian scene, and the Arabs decided to resume 
their revolt as a sign of discontent.    
The Woodhead Commission and the revocation of the partition plan
Implementing the decisions made during the debates on the Peel plan, 
the British government, appointed another commission in February 1938 – the 
Palestine Partition Commission or the Woodhead Commission55 – whose terms 
of reference had been subject to a debate between the Colonial and the Foreign 
Offices. Indeed, both the Secretary of State for the Colonies William Ormsby 
Gore, and the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Anthony Eden, had their 
ideas  about  the  tasks  of  the  Commission:  with  the  former,  following  the 
decisions  of  the  Government,  suggesting  that  the  Commission  should  have 
technical tasks only and dismissing the arguments against partition, whereas 
the latter proposed that the Commission should proceed with hearings about 
54 National Archives, CAB/24/271, “Mr. De Valera and Palestine”, Note by the Secretary of State for  
Dominion Affairs, October 14, 1937.
55 After the name of the head of the Commission, John Woodhead, a former civil administrator in India 
(Secretary  of  the  Commerce  Department  of  the  Government  of  India,  Finance  member  of  the  
government of Bengal).
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the  principle  of  partition  itself56.  Indeed,  if  we  recall,  although  partition  was 
approved  by  the  Government,  it  did  not  raise  a  clear  consensus  within 
Parliament, leading to an unclear  vote and the demand for further study of the 
plan. However, probably due to pressure from the Government, the task of the 
commission was finally stated as that of analysing the technical possibilities for  
such  a  partition  and  addressing  the  problems  this  might  raise  and  on  no 
account giving an opinion on the partition principle57. 
“Our terms of reference required us to recommend boundaries for the  
Arab and Jewish areas which would include the fewest possible Arabs  
and Arab enterprises in the Jewish area, and vice-versa. 
The commission travelled through Palestine from April to early August 1938, but 
nonetheless, as the numerous memoranda issued by the Secretary of State for 
the Colonies and the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs attest, debate on the 
principle of partition did not fade. 
In a memorandum dated  August 21, 1938, the newly appointed Secretary of 
State for the Colonies, Malcolm McDonald gave an account of his incentive for 
the  Partition  of  Palestine  and  of  his  discussions  with  Haim  Weizmann  and 
'Ezzat Tannous – a Palestinian politician in charge of the Arab Centre in London 
and whose purpose was to support the Palestinian Arab case. McDonald, just 
like his predecessor, William Ormsby-Gore, was in favour of partition and whilst 
he  still  awaited  the  conclusions  of  the  Woodhead  Commission,  he  did  not 
hesitate to give his favourable opinion on partition.
“1. A scheme of Partition on lines similar to those sketched in the Peel  
Report  is still the best solution of the problem, if it proves practicable  
from the point of view of conditions inside Palestine and opinion outside  
the country. The arguments in its favour are very powerful, and most of  
them are set out in the Peel Report itself.
2.  We should  not  abandon  this  general  solution  lightly,  and  should  
recognise that the arguments in its favour can be made very effective  
not only from the point of view of the Jews, but also from the point of  
view of the neighbouring Arab countries who fear Jewish domination in  
the Near East.
3.  But  two  considerations  may  destroy  this  solution.  First,  practical  
considerations inside Palestine may lead the Woodhead Commission to  
recommend a Jewish State so small that the Jews themselves (who are  
56 Anthony Eden's views are developed in a memorandum to the Cabinet he issued in November 1937, 
and William Ormsby Gore's views are to be read in a memorandum he wrote in December 1937,  
National Archives, CAB/24/273.
57 Woodhead, John, “The report  of the Palestine Partition Commission”,  International Affairs 18(2), 
March-April 1939.
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divided,  even  in  the  Zionist  Movement,  on  Partition)  finally  decide  
against  Partition.  Second,  opinion  in  the  surrounding Arab countries  
and in Egypt may be so bitterly opposed to Partition, and their hostility  
to us be so dangerous in the present international situation, that we  
ourselves are forced to seek an alternative solution.
In view of this possibility, I am examining a variety of other proposed  
solutions. (I can assure my colleagues that I am not suffering from a  
lack of advisers;  almost everybody that I  meet produces some fresh  
solution.)  None of them is really satisfactory;  so far as I  am able to  
judge, all of them would be rejected by either the Arabs or the Jews or  
both; we are faced by a choice between evils. Whatever we do, there is  
likely to be difficulty and trouble in Palestine for a long time to come.  
What we have to try to find is the solution which, whilst it may not bring  
pacification at once, is most likely over a period of years to heal the  
breach between Jews and Arabs and ultimately to create an enduring  
peace”58.
He also had come to think that H. Weizmann and the Zionist Executive were in 
favour of  partition. During talks with Weizmann, the latter had even suggested 
that partition had to be imposed by the British authorities as the only way to 
make the Arabs understand that they should negotiate in that direction. Indeed, 
he considered that  the unclear  British position as to  the  future of  Palestine 
made the Arabs hope for a solution without partition and that it would lead them 
to further their protests. However, even though they arrived at such a scheme, 
the question of demography would still remain.
And a solution to the question of demography was indeed, proposed in 
the report of the Peel Commission, which from its inception had addressed the 
intermingling  of  the  populations,  an  intermingling  that  could  not  enable  the 
creation of states ruling over demographically homogeneous territories59. 
“The number of Arabs in the Jewish area was very large, being about  
295,000, as against 305,000 Jews. The area of the Arab land was also  
large, out of a total of about 5,000,000 dunums, the Arabs owned more  
than 3,750,000 dunums. The Royal  Commission recognised that  the  
problem  created  by  this  large  Arab  minority  would  be  a  serious  
hindrance to the successful operation of partition, and they proposed  
that  it  should be solved by the transfer  of  the greater  part  of  those  
Arabs from the Jewish State to the Arab State. They hoped that it would  
be possible by means of irrigation to provide land in the Arab State for  
the re-settlement of this large number of Arabs, and they contemplated  
that, with the consent of the Arab leaders, the transfer of the Arabs from  
the plains should in the last resort be compulsory”. 
58 National Archives,  CAB/24/278, “Memorandum by the Secretary of State for  the Colonies to the 
Cabinet”, Discussion on Palestine, 21 August 1938.
59 Ibid.
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The British government had however refused to resort to compulsory transfer, 
which made the application of the Peel partition scheme non-viable. So, the 
Partition Commission had to sort out a plan that would not require such drastic  
measures. To that end, it elaborated two other plans, a Plan B, which also could 
not work without transfer, and a Plan C, which it approved by a large majority.  
Plan C was based on a partition in three stages, the Jewish and Arab states 
according to this plan would be smaller, as the former would lose the Galilee 
and Beersheba as both areas contained an Arab majority. However, although 
these areas were Arab in population, the Commission decided not to transfer 
them to the Arab state but to leave them under British authority in the same way 
as Jerusalem and Bethlehem, for two major reasons. First, the commissioners 
considered that it would serve the Jewish state in terms of security as well as 
economics – the Galilee led to the port of Haifa, which was of vital importance.  
Second, Beersheba was a large area with a few Arab inhabitants that could 
eventually contain Jews and granting it to the Arabs would not enable the Jews 
to settle there. 
With all these reservations, the commission ultimately rejected the partition of 
Palestine  as  an  unfeasible  scheme.  However,  the  fact  that  Britain  had 
envisaged  partition  to  end  the  conflict  between  the  two  communities  and 
transfer as a way to create ethnic homogeneous states had created a precedent 
that  the  Zionist  movement  would  further  study  to  provide  its  own  partition 
scheme in due time.
1939 White Paper: safeguarding the unity of Palestine and the pre-
partition plan status quo
In the midst of the debates, the Secretary of State for the Colonies issued 
a new memorandum stating the pledges and proposing guidelines for the future 
policy in Palestine60. 
In  this  memorandum,  the  Middle  East  Department  shows consistency in  its 
60 National Archives, CAB/24/282/, “Memorandum by the Secretary of State for the Colonies”,  January 
18, 1939.
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position as it defends its government in view of the pledges made to the Arabs,  
which he considers were clear from the beginning. However, here we observe a 
new phenomenon, as until then, whereas the British government had made it  
clear that Palestine was not among the territories which it would recognize as 
independent, it did not explicitly state that it was not Arab and did not belong to 
them:
“The phrase used was, unfortunately, vague, and it is a thousand pities 
that,  perhaps  owing  to  the  exigencies  of  war,  the  authors  of  the  
McMahon correspondence did not make it clear to the Arabs beyond  
any reasonable doubt that Palestine was not to be theirs. Certainly, the  
Arab belief that we intended Palestine to belong to them, and that its  
withholding  was  an  after-thought,  is  genuine,  and  they  regard  their  
ownership of it as one of our commitments. On the other hand, I believe  
that it is perfectly true that the British Government of the time did intend  
to  exclude Palestine.  "Responsible statesmen of  the day have been  
unanimous  in saying so, and Sir Henry McMahon has said so. As the  
matter  will  certainly  form  a  subject  of  discussion  when  the  Arab  
representatives  come  to  London,  the  Foreign  Office  are  circulating  
separately some notes upon it as well as upon other legal aspects of  
the Arab case”.
Furthermore, the Arabs had never accepted the division set up by the British 
who considered that areas inhabited by Christians were not to be considered 
purely Arab61. Moreover, the Arabs were always consistent in their position and 
claims  regarding  this,  a  fact  acknowledged  at  the  time  by  the  British 
administration.
In February 1939, after the rejection of the partition principle and in order to 
reach a solution, the British government decided to convene an Anglo-Jewish-
Arab  conference  in  London.  The  conference  was  presided  by  Neville 
Chamberlain  and  was  attended  by  a  Jewish  delegation  headed  by  Haim 
Weizmann.
As  Britain  vetoed  Amin  al  Hussayni's  presence  at  the  conference,  the 
Palestinian  delegation  was  eventually  led  by  Jamal  al-Hussayni62 and  was 
composed  of  members  of  the  high  ranking  families  of  Jerusalem and  Arab 
61 SEE Sharif Hussein's answer to McMahon letter of the 15th October 1915. Moreover, Arab nationalism 
was developed by Muslims and Christians through literary circles and political groups. In Palestine 
this was even more obvious as the preponderant political organ was the Christian-Muslim Association, 
which represented Palestine in several Conferences in London.
62 Jamal al-Husayni (1893-1982), Secretary of the Palestinian Arab Action Committee from 1921 to 
1934. He was also  the founder and chairman of the Palestine Arab Party whom he represented within 
the Arab Higher Committee.
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nationalists: Hussein Fakhri Al-Khalidi, Raghib al Nashashibi, Mussa al Alami, 
Georges Antonius, Amin al Tammimi, Alfred Rock and Yaakoub al Ghossayn. 
They were accompanied by an Arab delegation including the Emir Faisal Ibn 
Abdel-Aziz  (Saudi  Arabi);  Abdel  Mu'min,  the  heir  of  Egypt;  the  Iraqi  Prime 
Minister, Nuri al Said; Emir Hussein of Yemen and the Transjordanian Prime 
Minister, Tawfiq Abu Al Huda.
The  purpose  of  inviting  all  these  delegations  was  to  appease  the  Arabs 
moreover,  the  British  government  thought  that  the  presence  of  other  Arabs 
would temper the Palestinian position, which it clearly did not as the positions 
proved  to  be  irreconcilable.  Due  to  the  lack  of  consensus,  the  British 
government  decided  to  end  the  Conference  and  released  a  White  Paper 
presented by Sir Malcolm McDonald – then Secretary of State for the Colonies. 
The document is mostly known because of its introduction of a limit  to land 
purchase by the  Jews as  well  as  to  Jewish immigration63. Moreover,  it  was 
considered as  a  huge change of  policy,  both  by the  Zionist  movement  and 
among Zionist sympathizers in the United States. As a matter of fact, the White 
Paper viewed favourably the establishment of a Palestinian state – with Arabs 
and Jews – within a period of ten years during which immigration could not 
exceed 75,000 within five years. After those five years, Jewish immigration was 
to be submitted to the agreement of the Arab majority. 
The release of the White Paper was acclaimed by the Arabs who tried to push 
the  Palestinians  to  accept  it.  However,  the  Mufti  and  the  majority  of  the 
Palestinians regarded the ten years period until  independence as a too long 
period, during which Britain might operate a reversal in its policy.  
In Zionist circles however, the White Paper was seen as a reversal and 
treason,  and  it  led  to  campaigns  of  protest  in  the  Yishuv,  including 
demonstrations but also terrorist attacks. It was seen as a blow to the Zionist 
objectives as well as a condemnation of the Jews in the Reich. 
63 The areas concerned by the limitations are the region of Nablus, the Gaza Strip and Bersheva. As for 
the immigration, it was limited to 75,000 for five years. 
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C.  From the  Anglo-American proposal  to  the  United  Nations 
Plan: bi-nationalism, partition and economic union
The way to a bi-national plan
Whereas it  was manoeuvring in  order  to  obtain  a favourable partition 
scheme, the Zionist movement was going further within its own instances as it 
called for a Jewish state all over Palestine and beyond. This was announced 
during the Biltmore Conference in 1942 in the United States and it was to pre-
empt the basis of the Zionists future policy. 
After the adoption of the Biltmore programme, the Zionist leadership worked at 
drawing the United Kingdom and the United States to their cause, the cause of  
partition and the establishment of a Jewish State in order to secure the idea of 
Jewish sovereignty. 
At the end of the 2nd World War, the World was focused on the six million Jewish 
victims of the Third Reich and on the survivors in the camps. The majority of the 
survivors sought to leave for the United States, however, the latter had, since 
the end of the 19th Century carried out  a very restrictive immigration policy 
based on quotas64. At the same time, the United Kingdom was still implementing 
the White Paper of 1939. Quickly, the situation became difficult to control and 
the British government was facing new moral considerations. On the one hand, 
there  were  thousands  of  survivors  seeking  a  home  and  whom  the  Zionist 
leadership was wishing to send to Palestine, whereas on the other hand, the 
Arabs of  Palestine were continuing to  reject  any form of  partition and were 
aspiring to independence. Moreover, the British colonial authorities in Palestine 
had to  face  Jewish  terrorism as  since the  White  Paper  had  been  adopted, 
Jewish  militias  had organised to  protest  against  and attack  the  British.  The 
destruction of the European Jews had had rather positive consequences for the 
Zionist movement as it encouraged Jews and non-Jews to further support the 
movement.  Moreover,  in  1945,  the  World  Zionist  Conference  adopted  the 
Biltmore programme and at the beginning of 1946, about two millions of Jews 
64 From 1945 to 1948, only 25,000 Jews were allowed to settle in the United States.
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all over the World joined the World Zionist Organization.
Parallel to that, the Arabs were also organising themselves and on September 
25, 1944, they met in Alexandria to sign a protocol aiming at the establishment 
of the League of the Arab States, an opportunity to reaffirm the central position 
of Palestine in the Arab World. 
In the meanwhile, the Jewish attacks in Palestine aggravated relations 
between  the  Zionist  movement  and  Britain.  In  the  United  States,  President 
Roosevelt however, had his sympathies set on the Zionist enterprise. It should 
be  remembered  that  in  1938,  he  had  even  thought  of  the  transfer  of  the 
Palestinians  to  enable  the  Jews  to  settle  in  Palestine  but  at  that  time  the 
consequences  of  such  a  move  was  analysed  as  too  important  by  his 
counsellors65.  Until  Roosevelt's  death,  the  United  States  did  not  decide 
categorically in favour of Zionism.
When Roosevelt died, he was succeeded by Harry S. Truman, who, as soon as 
he was in place, appointed an academic – Earl Grant Harrison66 – to write a 
report on the displaced Jews in Europe. Harrison's report  was alarming and 
recommended to open Palestine for the Jews to immigrate. President Truman 
shared  the  conclusions  of  the  report  with  the  British.  Meanwhile,  Clement 
Atlee67 had arrived at  the head of  the British Government and he reminded 
Truman of the pledges to the Arabs. He nevertheless showed himself ready to 
allow steady Jewish immigration into Palestine if the United-States decided to 
assist in the resolution of the Palestine question. 
Whilst Truman accepted the deal, he was to find himself facing, on the one 
hand, the American ambassadors in the Arab countries raising the interests of 
the oil  producing countries,  and on the other hand, the pro-Zionist  senators 
raising  “Jewish vote” as a threat and arguing for pro-Zionist policy. He finally 
decided to espouse the Zionists'  ideal,  furthermore, Palestine also offered a 
chance  to  quickly  resettle  the  European  Jews  without  Western  countries 
needing to adjust and make room. 
The commission submitted its report in ten points on May1, 1946. The main 
recommendations were the issue of 100,000 Jewish immigration certificates to 
65 Christison, Kathleen, “U.S policy and the Palestinians: bound by a frame of reference”, op.cit., pp.46-
59.
66 Earl Grant Harrison (1899-1955), An American attorney, academician and public servant.
67 Clement Richard Attlee (1883-1967), leader of the British Labour Party from 1935 to 1955, he served 
as Prime Minister from 1945 to 1951.
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Palestine and the maintenance of Palestine under international mandate. 
The recommendations of the commission raised a general outcry in the Arab 
World and within the Yishuv and the Zionist federations.  
The former felt betrayed and feared the end of the Arab dream of unity, whereas 
for the latter, they rejoiced at the news of the immigration of 100,000 Jews but 
they wanted a Jewish state. Out of the recommendations of that commission, 
the United States and the United Kingdom produced the Morrisson-Grady plan, 
which advocated the establishment of autonomous provinces within a federal 
frame,  this  was  the  come  back  of  the  “cantonisation”  scheme.  Despite  the 
United States participating in its elaboration, President Truman found a way to 
reject it under the pretext that the plan had received no support, neither from the 
American population nor from their national agencies.
Wishing to put the Zionist movement and the Arabs around the same 
table, and reach an agreement, Britain called for a conference on Palestine. It  
set the Morrisson-Grady plan as the basis for the discussions and negotiations. 
However,  both  the  Zionist  leadership  and  the  Palestinian  Arabs  imposed 
conditions  on  their  participation,  and  these  conditions  were  rejected68.  So, 
although the Zionist Executive and the Palestinians refused the invitations, the 
Arab  Governments  however,  accepted  it  and  they were  finally  to  be  joined 
during the second round of sessions in February 1947, by the representatives of 
the AHC69. 
The  conference  opened  in  September  1946 on  the  basis  of  the  Morrisson-
Grady plan  presented by the  Secretary of  State  for  Foreign  Affairs  himself, 
Ernest Bevin. As expected it aroused the opposition of the Arab representatives, 
who had announced their refusal to participate in discussions on the basis of 
this plan. They did nevertheless propose an alternative plan as a basis for the 
discussions,  and  this  plan  was  based  on  the  end  of  the  mandate  and  the 
establishment of an Arab State in Palestine70.
However,  whilst  Britain  had encouraged  the  Arabs to  take  into  account  the 
68 The Palestinian representatives had been deliberately pushed aside as they had announced they would 
take  position  against  any  proposition  that  did  not  stress  the  Arabs'  historical  rights  in  Palestine.  
H.Levenberg,  “Bevin's  disillusionment,  the  London  conference,  Autumn  1946”,  Middle  Eastern  
Studies 27(4), October 1991, pp.615-630.
69 Arab Office in London, The Future of Palestine, London 1947, p.53.
70 National Archives,  CAB/129/16, “Palestine – Memorandum by the Secretary of State for  Foreign 
Affairs”, January 15, 1947; H. Levenberg, “Bevin's disillusionment, the London conference, Autumn 
1946”, Middle Eastern Studies 27(4), October 1991, pp.615-630.
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Anglo-American  Commission's  recommendation  on  immigration  to  grant 
100,000  Jewish  immigration  certificates,  the  Arabs  sought  a  solution 
independent from the question of Jewish refugees. 
Furthermore,  the  Arab  proposition  clearly  divided  the  British  officials  and 
created  a  gap  between  the  Foreign  Office  and  the  Colonial  Office.  Indeed, 
whilst the former was ready to study the proposition, the latter disqualified it  
outright. Actually, the Colonial Office rejected all  the plans except the Zionist 
movement's plan, namely partition, which it declared as the only plan able to 
solve the question of Palestine. 
Britain was facing a dilemma and several settlement proposals on the table71:
• Its own proposal – which was finalised with the United States, and  
known  as  the  Morrisson-Grady  plan.  This  plan  was  in  substance  
proposing to set autonomous Arab and Jewish provinces.
• the Zionist Executive's partition proposal 
• the Arab proposal which had been presented during the Palestine  
Conference, held in London in September 1946, and which foresaw a  
common state.  
Despite  the  internal  confusion  amongst  the  British  authorities,  the 
negotiations  had  not  yet  ended  when  President  Truman  announced  the 
issuance of  100,000 visas  and the  United  States  support  for  partition,  thus 
sabotaging the negotiations headed by Great Britain. His decision was more a 
gesture towards the Jews and a way to place the United States at the centre of 
the events than a real blow to negotiations as indeed there was no progress72. 
In a context of non-ending conflict and negotiations, and after many attempts to 
reach a status quo for Palestine, no solution could be found that would reconcile 
the Zionist colonial aspirations and the Palestinian national aims. Britain started 
envisioning that the solution would have to be imposed, however they did not 
feel  like  they could  do  this  alone.  Indeed,  they had  been  unable  to  find  a 
solution before the war, how would they find one after it?  Especially now that 
they also had to take into account the Jews who survived the genocide? They 
went back to the United Nations and renounced their mandate over the country. 
71 National Archives, CAB/129/16, “Palestine: Future policy, A memorandum by the Secretary of State 
for the Colonies”, January 16, 1947. On the diverse positions of the Foreign and Colonial Office: 
CAB/66/64/14, “The offices of the war Cabinet,  The future of the British mandate for Palestine”, 
April 4, 1945; CAB/129/16, “Cabinet, Palestine: Reference to United Nations”, January 13, 1947.
72 Morris, Benny, Righteous victims. A history of the Zionist-Arab conflict 1881-2001, New York 1999, 
p.180
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The debates in the UN: partition or not? 
The newly established and “inexperienced” United Nations took on the 
file and constituted a commission to enquire about the Palestine question73. For 
that purpose it sent a delegation to the camps in Europe and to Palestine. So, 
from the very beginning of that enquiry, Palestine was linked with the fate of the 
European  Jews,  which  rendered  an  objective  solution  for  Palestine  barely 
plausible.  This  commission  known as the  UNSCOP (United Nations Special 
Committee  on  Palestine)  set  up  hearings  from  15  June  to  20  July  1947. 
Boycotted  by  the  Arabs  of  Palestine,  it  however  met  with  Arab  States' 
representatives  and  received  a  written  statement  from  the  Arab  Office  in 
Washington. All the testimonies called for the independence of Palestine as an 
Arab State with provision of equality for the Jews as individuals. The Zionist 
movement, as for it, welcomed the Commission with enthusiasm and apart from 
the bi-nationalists and the revisionists, all its members favoured the creation of 
a Jewish State in Palestine be it on all or only part of it – although Ben Gurion 
had started speaking of a Jewish State all over Palestine. I will not go further on  
the presentation of the Zionist and Arab proposals as these will be dealt with in  
the next chapters.  As the inhabitants of Palestine, they refused any idea of 
sharing with a “settler community”74 that had the intention to create a Jewish 
state, which meant a state where the Arabs would not even have the status of 
national minority. Arab desperation only contrasted with the Zionist exacerbated 
battle  on all  fronts  to  obtain  positive  statements on partition from the Great 
Powers. Statements it had obtained by August 1947, just a few days before the 
submission of the first report75.
Although the members of the commission had been hearing testimonies 
for days and collecting written information and reports, they were divided about 
the solution they would recommend. As a matter of fact, whilst all  did agree 
about  the  necessity  to  end  the  Mandate,  eight  out  of  the  eleven  members 
proposed  to  partition  Palestine  into  Jewish  and  Arab  states  bound  with  an 
73 Pappe, Ilan, The Ethnic cleansing of Palestine, London 2006, p.31.
74 Ibid.,  p. 34.
75 Morris, Benny, Righteous victims, op.cit., p.184.
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economic  union,  and  with  an  international  trusteeship  for  Jerusalem  and 
Bethlehem.  The  other  three  members  as  for  them  (representatives  of 
Yugoslavia, Iran and India), proposed that Palestine be given independence as 
a federal state76. As a consequence, the UNSCOP presented two reports to the 
UN  General  Assembly  (UNGA),  the  “majority  report”  with  the  partition 
recommendation  and  the  “minority  report”  which  recommended  to  keep 
Palestine as one unit.
The Zionist movement which as we have seen favoured partition, continued its 
lobbying to gain votes in favour of partition through direct and indirect pressure 
and threats notably via the United States on the latter's client states. By the eve 
of the vote, the Zionist movement had already obtained official  support from 
Truman and the Soviet Union. This was also the occasion to negotiate the terms 
of partition and the frontiers so as to say and that led to the Jews obtaining fifty-
five percent of Palestine in the definitive plan.   
The majority plan got 33 votes, and the minority proposal 13, with ten countries 
abstaining, among which Britain. 
Once partition was decided, the UN appointed a Commission to prepare for the 
establishment of the two States and administrate both parts of the country in the 
meanwhile77. As we will see in the next chapters, the decision by the UNGA led 
to violent clashes but also to what has been identified by numerous scholars of 
the field as an ethnic cleansing against the Palestinian Arabs78. 
E. The American Perspective on Peace and Partition, 1948-1988
As  we  have  seen,  during  and  after  World  War  I,  the  United  States 
presided  by  Woodrow  Wilson  had  been  introducing  the  principle  of  self-
determination.  Whether  the  United  States  aimed for  it  to  be  applied  to  the 
southern countries, and notably to the Middle Eastern area, or not, is a matter of 
76 Ibid., 183.
77 Khader, Bishara, L'Europe et la Palestine: des croisades à nos jours, op.cit., pp. 201-204.
78 The  use  of  the  term  of  ethnic  cleansing  to  describe  what  had  been  qualified  in  the  traditional  
historiography  as  Palestinian  civil  war  has  been  controversial.  Read:  Pappe,  Ilan,  The  Ethnic  
cleansing of Palestine, op.cit. 
104
controversy79.  Nevertheless,  what  is  certain  is  that  the  emerging  national 
movements in the Middle East had taken Wilson at his words and were aspiring 
to independence according to that principle. Despite the personal sympathies of 
President Woodrow Wilson with the Zionist movement, the United States had 
been willing to find a solution that would work for both the Zionist Movement 
and the Arabs. However, they were caught up in their own internal debates as to 
the  attitude  to  adopt  with  regards  to  the  Zionist  movement  and  economic 
considerations,  as they were more and more involved in  the region,  and in 
particular regarding oil production. 
For several years, the United States would be more or less absent from the 
Middle-East  scene,  however,  they came back with  President  Roosevelt  who 
became President from 1933 to 1945. The latter was still keeping the principle 
of self-determination as a guiding line as he considered that the United States 
would not move against the will of the Arabs of Palestine and the Jews on the 
Palestine question80. This position was to die with him, as his successor Harry 
Truman  made  a  point  of  pleasing  his  supposedly  Zionist  driven  Jewish 
electorate81.  This  was  also  the  period  chosen  by  the  Zionist  leadership  to 
reinforce both its presence in the United States and its lobbying to obtain the 
US Government's support to a Jewish State. Indeed, as mentioned above, in 
1942, the Zionist Executive succeeded in endorsing the Biltmore programme, a 
maximalist  programme that  foresaw the  establishment  of  a  Jewish  State  in 
Palestine. On that occasion, Ben Gurion made numerous interventions in order 
to gather support, and from then on, many “resolutions supporting Zionism were 
introduced in state legislatures”82. 
79 Kapitan, Tomis, “Self-Determination and International Order” , The Monist 89(2), pp.356-370.
80 Khalidi, Rashid,  Sowing crisis: the cold war and American dominance in the Middle East ,  op.cit., 
p.14.
81 Ibid., pp.15, 25.
82 Roosevelt, Kermit, “The partition of Palestine; a lesson in pressure politics”,  Middle East Journal  
2(1),  January 1948,  pp.1-16. Grandson of President  Roosevelt,  Kermit  Roosevelt  was,  in the late 
1940s, on the advisory board of the Institute of Arab American Affairs Inc. and in the early 1950s he  
was a  senior  officer  at  the CIA's  Middle East  division.  He thought  that  supporting Zionism was  
detrimental  to  the  US  interests  in  the  Middle  East:  “Almost  all  Americans  with  diplomatic,  
educational, missionary, or business experience in the Middle East protest fervently that support of  
political Zionism is directly contrary to our national interests, as well as to common justice”
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The United States and the partition of Palestine 
In  the  United  States,  there  had  always  been  a  certain  sympathy  for 
Zionism, partly due to religious grounds, whereas the State Department,  the 
military and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) were for their part cautious 
and considered partition as a threat to US interests in the region83. In a report it 
presented on November 28, 1947 – one day before the UNGA vote – the CIA 
drew its analysis on Palestine's partition and its possible outcome. Besides the 
war  which  it  believed  to  be  inevitable,  the  CIA  warned  against  the 
consequences on the US interests in the region as well as against the Zionist 
territorial ambitions84. Although the report overestimated the Arabs' forces, it did 
note  that  “in  the  long  run,  no  Zionist  in  Palestine  will  be  satisfied  with  the 
territorial arrangements of the partition settlement. Even the more conservative 
Zionists (as opposed to the revisionists in the text) will hope to obtain the whole 
of  the  Negev,  western  Galilee,  the  city  of  Jerusalem,  and  eventually  all  of 
Palestine”. Nevertheless, Zionist lobbying had been restless and the American 
opinion was moved by the fate of the European Jews, the supposedly moral 
grounds of Zionism – the religious connexion, the appeal to the patriot fibre etc. 
Moreover, the White House and the Congress were in favour of partition and 
ignored the State Department and the CIA so that they were inclined to favour 
this outcome by any means, helping to ensure a majority vote for the partition 
plan, notably through pressure on other UN member States85.  So, when the 
partition plan was presented to vote at the UNGA, the United States voted in 
favour of  the plan, unlike the United Kingdom, which abstained. Despite the 
reservations of the State Department, the White House and the Congress were 
now willing to impose a solution no matter the expectations or oppositions of the 
Palestinians Arabs86.
The clashes in Palestine and in the Arab region in general that burst out after 
the announcement of the partition resolution, seem to have confirmed the CIA's 
83 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), “The consequences of the partition of Palestine”, November 28, 
1947. Source: http://www.foia.cia.gov/docs/DOC_0000256628/DOC_0000256628.pdf
84 Roosevelt, Kermit, “The partition of Palestine; a lesson in pressure politics”,  Middle East Journal  
2(1), January 1948, pp.1-16; Christison, Kathleen, U.S Policy and the Palestinians: bound by a frame 
of reference, op.cit., pp.46-59.
85 Roosevelt, Kermit, “The partition of Palestine; a lesson in pressure politics”, op.cit., pp.1-16. 
86  Ibid.
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and State Department's conviction of the problematic nature of the partition at a 
moment when the United States was developing its network of military bases in 
the  region.  Indeed,  the  State  Department  tried  to  raise  awareness  on  the 
impossibility to enforce the resolution and started to investigate alternatives to 
partition in the form of a “UN-mandated trusteeship including consultations with 
the AHC and the Jewish Agency”87. By March 1948, the evidence on the ground 
showed  that  partition  was  inapplicable  through  peaceful  ways  and  the  U.S 
briefly reconsidered their support to partition88, however, Truman under pressure 
from the Zionist leadership continued to ensure the latter of the U.S support to 
the scheme. So, eventually,  the alternatives he was presented with were all 
rejected and Truman was the first to recognise the State of Israel in May 1948.  
Thus ending the efforts of the State Department to find unitary alternatives. 
The partition was strongly opposed by the Arabs and the Palestinian Arabs who 
did not acknowledge the legitimacy of the United Nations and its decision. The 
unilateral  announcement led the neighbouring Arab states to declare war on 
Israel, however, in the meanwhile, the Zionists had been cleansing their newly 
acquired territory and the territories they had gained in battle. The U.S however, 
called  for  the  immediate  repatriation  of  the  Arab  refugees,  in  vain  and 
eventually, it shifted to a call to find a solution to the refugee problem.
Once  the  first  Arab-Israeli  war  ended  with  the  occupation  of  part  of 
Palestine by the newly established Israeli state, Washington which had by then 
accepted a two-state solution to the Palestine Question, encouraged Israel and 
Jordan to resume talks in view of ending the Arab Israeli conflict. Indeed, in their 
view,  a  Jordanian-Israeli  alliance  would  put  an  end  to  it,  consecrate  the 
annexation  of  the  Arab part  by the  Hashemite  Kingdom – actually,  the  U.S 
considered that the Arab State as drawn by the UN would not be viable unless it 
was to fall under Jordanian jurisdiction – and eventually contribute to pushing 
aside the Palestinian Leadership as represented by Haj  Amin al  Hussayni89. 
These talks did not lead to any viable agreement.
87 Khalil, Ossamah, “Pax Americana: The United States, the Palestinians, and the Peace Process, 1948-
2008”, in CR: The Centennial Review 8(2), Fall 2008, pp.1-41.
88 Khalidi, Walid,  “Plan Dalet: The Zionist Master Plan for the conquest  of Palestine”, Middle East  
Forum 37(9), November 1961, pp.22-28; Lippman, Thomas, “The view from 1947: the CIA and the 
partition of Palestine”, Middle East Journal 61(1), Winter 2007, pp. 17-28.
89 Khalil, Ossamah, “Pax Americana: The United States, the Palestinians, and the Peace Process, 1948-
2008”, op.cit., pp.1-41.
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Lauding peace in partition while  aligning with Israel's  maximalist  
vision
In the late 1940s, the United States was to further anchor its influence in 
the Middle East and rapidly, its relations with the Middle East would be dictated 
by the Cold War and the polarisation that resulted from it90.  Noam Chomsky 
reminds us that from 1948 onwards, the United States had been supporting 
Israel's  claims  and that  in  the  1950s  it  decided to  use Israel  as  a  rampart 
against Arab nationalism as represented and carried by Gamal Abdel Nasser91. 
This policy would continue and develop in the next decades and Israel would be 
considered as the US “strategic asset”. It was, however, only in the late 1950s 
and in the 1960s that the United States began supplying arms to Israel92. 
From then on, the Palestine Question transformed into the Arab-Israeli conflict, 
meaning that the potential diplomatic partners were the Arab States with the 
Palestinians no more than a refugee problem to solve as a humanitarian cause. 
And indeed, most of the United Nations resolutions issued before the 1967 war 
– and the occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip as well as parts of  
the neighbouring countries – dealt with the issue of the Palestinian refugees on 
a humanitarian level and urged for a peace settlement between Israel and its 
neighbouring Arab states. 
The US-Israeli relation was to dramatically evolve during and after 1967 
and on various levels. As noted by Rashid Khalidi, it was from 1967 onwards 
that  the  United  States  eventually  totally  aligned  with  Israel,  meaning  the 
recognition of Israel as its major ally in the region93. This alignment materialised 
in  the  form of  arms supplies,  economic  support  and  political  back  up.  It  is 
interesting to recall that Israel could not have taken advantage over the Arab 
armies during the 1967 war without U.S assistance. As a consequence, when 
the war ended, Israel had seized the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, the Golan 
90 Chomsky, Noam, “The US and the Middle East”, Journal of Palestine Studies 16(3), Spring 1998, pp. 
25-42. ; Khalidi, Rashid,  Sowing crisis: the cold war and American dominance in the Middle East, 
Boston 2009; Khalil Osamah, “Pax Americana: The United States, the Palestinians, and the Peace 
Process, 1948-2008”, op.cit., pp.1-41.
91 Chomsky, Noam, “The US and the Middle East”, op.cit., pp. 25-42.
92 Khalidi, Rashid, Sowing Crisis, op.cit., p.27. The US was not the only arms suppliers to Israel, France 
and Great Britain did also militarily support Israel. The USSR supported Israel for a time and was one 
of the first to supply arms to Israel notably during the first Arab-Israeli war. 
93 Ibid., p.27
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Heights and the Sinai.
Lyndon Johnson, then U.S President and a long time friend of Israel did no 
more than call for a cease-fire which allowed Israel to occupy the territories it 
had seized control  of94.  That support also translated in a strategic refusal to 
recognise the Palestinians as one of the main political actors on the scene and 
the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people. The U.S rather ignored 
the  political  organ,  its  positions  and  its  propositions  and  continued  to  seek 
peace agreements with the neighbouring countries. As for the United Nations, it  
took them months to release resolution 242. UN Security Council  Resolution 
242 which was co-sponsored by the U.S. The resolution made  tabula rasa of 
the pre-1967 situation indeed, firstly, it makes no mention of Palestine, or the 
Palestinians  as  a  recognised  belligerent,  secondly,  Israel  was  not  asked  to 
withdraw from all the conquered territories but from “territories”, a rather vague 
denomination that convinced Israel it could decide not to return some territories. 
This is also a good example of the lack of consideration given to the PLO.  
“Withdrawal  of  Israel  armed  forces  from  territories  occupied  in  the  
recent conflict as well as the end of claims, 
Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and  
acknowledgement  of  the  sovereignty,  territorial  integrity  and  political  
independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace  
within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of  
force”.
However, the United Nations could not find a way to implement resolution 242 
and  in  that  context,  the  USSR  approached  the  US  and  proposed  to  work 
together to  find a solution.  To that  purpose,  Nixon's  first  Secretary of  State, 
William Rogers, proposed a peace plan in December 1969, in which he called 
for Israeli withdrawal from the territories conquered in the 1967 war. The plan 
foresaw that in return to such a move, Israel would be granted Arab recognition, 
thus setting the principle of land for peace. Whilst Egypt’s President, Anwar al 
Sadat,  accepted  compromise  and  promised  to  recognise  Israel  if  the  latter 
withdrew from all the territories conquered in 1967, opening the way to total 
Arab recognition, Israel finally decided that they could not envisage returning to 
1949 armistice line. They were backed in this decision by Nixon and Kissinger, 
94 Johnson, Robert David,  Lyndon Johnson and Israel: The secret presidential recordings, The S.Daniel 
Abraham  Center  for  International  and  Regional  Studies,  Tel  Aviv  University  : 
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who privately promised to support them.
For Salim Yaqub, a specialist of U.S Foreign Relations, “since the early 
1970s,  Washington has steadily revised its  prescriptions  for  a  settlement  to 
bring them more into line with Israeli preferences”95. Yaqub then explains that 
supporting Israel often means accepting and supporting the status quo... And at 
that time, Israeli preferences were balancing between annexing the territories it 
occupied in 1967 and leaving them under Jordanian tutelage.  As a matter of 
fact,  American  support  for  Israel  was  further  reinforced  with  the  Nixon 
administration, and the influence of Henry Kissinger. Indeed, the latter was to 
mark  a  qualitative  evolution  in  US-Israel  relations  in  favour  of  Israel. 
Noteworthy examples being firstly, U.S support for King Hussein of Jordan in 
the  crisis  that  became  known  as  Black  September,  in  1970.  Following 
Palestinian  resistance  guerilla  activities  in  Jordan  and  aircraft  hijackings  by 
Palestinian armed organizations – particularly the PFLP and Fatah –  ,  King 
Hussein ordered a harsh and brutal repression that ended with thousands of 
dead. As soon as the King had decided to decree a military government in view 
of halting Palestinian activities, the U.S announced that they would intervene 
militarily in the conflict besides the Jordanian military if Syria and Iraq were to 
intervene in favour of the Palestinians. Moreover, “the U.S dispatched the Sixth 
Fleet to the eastern Mediterranean and called the USSR to use its influence to 
halt Syria's intervention in Jordan”96. Secondly, relentless efforts to transform the 
regional conflict into separate conflicts. For that purpose, the U.S tried to lower 
the USSR influence in the region, especially in Egypt and to make the latter 
accept a peace agreement, which it did as the consequence of intense lobbying 
by Kissinger in 1978. 
As noted by Yaqub, the early 1970s would also see another U.S move towards 
Israel, as the U.S would start using their veto in the United Nations institutions 
particularly when it came to sanctions against Israel. In 1973, Syria and Egypt 
attacked Israel and had the upper hand until  the U.S came to the rescue of 
Israel.
Moving forward their exclusive relation with Israel and ignoring the PLO, the 
95 Yaqub, Salim, “The United States and the Arab-Israeli conflict, 1947 to the present”, OAH  Magazine 
of History 20(3), May 2006, pp..13-17.
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U.S, in the persons of Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger, even signed a secret 
agreement in 1975 with Israel stating that the United States would not recognise 
or deal with the PLO – then the official representative of the Palestinian People 
as recognized by the Arab states and the United Nations – as long as it did not 
recognise Israel's right to exist and resolutions 242 and 33897. As a matter of 
fact, the U.S only did recognise the PLO in 1991, after the latter had accepted 
the two-state paradigm in 1988 and engaged in the peace process materialised 
by the Madrid Conference. The U.S refusal to recognise the PLO before that did 
not, however, prevent the United Nations from recognising the organisation in 
1974, and inviting Yasser Arafat to give a speech in the context of a General 
Assembly meeting. The meeting, however, could not be held in New York as 
planned, as the PLO was still on the U.S terrorist organisations list. 
For  Ossamah Khalil,  this  special  relationship  with  Israel  did  transform later, 
under  the  Clinton  administration,  into  a  “strategic  relationship”  to  become a 
“strategic alliance” after September 11, 200198. 
F. Conclusion
After the Ottoman Empire's collapse, Western powers took their share in 
the Middle East and installed a mandate system which instead of  preparing 
peoples  for  independence  and  self-rule  introduced  separation  and  colonial 
partition in the Middle-East. Indeed, one could not fail to see that the separation 
principle was all over the numerous drafts proposed by the WZO as the basis 
for the British mandate in Palestine. One should also note that although Curzon 
who had been one of  the  most  relentless  opponents  to  Zionist  claims over 
Palestine had understood the colonial dimension of the Zionist movement, he 
had  failed  to  catch  its  particularity.  The  Zionist  movement  did  not  seek  to 
colonise Palestine and use the indigenous population as a cheap work force but 
it sought to replace the indigenous population. Thus the outcome of the conflict  
between the indigenous population and the settlers would not lead to a mere 
97 Khalil, Ossamah, “Pax Americana: The United States, the Palestinians, and the Peace Process, 1948-
2008”, op.cit., pp.1-41.  
98 Ibid.
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conflict of power but of existence.
The consequences of the western powers' adoption of Zionists' demands were 
to emerge on two levels, first, it prefigured the partition of what had been for 
centuries Greater Syria,  second, it  introduced a settler colonial  movement in 
Palestine, the presence of  which could only lead to clashes, separation,  and 
eventually the partition of Palestine. 
Indeed, whilst the mandate authorities had shown their unwillingness to partition 
Palestine, they however, had created the conditions for the future partition. By 
simultaneously implementing policies leading to the emergence of conditions 
that favoured the partition of Palestine and advocating a unitary state. The U.K 
created  a  situation  of  separate  development  in  Palestine  and  enabled  the 
Zionist leadership to secure pre-statist institutions and eventually claim a state 
of their own. Facing such claims, as well as Arab opposition to Zionism, Britain  
tried  to  solve  the  Palestine  question  through  further  evaluation  notably  by 
sending investigative commissions, which all concluded that the two claims in 
question – the Arab and the Zionist  –  were mutually exclusive.  However,  in 
1937, the Royal Commission proposed the partition of Palestine for the first 
time, a proposal met with strong controversy within the British political class and 
administration. As a consequence, the idea was abandoned only to reappear 
sporadically until it became a real option in the mid-1940s when the question of 
Palestine was tackled by the U.S and the United Nations.  After World War II, 
the U.K decided to leave Palestine and surrender their mandate to the United 
Nations,  which  eventually  decided  Palestine's  partition.  That  decision  was 
strongly supported by the United States which, though for a time, driven by their 
interests with the Arab regimes, advocated a solution that would result from a 
local consensus, finally decided to support Zionist claim of partition. To reach 
that outcome, it even pressured some states to vote in favour of partition. Then,  
from the mid-1940s onwards, the U.S would replace the United Kingdom in the 
Middle East in terms of influence. A Jewish state was granted to the the Zionist  
movement by the United Nations in 1947 without any legal grounds.  Claiming 
peace in partition, the U.S was in fact aligning with Israel's maximalist vision. 
Indeed, U.S officials would never cease to appeal for a peace agreement while 
supporting  financially  and  diplomatically  Israel,  refusing  to  recognise  the 
Palestinian representative Organization, the PLO, thus isolating the Palestinians 
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and using its veto to avoid sanctions against Israel. So, the U.S discourse was 
not followed by any concrete action in that sense, as the United States would 
prove to be an unswerving ally for  Israel  by maintaining the status-quo,  i.e. 
theoretical partition.
The departure of the U.K, the arrival of the U.S on the Middle Eastern political 
scene and the adoption of partition by the UN – even though this has only value  
of recommendation –  would eventually contribute to the imposition of partition 
as the only solution that could bring peace as the dominant discourse.   
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Chapter Three: The Zionist Drive to Partition, 1882-
1988
The previous chapters introduced the origins and the early development 
of Zionism as well as the mechanisms and lobbying that led to the adoption of 
the Balfour Declaration by the British Government, its adoption by the Western 
powers and in the text of the mandate. Also, we have seen how the foreign 
powers  and  international  institutions'  positions  as  regards  the  Question  of 
Palestine  evolved  throughout  time,  from a  discourse  stressing  the  unity  of 
Palestine to the decision of partition in the United Nations in 1947. 
This  chapter  focuses  on  the  Zionist  internal  debates  and  political 
evolution on the issue of partition. It argues that separation has been a guiding 
principle in Zionist ideology and that this, together with the search for Jewish 
autonomy and sovereignty, led to the formal acceptance of partition in 1947. 
The separation principle, as we will see in the first part, has materialised in the 
alienation  of  the  Arabs  in  Palestine  and  contributed  to  the  separate 
development of the Jewish and Arab communities leading to the emergence of 
separation and then partition as a solution to the Palestine question. Though 
the leading idea in Zionist mainstream thought had always been to establish a 
Jewish State in all of Palestine –  an idea that was officially voiced for the first 
time in the Biltmore programme in 1942 through the demand of a Jewish State 
all over Palestine state – pragmatism and tactics pushed the Zionist leadership 
to accept partition. An idea that was not a novelty, as stated by Yossi Katz, as 
some Zionist leaders had already been tackling the issue in the 1920s1. So, the 
second part will  evoke Zionist attitude to the first partition plan proposed by 
Britain in 1937 and the third part will deal with the Biltmore programme and its 
critics.
However,  as  we  will  see  in  the  last  part  of  this  chapter,  nominal 
acceptance of partition has not led to its implementation – far from that – and 
1 Katz, Yossi, Partner to partition. The Jewish Agency's partition plan in the Mandate era, op.cit., p. 
17. Personalities among the Zionist Organization such as Avigdor Jacobson (the Zionist Executive's 
representative at the League of Nations) and Haim Arlosoroff (head of the Political Department of the 
Jewish Agency's Executive from 1931 to 1933) had raised the issue but it would only be after the  
Royal Commission's proposal that the idea would be given serious thought.
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second,  the  debate  over  Greater  Israel  would  re-emerge  in  the  official 
discourse notably with the 1967 war. The latter would then be challenged by 
the emerging two-state discourse within fringes of the Israeli population and of 
the Labour party notably after Lebanon's invasion by the Israeli army in 1982.
A.  The  Evolvement  of  Zionist  Support  for  Separation,  1882-
1929   
The  previous  chapters,  have  introduced  the  Zionist  movement,  its 
thought and achievements. As we have seen, by the early  20 th Century, the 
Zionist  movement  had  already  established  its  major  institutions  securing a 
great margin of autonomy that was not enjoyed by the Arabs of Palestine. The 
Jewish  National  Homeland  however  also  meant  the  beginning  of  concrete 
separation between Jews and Arabs.  Indeed,  these institutions enabled the 
Zionist movement to grow both in number and in influence in Palestine and in 
the international instances, which caused a drift with the Palestinian population 
that feared losing control over its territory. 
Things were to take another turn after WWI. By the end of the war, the 
Allied victors organised a Peace Conference whose aim was to set the peace 
terms for the defeated powers. Whereas the Arabs who had participated to the 
War on the eastern front had to face difficulties to obtain the right to make their 
case,  under  the  impulse  of  Britain  and  France,  the  Zionist  movement  was 
invited  to  present  its  case  at  the  Conference2.  Represented  by  Haim 
Weizmann, the movement called for the recognition of the historic title of the 
Jews to Palestine and proposed boundaries for Palestine, that is to say to the 
Jewish  National  Home  they demanded.  The  proposed  boundaries  included 
Palestine as it has come to be after the attribution of the Mandate, the south of 
Lebanon and part of what was to become Transjordan3. In a comprehensive 
study on partition in the Zionist movement, Itzhaq Galnoor emphasised that the 
proposed boundaries were the product of a pragmatic choice as they already 
were the result of a compromise. Indeed, the Zionist movement wished first, to 
2   The Paris Peace Conference on January 18, 1919.
3   UNISPAL, “Statement of the Zionist Organization regarding Palestine”, February 3, 1919.
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facilitate  British-French  negotiations  over  the  territories  they  claimed  as 
mandate powers by setting a clear boundary with Lebanon, second, it aimed at 
obtaining the support of the Amir Faisal by not claiming all of Transjordan4.
However, the Allies finally set Lebanon's southern border south of the 
Zionist proposal. Then, Britain added a provision expelling Transjordan from 
the  scope  of  the  Balfour  Declaration  and  the  League  of  Nations  when 
attributing the mandates in 1922, agreed to a certain degree of autonomy for 
Transjordan.  The latter  would  be ruled  by Amir  Abdullah  but  with  Sir  John 
Philby as the Chief Representative. This decision was thus moving the frontier 
between Transjordan and Palestine west of the Jordan River5. The exclusion of 
the eastern bank of  the river  Jordan was not  welcome but  was seen as a 
necessary sacrifice  by the  Zionist  leadership  except  the  group  that  was  to 
become  the  revisionist  branch  led  by  Zeev  Jabotinsky.  The  latter  saw the 
acceptance  of  that  measure  as  a  treason  and  eventually  formed  his  own 
political  party,  the  Revisionist  Party  in  1925  to  protest  the  exclusion  of 
Transjordan from the mandate for Palestine. 
Once they were officially granted their National Home through the League of 
Nations, the Zionist movement was to obtain more liberties in the country, and 
move to the next stage, namely developing the Zionist community and the pre-
state institutions. For that purpose they were to set separatist policies. 
Separation as a guiding principle 
The  British  government,  which  since  1917  had  enjoyed  the  military 
control of Palestine, believed that the development of Zionist economy would 
ultimately have positive repercussions for the economy of all the sections of the 
population and bring development. Then, when the Zionist movement wished 
to  gain  control  over  all  the  political,  social  and  economic  aspects  of  their 
community's life,  the British administrations were there to help them for the 
sake of the Jewish National Home but also for the sake of Palestine, which in 
Britain's  view  would  automatically  benefit  from  Zionist  activities.  As  a 
4 Galnoor,  Itzhak,  The Partition of Palestine. Decision crossroads in the Zionist movement,  op.cit., 
p.274.
5 As added by the British in the Transjordan Memorandum to article 25 of the text of the Palestine  
Mandate.
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consequence,  the Zionist  movement partially succeeded in implementing its 
projects as early as 19236. 
Control  over  the major  aspects of  the community's  life  required their 
extraction  from the  British  government's  scope and  establishing  a  de  facto 
differential treatment between the Jews and the Arabs. Aware as it was of the 
growing Arab opposition to its enterprise, the Zionist movement wished above 
all to postpone the resolution of what it had come to call “the Arab question”. To 
postpone it to the moment when there would be enough Jews in Palestine to 
constitute  a  majority  and  thus  impose  a  power  struggle.  For  that,  “it  was 
necessary  that  the  British  keep  the  Arabs  in  check  so  that  the  Jewish 
community  could  expand.  This  meant  also  keeping  the  Arab  economy  as 
separate as possible from the Jewish”7. 
Addressing Zionist ideological outlooks in Palestine before the mandate 
and  the  Balfour  Declaration,  Yosef  Gorny  identified  four  approaches:  the 
integrative, the separatist,  the liberal and the constructive socialist one. The 
separatist outlook, which was to win over the other visions and constitute the 
core of Zionist thought and policy towards the Arabs, viewed the Arabs with 
superiority and advocated “separation and dominion”8. 
Rejection of assimilation was a feature of the separatist outlook, but also 
one of the basics of Zionism. 
“We Jews have  been  living  more  than  two  thousand  years  among  
cultured peoples and we cannot and must not descend once more to  
the cultural level of semi-savages. Indeed, our hope that one day we  
shall be masters of the country is not based on the sword or on the fist  
but  on our cultural  advantage over  the Arabs and Turks,  which will  
gradually increase our influence”9. 
Beside its ideological and institutional aspects10, separatism was a policy that 
was  best  illustrated  on  the  ground  through  the  economic  strategies  of  the 
Zionist Organisation. Indeed, the second immigration vague, introduced among 
6 Pappe, Ilan,  A History of modern Palestine,: one land, two peoples, op.cit., p.88.
7 Smith, Charles D., Palestine and the Arab-Israeli conflict, a history with documents,  op.cit., p.121-
122.
8 Gorny, Yosef, Zionism and the Arabs, 1882-1948: a study of ideology, Oxford 1987, p. 49
9 Ibid.  Cited  is  Joseph  Klausner,“Hashash”  [Foreboding],  HaShiloah,  17  (July–December,  1907). 
Klausner was a historian and professor of Hebrew Literature but also the successor to Ahad Haam as  
editor of HaShiloah. 
10 As already mentioned in  Chapter  I,  one has  to keep in  mind that  the first  policy of  the Zionist  
Organisation was to create Jewish institutions (The Jewish National Fund, the Jewish Colonial Bank, 
The Reconstruction Fund).
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other decisions the concept of Jewish labour: Jewish workers in Jewish lands, 
kibbutzim, industries etc... 
For Gershon Shafir,  
“Whereas  the  First  Aliya  established  a  society  based  on  Jewish  
supremacy, the Second Aliya's method of colonization was separation  
from  Palestinians.  This  form  of  pure  settlement  rested  on  two  
exclusivist  pillars:  on  the  WZO's  Jewish  National  Fund  and  on  the  
Jewish Labor Movements trade union - the Histadrut”11.
As argued by Barbara J. Smith, whilst “Zionist institutions would gain a decisive 
influence  over  economic  policy  in  land  and  labour  matters,  the  separatist 
tendencies in Zionist economic policy […] intensified during the 1920s”12.   It 
intensified  and  was  helped  by  British  policies,  which  enabled  the  Zionist 
movement  to  develop  its  own  industries13,  which  furthermore  entered  into 
competition with the Palestinian industries. This competition in industry building 
and labour  market  was  the  subject  of  numerous discussions  in  the  Zionist 
circles worried about the competitiveness of the Arab workers, as they were 
cheaper. 
To illustrate this vision, Zackary Lockmann would cite Haim Arlosoroff and Ben 
Gurion who had advanced the slogan “Arab labour in the Arab sector, Jewish 
labour in the Jewish sector, mixed labour in the mixed (government) sector”14. 
However, whilst they made sure – sometimes using coercion – that only Jews 
could be employed in Jewish sectors, this was not the case in Arab sectors15.  
To be effective, that policy required the apposition or juxtaposition of two 
dimensions  of  equal  importance,  first,  the  geographical  or  territorial  one, 
second  the  demographic  one.  According  to  Shafir,  as  long  as  the  two 
dimensions  –  territorial  and  demographic  –  are  considered  as  of  equal 
importance,  Zionism  would  continue  developing  a  maximalist  approach. 
However,  if  the  demographic  dimension overrides  on the  other,  meaning if 
separation from the Arabs becomes the major issue, then, partition becomes a 
possible outcome. 
11 Shafir,  Gershon,  “Zionism and colonialism.  A comparative  approach”,  in  Pappe,  Ilan  (ed.),  The 
Israel/Palestine question, op.cit., p. 89.
12 Smith, Barbara Jean, The roots of separatism in Palestine: British economic policy 1920-1929, New 
York 1993, p.7.
13 Ibid., p.47.
14 Lockman,  Zackary,  “Land,  labor  and  the  logic  of  Zionism:a  critical  engagement  with  Gershon 
Shafir”, Settler Colonial Studies 2(1), 2012, pp.9-38. 
15 Ibid.
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Making separation a principle,  the Zionist  movement could not  come to an 
agreement with the Palestinian Arabs – who never abandoned their rejection of 
the Balfour Declaration – and it would eventually favour the establishment of a 
separate homogeneous Jewish State to attain sovereignty. Once its claim of a 
separate  national  and territorial  sovereignty was recognised by the colonial 
power  however,  the  Zionist  movement  could  embrace  again  its  maximalist 
vision.
Alienating  the  Palestinians:  Getting  around  the  Palestinian  Arab  
leadership
After the Balfour declaration made the objective of the Zionist movement 
clear, and the mandate gave the Zionist movement the green light to implement 
its  goal,  the  Arab  nationalists  had  understood  that  they would  face  a  real 
challenge to their objective of unity and independence. However, as mentioned 
above,  the  partition  of  Syria  had  encouraged  the  Arabs  to  focus  on  local 
struggles.  Whereas  the  Palestinian  Arabs  were  determined  to  get  rid  of 
Zionism,  other  Arabs not  always  aware  of  the  dangers  of  Zionism,  usually 
showed themselves more inclined to negotiate with the Zionist Organisation. 
In this context, the Palestinians were persuaded of their natural right to 
Palestine and rejected the demands of the Zionist leadership over a number of 
important issues such as immigration and land purchases. This was one of the 
reasons why the  Zionist  movement  preferred  to  have talks  with  other  Arab 
leaders (notably Faisal and Abdullah) who were not directly confronted with the 
Zionist Organisation, making them more inclined to reach an agreement16. 
However, the Palestinians had not approved of Amir Faisal's discussions 
and agreement with Weizmann in the past and they made it clear to the Zionist  
leadership that the only ones who could ever sign an agreement with them 
were the Palestinians. 
The Zionist leadership would nevertheless not cease to circumnavigate 
the  Palestinians  in  the  attempt  to  reach  an  agreement  with  other  Arab 
16 Caplan,  Neil,  “Zionist-Arab  diplomacy:  Patterns  and  ambiguities  on  the  eve  of  statehood”,  in 
Laurence Jay Silberstein (ed.), New perspectives on Israeli history: the early years of the state, New 
York 1991, pp. 242-255.
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dignitaries. It  is in that spirit  that they contacted Shakib Arslan, a Lebanese 
Amir, who advocated a pan-Islamic nationalism and who, as such, had been a 
fierce defender of the Ottoman empire before advocating Arab nationalism. In 
the 1930s, he published a periodical, which he called  La Nation arabe (The  
Arab nation),  in which he positioned himself  against the British and French 
mandates. Arslan was however, very clear in his discussions:
“The Amir Shakib told me clearly that by the limitation of immigration  
he means that we, on our side, commit ourselves to the assurance that  
the Arabs will always be a majority in Palestine, that immigration will be  
regulated in such a way that the Jewish population will not outnumber  
the Arabs, and not even become equal to it. They want the Jews to  
remain forever a minority. I told him that here was a point which was  
unacceptable. They are also insisting on our renouncing the article in  
the Mandate concerning the creation of a Jewish Agency. Before being  
sure that these points are accepted by us, they don't want to undertake  
anything. What do you think? You know how much I desire a Jewish-
Arab entente, but the sacrifices which we are being asked in exchange  
for their intervention with the Palestinian delegation, to make them stop  
their intrigues, seem to me too great. I don't deny that the intervention  
of Shakib Arslan and Ihsan Al Jabiri could have some effect towards  
pacifying spirits in Palestine, but can we renounce the most precious  
and most essential things in the Mandate? [...]”17. 
The episode with Shakib Arslan was not the only attempt made by the 
Zionist  movement,  but  most  of  those  that  occurred  before  the  partition  of 
Palestine ended quite the same way, with the rejection of Zionist supremacy 
over the country. Nevertheless, the most striking and important example of this 
bypass policy can be found in the contacts with the Hashemite Kingdom and 
the constant will to find an agreement with the latter. Whether in 1947-1948 to 
prevent the Palestinians from establishing their own state as stipulated by the 
United  Nations18,  or  later,  as  we  will  see  below,  with  the  development  of 
solutions based on the “Jordanian option” always to prevent the recognition of 
the Palestinian national movement and demands. 
17 Extract  of a letter from H.M. Kalvaryski to Dr.  Weizmann, Geneva, 21  September 1922, in Neil 
Caplan,  Futile  Diplomacy:  Early  Arab-Zionist  negotiation  attempts,  London  1983, pp.203-204. 
Translated by Neil Caplan.
18 This is the very thesis developed by Avi Shlaim in his comprehensive work,  Collusion across the  
Jordan: King Abdullah, the Zionists and the partition of Palestine, New York 1988.
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B. The Solidification of the Zionist partition plan, 1929-1939
The Wailing Wall conflict and the rejection of the Passfield White  
Paper
When the conflict over the Western Wall – the Wailing Wall – peaked in 
1929, the situation on the ground, in terms of violence, had been rather quiet 
and the last Palestinian riots had occurred in 1921. However, the development 
of  the  Zionist  movement,  its  proximity  with  the  British  authorities  and  the 
privileges  it  enjoyed,  as  described  above,  combined  with  a  drastic 
impoverishment of the Palestinian population, created a noxious atmosphere. 
This was exacerbated by the Zionist movement and by the rumours according 
to which the Jews were seeking to obtain the control over all the holy places. 
Whilst the seventh Palestinian congress did not issue major decisions, it called 
for rebellion against Zionism as well as against sustained Jewish immigration19. 
So, when the  Beitar,  the revisionists'  militia,  decided to demonstrate on the 
Mosques Esplanade the religious authorities finally called for action.  And in 
1929, a revolt broke out in Jerusalem, which ended with about three hundred 
people killed – including 133 Jews and 116 Palestinian Arabs20. 
Some Zionist leaders and a few members of the Zionist movement – 
particularly the bi-nationalists to whom the fifth chapter is consecrated – saw 
then that the Palestinians were starting to structure themselves and that it was 
much  more  than  a  clash  but  an  organised  revolt.  The  revolt  was  strongly 
repressed by the British authorities. Once again, Britain sent a commission to 
enquire about the “reasons” of the clashes and to present recommendations. 
This commission was known as the Shaw Commission, named after its chair: 
Sir Walter Shaw; it concluded that the violence was not planned and that what  
had happened was provoked by Arab attacks in “an atmosphere of political and 
religious tensions”21. The commission's report also stressed the problem of land 
19 Al-Kayyali, Abdelwahab (ed.),  Documents of the Arab Palestinian resistance against Great Britain  
and Zionism, op.cit., pp.111.
20 Laurens, Henry, L'Orient arabe. Arabisme et islamisme de 1798 à 1945,  op.cit., p. 210.
21 Baron, Xavier, Les Palestiniens, un peuple, Paris 1983, p. 56.
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purchase by Jews and it even stated that “a class of landless and frustrated 
farmers” was about to be formed22. 
In May 1930, in order to continue and complete the investigation, the 
colonial office sent another commission. The latter was led by Sir John Hope 
Simpson  and  presented  similar  conclusions,  condemning  moreover,  the 
eviction of hundreds of Arab farmers and above all the “boycott of Arab labour” 
by the Zionist movement23. These as well as numerous other reports, together 
with the Chancellor memoranda, would be taken into account in drawing up the 
Passfield  White  Paper  – after  the Colonial  Secretary Lord  Passfield.  In  his 
White Paper, Passfield recommended the limitation of Jewish immigration and 
condemned Zionist institutions for their Jewish Labour policy. During the same 
period,  the Palestinian Arabs sent  a delegation to  London whose aim was, 
again, to ask for the end of Jewish immigration, the end of the land transfers 
and, quite interestingly, for the establishment of a democratic government that 
would be elected on a proportional basis24. However, the White Paper provoked 
strong  disagreements  within  the  British  political  class  as  the  opposition 
positioned  against  it  and  condemned  the  consultation  process  before  its 
release25. 
The White Paper was also immediately condemned and rejected by the 
Zionist leadership, which argued it was a total revocation of the clauses of the 
Mandate  and  as  such  it  questioned  a  decision  made  by  the  International 
Institutions26. In the British Offices too, the White Paper raised an outcry among 
the members of the Labour Government as well as among the Conservative 
opposition.  Winston  Churchill  argued  that  it  was  in  contradiction  with  the 
Balfour Declaration and Lloyd George even called it an anti-Semitic measure27. 
The internal and Zionist pressure was such that fearing the consequences of 
such a move, the British government reaffirmed its loyalty to the terms of the 
mandate, and to the Balfour Declaration in a letter sent by Ramsay McDonald, 
then Prime Minister, to Haim Weizmann. This letter – the black letter as it came 
22 Ibid., p. 57.
23 Khader, Bishara, L'Europe et la Palestine. Des croisades à nos jours, op.cit., p.149.
24 A proposition to implement such a government was made under the form of a legislative council.
25 House  of  Commons  debate  on  the  White  Paper,  November  17,  1930.  Accessed  at: 
http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1930/nov/17/palestine
26 Segev, Tom, One Palestine complete: Jews and Arabs under British mandate, Oxford 2001, pp.334-
335.
27 House of Commons debate on the White Paper, November 17, 1930, op.cit.
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to  be  known  as  by  the  Arabs28 –  dated  on  February  13,  1931,  de  facto 
cancelled  the  White  Paper  and buried  the  idea of  one Arab state  in  all  of 
Palestine. Furthermore, the controversy around the White Paper only exposed 
the reality of the country, which was the presence of two competing national 
movements. Thus, the reversal in British policy enabled the Zionist movement 
–  the  mainstream  trend  –  to  further  its  demands  and  argue  for  partition 
whereas a minority in the movement argued for a bi-national state. 
Parallel  to  these  events,  the  developments  on  the  ground  had  also 
revived the debate around the British pledges concerning Palestine. This was a 
subject of concern for the High Commissioner appointed to Palestine at the 
end  of  1928,  Sir  John  Chancellor.  Chancellor  considered  that  the  Balfour 
Declaration was not in the interest of the British Empire, and in January 1930, 
he sent a memorandum to the Government in London explaining his position29. 
His memorandum raised such interest among the British administration that the 
King  himself  asked  him  for  a  note  on  the  state  of  affairs  in  Palestine. 
Chancellor  considered  that  British  policy  in  Palestine  was  unjust  and 
impossible to carry out, and he proposed to reduce Jewish immigration and 
land purchases. Most of all, he strongly opposed the Zionist movements' idea 
that the Palestinian Arabs could move to any other part of the Arab territories, 
and believed that it was unfair for the Arabs but also contrary to the Balfour 
Declaration that stipulated that nothing would be done to prejudice the existing 
non-Jewish communities. Chancellor advocated a more careful policy, one that 
would not further the Zionist claims:
“The facts of the situation are that in the dire straits of the war, the  
British Government made promises to the Arabs and promises to the  
Jews which are inconsistent with  one another and are incapable of  
fulfilment. The honest course is to admit our difficulty and to say to the  
Jews  that,  in  accordance  with  the  Balfour  Declaration,  we  have  
favoured the establishment of  a Jewish National  Home in Palestine  
and  that  a  Jewish  National  Home  in  Palestine  has  in  fact  been  
established and will be maintained and that, without violating the other  
part of the Balfour Declaration, without prejudicing the interests of the  
Arabs, we cannot do more than we have done”30.
28 This letter is since then referred to as the 'black letter' by the Arabs. See Jabber, Fuad, Ann Mosely 
Lesch & William Quandt, The Politics of Palestinian nationalism, Berkeley 1973, p.34.
29 Segev, Tom, One Palestine Complete: Jews and Arabs under British mandate, op.cit., pp.334-335.
30 Sir John R. Chancellor to Lord Stamfordham, May 27, 1930, Middle East  Archive, St. Antony’s 
College, Oxford. Quoted in Shlaim, Avi, “The Balfour Declaration and its consequences”, op.cit., pp. 
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For  Chancellor,  the  objective  of  the  Balfour  Declaration  had  already  been 
attained  and  the  Jewish  National  Home  existed  in  Palestine.  However,  in 
following this policy, Great Britain would contravene the provision concerning 
the other inhabitants of Palestine whom the Zionist movement clearly wanted 
to see leave the country. 
Chancellor's  view,  just  as  the  White  Paper  succumbed  to  the  Zionist 
movement's pressures and was buried by McDonald's letter, thus opening the 
way to expanding Zionist activity in Palestine, unlimited immigration and hence, 
further competition, conflicts and clashes with the Arabs of Palestine.
Seizing  opportunities,  accepting  partition:  the  Zionist  leadership  
and the Royal Commission's partition plan
The Royal Commission and the Zionist leadership
In 1936, the Arabs of Palestine launched a great revolt, the first of such 
importance and scope. Indeed, for the first time, all the factions of the Arabs of 
Palestine were involved in the revolt through demonstrations and above all the 
general strike. Moreover, for the first time, the local leadership gathered in one 
political organ, the AHC. As mentioned in Chapter Two, to understand and stop 
the revolt, Britain then decided to enquire about the causes and sent the Royal 
Enquiry Commission. The Zionist movement was not particularly enthusiastic 
about this Commission, as it feared the British government would consider the 
compatibility of Zionist and Arab aspirations and so it tried to use its influence 
to prevent it. The decision, however, was already made31. 
After first refusing to participate in the hearings, the Zionist leadership 
decided it could not boycott the Commission without harming its position. Haim 
Weizmann was then the main Jewish witness and he enjoyed a certain status 
within the Zionist movement but also among his British contacts, he was then 
to  be  heard  five  times.  Itzhak  Galnoor  notes  that  although  Weizmann's 
testimony included “a hint of the need for separation”, the latter stressed the 
251-270.
31 Rose, Norman A, “The debate on partition 1937-1938: The Anglo-Zionist Aspect: I. The proposal”,  
Middle Eastern Studies 6(3), Oct 1970, pp.297-318. 
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importance of immigration whilst trying to explain that even in the case where 
the Jews would become the majority, Palestine should not become a Jewish 
State.  However,  he  also  pointed  out  that  the  country  would  automatically 
become a Jewish National State if it contained no Arabs32. It was only during 
his fourth hearing on December 23, 1936, that the questions of cantonisation 
and the division of the country into two large parts arose. This was the doing of 
Sir Laurie Hammond and Reginald Coupland33.  This was the first time such 
ideas had arisen in official circles and discussed with one of the belligerents. 
They were still  not fully formulated so  Haim Weizmann argued that cantons 
would only be an artificial solution. But, by January, Coupland would resubmit  
to him the idea in a more detailed way, even using the term of “partition” and 
from then on Weizmann was to consider the idea as a great one for the future 
of Zionism in that it permitted to think of a future including Jewish sovereignty.  
Partition required  the  end of  the mandate  and he was still  not  sure of  the 
outcome of such a step, nevertheless, he thought of it as a more long-term 
policy  so,  when  he  returned  to  London  in  February  1937,  Weizmann  had 
clearly rallied the idea of partition and he made his objective to gain support for 
partition amongst the Members of Parliament (MPs). On March 2, he received 
the confirmation that partition would be recommended by the Commission34. 
When  the  British  government  revealed  the  conclusions  of  the  Royal 
Commission's report, the Zionist movement expressed diverse reactions, with, 
for example, the Jewish Chronicle giving its editorial the following title: “Royal 
Commission's  nightmare  scheme”  as  soon  as  the  plan  was  public.  It  was 
divided between those who were opposed to the principle of partition and those 
who were opposed to the partition plan but not to the principle, at least on a 
temporary basis. So, it seemed hesitant rather than rejecting. Indeed, as we 
have seen,  Haim Weizmann was rather in favour of the principle of partition 
and he was to be backed by David Ben Gurion35. Furthermore, even those who 
backed the partition principle took great care not to show their interest and 
32 Galnoor,  Itzhak,  The Partition of Palestine. Decision crossroads in the Zionist movement,  op.cit., 
p.57.
33 Rose, Norman A, “The debate on partition 1937-1938: The Anglo-Zionist Aspect: I. The proposal”,  
op.cit., pp.297-318. 
34 Haim, Yehoyada,  “Zionist  attitudes towards partition, 1937-1938”,  Jewish Social  Studies 40(3/4), 
Summer-Autumn 1978, pp.303-320.
35 Katz, Yossi, Partner to partition, the Jewish Agency's partition plan in the mandate era, op.cit., p.17.
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support, from fear that the scheme would be identified as Zionist doing36.
On August 2, 1937, the twentieth Zionist Congress in Zurich was held and the 
main  issue  dealt  with  was  the  partition  plan.  Whilst  being  in  favour  of  the 
principle of partition,  Haim Weizmann addressed an ambiguous message to 
the 484 delegates:  “We shall  resist  these proposals before the eyes of  the 
world, openly and honestly, with every means at our disposal”37. He was to be 
followed by a number of speeches in favour and most of them against partition. 
The  lines  of  fracture  and  new  alliances  were  to  be  created  according  to 
positions  on  partition.  The  religious  Zionists  who  could  not  envisage  the 
division of Palestine or Eretz Israel found an entente with Vladimir Jabotinsky 
and the revisionists,  who claimed a great Jewish state and feared that any 
decision  on  borders  would  be  definitive.  The  leftist  organisation  Hashomer 
Hatzair, for its part, advocated cooperation between Jewish and Arab working 
classes as well as with the proponents of a bi-national state. In spite of the 
dissolution of Brit Shalom38, Judah Leon Magnes (the Chancellor of the Hebrew 
University and a prominent advocate of bi-nationalism in Palestine) and other 
former members of the association were still very active  – most of them even 
united behind Magnes to elaborate a resolution, which he was mandated to 
present during the congress. Opposing partition, in continuity with Brit Shalom's 
precepts,  they  proposed  a  plan  for  a  bi-national  state  in  a  non-divided 
Palestine. To that end, they called for direct negotiations with the Arabs and the 
appointment of a committee with half its members as Zionists and the other 
half  as non-Zionists,  in order to negotiate with Great Britain,  the Arabs, the 
League of the Nations and the United States. Explaining that the Arabs were 
against  partition,  they  argued  that  if  the  Jews  also  decided  not  to  accept 
partition, the British Government could not pursue in that direction and could 
only  revoke  its  decision.  For  Magnes,  the  creation  of  a  Jewish  state  was 
against  the  mandate  and the  Wilsonian ideals  as  it  would  mean using  the 
Arabs as pawns and that this could only lead to a lengthy war. 
36 Rose, Norman A,   The Gentile Zionists: A study in Anglo-Zionist diplomacy 1929-1939,  London 
1973, pp. 129-30. 
37 Quoted by Aaron Klieman,  “In the public  domain:  the controversy over partition for  Palestine”, 
Jewish Social Studies 42(2), 1980, pp.147-164.
38 Brit Shalom was the first association in the Yishuv to advocate to a bi-national society and a bi-
national state. Formed in 1925, it was dissolved in 1933. The bi-nationalist component of the Zionist  
movement will be the subject of Chapter Five.
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However,  neither the right wing's arguments nor those of the bi-nationalists' 
weighed  against  the  leaders  of  the  movement  who  favoured  partition  as  a 
temporary  pragmatic  choice  but  not  as  an  end  in  itself.  Indeed,  Haim 
Weizmann, Moshe Shertok, Nahum Goldmann and David Ben Gurion were in 
favour  of  partition  as  a  pragmatic  choice  born  out  of  necessity39.  For  Ben 
Gurion, 
“The [1922] British Mandate should be understood as the first stage;  
the [proposed 1937] Jewish State will constitute the second stage; yet  
it will not be the last stage. There are no eternal political arrangements.  
We live in a dynamic, changeable world. In the face of all present and  
future changes we hold a singular testing criterion: the rapid growth of  
Jews in Eretz Yisrael and the strengthening of their independent force.  
That‘s the sole pathway to transform Palestine into Eretz Yisrael”40. 
All in all, the Zionist congress did not reject partition, especially as the British 
Government had accepted it. On the contrary, they saw it as a possibility that 
could  be  embraced,  should  the  conditions  offered  be  favourable.  So,  they 
decided to release a non-binding resolution:
“The Congress strongly rejects the assertion of the Palestine Royal  
Commission that the Palestine Mandate has proved unworkable and  
demands its fulfilment. The Congress directs the Executive to resist  
any infringement upon the rights of the Jewish people internationally  
guaranteed  by  the  Balfour  Declaration  and  the  Mandate.  While  
regarding  the  scheme  of  partition  put  forward  by  the  Royal  
Commission as unacceptable, the Congress empowers the Executive  
to enter into negotiations with a view to ascertaining the precise terms  
of  His  Majesty's  Government  for  the  proposed  establishment  of  a  
Jewish State ...41.
The Jewish Agency's partition plan and the transfer question 
Even before the Commission released its report, the Zionist leadership 
started to consult about the possibility of partition and a two-state outcome. 
This is the case of Ben Gurion who seems to have presented such a plan 
39 Galnoor,  Itzhak,  The Partition of Palestine. Decision crossroads in the Zionist movement,  op.cit., 
p.57.
40 Quoted in: Behar, Moshe, “One-State, Two-States, Bi-National State  Mandated Imaginations in A 
Regional Void”,   Middle East Studies Online Journal 5(2), 2011, pp.97-136.
41 The Jewish Agency for Palestine and Executive of the Zionist Histadrut, Protocol of the Twentieth 
Zionist Congress,  quoted in Aaron Klieman, “In the public domain: the controversy over partition 
for Palestine”, op.cit.; and Haim, Yehoyada, “Zionist attitudes towards partition, 1937-1938”, op.cit.
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during a Mapai's Central Committee meeting  held on February 5, 193742. The 
plan did not however receive a warm welcome and a rift was created between 
the Executive and the rest of the movement's members. 
Whilst  the  members  of  the  Royal  Commission  were  deliberating,  the 
Zionist leadership was gathering information from their contacts in Great Britain 
and trying to influence the outcome of the enquiry43.
So even before the Commission rendered its report, the Zionist Executive was 
working on a more favourable partition proposal. 
“The Executive must do its utmost... so that a good proposal, ideal to  
the extent possible concerning the establishment of the Jewish State  
should be submitted to the forthcoming congress. A large part of the  
Zionist Movement favours this and therefore the Congress granted its  
sanction that this position is not illicit, because it rejected the position  
which sought to negate this opinion and stated that the forthcoming  
Congress would decide while the Executive for its part would see to a  
sound plan for a state...  Congress entrusted the Executive with the  
conduct of negotiations regarding a Jewish State which would not arise  
in all of Palestine but only in part of the country...”44
Having decided to enter into negotiations with the British authorities on 
the  partition  issue,  the  Zionist  movement  did  its  best  to  facilitate  the  final 
adoption of the partition principle. It sought to find an alternative plan with more 
favourable conditions for Zionism, notably a more expanded territory. Thus, the 
Jewish Agency's political department appointed a Boundary Commission with 
the  task  of  drafting  a  map  following  the  considerations  that  the  Royal 
Commission  itself  used  to  draw  its  boundaries,  focussing  particularly  on 
security and economic interests – which meant British interests too. The idea 
was also to create new facts on the ground to facilitate the success of their 
claims. Claims that they would submit to the Woodhead Commission. 
They had fought to obtain Galilee as part of the proposed Jewish State and in 
spite of the strong presence of Arabs in that region, the Royal Commission had 
agreed45. So, the Zionist movement decided to create settlements there and 
42 Galnoor,  Itzhak,  The Partition of Palestine. Decision crossroads in the Zionist movement,  op.cit., 
p.60.
43 Katz, Yossi, Partner to partition. The Jewish Agency's partition plan in the Mandate era, op.cit., p. 
19.
44 CZA, Protocol of the inner Zionist General Council's meeting on November 3, 1937 and June 1938. 
Quoted in Yossi Katz, Partner to partition. The Jewish Agency's partition plan in the Mandate era , 
op.cit., p. 20.
45 In  June  1937,  Moshe  Shertok  had  written  to  the  members  of  the  Commission  to  highlight  the  
historical, spiritual and vital importance of the Galilee for the Jews.
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buy land in order to secure its inclusion in the final decision46. The Zionist plan 
also envisaged a more extensive territory for the permanent British mandate – 
to the detriment of the Arab State. The Zionist executive in particular proposed 
to include more parts of the Jerusalem district as well as the Negev and the 
Dead Sea areas within the territories to be controlled by Britain. The idea was 
to avoid losing important Jewish settlements in favour of the Arabs and most 
importantly, that, in time, parts of the areas under British mandate might be 
proposed  for  more  Jewish  settlements47.  But  above  all,  the  question  of 
immigration was of utmost importance to the Zionist movement. And, all these 
maps for a Jewish state were void if the state in question was not to be entirely,  
meaning homogeneously, Jewish. 
So, remained the question of the Arab presence. The Royal Commission 
had  already  mentioned  that  there  should  be  an  exchange  of  population 
between the two future states, possibly a “soft transfer”, meaning a voluntary 
one, however,  both the British government and the Zionist  movement were 
conscious that there was only an infinite chance of that happening48. And if it 
did  not  work,  there  would  have  to  be  measures  to  ensure  a  compulsory 
transfer. 
As argued by Benny Morris, “the evidence for pre-1948 Zionist support 
for 'transfer' really is unambiguous”49. The author of the Birth of the Palestinian  
refugee problem,  explains that talks of transfer have been constant since the 
beginning of the Zionist  colonisation enterprise, in a somewhat private way, 
which would not be the case for the discussions after 193650. Moreover, the 
idea of transfer was further developed after the Peel Commission proposed its 
partition  plan  which  as  we  have  seen  tackled  the  demographic  issue  and 
proposed transfer as a solution. Whilst in the first version of his book, Morris 
acknowledged only a very tenuous connexion between the talks on transfer in 
the  1930s  and  the  expulsion  in  1947-1948,  in  the  revised  version, he 
“concluded  that  pre-1948  ‘Transfer’  thinking  had  a  greater  effect  on  what 
46 Haim, Yehoyada, “Zionist attitudes towards partition, 1937-1938”, op.cit.
47 Rose, Norman A, “The debate on partition 1937-1938: The Anglo-Zionist Aspect: I. The proposal”,  
op.cit.,  pp.297-318;  Katz,  Yossi,  Partner  to partition.  The Jewish Agency's partition plan in  the  
Mandate era, op.cit., p. 46-49.
48 See the account on the Peel Commission in Chapter II.
49 Morris, Benny, The Birth of the Palestinian refugee problem revisited, Cambridge 2004, p.6
50 Ibid., p.45.
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happened in 1948 than I had allowed for”. However, Morris still considers that 
the connexion is far more tenuous than argued by Arab historians notably Nur 
Masalha51.  Indeed,  for  Walid  Khalidi  and  Nur  Masalha,  solving  the  “Arab 
problem” through “transfer” has been a constant in Zionist political thought52. 
Masalha has showed how the myth of an empty land and the discourse on the 
absence  of  a  distinct  Palestinian  people  have  been  key  elements  in  the 
development of the transfer discourse, but also how transfer became central in 
Zionist strategy from 1936 to 194853. So central actually that the Jewish Agency 
appointed  an  experts'  Committee  to  deal  with  the  question:  The  Transfer 
Committee.  The  Committee  studied  in  length  the  precedents,  notably  the 
Greek-Turkish and Balkans ones and even made trips to those areas during 
the  Autumn  1937,  to  observe  “the  experience  of  population  transfer  that 
occurred  there”54.  They  concluded  that  transfers  in  those  regions  were 
successful and benefited “all the parties”, feeling that the “benefits” of transfer 
would help them argue in favour of such a policy within the Zionist movement. 
At the end of the day, although there were a few debates about the morality of  
a transfer policy, the principle was not rejected, and on the contrary, as Ben 
Gurion argued during the twentieth Zionist Congress, it had already started.
“Was the transfer of the Arabs ethical, necessary and practicable? …
Transfer of Arabs had repeatedly taken place before in consequence of  
Jews settling in different districts”55.
Furthermore,  Ben Gurion  thought  the  Jewish  Agency had to  do  its  best  to 
convince Great Britain to pursue the politics of transfer. However, the report of 
the  Committee  also  criticised  the  slow transfer  as  practised  by the  Zionist 
Executive as unproductive. They argued for drastic measures to encourage the 
Arabs of Palestine to settle in Transjordan and Syria and so they proposed that 
the Jewish Agency should find land for the transferees56. 
51 Ibid., pp.5-6.
52 Khalidi, Walid, “Plan Dalet: The Zionist Master Plan for the conquest of Palestine”,  Middle East  
Forum 37(9), November 1961, pp.22-28.
53 Masalha, Nur,  The Politics of denial,  Israel and the Palestinian refugee problem, London 2003, p. 
14-19.
54 Katz, Yossi, Partner to partition. The Jewish Agency's partition plan in the Mandate era, op.cit., p. 
91.
55 Masalha, Nur, The Politics of denial, op.cit., p. 18.
56 Katz, Yossi, Partner to partition. The Jewish Agency's partition plan in the Mandate era, op.cit., p. 
94-95.
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The plan lacked details and required numerous conditions that were not met at 
the time, moreover, the Zionist Executive was aware that the Arabs would not 
agree to leave easily and that most of them would have to be removed forcibly,  
but it was not ready at the time to do this alone, hoping rather that the British  
authorities would take care of that task. However, it soon appeared that the 
British  would  not57.  The  abandonment  of  the  Partition  Plan  by  the  British 
government and the following White Paper advocating the establishment within 
a ten-year period of an Arab State with a Jewish minority, did nevertheless not 
put an end to the transfer option, on the contrary,  from then on the Zionist  
Executive would think about how they could themselves create the conditions 
and apply it, notably through accords with the Arab neighbouring countries to 
resettle the Arabs of Palestine58.
C. Biltmore and the demand for a Unitary State
Whilst war was raging in Europe, the Zionist leadership was working to 
obtain support from and in the United States. In 1941, the then president of the 
executive committee of the Jewish Agency, Ben Gurion, was on a tour of the 
United  States  in  order  to  prepare  Jewish  communities  for  his  new political 
programme  for  a  Jewish  Commonwealth.  He  presented  the  programme in 
January 1941 to the American Zionist Federation. In 1942, in the middle of the 
war,  in  order  to  organise  the  annual  Congress  of  the  World  Zionist 
Organization, the Zionist executive called for a meeting at the Biltmore Hotel in 
New York from the 6th to 9th May. Nearly 600 delegates from all over the United 
States  were  to  attend the  meeting  in  order  to  discuss and reformulate  the 
objectives of the movement. It was the opportunity for Ben Gurion to present 
the new programme he had drawn up  in response to the 1939 White Paper. In 
his speech, he upheld that there should and could not be a new World order 
after the war as long as there was no solution to the lack of a homeland for the 
Jews. The ideas of a bi-national state or of a partition of Palestine into two 
57 Ibid., p.104.
58 Masalha, Nur, The Politics of denial, op.cit., p. 19.
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states were then rejected in favour of a “maximalist programme” advocating the 
establishment of a Jewish sovereignty in all of Palestine. This was not a new 
objective,  but  a  new strategy.  Indeed,  it  was  a  turning  point  in  the  Zionist  
Movement history and political activity as it was the first time that its objectives 
were set  out  so clearly.  Of  course,  it  was a strategic  move backed by the 
atrocities the European Jews were facing which gave it a form of legitimacy. 
This  new  strategic  line  was  adopted  during  that  conference  in  what  has 
become known as the Biltmore Programme. It contained the re-affirmation of 
the historical ties of the Jews with Palestine and made the case of the Zionist 
enterprise.  Furthermore,  the  Biltmore  programme  brought  the  question  of 
numbers and demography back into the foreground, with the maximalist trend 
taking the majority within the Zionist movement, it demanded a Jewish majority 
in Palestine and was ready to confront the British authorities and their White 
Paper of 1939. However, the main decisions were contained in points six to 
eight:
“6. The Conference calls for the fulfilment of the original purpose of the  
Balfour Declaration and the Mandate which recognizing the historical  
connection of the Jewish people with Palestine' was to afford them the  
opportunity,  as stated by President Wilson, to found there a Jewish  
Commonwealth. The Conference affirms its unalterable rejection of the  
White Paper of May 1939 and denies its moral or legal validity. The  
White  Paper  seeks  to  limit,  and  in  fact  to  nullify  Jewish  rights  to  
immigration and settlement in Palestine, and, as stated by Mr. Winston  
Churchill in the House of Commons in May 1939, constitutes `a breach  
and repudiation of  the Balfour Declaration'.  The policy of  the White  
Paper  is  cruel  and  indefensible  in  its  denial  of  sanctuary  to  Jews  
fleeing  from  Nazi  persecution;  and  at  a  time  when  Palestine  has  
become  a  focal  point  in  the  war  front  of  the  United  Nations,  and  
Palestine  Jewry  must  provide  all  available  manpower  for  farm and  
factory and camp, it is in direct conflict with the interests of the allied  
war effort.
7.  In  the  struggle  against  the  forces  of  aggression  and  tyranny,  of  
which  Jews  were  the  earliest  victims,  and  which  now  menace  the  
Jewish National Home, recognition must be given to the right of the  
Jews of Palestine to play their  full  part  in the war effort  and in the  
defence of their country, through a Jewish military force fighting under  
its own flag and under the high command of the United Nations.
8. The Conference declares that the new world order that will follow  
victory  cannot  be  established  on  foundations  of  peace,  justice  and  
equality, unless the problem of Jewish homelessness is finally solved.  
The Conference urges that the gates of Palestine be opened; that the  
Jewish Agency be vested with control of immigration into Palestine and  
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with the necessary authority for upbuilding the country, including the  
development  of  its  unoccupied  and  uncultivated  lands;  and  that  
Palestine be established as a Jewish Commonwealth integrated in the  
structure of the new democratic world.
Then and only then will  the age old wrong to the Jewish people be  
righted”59.
Knowing that the programme would be supported but controversial, Ben Gurion 
had made sure not to reveal the programme too soon. And indeed, as soon as 
he  knew about  it,  Weizmann  was  very  critical.  For  the  latter,  it  marked  a 
rapprochement  with  the  maximalist  programme of  the  revisionists  and  this 
opinion was shared by the British Embassy in  the United States.  The plan 
constituted a national demand at a moment when national self-determination 
was  law  and  when  nation-states  were  in  formation  all  over  the  world,  it 
translated the will of the Zionist movement not to let the chance pass. And it 
revealed itself  to be a good calculation, as in November of the same year, 
information about what was happening in Europe and more particularly to the 
Jews in Germany and Poland were to reach Palestine and attract sympathy for 
the programme. What should have been the conclusions of a Jewish American 
conference  became  the  Zionist  political  programme  and  the  committee  of 
Zionist Action adopted it on the 19th November 1942 with a majority.
The  demand  for  unlimited  immigration,  until  then  embraced  for 
ideological reasons, was now reinforced with humanitarian arguments. 
The Biltmore programme was adopted as a response to the 1939 White 
Paper and its proposal of a united and unitary State with an Arab majority. It  
proposed the opposite alternative, that is a Jewish State with a Jewish majority, 
thus risking – as argued by Hashomer Hatzair – to dismiss all chances for a 
peaceful  resolution60,  to  affect  the  British  administration's  patience  and  to 
eventually push it to put the partition scheme it had proposed in 1937 back on 
the table. This was at least the fear of the advocates of bi-nationalism within 
the Zionist movement, as we will see in Chapter Five. However, more than that, 
Biltmore announced clearly that the Zionist movement would never be content 
with  partition  and  a  Jewish  State  on  only  part  of  Palestine,  thus  that  the 
endorsement of partition was a mere tactical move.
59 UNISPAL, “Declaration adopted by the Extraordinary Zionist Conference at the Biltmore Hotel of  
New York City”, May 11, 1942. 
60 Hazony, Yoram, The Jewish State: the struggle for Israel's soul, New York 2000, p.242.
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D.  The Zionist  movement  and the  UN partition  plan:  official 
acceptance, de facto rejection
When Britain appealed to the United Nations to find a solution to the 
Palestine  Question,  the  Zionist  movement  understood  that  it  was  a  great 
opportunity to obtain what it wished for. Indeed, the United States had for a 
while been showing great sympathy for the movement and this contributed to 
raise optimism within the Zionist movement's ranks.
Whereas the Arabs of Palestine decided to boycott the United Nations Special 
Committee on Palestine, the Zionist leadership decided it would make the best 
of it.  And during their hearings, David Ben Gurion and Haim Weizmann made 
strong cases in favour of partition, both having been advocates of the solution 
for a long time, as already mentioned. After recalling Zionist history since WWI, 
Weizmann thanked President Truman and Andreï Gromiko, the Soviet Union's 
envoy,  for  their  statements  in  favour  of  a  Jewish  State  and then  talked  in 
messianic terms about Zionism, stating that Zionism had always been seeking 
what God had promised the Jews: the whole of Palestine, but that they would 
accept partition as God would, in due time, “keep his promise”61. He attacked 
the 1939 White Paper in very violent words, immigration after all was the basis 
of Zionism. Partition for him and his colleagues was preferable to any other  
scheme, even those including independence in an Arab-Jewish federation. Bi-
nationalism was out of the question, they wanted a clean and clear cut. And 
they would do their best to impose partition as the best solution, which should 
indeed not be a difficult task as they already had the favour of the two great 
powers, the United States and the USSR that for once were in agreement.
After much pressure from the Zionist movement and the United States, 
and despite other proposals for a bi-national state or federal structure being 
backed  by  some  of  the  members  of  the  Commission,  the  United  Nations 
decided the partition of Palestine as a basis for the establishment of a Jewish 
State and an Arab State. Partition  was  then  announced  on  the  29th of 
61 UNISPAL, /A/364/Add.2 PV.21, Oral Evidence presented by Haim Weizmann to the United Nations 
Special Committee on Palestine, Jerusalem, July 8, 1947. 
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November.  This decision, as mentioned earlier and as we will see in the next 
Chapter, was strongly opposed by the Arabs and the Palestinians, whereas it 
was acclaimed by the Zionist Leadership who understood it as the recognition 
of  their  right  to  a  state  and  saw it  as  the  first  step  towards  achieving  its  
objectives.  
As expected, from the next day, clashes occurred between Palestinians 
and Jews. The British authorities had already announced they would leave the 
country and the Zionist movement knew that once the British would leave they 
would be confronted with the Arab armies. They had to act quickly so as to 
create new facts  on  the  ground,  namely evacuate as  many Arab areas as 
possible while maintaining intact the Zionist settlements in the area allotted to 
the Arab State. This strategy would constitute the first phase of the war, later  
called the civil war, as it confronted the Zionists with the Arabs of Palestine,  
and was to continue until March 1948.
March 1948 represents a turning point on the Palestine scene. Anticipating the 
retaliation of the British troops, and the intervention of the Arab armies, the 
Zionist  Executive  adopted  the  “Plan  Dalet”  to  accelerate  the  conquest  of 
Palestine62.  This  plan  foresaw  the  forcible  removal  or  transfer  of  the  Arab 
Palestinian  population63.  And once in  place,  the  plan  would  provide  for  the 
emergence of a larger exclusive Jewish State64. 
The  “plan  Dalet”  roughly  consisted  in  providing  the  maps  and  information 
compiled for many years about the Palestinian localities and their inhabitants to 
62 Ilan Pappé, A history of modern Palestine. One land, two people, Cambridge 2004, p. 129. Plan Dalet 
is  still  highly  controversial  among  Scholars  of  the  Middle  East.  Whilst  traditional  Zionist  
historiography has always rejected the idea of a premeditated transfer of the Palestinian populations, 
the Arab and Palestinian historians have been struggling to impose their version of the story for  
decades. Actually,  the latter have tried to prove that a forcible transfer had taken place since the 
1950s. The foremost historian Walid Khalidi, for example, has undertaken  thorough research on the 
subject and his conclusions were delivered in several articles published in the late 1950s and early 
1960s.  The  Palestinian  and  Arab  version  would  eventually  be  taken  into  account  in  Western 
scholarship after it was confirmed by Israeli historians, known as the “new historians”, in the late 
1980s. So, whilst the expulsion of the Arabs of Palestine in 1948 now seems accepted, there is still a  
debate over “whose fault it was”. Obviously, the Arab leaders did not call the Palestinians to flee, but  
Benny Morris maintains that whilst the Arabs are not to blame, Israel is not either. For him, this was 
the natural outcome of war and he refuses to draw a link between the discussions and position on  
transfer that took place in the 1930s among the Zionist leadership and the actual transfer or expulsion 
that took place in 1948. And this is where he is strongly criticised by the other “new historians”, most  
of whom have come to the conclusion that the Zionist leadership and later Israel have enforced a 
transfer policy that was long thought of.
63 Khalidi, Walid, “Plan Dalet: The Zionist Master Plan for the conquest of Palestine”,  Middle East  
Forum 37(9), November 1961, pp.22-28.
64 Pappe, Ilan, The Ethnic cleansing of Palestine, op.cit., p. 9.
136
the Israeli troops with a simple instruction: get the maximum of territories with 
the minimum of Arab inhabitants65. The process established to implement that 
policy is often referred to as “transfer” and it has been dealt with in numerous 
studies notably as we have seen by Walid Khalidi or Nur Masalha who have 
argued  that  transfer  has  been  one  of  the  key elements  in  Zionist  political 
thought since the early 1930s. Going further, Masalha stated that Ben Gurion 
entered  the  war  with  “a  transfer  desire  of  mindset”66.  The  idea  of  a 
premeditated transfer  has recently been taken further  by Ilan Pappe in  his 
Ethnic cleansing of Palestine.  The term ethnic cleansing has however been 
criticised especially among Israeli historians and political class. Pappe used the 
definitions of ethnic cleansing as elaborated by the US department the United 
Nations  and  numerous  researchers  in  the  1990s  after  the  Yugoslavian 
situation, namely the ethnic cleansing of Kosovo. He then showed that these 
definitions suited perfectly to the Palestine case when talking about what is 
generally known as the first Arab-Israeli war, even if the latter implies troops 
and confrontations. With his analysis, Pappe tends to prove that the transfer of 
the  Palestinians is  incumbent  solely  on  the  Zionist  and Israeli  political  and 
military class. Geographer Ghazi Falah supported the ethnic cleansing thesis 
as he chose to analyse the 1948-1949 war through the paradigm of total war 
combining “unlimited violence and depopulation of the Palestinian places”67. 
All in all, whilst the lack of political clarity in which Palestine found itself 
between 1947 and May 1948 offered the opportunity to implement the ethnic 
cleansing, the ideology behind it had been for a long time present in Zionist  
political thought. 
Moreover, the task was taken so seriously and whole-heartedly that when the 
British left Palestine in May 1948, already most of the Palestinian population of 
what was to become Israel was on the road to exile68. 
As  soon  as  the  British  evacuated  Palestine,  the  Zionist  movement 
declared its “independence” and proclaimed the birth  of  the State of Israel, 
65 Ibid., p.10. The same slogan was to be implemented during the 1967 war.
66 Masalha, Nur, “A critique of Benny Morris”,  Journal of Palestine Studies 21(1), Autumn 1991, pp. 
90-97.
67 Falah,  Ghazi,  “The  1948  Israeli-Palestinian  war  and  its  aftermath:  the  transformation  and  de-
signification of Palestine's cultural landscape”, Annals of the Association of American Geographers  
86(2), June 1996, pp. 256-285.
68 Pappe, Ilan, The Ethnic cleansing of Palestine, op.cit., p.158.
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which opened the door to the First Arab-Israeli  war involving Israel and the 
neighbouring Arab states. Just five days after the start of the war, the United 
Nations tried to appease the situation and sought reconciliation through the 
appointment of a United Nations Mediator in Palestine in the person of Count 
Folke Bernadotte. The latter made two peace proposals in which he advocated 
a two state-solution with the revision of the frontiers between the Jewish and 
the Arab states and if necessary by the United Nations, but above all he called 
for the return of the refugees. Bernadotte was however killed on September 17 
by a member of the Stern Gang, which adhered to revisionist Zionism but had 
split from the Irgun – the revisionist party's militia – in 1940. 
As  a  consequence  of  the  large-scale  policy,  more  than  750,000 
Palestinians had become exiles, “531 villages were destroyed and 11 urban 
neighbourhoods had been emptied” of their Palestinian inhabitants69. Palestine 
as it had crystallised under the British mandate, did not exist any more. Israel 
was established on over 78% of the territory,  the Western bank of the river 
Jordan was controlled and then annexed by the Hashemite Kingdom and Gaza 
found itself under Egyptian rule. 
E.  Israeli position on Peace , 1949-1988
The Jordanian option vs Greater Israel
The Jordanian option and the Greater Israel option refer to two major 
trends within the Zionist and then the Israeli political circles. Both deal with the 
future of the territories allocated to the Arab State in the partition scheme. The 
Jordanian option was not in fact an option that emerged after the UN decision 
to  partition  Palestine,  rather,  it  had  already  been  mentioned  by  the  Peel 
Commission.  The idea was to  partition Palestine and push for  a federation 
between the two banks or sides of the Jordan river. The idea was then to take 
shape  in  1947,  when  the  British  approached  King  Abdullah,  whom  they 
considered  their  most  trustworthy ally  in  the  region,  and  convinced  him to 
69 Pappé, Ilan, “The 1948 ethnic cleansing of Palestine”,  Journal of Palestine Studies 36(1), Autumn 
2006, pp. 6-20.
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annex what was destined to become the Arab part of Palestine70. Later on, as 
extensively shown by Avi Shlaim, the Zionist leadership would also enter into 
contact with Abdullah and both would come to a kind of similar agreement71. 
However, the years 1948-1950 gave the idea a whole new dimension as the 
establishment of Israel over nearly 78% of the territory and Jordan control over 
the rest after the first Arab-Israeli war made the Jordanian option a reality. 
The  expressions  “Greater  Israel”  or  “the  whole  land  of  Israel”  are 
currently usually used to refer to the same entity: the territory encompassing 
the  current  state  of  Israel  and  the  occupied  territories.  However,  these 
expressions have always caused controversy as there exists  no consensus 
over the frontiers of “Eretz Israel” or the land of Israel and the Bible drew more 
than  one  frontier.  Whilst  there  was,  as  is  underlined  by  Benny  Morris,  a 
consensus over the objective of Zionism – except for those groups believing in 
spiritual Zionism – i.e. the establishment of a Jewish sovereignty in Palestine, 
there existed none over the frontiers of the entity. The question of frontiers has 
always been the core of a heated debate within the Zionist  movement and 
whilst the latter had always sought all of Palestine as its territory, it had become 
a matter of time, strategy and tactics. As a matter of fact, in the late 1910s, the 
Zionist  movement  was claiming a  territory encompassing both  sides of  the 
Jordan River,  “Greater Palestine”72.   And it  was out of  pragmatism and not 
without internal fights that they decided to accept the exclusion of Transjordan 
(the western bank of the Jordan) from Palestine and as a consequence from 
the scope of the Balfour Declaration. This decision caused a major rift within 
the Zionist movement and was, as mentioned above, one of the motors for the 
creation of the Revisionist party in 1925, the ancestor of the Likud. 
Later, in the late 1930s, the most pragmatic of the Zionist trends understood 
that as long as the Jews did not dispose of a sovereign state, sovereignty had 
to be the core quest and to achieve it, they could not demand all of Palestine,  
making them ready to new territorial compromises. However, this did not stop 
them from trying, although in vain, to gain more territories, notably the Galilee 
70 Khalidi, Rashid, The Iron cage, op.cit., p. 127-128.
71 Shlaim, Avi, Collusion across the Jordan: King Abdullah, the Zionists and the partition of Palestine, 
op.cit.; The Politics of Partition. King Abdullah, the Zionists and Palestine 1921-1951,Abridged Ed. 
New York/Oxford 1990. 
72 Morris, Benny, One State, Two States. Resolving the Israel/Palestine conflict, op.cit., p. 34.
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and Jerusalem, in particular during the hearings with the Royal Commission in 
1936-193773.  The Biltmore programme consecrated the official re-emergence 
of the Zionist maximalist vision, calling for the first time in clear words for a 
Jewish State on the land of Israel and drawing at the same time the frontiers of 
the wanted State. From then on, the top priorities were obtaining sovereignty 
and  contracting  additional  territories.  So  that  when  the  Anglo-American 
commission advocated a bi-national state, the Zionist movement immediately 
rejected the plan and gave way to violence74. 
As  soon  as  the  Zionist  movement  obtained  its  state  in  November  1947,  it  
engaged in the expansion of its territory, proclaimed its state and engaged in a 
war with its Arab neighbours, a war that ended with the seizure of even more 
territories. By the end of the war, Israel had effectively reached its goal with a 
territory comparable  to  the  one they had lobbied for  over  the  previous ten 
years75,  moreover,  as explained above it  had successfully  transferred about 
eighty percent of the Palestinians who lived in the territory it now controlled. 
The Palestinian population who stayed – nearly 160,000 – was surrounded by 
complete  strangers,  strangers  to  their  language,  traditions  and  social  and 
political  systems. They were living in the middle of their  enemies and were 
themselves considered as inside enemies. Israel having unexpectedly to cope 
with that population (it had been unable to push all the Palestinians into the 
roads  of  exile)  decided  in  October  1948,  to  place  them  under  a  military 
government  which  was going  to  last  eighteen years,  until  December  1966. 
Living  under  military  government  meant  curfews,  arbitrary  imprisonment  or 
even  deportation  which  considerably  limited  them  in  their  movements  and 
activities.  Discriminatory  and  restrictive  laws  were  promulgated  that 
expropriated or confiscated most of the Palestinian lands76. 
After the armistice of 1949, the question of territory remained unsettled, 
as beside the willingness to conquer the whole of mandatory Palestine, there 
existed  a  strong  drive  towards  what  was  to  be  later  called  the  “Jordanian 
73 Haim, Yehoyada, “Zionist attitudes towards partition, 1937-1938”, op.cit..
74 On July 22, 1946, the Irgun, a Zionist militia affiliated to the Revisionist Party bombed the King 
David Hotel, known to be the British headquarters, killing 91 persons and injuring 46.
75 Galnoor,  Itzhak,  The Partition of Palestine. Decision crossroads in the Zionist movement,  op.cit., 
p.279.
76 Ghanem, Asad, Nadim Rouhana and Oren Yiftachel, “Questioning "Ethnic Democracy": A Response 
to Sammy Smooha”, Israel Studies 3(2), Fall 1998, pp. 253-267
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option”. Israel was then in its formative years and already occupying areas not 
included in the territory it was given by the United Nations. It could not allow 
itself to start another conflict and risk losing the territories it had conquered. So, 
for  pragmatic  and  strategic  reasons  Israeli  leadership  left  unsettled  the 
question of Greater Israel.  
The question of Greater Israel was only to re-emerge after 1967, with 
the question of the annexation of the West Bank and the Gaza strip.  As a 
matter of fact, since 1956 and the Suez Canal crisis, there had been constant 
tensions between Israel and its Arab neighbours. These were exacerbated by 
Israel's strikes on Jordan as a response to the infiltration operations by the 
Palestinian  fidaiyyun organisations.  However,  the  main  sources  of  tensions 
were the cultivation by Israel of land situated in the demilitarised zone between 
Israel and Syria, the use by Palestinian and Syrian fishermen of Lake Tiberias 
and above all  Israel's pumping of Lake Tiberias’ waters for  agricultural  and 
industrial use77. These events, combined with permanent harassment of Syrian 
troops by the Israeli army78, led to an escalation from April 1967 and eventually 
to the Six Days war in June 1967.
In  the  wake  of  the  war,  Israel  had  gained  control  over  the  rest  of  historic  
Palestine's territory besides the Syrian Golan Heights, southern Lebanon and 
the Egyptian Sinaï and provoked a new  expulsion of Palestinian population 
notably in Jerusalem where Israel started a Judaisation policy79. As a result, 
Israel was occupying all of mandatory Palestine and it was once again facing a 
great dilemma: annex the occupied territories with their majority of Arabs that 
would  invert  the  balance  of  population  or  render  them  and  keep  a 
homogeneous although narrow Jewish state. In the aftermath of the war, the 
United Nations voted resolution 242 which called for Israeli withdrawal from the 
occupied territories hence, de facto displacing the lines of the partition plan by 
normalising  and  legitimising  the  previous  occupation.  From  then  on,  the 
77 Dieckhoff, Alain and Mark Tessler, “Israël et les États arabes: de la confrontation totale à une paix 
partielle”, in Dieckhoff, Alain (ed.), L'État d'Israël, Paris 2008, pp.293-312.
78 Nearly ten years after the war, Moshe Dayan would confirm the state f tension that existed before the 
war and the harassment policy of the Israeli army. In Zisser, Eyal, “June 1967: Israel's Capture of the 
Golan Heights”, Israel Studies 7(1), Foreign Relations Spring, 2002, pp. 168-194
79 Pappe, Ilan, A history of modern Palestine, op.cit., pp.194-196; Lesch, Ann M., “Israeli Deportation 
of Palestinians from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, 1967-1978”,  Journal of Palestine Studies  
8(2), Winter 1979, pp. 101-131.
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Greater Israel discourse was not limited to the Revisionists, and now that it 
seemed feasible,  the idea spread. Until  then Israel had been going through 
different  phases  characterised  by  Baruch  Kimmerling  as  the  pre-sovereign 
period coupled with presence; the sovereign period coupled with “ownership” 
and  control  over  the  territories  conquered  in  1947-194880.  1967  redefined 
Israeli relations to land control as it presented a possibility for ownership of the 
West  Bank.  It  thus  led  to  the  emergence  of  a  new maximalist  movement 
transcending political  labels,  the Whole Land of Israel  Movement (Hatnu'ah 
Lema'an  Eretz-Yisrael  Hashlemah)  as  it  encompassed  members  from  the 
entire political spectrum81. 
Its manifesto stated: 
“Zahal's  victory in  the six  day war placed the people and the state  
within a new fateful  period. The whole of Eretz Israel is now in the  
hands of the Jewish people, and just as we are not allowed to give up  
the State of Israel, so we are ordered to keep what we received there  
from Eretz Yisrael...  We are bound to be loyal to the entirety of the  
country... and no government in Israel is entitled to give up this entirety,  
which represents the inherent and inalienable right to our people from  
the beginning of its history”82.
The movement was strong and its bards were numerous, from poets and other 
artists  to  political  figures.  Beside  the  political  statements,  the  movement 
translated on the ground through an expansionist  settlement policy and the 
development  of  settler  movements  such as Gush Emunim.  These,  with  the 
approval of the Labour dominated government, started confiscating Palestinian 
lands and colonising the occupied territories almost immediately after the war83.
A major  turning  point  was  to  occur  with  the  arrival  in  power  of  the 
revisionist Likud party in Israel ten years after the 1967 war. Indeed, as we 
have seen, the revisionists had been on the leading edge in advocating the 
advent of Greater Israel, wishing to establish a state on all of Palestine and 
beyond. Whereas the Labour party, for its part, had been open to a territorial  
80 Kimmerling,  Baruch,  “Change  and  continuity  in  Zionist  territorial  orientations  and  politics”,  
Comparative Politics 14(2), January 1982, pp.191-210.
81 Masalha, Nur,  Imperial Israel and the Palestinians: the politics of expansion, London 2000, pp.28-
29.
82 Lustick, Ian, For the land and the Lord, Jewish fundamentalism in Israel, New York 1988, p.43.
83 Dieckhoff, Alain, “Israel  face aux Palestiniens”,  in Dieckhoff, Alain (ed.),  L'État d'Israël,  op.cit., 
pp.275-292. 
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compromise  with  King  Hussein  of  Jordan,  the  revisionists’  arrival  in  power 
accelerated the colonization process of the occupied territories.
It  may be  worth  at  this  stage reminding ourselves  of  the  change  of 
position that occurred within the revisionist fringe. Indeed, the revisionist trend 
had  begun  to  change  position  during  the  1950s,  slowly  accepting  that  the 
eastern bank of the Jordan could not be included within the Jewish State. It  
should be remembered that before that, they had been the great opponents of 
the  exclusion  of  Transjordan  from  Zionist  activities84.  After  1967,  the 
predecessor  of  the  Likud,  Gahal,  was  firmly  opposed  to  any return  of  the 
conquered lands except for the Sinai and that for two reasons, first, it was not 
part of Eretz Israel, second, Menachem Begin, the head of the Likud and from 
1977,  Israel's  Prime  Minister  was  not  ready  to  grant  more  than  mere 
administrative autonomy to the Palestinians and sought a separate peace with 
Egypt85.  Moreover,  it  was  firmly  opposed  to  resolution  242  and  refused  to 
recognize  the  PLO,  which  it  sought  to  isolate  and  destroy  (Israel  would 
eventually invade Lebanon in 1982 to destroy the organisation). This led them 
to  push  aside  the  Jordanian  option  in  favour  of  the  Greater  Israel  one. 
However, the Jordanian option would re-emerge in the mid 1980s, although 
again proving unsuccessful86.
The emergence of a two-state movement in Israel
As mentioned in the previous part, immediately after the seizure of the 
West Bank, Gaza, the Golan, the Sinai and South Lebanon, a debate emerged 
over  the  return  of  the  occupied  territories.  The  majority  of  Israelis  were  in 
favour of keeping them under Israeli control however, there was also a minority 
that  considered  the  idea  of  using  these  territories  as  bargaining  power, 
basically land for peace. This was the basis of the Allon plan that emerged in 
late  July  196787.  The  latter  included  conditions  according  to  which  the 
84 Nadav G., Shelef, “From 'both banks of the Jordan' to the 'Whole Land of Israel': ideological change 
in revisionist Zionism”, Israel Studies 9(1), Spring 2004, pp. 125-148. Also see Chapter I.
85 Shlaim, Avi, “The Likud in power: the historiography of revisionist Zionism”,  Israel Studies 1(2), 
Fall 1996, pp.278-293.
86 Dieckhoff, Alain, “Israel face aux Palestiniens”, op.cit.,  pp.275-292.
87 Morris, Benny, One State, Two States. Resolving the Israel/Palestine conflict, op.cit., p. 84.
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negotiations were to be held with the Hashemite Kingdom and not the PLO, 
meaning that the part of the West Bank that Israel would not keep would go to 
Jordan88.  However,  the  plan  was  rejected by the  Israeli  Cabinet  and never 
became part of any official policy although it would after the late 1980s serve 
as a basis for the two-state solution proposals. 
With the arrival of the Likud in power, the situation seemed even more 
difficult.  The  Israeli  government  appeared  to  refuse  any  offer  of  territorial  
concessions,  and  negotiations  with  Egypt  were  at  a  deadlock.  This  is  the 
moment when 348 reserve officers and soldiers of the Israeli army decided to 
publish an open letter to the government in order to push for advancement on 
peace89.  Peace  Now,  was  then  created  with  a  call  of  “land  for  peace”, 
demonstrating against the invasion of Lebanon and objecting to the pursuit of 
colonisation in the occupied territories. 
Peace  Now  was  motivated  by  what  Tamar  Hermann  called  “pragmatic 
pacifism”, indeed the movement's members were not pacifists and they were 
ready to fight for their country without question. However, they preferred peace 
when it  was possible.  Theirs was a pragmatic reading of pacifism: it  was a 
necessity in  a  situation where the  control  over  all  the  territories conquered 
during the 1967 war could induce more weakness than strength. Actually, they 
feared  that  the  occupation  would  keep  too  many fronts  open  and  blemish 
Israel's legitimacy on the international scene90.
When the PLO eventually adhered to the principle of the two-state solution and 
proclaimed the independence of the Palestinian State in 1988, it opened the 
door to secret talks between members of the Israeli Intelligence Service and 
the leaders of the PLO. These in turn opened the way for the Madrid Peace 
Conference and Oslo Agreement.
F. Conclusion 
88 Morris, Benny, Righteous victims, op.cit., p.330.
89 Peace  Now,  “The  Officers'  letter”,  March  1978:  http://peacenow.org.il/eng/content/officers-letter-
march-1978
90 Debié, Frank, “Les stratégies territoriales en Cisjordanie et à Gaza”, in Dieckhoff, Alain (ed.), L'Etat  
d'Israël, op.cit., pp.313-332.
144
After  having  secured  the  principle  of  a  Jewish  National  Home  in 
Palestine, the Zionist movement launched a diplomatic and political offensive to 
transform the National Home into an exclusively Jewish political  centre. For 
that purpose, it has implemented the principle of separation from the Arabs in 
all  the  political,  economic  and  social  fields.  This  as  we  have  seen,  was 
particularly obvious in the numerous drafts the WZO proposed to serve as a 
basis for the text of the British mandate over Palestine. Separation as a tool for 
Jewish autonomy became an objective in itself, and one that  would lead to 
sovereignty.  When after the Great Arab Revolt,  and facing a deadlock in its 
policy, the British government came up with the idea of partition in 1937, as a 
solution to the Palestine question, the Zionist movement almost immediately 
accepted  the  principle  of  partition,  although  wishing  for  a  more  favourable 
settlement  for  Zionism  than  the  one  proposed  by  the  British  government. 
Indeed, what was a “way out” for Britain, was for the Zionist movement a way 
to secure sovereignty. And to reach such a settlement, the Zionist leadership 
decided to accelerate its land settlement policy. This meant trying to buy more 
lands from the Arabs and establishing settlements in the areas they wished 
would one day would be part of the Jewish State. A Jewish State without a 
Jewish majority was out of the question, so the Zionist Executive made sure of 
finding a way to secure Jewish exclusiveness. It tackled the issue of transfer as 
a foreseeable solution. Indeed, the Peel Commission itself had envisaged this 
under the euphemism of the “exchange of population”. 
Although Britain did abandon its partition scheme in the late 1930s, the 
Zionist leadership continued to develop its plans for an exclusive Jewish State. 
The situation on the ground as well as the situation of the European Jews in 
the early 1940s made a solution even more urgent and the Zionist leadership 
made a strategic move from the acceptance of the principle of partition in 1937 
to the advocacy of partition before the various Commissions of Enquiry it met. 
And this despite the fact that the leading idea in Zionist thought had always 
been to establish a Jewish autonomy in all of Palestine. So whilst it internally 
advocated the transformation of the whole of Palestine into the Jewish State, 
notably with  the Biltmore programme, the Zionist  movement was pragmatic 
enough to argue in favour of partition on the international scene. 
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As  we  have  seen,  the  United  Nations  eventually  decided  on  Palestine's 
partition and although it had nominally fought for and accepted partition, the 
Zionist movement made sure to obtain partition on its own terms, meaning the 
most  territories  with  the  least  Arabs.  And  for  that  purpose,  the  Zionist 
leadership and then the Israeli political-military class implemented a policy of 
transfer,  followed  by  the  establishment  of  Jewish  settlements  in  all  the 
ethnically cleansed areas.
Whilst the Israelis accepted the terms of the 1949 armistice, the idea of 
the whole of Palestine under Israeli control still prevailed and Israel was faced 
with  a choice between aiming for Greater Israel  or to further the Jordanian 
option. In the aftermath of war, Israel decided to leave the territorial question 
undecided. However, that question would re-emerge after the 1967 war, which 
enabled Israel to control all of mandate Palestine and created a new fact on the 
ground necessitating new peace proposals and a new basis for partition and 
the two-state solution. The 1977 elections put an end to the Jordanian option 
for  a  while  and  consecrated  new facts  on  the  ground,  namely  the  Jewish 
colonies in the West Bank, Gaza and the Golan. 
The 1980s were then to open the way to a two-state movement, which first  
called for a peace settlement on the basis of the Jordanian option and the land 
for  peace  principle,  and  then,  once  the  PLO  had  endorsed  the  two-state 
solution and accepted the UN resolutions 242 and 338, it encouraged direct 
negotiations with the Organisation itself. 
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Chapter Four: Palestinian Perspectives on Partition(s)
The 1910s saw the growth of Arab nationalism, which brought with it the 
search for self-determination and sovereignty. However, WWI had contributed 
to  the total  redrawing of  the Arab east  and North  Africa and instigated the 
desires of the traditional colonial powers, which were processing the division 
and  partition  of  the  region.  In  that  context,  Palestine  was  at  the  core  of 
numerous pledges. The partition of Syria created different realities in Syria and 
Palestine  which  would  accelerate  the  passage  from  a  struggle  based  on 
Qawmiyya, with the objective of establishing an Arab State in Greater Syria, to 
one based on  Wataniyya, as a way to defeat British and Zionist colonialism. 
However,  Zionism  too  created  a  new  reality  on  the  ground  that  would 
eventually pose the question of the partition of Palestine.  
This  chapter  examines  the  Palestinian  perspective  on  partition  and 
construction of the anti-partitionist discourse to show that it has been constant 
and consistent to the extent that the Palestinians were ready to offer an Arab 
unitary state in Palestine. First, I will explore the historical process that led the 
Palestinian Arabs to replace the objective of an Arab State in a united Greater 
Syria.  The  Arab  Palestinians  had  no  choice  but  to  adapt  to  the  situation 
imposed by the colonial powers and Wataniyya was a way to struggle against 
the foreign powers and particularly Zionism.
Second, I will contemplate the Arab attitude towards Zionism and the British 
mandate, to argue that although they rejected Zionism, the Palestinian Arabs 
were ready to give the Jews their share of political representation within an 
Arab government and according to the principles of democracy. However, after 
only fifteen years of rule, the United Kingdom was losing grip over Palestine 
and  the  mandate  became  unmanageable.  As  a  response  to  the  events  in 
Palestine, namely the Great Arab Revolt of 1936, the mandatory authorities 
eventually came up with a partition plan that the Palestinians rejected. 
As  we  will  see  in  the  third  part,  rejection  of  partition  and  advocacy  of  a 
democratic government would prevail during the period preceding the adoption 
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by the United Nations of the partition resolution in 1947.
Finally,  just  a  few months after  the adoption of  the partition resolution,  the 
Zionist  movement  would  proclaim the  establishment  of  a  Jewish State  and 
proceed to an ethnic cleansing in order to expand its territory without including 
the  Arabs.  Weakened  and  dispersed  the  AHC members  would  eventually 
proclaim  the  establishment  of  a  government  in  exile,  the  All-Palestine 
government.
 
A.  Faced  with  Zionism:  Between   Qawmiyya  and  Wataniyya,   
1918 – 1922
As  we  have  seen  in  Chapter  One  and  Two,  Arab  nationalism  or 
Qawmiyya had  developed  during  WWI.  By  1918  it  had  largely  replaced 
Ottomanism, and, although it had not yet fully developed, Arab nationalism had 
one clear objective, Arab unity, and as such it rejected colonial partitions. By 
1919, Arab nationalists would call for the independence of the Arab peoples 
and most importantly for the unity of Greater Syria, thus against the separation 
and partition of Palestine and the Zionist project.
However, as we will see, in the following sections, just a few years after the 
Arab  nationalists  organised  in  a  united  framework,  as  underlined  by 
Muhammad  Muslih,  the  local  crises  would  get  the  better  of  the  Arab 
nationalists who, in absence of a clear Arab nationalist programme, “resigned 
themselves – some painfully and begrudgingly – to the overwhelming pull of 
local concern and priorities. Nationalism linked to limited pieces of territory and 
their  populations  prevailed”1.  Local  nationalism  or  wataniyya,  would  then 
appear as the only means to struggle against British and French colonialism, 
and even more since Britain  was known to  support  the Zionist  project  and 
since the champion of Arab nationalism was not aware enough of the dangers 
of Zionism for the Arab cause2. 
1 Muslih, Muhammad, “Arab politics and the rise of Palestinian nationalism”,  Journal of Palestine  
Studies 16(4), Summer 1987, pp.77-94.
2 Ibid.
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The aftermath of the Balfour Declaration in the Arab region
When the news about the Balfour Declaration reached the Middle East 
and the Arab nationalists, approximately at the same time as the news of the 
Sykes-Picot Agreements, in December 1917, it had the effect of a small bomb. 
In  order  to  defuse  it,  the  British  Government  multiplied  the  appeasing 
messages to the Arabs. 
Sharif Hussein – by then King of Hejaz – leaving the benefit of the doubt to his 
British interlocutors, immediately sent for explanations. The British of course 
responded with a reassuring message sent through Commander D.G. Hogarth, 
one of the heads of the Arab Bureau in Cairo. The latter was dispatched to 
Jeddah at the beginning of January 1918, where he conducted a series of 
interviews with King Hussein. In the message, that came to be known as the 
Hogarth message, Britain stated: “Jewish settlement in Palestine would only be 
allowed in  so far  as it  would be consistent  with  the political  and economic 
freedom of the Arab population”3. More than evasive, the message did not say 
anything about the Sykes-Picot Agreement and its dismantlement of the Arab 
territory, or about the real content of the Balfour promise4. Nevertheless, it was 
sufficient to calm King Hussein. 
Whilst the awareness of King Hussein and his sons was gradual and 
expressed with great disappointment, the reaction of the Arab nationalists was 
immediate and hostile. Reacting to the news about the Balfour Declaration and 
the Sykes-Picot agreements, seven Arab notables from the newly-formed Party 
of Syrian (in the sense of Greater Syria) Unity, and based in Cairo, issued a 
memorandum requesting explanations from the British Government5. They also 
demanded that “the ultimate independence of Arabia” should be guaranteed. In 
a will to appease the Arabs, the British government issued a declaration – the 
Declaration to the Seven – stressing it would always seek the consent of the 
people in the guidance of  its  policies6.  However,  the letter  consecrated the 
dividing of the Arab territories into four categories – the territories that were 
3 Quoted in: Antonius, Georges, The Arab awakening, op.cit., p. 268.
4 Shlaim, Avi, “The Balfour declaration and its consequences”, op.cit., pp. 251-270 
5 Khader, Bishara, L'Europe et la Palestine des croisades à nos jours, op.cit., pp.120-121.
6 UNISPAL, “The Declaration to the Seven of June, 1918”, Annex G to the Report of a Committee set  
up to consider certain correspondence between Sir Henry McMahon and the Sharif of Mecca, in  
1915 and 1916, March 16, 1939.
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already independent,  the  ones  that  were  freed  by  “the  Arabs  themselves”, 
those freed by the Allied troops (roughly Iraq and Palestine) and those still  
under Turkish rule. This enabled Britain to introduce a differential treatment of 
the territories according to their category, indeed, although it recognised “the 
complete and sovereign independence of the Arabs” inhabiting the areas under 
the first two categories, it was more than ambiguous in the case of the areas 
freed by the Allied troops7. In this, the British government was thus preparing 
for the separation and the partition of the Near East.
Great Britain's assurance to the Arabs did not prevent the Zionists from 
developing their institutions (mentioned above). This inability or lack of will from 
the  British  administration  only  helped propagate  fear  among the  Arabs.  As 
unrest was growing, the British and French governments in a joint effort issued 
a declaration aiming at calming the situation. This time, it stated more clearly 
the  principle  of  liberation  –  without  however  mentioning  independence  – 
including  Syria  and Mesopotamia,  which  were  the  areas demanded by the 
nationalists.
“The goal envisaged by France and Great Britain in prosecuting in the  
East the War let loose by German ambition is the complete and final  
liberation of the peoples who have for so long been oppressed by the  
Turks, and the setting up of national governments and administrations  
deriving  their  authority  from  the  free  exercise  of  the  initiative  and  
choice of the indigenous populations.
In pursuit of those intentions, France and Great Britain agree to further  
and  assist  in  the  establishment  of  indigenous  Governments  and  
administrations in Syria and Mesopotamia which have already been  
liberated by the Allies, as well as in those territories which they are  
engaged  in  securing  and  recognizing  these  as  soon  as  they  are  
actually established”8.
By October 1918, the Arabs and the British had reached and taken Damascus, 
and  by  November  the  armistice  was  signed.  The  war  being  over  and, 
reassured by the joint declaration as well as by the fourteen points issued by 
President Wilson, the Arabs were on their way to the Paris Peace Conference 
which  they  thought  would  settle  once  and  for  all  their  independence  and 
territorial claims. 
7 Ibid.
8 Antonius, George, The Arab awakening, op.cit., p. 435-436
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The  Paris  Peace  Conference:  the  fragmentation  of  the  Arab  
independence struggle
In  1918,  in  view  of  gaining  further  legitimacy,  isolating  the  French 
government and gaining American support, the Zionist leadership decided to 
negotiate  an  agreement  with  the  Arabs.  Indeed,  if  it  reached  such  an 
agreement, this would respect Wilson’s principles. However, it knew they could 
not  deal  with  the  Palestinian  Arabs,  whose  hostility  towards  Zionism  was 
known and who had started organising in associations amongst which the well-
known Arab Muslim–Christian Association9. Moreover, the British government 
was encouraging the Zionist movement to talk with Faisal, knowing that the 
latter was under its influence through T. E. Lawrence, with whom he had fought 
and whom he trusted to be a true friend of the Arab cause. So, the British 
government used its influence to convince Faisal to meet with Weizmann and 
discuss  the  question  of  Palestine.  The  first  encounter  between  Faisal  and 
Weizmann took place in June 1918 in Aqaba, and Weizmann made an effort to 
reassure Faisal as to the objectives of the Zionist movement, which were to 
help to develop the country for the advantage of the Jews as well as the Arabs. 
Of  course,  he  denied any willingness to  establish  a Jewish  government  in 
Palestine10. Parallel to that, and as mentioned above, the Arabs of Palestine 
were  organising in  local  chapters  of  the Arab Muslim-Christian  Association. 
They  started  petitioning  the  Occupied  Enemy  Territory  Administration  – 
established by military edict in 1918 – against the Balfour Declaration and for 
the restitution of Palestine into Syria11. 
The Paris Peace Conference, aiming at establishing a settlement according to 
the principle of self-determination as developed by President Wilson, began on 
January 18, 1919 and Faisal was invited by Britain to take part as the Arab 
delegate. 
9 Palestinians from the Muslim-Christian Association formed that year presumably in June would even 
submit memoranda to the Peace Conference to reiterate that nothing should be done without the 
Arabs' consultation and consent. Abdelwahab al-Kayyali (ed.),  Documents of the Arab Palestinian  
resistance against Great Britain and Zionism, op.cit., pp. 8-9.
10 Antonius, George, The Arab awakening, op.ct., p. 283-286.
11 Fieldhouse, D.K, Western Imperialism in the Middle East 1914-1958, op.cit., pp.153; Abdelwahab al-
Kayyali (ed.),  Documents of the Arab Palestinian resistance  against Great Britain and Zionism, 
op.cit., pp.1-16.
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Once Faisal reached London, the British government made the case for 
Zionism  and  used  all  its  influence  to  push  him  to  recognise  the  Zionist 
aspirations on behalf of the Arabs and to sign an agreement with Weizmann. 
Although reluctant, Faisal, who was under extreme pressure, eventually signed 
an agreement with  Weizmann on January 3rd 1919.  He nevertheless made 
sure to add a clause in Arabic stating that the agreement would be null and 
void if the Arabs did not achieve their independence.
Beside guaranteeing the application of the Balfour declaration and proposing 
the creation of an independent state of Palestine alongside the Arab state, the 
text also clearly secured the rights of the “Arab peasant and tenant farmers”. 
The signature of the agreement, which consecrated the partition of Syria with 
Faisal's consent, was however strongly condemned by the Arab nationalists, 
especially the Palestinians, as attested in the diary of Auni Abd al-Hadi – who, 
as we have seen above, was a companion of Faisal in the Secret Societies.
According to Abd al-Hadi and the historians of the period, Faisal signed the 
agreement without understanding its implications because it was in English, a 
language he did not know. Moreover, as reported by Henry Laurens, the texts 
in  English,  which  were  favourable  to  the  Zionists  differed from the texts in 
French and Arabic12. The latter seem to be less advantageous as they refer 
only to an “equality of rights between Jews and Arabs in Palestine”. 
By  mid-January,  Faisal  went  to  Paris  and  after  controversy  over  his 
legitimacy, he was eventually authorised to present his case13.  In contrast, the 
Zionist movement, whose claims were convergent with Britain's, presented its 
case as part of Great Britain's propositions and plans.
Since his arrival in Europe, Faisal had sent two memorandums explaining the 
Arabs' claims to the British and the French governments' representatives. In 
the first, dated January 1st, he argued in favour of independence and stressed 
the  notion  of  unity of  the  Arab region – which he presented as the  region 
inhabited  by  the  Arabic-speaking  peoples.  Concerning  the  question  of 
12 Laurens, Henry, L'Orient arabe. Arabisme et islamisme de 1798 à 1945, op.cit., p.158.
13 Once he arrived in Paris, Faisal discovered that the French were rather hostile to his presence and did 
not recognise his right to be present at the Conference, as Hejaz was not considered as an Allied  
belligerent state. As a matter of fact, since President Wilson had imposed the consultation of the  
concerned peoples for making any territorial decisions, they were worried that his presence could 
represent a challenge to the application of the Sykes-Picot agreement. However, the British, who 
were trying to tip the balance in their favour, intervened through the Foreign Office and his right to  
speak at the conference was finally recognised.
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Palestine, he wrote:
“In  Palestine,  the  enormous  majority  of  the  people  are  Arabs.  The  
Jews are very close to the Arabs in blood, and there is no conflict of  
character between the two races. In principle, we are absolutely as  
one. Nevertheless, the Arabs cannot risk assuming the responsibility of  
keeping the balance of power, in the clash of races and religions that  
have, in this province, so often brought difficulties to the world. They  
wish for the effective super-position of a great trustee, so long as a  
representative  local  administration  commended  itself  by  actively  
promoting the material prosperity of the country”14. 
The second memorandum he wrote was dated January 29, and, once again, it 
insisted on the unity of the Arab region:
“Representing my father who, by request of Britain and France, led the  
Arab rebellion against the Turks, I have come to ask that the Arabic  
speaking  peoples  of  Asia,  from  the  line  Alexandretta-Diarbekr  
southward  to  the  Indian  Ocean,  be  recognised  as  independent  
sovereign peoples, under the guarantee of the League of Nation. The  
Hejaz, which is already a sovereign state and Aden, which is a British  
dependency, are excluded from the Arab demand. The confirmation of  
the  states  already  existing  in  the  area,  the  adjustment  of  their  
boundaries with one another, with the Hejaz, and with the British at  
Aden, and the formation of such new states as are required, and their  
boundaries, are matters of arrangements between us, according to the  
wishes of their respective inhabitants. Detailed suggestions in these  
smaller points will  be put forward by my government when the time  
comes. I base my request on the principles enunciated by President  
Wilson  and  am  confident  that  those  in  power  will  attach  more  
importance to the bodies and souls of  the Arabic speaking peoples  
than to their own material interests”15. 
It should be pointed out that although Faisal based the Arabs' claims on the 
principle  of  self-determination,  demanding  the  implementation  of  sovereign 
states – and, in doing so, called for a geographical partition, he still envisaged 
the future states as part of the larger Arabic speaking peoples unitary territory.  
By February 3, 1919, the First Arab Palestinian Conference dispatched 
a message of protest  against the establishment of  a national  home for the 
Jews in Palestine to the Peace Conference16. They voiced their refusal of the 
Zionist  colonisation  of  Palestine  and  stressed  that  no  decision  concerning 
14 Bonsal, Stephen,  Suitors and suppliants. The little nations at Versailles, Simon Publications 2001, 
(First published in 1947), p.44.
15 Quoted in George Antonius, The Arab awakening, op.cit., p. 286-287
16 “Message of protest - from the First Arab Palestinian Congress to the Peace Conference – against the  
making of  Palestine  into a  National  Homeland for  the  Jews”,  in  Al-Kayyali,  Abdelwahab (ed.), 
Documents of the Arab Palestinian resistance against Great Britain and Zionism, op.cit., pp. 3-4.
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Palestine could be made without consultation of its inhabitants. They were also 
relentless  in  reminding  them of  the  principle  of  self-determination  and  the 
engagement to protect the “weak nations”. 
Faisal then made his case on February 6th, and he presented in substance the 
same demands as those made during his speech on January 29 th;  he also 
tackled the question of Palestine as a question that needed a deeper common 
analysis. 
On February 27th, it was the Zionist movement's turn to make its case 
and  it  immediately  asked  that  the  terms  of  the  Balfour  declaration,  which 
envisaged a “Jewish national home”, be changed into “an autonomous Jewish 
commonwealth”.  At  the  same  time,  Weizmann  still  advocated  Jewish 
immigration  that  would  not  harm the  existing  population's  rights.  However, 
when asked by Lansing, the United States' envoy, the meaning of a Jewish 
national home, he would answer: 
“The  Zionist  Organisation  does  not  want  an  autonomous  Jewish  
Government, but merely to establish in Palestine, under a Mandatory  
Power, an administration, not necessarily Jewish, which would render  
it possible to send into Palestine 70,000 to 80,000 Jews annually. The  
Zionist  Organisation  requires  permission  at  the  same  time  to  build  
Jewish  schools  where  Hebrew  would  be  taught,  and  to  develop  
institutions of every kind. Thus it would build up gradually a nationality,  
and so make Palestine as Jewish as America is American or England  
English. Later on, when the Jews form the large majority, they will be  
ripe to establish such a Government as would answer to the state of  
the development of the country and of their ideals”17.
This declaration did not leave any space for doubts as to the objectives of the 
Zionist movement – namely to become a majority in Palestine and eventually 
to  implement  a  Jewish  state.  Even  before  any  international  institution 
sanctioned the dismemberment of Palestine, the Zionist movement based its 
demands  on  a  partition  of  Palestine  from its  Arab  environment.  Moreover, 
Palestine was disconnected from its indigenous population, which was scarcely 
mentioned in all the documents presented by the Zionist Organisation. 
Despite the efforts of the British government to hide the comments of H. 
Weizmann,  the latter  were  published and became known all  over  the Arab 
17 Quoted in Sir Martin Gilbert, “An overwhelmingly Jewish State, From the Balfour Declaration to the 
Palestine mandate”, in Ambassador Alan Baker (ed.), Israel's rights as a nation-state in international  
diplomacy, Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs - World Jewish Congress, 2011.
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territories.  Faisal,  who  was  still  in  France,  replied  immediately  through  the 
Paris based newspaper Le Matin:
“If the Jews wish to establish a state and claim sovereign rights in the  
country, I foresee and fear very serious dangers and conflicts between  
them and the other races”18.
So,  despite  his  willingness  to  come  to  an  agreement  with  the  Zionist 
movement, Faisal was not ready to concede a Jewish State in Palestine. This 
put an end to the Faisal-Weizmann agreement. 
The Paris Peace conference finally ended without having ruled on the 
Arab and Palestine questions, although the hearings that were held did serve 
as a basis for future discussions that were to take place at the San Remo 
conference in April 1920. 
The King-Crane Commission and Syrian Unity: a short-lived window
Meanwhile, the organising powers of the Paris Peace Conference, or 
the Council of Four – France, Great Britain, Italy and the United States, had 
agreed to appoint a commission of enquiry in the region to investigate and 
ascertain  the wishes of  the populations.  However,  France and Britain  were 
aware of the Arabs' aspiration to full independence and hostility to any foreign 
inference. Moreover, the Arab Palestinians had made clear that they rejected 
the Balfour Declaration and their separation from Greater Syria. They knew 
that  such  a  position  would  compromise  their  interests.  So,  France,  Great 
Britain  and  Italy  finally  decided  not  to  send  representatives  to  the  Peace 
Conference  commission  of  enquiry,  thus,  only  the  United  States  appointed 
members – Henry King, President of Oberlin College and Charles Crane, a 
philanthropist with an experience of the region. The Commission had already 
familiarised  itself  with  the  reports  and  literature  on  the  Near  East  when  it 
arrived in Jaffa on June 10th 1919.
In  the meanwhile,  Faisal  returned to  Syria  early in  May.  There,  he was 
presented  with  a  proposal  for  the  formation  of  a  national  assembly.  The 
proposition was supported by the Arab Independence Party – Hizb al Istiqlal al  
18 Quoted in Bishara Khader, L'Europe et la Palestine: des croisades à nos jours, op.cit., p. 126.
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Arabi19 – which, in fact, had grown out of al Fatat and al Ahd. Elections were 
held during that  same month and the  SNC was convened in July 1919,  in 
Damascus to prepare for the King-Crane Commission of enquiry on the future 
of  Greater Syria. During its first session, the congress adopted a number of 
resolutions  that  rejected  any  division,  partition  and/or  foreign  “political 
tutelage”: 
• the recognition of the independence of Syria with the inclusion of  
Palestine as a sovereign state with the Amir Faisal as King, and the  
recognition of the independence of Iraq
• the  rejection  of  the  Sykes-Picot  agreements  and  the  Balfour  
Declaration and any other plan for the partition of Syria or the creation  
of a Jewish Commonwealth in Palestine
• the  rejection  of  the  political  tutelage  implied  in  the  proposed  
mandatory systems, but acceptance of foreign assistance for a limited  
period  of  time  and  provided  it  did  not  conflict  with  national  
independence and unity, preference being given to America or – if not  
America – to Britain
• the rejection of French assistance in any form20.
These were the conclusions they would present to the American commission of 
enquiry,  also  known  as  the  King-Crane  Commission.  Over  a  period  of  six 
weeks, the latter heard oral testimonies and met with the  SNC and the Arab 
Muslim-Christian Association. The commission was also presented with more 
than  1,800  petitions,  amongst  which,  260  were  presented  by  Arabs  of 
Palestine. Eighty percent of the petitions made the case for a united Syria – to 
include Palestine – , then more than seventy percent of the petitions called for 
the independence of Syria and Iraq. More than seventy percent of the overall  
petitions rejected the Zionist programme – with more than eighty percent of the 
petitions  from  Palestine  doing  so21,  most  of  which  made  a  case  for  Arab 
independence, Syrian unity etc. According to the members of the commission, 
more than seventy two percent of these petitions “were directed against the 
Zionist programme”. 
By August, the commission was back in Paris where it submitted its report on 
the 28th. The commission's conclusions took into account the will of the Arab 
19 Muslih,  Muhammad,  ”The rise  of  local  nationalism in the  Arab  East”,  in  Khalidi,  Rashid,  Lisa 
Anderson, Muhammad Muslih, and Reeva S. Simon  (eds.), The Origins of Arab nationalism, op.cit., 
p. 181.
20 Antonius, Georges, The Arab awakening, op.cit., pp. 293-294
21 Report of the King-Crane Commission, August 28, 1919.
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populations  and responded positively to  both  the Syrian Congress and the 
Arab  Muslim-Christian  Association  as  it  rejected  the  partition  of  Syria  and 
Palestine  and  recommended  “serious  modification  of  the  extreme  Zionist 
programme for Palestine of unlimited immigration of Jews, looking finally to 
making Palestine distinctly a Jewish state”22. To secure the unity of Syria, and 
prepare  it  for  independence,  the  commission  even  recommended  the 
installation of mandates rather than colonial administrations:
“We recommend, as most important of all, and in strict harmony with  
our Instructions, that whatever foreign administration (whether of one  
or more Powers) is brought into Syria, should come in not at all as a  
colonising Power; in the old sense of that term, but as a Mandatory  
under the League of Nations with a clear consciousness that "the well-
being and development,"  of  the Syrian people form for it  a "sacred  
trust. […] We recommend, in the second, that the unity of Syria be  
preserved, in accordance with the earnest petition of the great majority  
of the people of Syria. 
[…]  There  would  then  be  no  reason  why  Palestine  could  not  be  
included in a united Syrian State, just as other portions of the country,  
the holy places being cared for by an international and inter-religious  
commission, somewhat as at present under the oversight and approval  
of the Mandatory and of the League of Nations. The Jews, of course,  
would have representation upon this Commission”23. 
Of course, these conclusions were seen as a positive stance by Faisal and the 
Arab nationalists. However,  the report  of  the American commission was not 
taken  into  account  during  the  deliberations  that  followed.  Moreover,  it  was 
made public  only two years  after  being  issued. In  the  meanwhile,  the San 
Remo International Conference, which took place in Italy from April 19 th to 26th 
1920, dealing with the arrangements for and future of the Ottoman Empire, had 
already handed in its conclusions, which were the attribution of a mandate over 
Palestine  to  the  United  Kingdom and a  mandate  over  the  rest  of  Syria  to 
France. These conclusions were reaffirmed by the signature of the Treaty of 
Sèvres,  and,  in  1921,  British policy in  Palestine was again asserted at  the 
Cairo Conference24. 
22 UNISPAL, “Recommendations of the King-Crane Commission with regard to Syria-Palestine and 
Iraq”, August 29, 1919.
23 Ibid.
24 A conference during which Winston Churchill, then Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs laid out his 
ambitions for Britain's role in the Arab world for the following generations.
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The slow disintegration of Arabism in favour of Palestinian patriotism 
Discontent continued to grow in the Arab regions and the Amir Faisal 
who, under British pressure, had just agreed to give the French limited control 
over the coastal area of Greater Syria, had come back to Syria in March 1920. 
Out of British scope, he became conscious that he could not deal  with the 
foreign powers without a clear mandate from the  SNC. The members of the 
SNC were careful when it came to the Allied powers and were very critical of 
Faisal's  political  arrangements  with  the  Britain  and  France.  The  recent 
developments and the situation on the ground, led Faisal to join the views of 
his Arab nationalists' colleagues in a more categorical position. From then on, 
he revoked his engagements with the British, the French and H. Weizmann – 
the agreement with the latter was null  and avoid anyway25.  Reaffirming the 
main principles stated during the first Syrian Congress, namely independence 
and above all  unity of  the Arab region26,  the nationalists  and Faisal  clearly 
rejected the partition of Syria. It was in this spirit that they decided to organise 
elections in March 1920, elections during which Faisal  was elected King of 
Syria  (Greater  Syria).  With  a  similar  Arab  nationalist  approach,  the  same 
process was carried out in Iraq. However, by April, the mandates had been 
distributed  and  the  mandate  powers  were  preparing  the  transfer  of  power, 
which took place rapidly.  A few months later,  as soon as they replaced the 
British in  Damascus,  the  French dethroned Faisal  and forced him to  leave 
Syria. The expulsion of Faisal was a blow for Arab nationalism, whose leaders 
were now dispersed all over the region. The Arab territories were subject to a 
partition sanctioned by the highest international organisations and unity and 
independence were nothing more than a politician's promise27. 
In  Palestine,  the  Third  Muslim-Christian  Congress,  held  in  Haifa  on 
December 3, 1920, repeated its previous decisions and positions, rejecting the 
British administration and the Balfour Declaration, and demanding the end of 
Zionism  and  Jewish  immigration.  However,  and  despite  the  reluctance  of 
numerous  delegates,  notably  Auni  Abd  al-Hadi  for  whom  Palestine  was  a 
25 SEE Chapter I.
26 Cf. the  First Congress' resolutions in Chapter I. 
27 Antonius, George, The Arab awakening, op.cit. 
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construct, it also decided to base its action on patriotism as an intermediary 
step and seek independence for Palestine as an Arab state28. In that, they were 
adapting to and acknowledging the situation on the ground and the partition of 
Syria.  This is best expressed by a comment by Musa Kazem al-Hussayni29:  
“Now,  after  the  recent  events  in  Damascus,  we  have  to  effect  a  
complete change in our plans here. Southern Syria no longer exists.  
We must defend Palestine”30.
This  move  is  of  the  utmost  importance  as  it  was  the  first  recognition  of 
Palestine as an entity in the frontiers defined by the colonial powers. However,  
this recognition was made on the basis of the reality on the ground and not as 
a result of an ideological move. Moreover, whilst Palestine was the immediate 
goal,  Syria  was the ultimate one as indicated by the decisions of  the Arab 
Muslim-Christian Association that followed31. Indeed, whilst there was a move, 
there  never  was  a  rupture,  at  least  not  yet  then.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  the 
Question of Palestine has always encompassed a dual dimension which marks 
the  interweaving  between  Arabness  and  Palestinian-ness.  The  relation 
between Arab nationalism – al-Qawmiyya al-'Arabiyya – and local nationalism 
– Wataniyya – as we will see in the following sections would soon re-emerge 
notably from the great Arab revolt in 1936 onwards and would remain as a 
constant until 1967 date after which it would become blurred. 
28 Arab Palestinian Congress, “Resolutions of the Third Arab Palestinian Congress sent to the British 
High Commissioner”, December 18, 1920, in Al-Kayyali, Abdulwahab (ed.), Documents of the Arab 
Palestinian Resistance against the UK and Zionism, op.cit., pp.16-20. 
29 Musa Kazem al-Hussayni was a member of a prominent family in Jerusalem, the Hussayni's. He was  
mayor of Jerusalem from 1918 to 1920 date of his dismissal by the British authorities.  Prominent  
member of the Arab Muslim -Christian Association, he was to become its leader from 1922 until his 
death in 1934.
30 Al-Kayyali, Abdulwahab (ed.),  Documents of the Arab Palestinian Resistance against the UK and  
Zionism, op.cit., pp.16-20;  Kimmerling, Baruch and Joel Migdal, The Palestinian people, a history, 
Cambridge 2003, p.82
31 Al-Kayyali, Abdulwahab (ed.),  Documents of the Arab Palestinian Resistance against the UK and  
Zionism, op.cit., pp.16-20. 
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B. Attitude to Zionism and the British Mandate   
Arab Palestinian opposition to the Balfour Declaration before the  
Great revolt
Refusing  to  recognise  the  Balfour  Declaration  and rejecting  anything 
done in its name, the Arabs were well aware of the threats contained in the 
declaration and the position of the British authorities, which they feared would 
be a means to take over the country. And indeed, since the issuance of the 
Declaration, the Zionist movement increased its activities in Palestine – land 
purchase  and  immigration.  Furthermore,  as  mentioned  above,  the  Zionist 
Organization had developed distinct agencies specialised in banking and land 
purchase at the beginning of the century, to which it added  a trade union, the 
Histadrut and a militia, the Hagana, which were both established in 1920. The 
British  government  had  witnessed  these  events  and,  in  conformity  with  its 
prerogatives  as  stated  in  the  text  of  the  mandate,  selected  the  Zionist 
Organization as the representative organ for the “Jewish movement”32.
Failing to bring about changes in British policy through diplomacy, Arab 
resentment  towards  the  British  government  and  its  Zionist  protégés  grew 
stronger and eventually translated into demonstrations, culminating in the Nebi 
Musa riots of April 1920, during which five Jews and four Arabs were killed33. 
The British authorities appointed a commission of enquiry to investigate the 
reasons for these events and it was concluded that the Balfour Declaration was 
“undoubtedly the starting point of the whole trouble” and that Arab fears were 
founded34. However, Winston Churchill, who had become Secretary of State for 
Colonial Affairs in February 1921, was inflexible on the matter of the Balfour 
Declaration as shown by his reaction when, during a visit to Palestine in March 
1921, he was presented with the conclusions of the third Arab Muslim-Christian 
Conference, which condemned the Balfour Declaration. To their demand for 
the abrogation of the Declaration, his response was negative; furthermore, he 
32 National  Archives,  CAB  24/159/,  “Palestine.  Memorandum  by  the  Secretary  of  State  for  the 
Colonies”, 17 February 1923.
33 Shlaim, Avi, “The Balfour Declaration and its consequences”, op.cit., pp.252-270.
34 Ibid.
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also refused to revise it and to reduce Jewish immigration35. 
The position  of  the British government  was once again  greeted with 
demonstrations and on May 1st 1921, clashes burst out between Arabs and 
Jewish  demonstrators.  These  events  led  to  the  appeal  for  the  fourth  Arab 
Muslim-Christian Congress that took place in Jerusalem from May 29 th to June 
3rd and which was to present the same conclusions as the third congress36. As 
a  consequence,  the  British  government  decided  to  send  an  enquiry 
commission  that  concluded  that  the  incidents  were  not  planned  but 
spontaneous and noted that there was growing a hostility on the Arab side 
towards the Jewish immigrants, a hostility motivated by economic reasons as 
well as the continuing Jewish immigration.
The report was followed by a speech delivered in Jerusalem, in June 
1921, by the British High Commissioner of Palestine, Sir Herbert Samuel37 and 
aimed at reassuring the Arabs: 
“They [i.e., the words of the Declaration] mean that the Jews, a people  
that are scattered throughout the world, but whose hearts are always  
turned to Palestine, should be enabled to found their home here, and  
that some among them, within the limits that are fixed by the numbers  
and interests of the present population, should come to Palestine in  
order to help, using their resources and efforts, to develop the country  
to the advantage of all its inhabitants”38.
However, the Palestinian Arabs were not reassured. Probably thinking 
that they would have influence if they were closer to the centre of power, the 
representatives of the  Arab Muslim-Christian Association decided to send a 
delegation  to  Britain.  The  delegation,  presided  over  by  Musa  Kazem  al-
Hussayni, arrived in August 1921 in London and, according to the Middle East 
department of the Colonial Office, it expressed two demands: “the abrogation 
of  the  Balfour  Declaration  and  the  immediate  grant  of  a  representative 
government in Palestine”. The British government had however no intention of 
abrogating the Balfour Declaration nor to grant a representative government, at 
35 Bishara, Khader, L'Europe et la Palestine, des croisades à nos jours, op.cit., p. 137.
36 Executive Committee of the Arab Palestinian Congress, Communiqué on the Fourth Arab Palestinian 
Congress' rejection of the mandate, July 8, 1922, in Al-Kayyali, Abdelwahab (ed.), Documents of the 
Arab Palestinian resistance against Great Britain and Zionism, op.cit., pp.46-47.
37 Herbert Samuel (1870-1963), Politician and diplomat, he was appointed first High Commissioner of 
Palestine on July 1, 1920, a position he held for five years. In 1915, he had advocated a British  
protectorate in Palestine in order to make it a home for the Jewish people. 
38 National  Archives,  CAB  24/159/,  “Palestine.  Memorandum  by  the  Secretary  of  State  for  the 
Colonies”, February 17, 1923.
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least  in  the short  term.  Instead,  W. Churchill,  who received the delegation, 
encouraged it to reach an agreement with the Zionist Organization. 
In  its  willingness  to  find  a  solution  that  would  combine  the  Zionist 
political  objectives  and  the  Arabs'  rights,  the  British  government  did 
nevertheless  work  to  found  a  legislative  council  and  this  was  discussed 
through a correspondence between the Colonial Office, the Palestinian Arab 
Delegation and the Zionist Organization39. The Arab Palestinians rejected the 
proposal of a legislative council that would lack any decision-making role and 
would be confined to a consultative role. This correspondence shows that the 
Palestinian Arab Delegation was concerned by British policy and refused the 
separation of the populations proposed by British representatives. It regarded 
the Palestine question as a political question and refuted the assimilation of all  
Jews to Zionism. Furthermore, they criticised the administration of Palestine as 
a colony by an “ardent Zionist”40,  whereas the League of Nations gave it  a 
status  of  mandate.  They  also  rejected  the  use  of  Hebrew  as  the  official 
language for Palestine, as they considered it to be a tool used to settle the 
Zionists in Palestine and create irreversibility by reinforcing whatever national 
character  they  had.  Condemning  the  attribution  of  a  special  status  to  the 
Zionist  Organization  –  a  public  body  for  the  purpose  of  advising  and  co-
operating  with  the  Administration  of  Palestine –  they proposed  to  give  the 
Zionists  a  share  in  representation,  on  a  proportional  basis.  Instead,  the 
delegation  proposed  to  consider  the  people  as  a  whole  and  as  such  to 
implement a policy that would safeguard the religious, economic and political  
rights of all the people of Palestine, to provide for the creation of a national  
independent  government,  to  safeguard  the  legal  rights  of  foreigners,  to 
guarantee religious equality to all peoples, to guarantee the rights of minorities 
and to guarantee the rights of the Assisting Power41. Thus, they were making 
plans for  an independent  Palestine – as opposed to  a unitary Syria  – and 
proposed that the Jews be part of the people of Palestine in a united territory.
39 UNISPAL,  Cmd.  1700,  “Palestine.  Correspondence  with  the  Palestine  Arab  delegation  and  the 
Zionist Organisation”, June 1922.
40 By using this phrase, the Arab Delegation was quoting a speech delivered on June 14 th 1921 by the 
Colonial Secretary in the House of Commons. 
41 UNISPAL,  Cmd.  1700,  “Palestine.  Correspondence  with  the  Palestine  Arab  delegation  and  the 
Zionist Organisation”, June 1922.
Al-Kayyali, Abdelwahab (ed.), Documents of the Arab Palestinian resistance against Great Britain  
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The demands of the delegation were reiterated a number of times but 
were never taken into consideration, which made the delegation's members 
worried by what  they called the growing “division and tension between the 
Arabs and the Zionists” which could only end up with the “extinction” of the 
Arabs  of  Palestine.  They  also  condemned  the  partiality  of  the  British 
government:
“Therefore we see division and tension between Arabs and Zionists  
increasing day by day, resulting in general retrogression. Because the  
immigrants  who are  being  dumped upon the  country  from different  
parts of the world are ignorant of the language, customs, and character  
of the Arabs, and enter Palestine by the might of England against the  
will  of  the people, they are convinced that they have come here to  
strangle them. Nature does not  allow the creation of a spirit  of  co-
operation  between  two  peoples  so  different,  and  it  is  not  to  be  
expected that the Arabs would bow to such a great injustice, or that the  
Zionists would so easily succeed in realising their dreams.
The  fact  is  that  His  Majesty's  Government  has  placed  itself  in  the  
position of a partisan in Palestine of a certain policy, which the Arab  
cannot  accept  because  it  means  his  extinction  sooner  or  later.  
Promises avail nothing when they are not supported by actions, and  
until  we  see  a  real  practical  change in  the  policy  of  His  Majesty's  
Government, we must harbour the fear that the intention is to create a  
Jewish National Home, to the "disappearance or subordination of the  
Arabic population, language, and culture in Palestine"42.
However, the British government had no intention of assuming a change 
of policy or abandoning the Balfour Declaration and it  saw no contradiction 
between that commitment and ruling Palestine as a unit and all its inhabitants 
as Palestinians. Furthermore, to translate this spirit into action, it proposed to 
set a mixed legislative council43.
After spending one year in England trying to make their opinion heard, 
the delegation returned empty-handed to Palestine except for the White Paper. 
Unsatisfied  with  the  developments,  the  Arab  Muslim-Christian  Association 
called  for  the  fifth  Palestinian  Congress.  This  was  the  occasion  to  reject 
Churchill's  White  Paper.  Moreover,  the  Congress  decided  to  boycott  the 
elections for a Legislative Council as well as the Rutenberg Project44, and to 
42 Ibid.
43 National  Archives,  CAB/24/159,  “Memorandum by the Secretary of  State  for  Colonial  Affairs”,  
February  1923.  Annex:  “Telegram  from  Secretary  of  State  for  the  Colonies  to  the  Officer 
administering the Government of Palestine”, June 29, 1922.
44 The Rutenberg project or concession has been described by Sahar Huneidi as the largest and most  
politically controversial Zionist scheme during Samuel's period of office. Named after its designer, a 
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stop  trade  relations  with  the  “Jews”45.  These  decisions  would  be reiterated 
during the following congress in June 1923. While the Churchill White Paper 
refuted the idea that the British government had promised a Jewish state, it 
also rejected the veracity of the pledges to the Arabs concerning Palestine. 
However, the pledges made to the Arabs and the Zionists continued to cause 
controversy among the British authorities. 
The rest of the 1920s was almost quiet, however, existing tensions eventually 
burst to the surface in 1929 with riots and violent confrontations opening the 
way to a decade of further rebellion and revolt in Palestine. 
As it appeared to the Arabs and especially the Arabs of Palestine that 
the  British  government  would  not  revoke  its  promises  made to  the  Zionist 
movement in the late 1910s and early 1920s, they started to organise to speak 
out  against  the Zionist  programme, warning about  the  consequences of  its 
implementation in Palestine.  It  however  soon became clear that  the Zionist 
movement  wanted  to  establish  a  Jewish  majority  in  Palestine,  which  was 
perceived as a threat to the Arab character of Palestine and to the Arabs' right 
to  self-determination.  By the early 1930s,  the Arabs of  Palestine eventually 
started envisaging political co-existence with the Jews in the form of a mixed 
legislative council as proposed by Britain. A proposition rejected by the Zionist 
movement, which was expanding its activities in Palestine.
The Palestinian Arab Revolt
In the early 1930s, the British authorities were willing to consider some 
of the Palestinians' demands and they were ready to limit Jewish immigration 
according to Palestine's capacity of  economic absorption and to accept  the 
principle of an internal autonomy, but this had to be under British supervision. 
They thus reiterated their proposal for the establishment of a mixed legislative 
council.  The  council  would  be  made of  twenty-eight  members,  with  twelve 
Russian electrical engineer, the project originally envisaged hydro-electrification and irrigation of all 
of Palestine. Therefore, concessions were granted to Rutenberg who was supported by the Zionist 
Organisation who eventually was the one who would benefit from the concessions. Huneidi, Sahar, A 
Broken trust, Herbert Samuel, Zionism and the Palestinians, London 2001, pp.205-208.
45 Conclusions of the Fifth Arab Palestinian Congress, August 20, 1922, in  Al-Kayyali, Abdelwahab 
(ed.),  Documents  of the  Arab Palestinian  resistance  against  Great  Britain  and Zionism,  op.cit., 
pp.55-56.
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elected, eleven nominated and five from the British administration. Among the 
elected members, eight would be Muslims, one Christian and three Jews; the 
nominated members would comprise three Muslims, two Christians, four Jews, 
two businessmen and five British, but most importantly, the president of the 
council had to be a British person appointed in London46. After years of refusal, 
the Palestinian Arabs were ready to accept the principle of a legislative council. 
However,  this  time,  the  composition  was  far  from being satisfactory to  the 
Zionist Organization, which rejected it during its Lucerne Congress in 1935, on 
the grounds that Britain could not recognise the special status of the Jews and 
constitute a Legislative Council based on the actual ratio of population, which 
was in its majority Arab. To their Arabs counterparts, however, they had been 
arguing that a legislative council  was of no value without an understanding 
between  them47.  On  the  one  hand,  the  Legislative  Council  was  a  stillborn 
project, being rejected by the British Parliament, and on the other hand, no 
alternative was to see the light, despite the discussion held between the Arab 
and  Zionist  leaders.  Indeed,  there  was  an  argument  of  principle  on  the 
question of Jewish immigration, whilst the Arabs proposed it to be limited, the 
Zionist movement would not accept a minority position and rejected any plan 
the Arabs made them directly. For instance, in April 1936, Georges Antonius, 
then adviser to the Mufti of Jerusalem, Hajj Amin al Hussaini, proposed to Ben 
Gurion a scheme combining the “natural rights” of the Arabs of Palestine and 
the “cultural and religious rights” of the Jews. Moreover, the Jews would be 
entitled to settle on part of the coastal plains48. Other attempts on similar bases 
– undivided Palestine, Arab majority with a Jewish minority, equal civic rights 
etc.  –  were  proposed  without  success.  Actually,  there  was  no  chance  of 
agreement between the Zionist movement, who made no secret of their goal 
that was the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine – Greater Palestine 
as their propositions included Transjordan – , and the Arabs who were totally 
against becoming a minority in their own country49. 
46 Bishara, Khader, L'Europe et la Palestine. Des croisades à nos jours, op.cit., p.158.
47 A.H.  Cohen,  Note  of  talk  between  M.Shertok  and  the  Amir  Abdallah,  Amman,  11  July  1935, 
Document reproduced in Caplan, Neil, Futile Diplomacy 2. Arab-Zionist negotiations and the end of  
the mandate, London 1986, pp.204-205.
48 Al-Khalidi, Kamal, The Arab-Israeli conflict: what perspective?, op.cit., pp.30-31
49 Examples of exchanges between Arab and Zionist leaders in the early 1930s were reproduced in 
Caplan, Neil, Futile Diplomacy 2. Arab-Zionist negotiations and the end of the mandate:
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This  was  the  context  in  which  the  Palestinian  Arab  Great  Revolt 
emerged,  and was also to re-introduce the Arab character  of  the Palestine 
Question as it would see the increasing implication of  the newly established 
Arab governments' leaders50. The history of this episode has been analysed at 
length in numerous studies51. Apart from stating the general roots of the revolt, 
all the studies point back to the warfare organised, in November 1935, by a 
preacher, Izz al-din al-Qassam – who had participated in the struggle against 
the French mandate over  Syria  and had been condemned to  death by the 
French colonial authorities which represented a turning point in Palestine 52. Al-
Qassam and his supporters were far from numerous, and they lacked support 
from the other Arab and Palestinian organisations. So, the guerilla action was 
harshly repressed and its leader was killed in an ambush, by the British53. The 
“great revolt” was then to start in April 1936 with the riots in Jaffa. The riots of 
Jaffa were repressed and emergency regulations and a curfew were imposed 
by force by the British troops which led to the formation of an Arab national 
committee that was to decree a popular general strike all over Palestine. When 
the clashes burst out in 1936, the revolt was led by the fellahin and the Arab 
Palestinian  political  movements  did  not  have  any  another  choice  than  to 
quickly join in and support the strikes by calling everyone to participate. The 
different  existing  political  parties  established in  the  early  1930s  united  and 
formed a new structure in April  1936, the  AHC, under the leadership of Haj 
Amin al-Hussayni54. From then on, the diverse existing Palestinian associations 
M.Shertok, “Note of conversation between Dr H. Arlosoroff and Awni Abd al-Hadi, at the home of 
G. Agronsky”, 12 February 1932, pp.186-187; “Three accounts of meetings between D. Ben Gurion 
and  Musa  al-Alami”,  March  1934,  pp.189-192;  “Two accounts  of  meeting  between  David  Ben 
Gurion and Awni Abd al-Hadi”, July 18, 1934, pp.192-196; 
50 Smith, Charles D., Palestine and the Arab-Israeli conflict. A history with documents, op.cit., p. 140; 
Kadi, Leila, Arab Summit conferences and the Palestine problem (1936-1950) – (1964-1966), Beirut 
1966, p.1.
51 Read Laurens, Henry, La Question de Palestine: Tome 2 - Une mission sacrée de civilisation (1922-
1947)  V.2, Paris 2002;  Morris, Benny, Righteous Victims: A History of the Zionist-Arab Conflict,  
1881–1999, op.cit.;  Kimmerling, Baruch and Migdal, Joseph S., The Palestinian People: A History,  
op.cit. 
52 Kanafani, Ghassan, “La révolte the 1936-1939 en Palestine”, published for the first time under the 
title “Thaourat 1936-39 fi Filestin” in Chou’oun Filistiniyya (6), January 1972. The version used here 
is the translation from the English version which was published by the Committee for Demcratic  
Palestine,  New  York  1972.  The  electronic  version  is  available  at  : 
http://fcgk44.free.fr/img/Kanafani_La%20revolte.pdf,  p  8.   Al-Qassam  was  also  opposed  to  the 
Palestinian notables, who he thought were too accommodating with the colonial powers. 
53 Since then on, Izz al-din al-Qassam has become a heroic figure of the Palestinian resistance (to the 
point that the Hamas movement named its armed branch of his name).
54 Al-Kayyali, Abdulwahab (ed.),  Documents of the Arab Palestinian Resistance against the UK and  
Zionism, op.cit., pp.378-379.
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would call for and support the general strike, the AHC would even renew its call  
a  few times.  It  tried to  negotiate  with  the British authorities demanding the 
cessation of the land transfers from the Arab population to the incoming Jews 
as well as the end of Jewish immigration, but Britain refused any discussion as 
long as the revolt continued, and they set the end of the uprising as a condition 
for discussions. A condition that was taken on board by the Arab monarchs 
who  believed  the  British  would  eventually  “do  justice  to  the  Arab  people”, 
probably by finally granting them independence55. 
So,  under  British  and  Arab  pressure,  in  October  1936,  the  AHC issued  a 
manifesto calling off the strike in order to sort out things with Great Britain56. 
What  ensued  is  that  they  refused  to  meet  with  the  Royal  Commission, 
considering that they already had given their vision of the Palestine question 
more than once, but that it had never been taken into account. The Arabs of  
Palestine would however – under Arab pressure – eventually agree to testify 
before  the  Commission  in  January  1937.  In  his  intervention,  the  Mufti 
denounced British policy as the core cause of the Revolt: had not the British 
deprived the Arabs of Palestine of their right to self- determination in favour of 
Zionism?57
Arab and Palestinian positions towards the partition plan of 1937
When the news of the Royal Commission’s recommendations reached 
the Arabs, it found a united front of hostility to the partition plan. The Peel plan 
only hardened the  revolt.  And whilst,  the Arabs consistently and constantly 
rejected any rupture of the national territorial unity and considered the proposal 
of partition as an attack on the Arabs' right of self-determination, they were 
conscious that  they had to  express it  in  a  way that  it  could  be  taken into 
55 UNISPAL, UA/AC.14/8, “Ad Hoc Committee on the Palestinian question communication from the 
United Kingdom Delegation to the United Nations”, October 2, 1947.
“to call upon you to resolve for peace in order to save further shedding of blood. In doing this,  
we rely on the good intentions of our friend Great Britain, who has declared that she will do justice.  
You must be confident that we will continue our efforts to assist you”.
56 Al-Kayyali, Abdulwahab (ed.),  Documents of the Arab Palestinian Resistance against the UK and  
Zionism, op.cit., p.454. 
57 Mattar,  Philip,  The Mufti  of  Jerusalem: Al-Hajj  Amin Al-Hussayni  and the Palestinian National  
Movement, New York 1998.
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account by the British authorities. The opposition was expressed in the form of 
letters  to  the  High  Commissioner  from  villages,  associations,  Ulemas and 
notables58. In a formidable united effort, action was taken to have all the parties 
express the same hostility so even the  Nashashibis party, which was not so 
hostile to the British, made its opposition public during a meeting of the party it 
led – the National Defense party – on the 11th July 193759. Furthermore, two 
days after the publication of the report, the AHC sent an appeal to the Muslim 
and  Arab  leaders  in  the  Middle  East  in  order  to  gain  their  support.  As  a 
consequence,  demonstrations  were  held  in  numerous  Arab  and  Muslim 
countries  and messages of  support  and condemnation  of  the British  policy 
were sent from many countries including India60. 
Most of the Arab countries were still  subject to foreign rule, and their  
scope of action was thus limited. However, many Arab countries, including Iraq 
and Egypt, made their opposition to partition known through communications 
with  the  League  of  Nations  in  July  1937  and  1938  respectively61.  Besides 
criticising the decision, they offered an alternative to the partition plan in the 
form of an Arab State including the Jews as a minority enjoying equal  civil 
rights. King Ibn Saud may have made the most robust criticism of the British 
scheme in a confidential note he sent to the British government by the 6th of 
September 193762. King Ibn Saud urged the British Government to change its 
policy's orientation, as it would only lead to more demonstrations of violence 
and ultimately to a conflict between the Arabs and the British, a conflict that he 
himself  did  not  wish  to  happen.  After  stating  the  situation in  Palestine  and 
expressing that the question of Palestine was an Arab and Muslim question, he 
remarked that:
“because we believe that the British Government had already fulfilled 
58 Al-Kayyali, Abdulwahab (ed.),  Documents of the Arab Palestinian Resistance against the UK and  
Zionism, Documents, op.cit., pp.600-607. 
59 Klieman, Aaron, “In the public domain: the controversy over partition for Palestine”, Jewish Social  
Studies 42(2), 1980, pp.147-164.
60 Ibid.; Arab Higher Committee, “Telegram to the Arab Kings and  Princes on the occasion of Britain's  
communiqué  on   Palestine's  partition”,  Jaffa,  July  7,  1937,  in  Al-Kayyali,  Abdulwahab  (ed.),  
Documents of the Arab Palestinian Resistance against the UK and Zionism, op.cit., p.601.
61 Kadi, Leila, Arab Summit conferences and the Palestine problem (1936-1950) – (1964-1966) , p.7.
62 National Archives, CAB/24/273, “King Ibn Saud's note to His Majesty's Government”, September 6, 
1937, enclosed in Anthony Eden's memorandum to the Cabinet, November 1937. 
It should be pointed out that King Ibn Saud had already expressed his rejection of partition to 
Sir Reader Bullard, the British envoy in Jeddah before the publication of the report.
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their  promise  to  the  Jews  while  partition  robs  the  Arabs  of  their  
essential rights specially if we take into consideration what is called  
'exchange of population' from the Jewish to the Arab Zone, which is  
nothing  but  an  unprecedented  clearing  out  of  the  Arabs  from  the  
Jewish Zone”63.
And followed his note with  a proposal that could, according to him, end the 
conflict:
“The Arab Zone has not got such a large number of Jews and the text  
of the Balfour Declaration far from speaking of the clearing out of the  
Arabs  from  their  country,  insisted  that  nothing  should  be  done  to  
prejudice their rights. It  gives us great pleasure to suggest to Great  
Britain  a  fair  and  just  solution  acceptable  to  all  those  whom  the  
question may concern. It is desired to bring about a final solution of the  
question on the following lines :-—
(i) The establishment of a Constitutional Government in Palestine in  
which all the present population will be represented in the present ratio  
on a basis which will be agreed upon with sufficient guarantees for the  
protection of the Holy Places, allowing all a free access to them, for  
ensuring  the  right  of  minorities,  for  maintaining  justice  and  for  
safeguarding the interests of Great Britain.
(ii)  The  regulation  of  Jewish  immigration  to  maintain  the  present  
percentage, so that it will never be exceeded under any circumstances  
whatever.
(iii) The introduction of the necessary measures in connexion with the  
transfer of land, so that the Arabs cannot be deprived of their lands”64.
Such protestations by Arab leaders, especially by King Ibn Saud, and those 
sent by the British envoys and Ambassadors in Iraq and Jeddah were taken 
very seriously by the British Foreign Office, then led by Anthony Eden. This 
provoked a heated debate between the Foreign and the Colonial Offices as the 
latter supported the partition decision65.
The Arabisation of the Palestine Question, or the reintegration of the Palestine 
question  in  its  regional  context  was  to  be  consecrated  during  the  Bludan 
(Syria)  Conference.  The  Conference  convened  by  Arab  non-governmental 
representatives from September 8th to 10th, 1937 would provide a platform to 
discuss  the  question  of  Palestine  and  propose  a  solution  and  roadmap of 
63 National Archives, CAB/24/273, “King Ibn Saud's note to His Majesty's Government”, September 6, 
1937, op.cit. 
64 Ibid.
65 National Archives, CAB/24/273, “George William Rendell, Letter of November  8, 1937,  from the 
Foreign Office to the Colonial Office”. Annex to the Memorandum by the Secretary of State for  
Foreign Affairs”. 
George William Rendell was head of the Eastern Department of the Foreign Office, 1930-1938. 
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action66. The conference was presided by a former premier of Iraq and was 
attended  by  more  than  three  hundred  delegates  from  Palestine,  Syria, 
Lebanon, Transjordan, Iraq, Egypt and Arabia67. It issued resolutions rejecting 
partition and reiterated a call to the Arab and Muslim leaders and heads of 
states68. 
• “Palestine is an integral part of the Arab countries. 
• Palestine  must  not  be  divided  nor  must  a  Jewish  state  be  
created therein.  Attempts to do either or both these things shall  be  
resisted.
• The  Act  of  Mandate  and  the  Balfour  Declaration  must  be  
abrogated and be replaced by a treaty between the Arabs and Great  
Britain on the Iraqi model. 
• Jewish immigration must be stopped and sales of land to others  
than Arabs must be forbidden by law. 
• The resolutions of the congress shall be communicated to the  
League of Nations and other interested parties”69. 
Arab determination  was  at  its  highest  level,  but  so  was  British  repression. 
Besides the arrests, the violent repression of the demonstrations and strikes, 
the British authorities were seeking to end the AHC's activities and launched a 
wave of  arrests  of  the heads of  the main  political  parties  and movements, 
finally deciding the dissolution of  the AHC70.  The repression resulted in the 
decapitation  of  the  Palestinian  leadership  whose  members  were  either 
deported  or  imprisoned,  with  only  a  few  able  to  leave  for  neighbouring 
countries,  one  of  whom  was  Haj  Amin  al-Hussayni  who  flew  to  Lebanon. 
Palestine was then left without a proper political leadership. 
Partition  was  impossible  to  implement,  so  was  the  conclusion  of  the 
(Woodhead)  Commission  in  charge  of  the  study  of  the  technicalities  of 
partition. Dialogue and reaching an agreement between the Zionists and the 
Arabs seemed just as impossible. There remained only one solution, ensuring 
66 Kadi,  Leila  S.,  Arab  Summit  conferences  and  the  Palestine  problem  (1936-1950),  (1964-1966), 
op.cit., p. 6.
67 Were present: 119 Palestinians, 75 Syrians, 60 Lebanese, 35 Trans-Jordanians, 13 Iraqis, 4 Egyptians, 
and 1 Saudi.
68 National Archives, FO371/20811 and E55515/22/31, cited in Aaron Klieman, “In the public domain:  
the controversy over partition for Palestine”,  op.cit.; Kadi, Leila S.,  Arab Summit Conferences and 
the Palestine Problem (1936-1950) (1964-1966), op.cit., p. 6.
69 In Keddourie, Elie, “The Bludan Congress on Palestine, September 1937”,  Middle Eastern Studies  
17(1), Jan 1981, pp.107-125.
70 Khalidi, Rashid, The Iron Cage. The story of the Palestinian struggle for statehood, op.cit., pp.106-
110.
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better conditions for the continuation of the mandate, which was the control of 
immigration  and  the  establishment  within  a  few  years  of  an  Arab  state 
comprising the Jewish National Home, this was the programme of the White 
Paper of 193971.  As we have seen, the White Paper raised an outcry among 
the Zionist movement, which from then on would focus on its cancellation by all  
possible means and further increased their demands: they would not demand a 
Jewish State on part of Palestine but on all of Palestine72. 
For the Arabs of Palestine and the Arab States, there ought to be no 
Jewish State whether on all  of Palestine or on part  of it  through a partition 
scheme.  And although the White Paper was in a sense reassuring, the Zionist 
offensive, which materialised three years later with the Biltmore programme 
provoked  another  wave  of  protestations  which  did  not  cease  to  reach  the 
mandate authorities and the United States, which had become the centre of 
Zionist attentions since the Biltmore Conference. 
The 1940s saw the progressive accession to independence of the Arab 
countries and by 1944-1945, these independent States decided to establish an 
organisation to deal with common Arab issues. Palestine was naturally one of 
these issues and it was the subject of special dedication from the onset, it was 
the consecration of the official takeover of the Palestine Question by the Arab 
States73. 
71 SEE the account of that episode and Arab reaction to the White Paper in Chapter II.
72 This was the purpose of the Biltmore Conference and programme. See Chapter III.
73 A special resolution concerning Palestine was adopted as one of the first measures in the Alexandria 
Protocol. 
“A. The Committee is of the opinion that Palestine constitutes an important part of the Arab World  
and that the rights of  the Arabs in Palestine cannot be touched without prejudice to peace and  
stability in the Arab World.
The Committee also is of the opinion that the pledges binding the British Government and providing  
for the cessation of Jewish immigration, the preservation of Arab lands, and the achievement of  
independence  for  Palestine  are  permanent  Arab  rights  whose  prompt  implementation  would  
constitute a step toward the desired goal and toward the stabilization of peace and security.
The Committee declares its support of the cause of the Arabs of Palestine and its willingness to work  
for the achievement of their legitimate aims and the safeguarding of their Just rights.
The  Committee  also declares  that  it  is  second to none in  regretting the  woes which  have  been  
inflicted upon the Jews of Europe by European dictatorial states. But the question of these Jews  
should not be confused with Zionism, for there can be no greater injustice and aggression than  
solving the problem of the Jews of Europe by another injustice, i.e., by inflicting injustice on the  
Arabs of Palestine of various religions and denominations.
B. The special proposal concerning the participation Of the Arab Governments and peoples in the  
"Arab National Fund" to safeguard the lands of  the Arabs of  Palestine shall  be referred to the  
committee of financial and economic affairs to examine it from all its angles and to submit the result  
of that examination to the Preliminary Committee in its next meeting.
In faith of which this protocol has been signed at Faruq I University at Alexandria on Saturday,  
Shawwal 20, 1363 (October 7, 1944)”.
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The Palestinian leadership crisis was accentuated with the dispersion of 
the AHC leaders and the members of the Arab League took the opportunity to 
designate a new leadership figure in the person of Musa al Alami, giving him 
the task of opening Arab offices to advocate the Arab case for Palestine. The 
Arab Office would play the role of Palestinian representative at least until the 
return of Haj Amin al-Hussayni from his exile. Reacting to the Zionist offensive, 
which had started with the maximalist Biltmore programme, the Arab League 
decided the boycott of “Jewish products”74. 
In the mid-1930s, it appeared that the Zionist movement was seeking 
Jewish national sovereignty and would not content itself with a proportional – 
minority – presence  in a Legislative Council. When the question of partition 
arose, the Arabs would fight it unanimously and even propose an alternative, 
which was the constitution of a democratic state. Once again, this was rejected 
by the Zionist movement, which had decided to go for partition to secure a 
Jewish  State  while  internally communicating about  a  Jewish  State  in  all  of 
Palestine.   
C. Palestinian Position towards the Anglo-American and the 
UN Peace Plans: reaffirming Palestine's independence as 
an Arab State 
Arguing against partition before the Anglo-American Committee 
As mentioned in Chapter II, during the war, the Zionist movement had 
intensified its pressure on the British and the American governments so that 
President  Truman  wrote  to  the  British  demanding  a  rise  in  the  number  of 
immigration certificates issued. As the Labour Party took over power in Great 
Britain, it also made a statement favourable to Zionism, which encouraged the 
The  text  of  the  Alexandria  Protocol  can  be  found  on 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/alex.asp;  Bishara  Khader, L'Europe  et  la  Palestine.  Des  
croisades à nos jours, op.cit., p.176; and in Henry Laurens, L'Orient arabe, op.cit., p.321.
74 Khader, Bishara, L'Europe et la Palestine, op.cit., p.177.
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latter to continue their lobbying and actions of protest against the White Paper 
and  to  call,  once  and  for  all,  for  the  establishment  of  a  Jewish  State  in 
Palestine. By 1945, the British government and the United States decided to 
constitute a common investigation commission to elaborate a peace plan with 
a view of finding a final solution to the Palestine Question. Fearing that the 
Commission would advocate partition, the Palestinians first called for a boycott 
of the Anglo-American Commission75. However, the AHC finally decided on the 
eve of the Commission's arrival  in Jerusalem to appear before it76.  So, four 
Palestinians were to testify: Jamal al-Hussayni for the AHC, Awni Abd al-Hadi 
for the Arab Higher Front and Ahmad Shuqayri and Albert Hourani for the Arab 
Office77.
The  positions  may  be  summed  up  as  follows:  first,  the  Palestine 
Question was independent from the question of the Jewish refugees, which 
was  an  international  problem  and  had  to  be  dealt  as  such;  second,  an 
independent Arab State had to be created in Palestine where all the inhabitants 
could enjoy equal civil rights. Given that, it was out of the question to consider 
any Jewish State in Palestine. 
The most sound and powerful argument was probably given by Albert 
Hourani, who was later to become the Head of the Arab Office in London78. The 
value  of  Hourani's  testimony  lies  in  his  analysis  of  the  situation  and  the 
proposed solutions, the partition proposal and the bi-national proposal (made 
by Judah Magnes and which we will see in further details in Chapter V) as well 
as the maintenance of the status quo, or the continuation of a Zionist oriented 
policy. The object of this chapter being to review Palestinian position towards 
partition, I will not comment in length on the position on bi-nationalism. Rather,  
it will be the subject of a part in the next chapter.
Expressing the views of the Arab Office, but more generally of the Arab 
League (which created the Office and the AHC with which arguments were 
75 Qaddoura,  Jamal Muhammad,  The Palestine Question and the Inquiry Commissions:  1937-1947, 
Beirut 1993, pp. 140-141. (Arabic)
76 Khalidi, Walid, “On Albert Hourani, the Arab Office and the Anglo-American Committee of 1946”, 
Journal of Palestine Studies 35(1), Autumn 2005, pp.60-79.
Actually, the AHC could not reach a position since its leaders were dispersed and could not 
meet. However, Jamal al-Husseini was released just in time, allowing the AHC to meet and make an 
official decision on whether or not to boycott the Commission.
77 Ibid.
78 Arab Office, “The Arab case for Palestine: evidence submitted by the Arab Office to the Anglo-
American Committee of Inquiry, Jerusalem March 1946.
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discussed79), Hourani described partition as a policy that could “bring down in 
ruins the whole political structure of the Middle East” and the analysis he gave 
of partition sounds somehow really topical.
“it is clear that the establishment of a Jewish State in part of Palestine 
would  not  satisfy  the  great  majority  of  Zionists  that  want  political  
domination over the whole of Palestine, at least. If they obtain a state  
in part of Palestine, they would be tempted to use it as the first step to  
pressing further claims. The establishment of a Jewish State in part of  
Palestine would not satisfy them, but would strengthen their position  
and encourage them to ask for more. That, on the one hand. On the  
other hand, even if they accepted partition in the first place, there are  
factors at work which would draw them, sooner or later (and probably  
sooner) into inevitable conflict with the surrounding Arab world. There  
is a dynamic force in Zionism which, unless it is checked now, will lead  
them on to destruction. They will be forced into conflict with the Arab  
world by various factors – by the need to deal with their  own Arab  
minority, which would not consent willingly to become the subjects of a  
Jewish State  and which would rise and protest,  and whose protest  
would be aided actively by surrounding Arab countries”80.
Rejecting the partition of Palestine, the Arab Office and the AHC also rejected 
bi-nationalism – on principle but also for strategic reasons – as well  as the 
continuation of the status quo. As a matter of fact, the Arab Office considered 
that maintaining the ongoing policy and releasing immigration certificates for 
the Jewish refugees would only give a clear signal to the Zionists that they 
could pursue violence to secure dominance over Palestine. Hourani reminded 
his counterparts of the objectives of the Zionist movement and that its leaders 
would stop at nothing to achieve their goals.
“The  Arabs  are  bound  to  remember  that  in  the  past  few  years  
responsible Zionists have talked seriously about the evacuation of the  
Arab population,  or  part  of  it,  to  other  parts  of  the Arab world.  […]  
Again it must be emphasized that what the Zionists want is a state,  
political domination, and they are therefore prepared to do anything to  
get it. Everything else is political strategy. Thus in the past they used  
the  method  of  economic  absorptive  capacity  in  order  to  obtain  
immigration,  and  thus  they  will  use  the  democratic  argument  if  
possible. If they can obtain a state by way of having a majority, that  
might seem simpler and it would enable them to justify their action in  
the eyes of  the British and the American public.  But  if  they cannot  
obtain a state and political  domination by way of having a majority,  
79 Khalidi, Walid, “On Albert Hourani, the Arab Office and the Anglo-American Committee of 1946”, 
Journal of Palestine Studies 35(1), Autumn 2005, pp.60-79.
80 “The  Arab  case  for  Palestine:  evidence  submitted  by  the  Arab  Office  to  the  Anglo-American 
Committee of Inquiry, Jerusalem, March 1946.
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they will  try to obtain it in some other way, either by violence or by  
securing an artificial domination supported from outside”.
For  all  these  reasons,  there  could  be  no  maintenance  of  the  status  quo. 
Moreover, the problem of the Jewish refugees could not be solved in the frame 
of  the Palestine question and the burden of  the re-homing of  the refugees 
could  not  be  imposed  on  the  Arabs  in  Palestine.  These  were  particular 
questions and required particular solutions. 
What was proposed was the same as had been proposed during the 
London Round Table Conference that  had led to  the issuance of  the 1939 
White Paper, i.e. an Arab State within which the Jews would be accepted as 
equal citizens. However, the Jews had to acknowledge the fact that they would 
be in Palestine by Arab goodwill.
The last attempts to prevent partition: from the London Conference  
to UNSCOP
The conclusions of the Commission were awaited with impatience and 
when the recommendations were made public, the AHC rejected them as they 
were in contradiction with the “natural rights” of the Arabs of Palestine and it 
deprived  them  from  their  right  to  self-determination81.  The  Anglo-American 
Committee did  indeed reject  both  national  claims and stated that  Palestine 
ought  to  be neither Arab nor Jewish.  By doing so, the Committee  de facto 
rejected the partition of Palestine.
The heads of the Arab States were convened to a meeting in Egypt to 
discuss  the  plan  on  May  28,  1946,  the  meeting  served  as  a  platform  for 
announcing Arab rejection of the plan and of any attempt to overthrow the 1939 
White  Paper,  notably  the  immigration  limitation  clause82.  The  position  was 
further brought during the Bludan Conference in June 1946. The conclusions 
reiterated the rejection of the Anglo-American plan, called for negotiations with 
the British Government in  view of  ending the current  situation in  Palestine, 
81 Qaddoura,  Jamal Muhammad,  The Palestine Question and the Inquiry Commissions:  1937-1947, 
op.cit., p. 154.
82 Kadi,  Leila  S.,  Arab  Summit  conferences  and  the  Palestine  problem  (1936-1950),  (1964-1966), 
op.cit., p. 26-27.
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rejected any partition plan, and called for the boycott of Zionist products and 
activities83.
The Arab plan was presented to the British during the London Conference in 
September 1946, it could be summed up as follows:
• the  end of  the  British  mandate  and  the  announcement  of  the  
independence of Palestine as a Unitarian state 
• the establishment of a democratic government in agreement with  
the  constitution  written  by  an  elected  constituent  assembly  (which  
presupposed the organisation of elections) 
• the  guarantee  of  essential  rights  to  the  Jews  as  a  minority  
community 
• the  immediate  cessation  of  Jewish  immigration  and  the  
submission  of  the  questions  linked  with  immigration  to  the  new  
government of Palestine 
• the conclusion of an alliance between independent Palestine and  
Great Britain
• the guarantee to access the holy places”84.
These propositions were indeed totally incompatible with the Zionist proposals, 
as the latter would not consent to anything other than a Jewish State. This 
made the British deliberation very complex all the more as it was subject to 
American pressure85. 
The British government failed to find a solution with both Jews and Arab and as 
a consequence, the British finally decided to refer to the United Nations for a 
final solution to the Palestine Question.
As soon as the British announced that they would bring the Question of  
Palestine to the United Nations, the Council of the Arab League gathered to 
discuss the Palestine issue and their response to the British move. The Arabs 
had  repeatedly  during  the  last  decades  announced  their  opposition  to  the 
Zionism and its objectives as well as to the British mandate. They had done 
their best to convince the Anglo-American Committee but had failed to obtain a 
83 Kadi,  Leila  S.,  Arab  Summit  conferences  and  the  Palestine  problem  (1936-1950),  (1964-1966), 
op.cit., p. 29-30.
84 National Archives, CAB/129/16, “Palestine – Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign 
Affairs”, January 13, 1947; H. Levenberg, “Bevin's disillusionment, the London conference, Autumn 
1946”, Middle Eastern Studies 27(4), October 1991, pp.615-630.
85 President Truman called for further immigration into Palestine during the Round Table Conference 
which was received as an act of sabotage by the Arabs but also by the British who sincerely hoped  
they could avoid partition. See Chapter II for a more lengthy account of this episode.
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settlement that would meet their demands. So, now, they felt that the recourse 
to the United Nations was once again a measure that proved the unwillingness 
of  the  Great  Powers  to  hear  their  case  and  that  it  would  only  lead  to  a 
resolution of the question without them. They considered that there was no use 
to go to the United Nations unless it was in order to proclaim the independence 
of Palestine86. This is the content of a memo signed by the representatives of 
five  Arab  States  sent  to  the  United  Nations  General  Assembly  before  the 
meeting  that  would  eventually  decide  the  appointment  of  the  UNSCOP87. 
However,  their  demand to end the mandate and recognise Palestine as an 
independent  Arab  State  was  outvoted  and  a  decision  to  send  yet  another 
Enquiry Commission under the aegis of the United Nations with the purpose of 
finding a solution to the Palestine Question was made. 
The United Nations were once again rejecting Arab demands, so,  the AHC 
decided to boycott the commission and organised demonstrations to greet it. 
After hearing the Zionists leaders and movements, the Commission eventually 
decided that it could not decide of the fate of Palestine without at least hearing 
the Arabs' point of view. For that purpose, it entered into contacts with the Arab 
diplomatic representations in Jerusalem88. The case for Palestine then lay in 
the hands of the Arab States and the Arab League.
By August 1947, one month before the commission’s debates, the Arab 
Office would publish a booklet examining in details the various aspects of the 
Palestine Question and presenting once again the positions of the Arabs of 
Palestine and elsewhere on the future of Palestine89. The British mandate and 
its  support  of  Zionism had led to  the separation of  Palestine from its  Arab 
neighbours and environment but it had also denied the Arabs of Palestine their 
right to self-determination. 
The text quoted to a large degree the content of the testimonies presented to 
the  Anglo-American  Committee  and  reiterated  its  rejection  of  partition,  the 
continuation of the  status quo and of any scheme involving federation or bi-
nationalism. 
To the rejection of principle of the partition of Palestine, the report added the 
86 Kadi,  Leila  S.,  Arab  Summit  conferences  and  the  Palestine  problem  (1936-1950),  (1964-1966), 
op.cit., p. 38-39.
87 Khader, Bishara, L'Europe et la Palestine: des croisades à nos jours, op.cit., p. 188.
88 Pappe, Ilan, The Making of the Arab-Israeli conflict, 1947-1951, London 2006, pp.23-24.
89 Arab Office, The Future of Palestine, London 1947 (August), Preface by Musa al-Alami.
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practical  problems  that  partition  would  introduce,  notably  with  regard  to 
demography. Indeed, the intermingling of both populations in some parts of the 
country was such that it would require a transfer of the Arab population from 
the  Jewish  state  to  the  Arab  state  in  order  to  match  the  Jewish  Agency's 
requirements for a Jewish State90. 
Moreover, the lands mentioned for the Arab State were poor agricultural lands 
and above all, far from the economic centre that the Arabs had participated in 
developing.  The  territory  destined  to  become  part  of  the  Arab  State  was 
already overpopulated and allowed for no economic growth. Economic growth 
already made difficult by the artificial redrawing of the Middle East. Partitioning 
Palestine would cause even more difficulties.
Above all, the report pointed out the fact that partition could not be a solution 
either in the short or in the long term. Far from that, it predicted a “permanent 
state of war”, to finally conclude that:
“the existence of one undifferentiated community within the framework  
of a common state is far more likely to bring about an eventual solution  
of the problem of Palestine than the perpetuation of differences by the  
establishment of separate communities or states”91.
Instead of separation and partition, the Arab Office reminded that the Arabs 
had proposed on numerous occasions the establishment of  a unitary state. 
They  now  proposed  it  to  be  Unitarian  and  “democratic  government 
representative  of  all  Palestinian  citizens  on  a  level  of  absolute  individual 
equality”92.   
D.   The  All-Palestine  Government  * ,  the  first  attempt  of  a   
government in exile
After almost three decades of permanent struggle for the advent of an 
undivided  and  independent  Arab  State  in  Palestine,  the  Palestinian  Arabs 
where facing an unstoppable international machinery that had decided in spite 
90 Ibid., pp.70-77.
91 Ibid., p.77.
92 Ibid., p. 81.
* Also cited as the Government of All-Palestine.
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of them, the partition of their country. 
The decision of  the UNSCOP created a state  of  chaos in  Palestine where 
clashes burst out between the Zionist militias and Palestinian volunteers. The 
fights were followed by expulsion and within a few months Palestine was totally 
redrawn. From a country with an Arab majority, to one with a Jewish majority. 
When the British had announced in September 1947, that they gave up their 
mandate  to  the  United  Nations  and  they  would  leave  Palestine,  Amin  al-
Hussayni – in the name of the newly re-established AHC93 – had proposed to 
the Arab states to help him form a “shadow government” whose aim would be 
to  prepare  for  the  period  that  would  follow  the  departure  of  the  British94. 
However,  no  Arab  leader  –  refusing  to  give  more  power  to  the  mufti  – 
answered  positively  to  that  proposition  so  that  when  the  British  left,  the 
Palestinians unlike the Zionists had no tools to face the consequences of the 
Unites Nations' decision.
On  22  September  1948,  however,  Haj  Amin  al-Hussayni,  announced  the 
independence of the state of Palestine and the constitution of its government 
under the name of the 'All-Palestine Government'95. Although he had lost most 
of his credibility, Haj Amin al-Hussayni was backed in his decision by the Arab 
League  and  particularly  Egypt,  which  feared  the  expansionist  aims  of  the 
Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and preferred to support at least verbally, the 
AHC96. The Kingdom of Jordan, which was the only Arab country to refuse to 
recognise the All-Palestine Government, intended to annex the West Bank and 
for that purpose, it set up conferences in Amman and Jericho. Discovering the 
93 The  Arab  Higher  Committee  which  had  been  recognised  as  the  representative  of  the  Arab 
Palestinians during the Great Arab Revolt in 1936-1939 was dispersed and its most notable leader, 
Haj Amin al-Hussayni who had been allied to Germany during World War II had spent some time in 
France, before moving from one Arab country to another. During the war, Haj Amin al-Hussayni had 
been to Germany with other members of the Committee and during his absence, they were replaced 
by other Palestinian figures linked with the Arab regimes and especially with the Hashemite kingdom 
which also had views on Palestine as the secret  negotiations between King Abdallah and Golda 
Meyer show. From then on, existed two official directions of the Palestinian national movement, on 
the one hand, the Arab Higher Committee led by Amin al-Hussayni and after by Jamal al- Hussayni, 
on  the  other  hand,  the  National  Authority,  led  by  Raghib  al  Nashashibi  and  supported  by  the 
Hashemites. But as we have seen, there was also the Arab Office, led by Mula al-Alami, which was 
sanctioned by the Arab League and enjoyed an entente with the AHC.
94 Shlaim,  Avi,  “The rise and  fall  of  the  All-Palestine  government  in  Gaza”,  Journal  of  Palestine  
Studies 20(1), Autumn 1990, pp. 37-53.
95 An announcement was cabled on September 28, 1948 by Ahmad Hili Pasha, the Premier and Acting 
Secretary of the All Palestine Government to the United Nations. The statement is available on 
UNISPAL.
96 Shlaim, Avi, “The rise and fall of the All-Palestine government in Gaza”, op.cit., pp. 37-53.
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Jordanian decision, the Head of the Egyptian Royal Cabinet summoned all the 
Arab representatives and gave them a message from the King Farouq in which 
he stated:
“The King has received reports  to  the effect  that  a conference has  
been held in Jericho attended by the refugees, who decided to request  
that  Palestine  be annexed to  the  Kingdom of  Jordan...  Those who  
attended the conference were a minority in comparison with the total  
number of the Arabs of Palestine, who are dispersed throughout the  
Arab countries, and those who are still in Palestine, and they are in no  
position to express their views as they wish in full freedom”97. 
Nevertheless, Jordan indeed annexed the West Bank by April  1950 and the 
Arab leaders could do little but make statements and threaten to expel Jordan 
from the League, or state that there was still the aim of “maintaining the pre-
aggression entity of Palestine”98. 
This Government of All-Palestine, which was to have its base in Gaza, was 
composed in  October  1948,  it  had Haj  Amin  al-Hussayni  as  president  and 
Ahmad Hilmi Abdul Baqi as prime minister. The latter did indeed represent the 
Palestinian people within the Arab League council in its session of October 30, 
1948 and until  his  death in  196399.  However,  this  government  was more a 
symbolic one than anything else, since on the one hand, Israel was already 
established  and  recognised,  and  the  people  of  Palestine  were  still  being 
expelled  from the  country  and,  on  the  other  hand,  it  had  no  material  and 
human resources – as it could not rally the resistance – to set up any concrete 
policies100. It continued to exist, even though progressively losing importance, 
until  the  death  of  Ahmad  Hilmi  Abdul  Baqi,  which  was  the  occasion  to 
definitively bury the Government of All-Palestine.
The Government of All-Palestine had been the first attempt of a Palestinian 
government, however, it  was  little more than a symbolic protest against the 
partition of Palestine by reaffirming in title the everlasting unity of the land of 
Palestine.  Besides,  it  had  neither  the  territory  nor  a  united  population  to 
govern.  
97 Quoted in Muhammad Izza Darwaza, Al Qadiya al Filistiniya fi Mukhtalef Marahiliha, part II, Beirut 
1960, p. 210, reproduced in Issa l-Shuaibi, “The development of Palestinian Entity consciousness”, 
Part I, Journal of Palestine Studies 9(1), Autumn 1979, pp. 67-84.
98  Ibid.
99  Al-Shuaibi, Issa, “The development of Palestinian Entity consciousness, part I”, op.cit., pp. 67-84.
100  Read Rosemary Sayigh, Palestinians: from peasants to revolutionaries, London 1979.
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E. Conclusion 
Arab  and  especially  Palestinian  perspectives  on  partition  have  been 
rather  consistent  throughout  the years  and decades from the  1910s to  the 
Nakba,  the rejection was indeed unanimous.  However,  the mandate  period 
with the British rule on the one hand and Britain's Zionist protégés on the other 
hand got the better of the Arabs who had eventually to turn to Wattaniyya as 
the only way to lead their independence and liberation struggles and protect 
their countries. This was a pragmatic move as stressed by  Musa Kazem al-
Hussayni however, it opened the door to future partition schemes. Thus, when 
the  Arabs  accepted  the  first  partition,  the  partition  of  the  Arab  territories 
previously under Ottoman rule this was as a default  position.  They indeed, 
considered it  would be a temporary situation, one that  would be overcome 
once they would have freed themselves from western rule and its protégé, the 
Zionist movement. 
Equally  consistent  if  not  more  in  their  rejection  of  British  rule  over 
Palestine  and  Zionism that  had  brought  partition  into  the  Middle  East,  the 
Arabs and especially the Arabs of Palestine would not cease to notify their 
decisions through petitions and riots, in vain. What the British administration 
was ready to offer, that is a mixed legislative council under control of the British 
administration and an autonomous Jewish community could not be regarded 
as an option by the Palestinians. Palestine was part of Greater Syria and as 
such whilst the Palestinians could nor reverse the partition at the moment, they 
wished to install  an Arab government,  and they were ready to consider the 
Jews as part  of  the Arab Palestinian people and grant them a proportional  
representation  as  a  minority,  this  was  their  vision  of  a  united  Palestine. 
However, the Zionist leadership has moved passed that point and rejected all 
propositions that did not include Jewish sovereignty, an objective shared with a 
few allies within the British government. 
When  partition  was  first  proposed  by  the  British  government,  the 
Palestinians but also the other Arabs organised in a joint effort to express once 
again  Arab  rejection  of  any  rupture  of  the  national  territorial  unity  and  of 
Zionism101. Moreover, they considered the proposal of partition as an attack on 
101 National Archives, FO371/20811 and E55515/22/31, cited in Aaron Klieman, “In the public domain:  
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the  Arabs'  right  of  self-determination,  and  the  Arabs  wanted  to  determine 
themselves  in  an  independent  Arab  State...  So,  they continued  to  propose 
unitarian schemes combining the “natural rights” of the Arabs of Palestine and 
the “cultural and religious rights” of the Jews102. 
Their  positions  were  to  be  expressed  again  at  the  occasion  of  the 
London  Conferences  for  Palestine,  the  Anglo-American  Inquiry  commission 
and ultimately the UNSCOP commission. The Arab positions may be summed 
up as follows: first, the Palestine Question was independent from the question 
of the Jewish refugees, which was an international problem and had to be dealt 
as such; second, an independent Arab State had to be created in Palestine 
where all the inhabitants could enjoy equal civil rights. Given that, it was out of 
the question to consider any Jewish State in Palestine. 
This was further developed, as we have seen, by Albert Hourani who offered 
an insightful analysis of Zionism. Hourani foresaw that partition was only a step 
in the Zionist  programme moreover,  and he was convinced that even if  the 
Zionist organisation was really after a Jewish State only on part of Palestine, it 
would sooner or later enter into conflict with the Arabs103. So, partition would 
reveal  itself  not  at  all  a  solution  device  but  the  beginning  of  a  non-ending 
conflict.
Instead, the Arabs reiterated their propositions for an independent Palestinian 
democratic State that would guarantee the “essential rights to the Jews as a 
minority community”104.
The incompatibility of Arab and Zionist claims were such that Britain rendered 
its  mandate to  the United Nations which under  the influence of the Jewish 
Agency and the United States eventually recommended partition. 
However,  even then,  the Palestinians continued to  reject  partition  and in  a 
desperate attempt to counter it, the AHC in the person of Haj Amin al Hussayni 
proclaimed the Government of  All  Palestine as if  to ward off  partition. This 
the controversy over partition for Palestine”,  op.cit.; Kadi, Leila S.,  Arab Summit Conferences and 
the Palestine Problem (1936-1950) (1964-1966), op.cit., p. 6.
102 Al-Khalidi, Kamal, The Arab-Israeli conflict: what perspective?, op.cit., pp.30-31
103 “The  Arab  case  for  Palestine:  evidence  submitted  by  the  Arab  Office  to  the  Anglo-American 
Committee of Inquiry, Jerusalem, March 1946.
104 National Archives, CAB/129/16, “Palestine – Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign 
Affairs”, January 13, 1947; H. Levenberg, “Bevin's disillusionment, the London conference, Autumn 
1946”, Middle Eastern Studies 27(4), October 1991, pp.615-630.
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being in reaction rather than in proposition of an alternative, it did not offer any 
common vision or any unitarian programme.
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Chapter Five: The Bi-Nationalist Option, 1918-1967 
From the 1900s, the Zionist movement developed a number of Jewish 
institutions  in  Palestine  and  established  Kibbutzim  where  they  advocated 
Jewish labour only. Thus, by the early 1920s, there were already two separate 
communities  in  Palestine.   This  separation  was  sanctioned  by  the  British 
authorities, which enabled the Zionist movement to create “a state within the 
state”,  and  to  have  its  own  recognised  representatives  in  the  Zionist 
Organization.  All  these  developments  favoured  the  emergence  within  the 
Zionist  movement  of  a  mainstream trend aiming  at  the  establishment  of  a 
Jewish majority in Palestine and later a Jewish Commonwealth/State. 
However,  a  Jewish  majority  and  a  Jewish  state  were  not  the  aims  of  all 
Zionists, a minority amongst whom advocated bi-nationalism as a means of 
reaching  an  understanding  with  the  Arabs.  The  latter  were  aware  of  the 
separatist  intentions  of  the  Zionist  leadership  and  warned  against  the 
repercussions of such a policy on the relation with the Arabs, but also with the 
British administration. 
Bi-nationalist  thought  was  originally  developed  by  a  group  of  intellectuals, 
mostly from Eastern Europe – although other far less known initiatives would 
later  briefly appear  that  would include Sephardic  Jews – who advocated a 
return to Judaism.  They were also Zionists and as such, their aim was the 
creation of a Jewish Homeland, however, they considered “the Arab question” 
or  the  relation  with  the  Arab  as  the  touchstone  of  Zionism.  Refusing  the 
separation between the Jews and the Arabs, they rejected the dialectics of 
majority/minority  and  were  convinced  that  the  stated  will  of  the  Zionist 
movement to establish a Jewish majority in Palestine could only antagonise 
the Arabs. They considered the first partition proposal as a consequence of  
Zionist  maximalist  policy and they would slowly transform their “philosophy” 
into a political programme. From then on, they would do their best to prevent 
partition,  but also the establishment of  a Jewish or an Arab State, seeking 
rather  a  bi-national  society  integrated  in  its  Arab  environment.  They  were 
joined in this aim by other organisations from the Zionist left wing – such as the 
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prominent Hashomer Hatzair. 
Blaming  the  Zionist  movement  for  sabotaging  the  relations  with  the  Arab 
population in calling for a Jewish majority, the bi-nationalists, as we will see, 
were often seen as traitors and were at the centre of continuous controversy. 
This  chapter  examines  the  bi-national  idea  as  it  was  developed  by  the 
advocates of spiritual Zionism, that is an anti-separatist and anti-partinionist 
ideology, the  programmes  that  emerged  from  it  as  well  as  their  reception 
among the Arabs of Palestine. 
First, I will review the origins of bi-nationalism, which are to be found within the 
spiritual trend of Zionism. Spiritual Zionism provided the theoretical framework 
for  bi-national  thought  and  its  anti-separatist,  anti-partitionist  component,  a 
framework that I will review in the second part of this chapter. Then, I will look 
into  the  concrete  propositions  that  came from the  bi-nationalist  framework, 
through contacts with the Arabs, the reactions and the alternative propositions 
elaborated in the aftermath of the first partition proposal. 
However,  as  we  will  see,  their  action  would  be  drastically  diminished  and 
receive less attention as it was perceived as obsolete after 1948.
Finally, and before concluding by sharing the major criticisms of the bi-national 
movement, I will inspect the Arab response to bi-nationalism. 
A. Dissent among Zionism: spirituality and bi-national thought 
Birth of bi-national thought  
If Zionism was a minority movement, it was also heterogeneous. At the 
beginning of the 20th century, a few Jewish Zionist intellectuals, essentially from 
Germany and central Europe, advocated a bi-national solution for Palestine. To 
understand their position, it is important, first, to state that their Zionism was a 
spiritual one, which they inherited from the Russian journalist Ahad Haam1. He 
was a thinker on spiritual Zionism and became the mentor of many of the bi-
1 Ahad Haam, literally “one of the people”, was the pseudonym of Asher Ginsberg was born in Russia 
in 1856 and died in Palestine in 1927. He was an essayist and one of the thinkers of cultural Zionism.
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nationalists.  Their  political  and  spiritual  engagement  were  inspired  by  their 
understanding of his writings and philosophy. 
Ahad Haam saw Zionism as a tool for the cultural and spiritual revival of the 
Jews, and this is the path they chose to follow when embracing bi-national 
thought. For them bi-nationalism, was the only way to link the values inherent 
to  Judaism  and  nationalism.  For  them,  Zionism  had  to  avoid  imitating 
European nationalisms, seen as aggressive and imperialist.
For  them,  whilst  Zionism was  a  solution  to  the  crisis  of  the  liberal  Jewish 
culture; it could not be the solution to what had been identified as the ‘Jewish 
problem’. That problem could not be solved by the creation of a Jewish state 
but  by  the  revival  of  the  Jewish  culture  and  the  re-emergence  of  Jewish 
identity. In that configuration, the role of Palestine was to provide a spiritual  
centre in which to develop Jewish identity through culture and religion and from 
which it would be spread around the world to enlighten the Diaspora and other 
peoples. 
These intellectuals would form the central group or the core of the bi-
nationalist associations in the Yishuv. Among them, we find the economist and 
Zionist  leader  Arthur  Ruppin,  the  philosopher  and theologian  Martin  Buber, 
Gershom Scholem, the historian of Kabbala and messianism Hans Kohn, a 
philosopher and historian who was to provide a noted study on nationalism, 
and  Samuel  Hugo  Bergmann,  a  philosopher2.  The  liberal  Rabbi,  Judah 
Magnes, who joined them in their thinking and demands, was not a member – 
for reasons we will see in the next section – of the first group they formed in  
1925, which they called  Brit Shalom (Peace Covenant). Within  Brit Shalom, 
they argued for coexistence with the Arabs, the creation of a bi-national society 
and the integration of the Jews into the Near East3. The group numbered at its 
peak  200  members,  mostly  intellectuals  from  Europe4.  They  criticised 
nationalism as it was developing in the west and dreamt of a new, “pure and 
pacifist”  nationalism,  a  model  for  other  nations.  The  basis  of  their  thought 
resided in their Judaism, and even if they were non-orthodox or non-practising 
Jews,  they all  referred to  Jewish spirituality.  Their  vision of  the dangers of 
2 Ratzabi,  Shalom,  Between Zionism and Judaism.  The radical  circle in  Brith  Shalom,  Boston  & 
Leiden 2002, p.22.
3 The charter of the association is available in Paul Mendes Flohr (ed.), Buber, Martin,  Une terre et  
deux peuples, op.cit. pp.103-104.
4 Henry Laurens, La Question de Palestine. Une mission sacrée de civilisation, Paris 2002, p.185.
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Zionism even caused them allegations of treason. 
The  members  of  Brit  Shalom and  their  sympathisers  evolved  around  the 
Hebrew University in Jerusalem, which was founded by Judah Leon Magnes, 
one of the most active bi-nationalists, in the mid-1920s. In itself, the Hebrew 
University materialises the contradictions in their thought.  
The  main  elements  of  their  thought,  as  we  will  see,  were  the  values  of 
Judaism, nationalism, opposition to the negation of exile and criticism of the 
Messianism inherent in Zionism5.
Moral and pacifism versus pragmatism
Scholars  have  constantly  questioned  their  motivations,  whether  they 
were sincere and advocated their solutions for moral reasons (morally linked to 
the value they defended), or whether they were animated by pragmatism and 
realism  (being  in  a  minority  position,  they  could  not  hope  for  more).  To 
understand the motivations of these men, one should keep in mind the context 
in which Brit Shalom was founded. Indeed, before focusing on the intellectual 
origin of its members and their political and philosophical considerations, one 
should point out that the association was officially established the same year 
the revisionist party was created. The revisionist party, a right wing party led by 
Zeev Jabotinsky6, advocated the establishment of a Jewish state on the two 
banks of the Jordan river (comprising Palestine and Transjordan) and while it  
was indeed, the instigator of the Iron Wall policy, it was also one of the rare to 
acknowledge the presence of the Arabs and recognise them a national feeling.
Contrary to the revisionist party but also to most of the Zionist leaders, the 
members of the association had in mind the internal threats of Zionism and 
they  wanted  to  convince  the  Zionist  leadership  of  the  need  to  imagine 
Palestine as a two-people land.  
First, it is clear that values played a prominent role in their political approach. 
5 This is particularly developed in Raz-Krakotzkin, Amnon, Exil et Souveraineté. Judaïsme, Sionisme  
et pensée binationale, op.cit..
6 Zeev Jabotinsky (born  Vladimir  Yevgenyevich  Zhabotinsky)  (1880-1940),  Leader  of  the  Zionist 
Organisation's right wing author of the maximalist Zionist claim of a Jewish State on the two banks 
of the Jordan river (Palestine and Transjordan). He is the founder of the fascist inspired revisionist  
party.
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As is underlined in Shalom Ratzabi's study7, the founders and theoreticians of 
the bi-national thought were born and raised in a Germanic context and, most 
of them, had studied in German Universities, and as such, they had developed 
the position that ideas were superior to reality: values should be determined by 
their  relation  to  actions  in  reality.  This  did  not  prevent  them  from  having 
different motivations and objectives. Their relation to Judaism and its system of 
values partly explains that debate. If they were not practising Jews, they all  
advocated spiritual Zionism. 
Then,  Brit Shalom developed an attitude of pacifism. However, there was a 
constant antagonism within the association, between “real pacifism” and tactics 
or pragmatism. This antagonism and its opaque positions were a matter of 
concern for personalities such as Judah Magnes. The latter, contrary to many 
of his colleagues and to the mainstream Zionists, appealed for a “deep theory 
of pacifism”, not only in Palestine for the Jews and the Arabs, but all around 
the world and for every people8. This corresponded to his personal trajectory 
as a pacifist during the First World War, when he approved the “neutrality” of 
the United States. Magnes said that antagonism was the principal cause of his 
non-adherence to  Brit Shalom, in spite of his positive view of the association 
and its goals. He felt that the members of Brit Shalom were not inhabited by a 
“real and strong pacifist” nature9. He cited Arthur Ruppin, one of its members 
who  he  thought  adhered  to  bi-nationalism and  to  Arab-Jewish  cooperation 
because of “tactical” reasons10.  It  should be pointed out that this remark by 
Magnes was revealed as true when,  after the riots and the revolt  of  1936,  
Ruppin showed some doubts and even lost faith in an agreement, also when 
we learn that Gershom Scholem started to criticise the movement after the 
1929 riots and adhered to mainstream Zionism in the early 1930s. 
Nevertheless,  the movement was not  divided between two trends perfectly 
espousing the lines of pragmatism or pacifism as a moral trait. And, most of the 
time pragmatism and the values they advocated were intermingling rather than 
7 Ratzabi, Shalom, Between Zionism and Judaism. The radical circle in Brith Shalom, op.cit.
8 Magnes, Judah Leon, 'Brit Shalom', in Goren, Arthur (ed.),  Dissenter in Zion. From the writing of  
Judah Leib Magnes, Cambridge 1982, pp. 272-273.
9 Ibid.
10 Magnes, Judah Leon, “Journal note, 'Brit Shalom'”, September 14, 1928, in Goren, Arthur, Dissenter  
in Zion, op.cit., pp. 272-273.
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competing11. 
B. Bi-nationalism: Theoretical framework
Though  themselves  members  of  the  Zionist  movement,  the  bi-
nationalists  did  not  agree  with  all  its  analyses  and  postulates.  First,  they 
developed a strong criticism of messianism, accompanied by similar criticism 
of the negation of the Diaspora.  Second, contrary to mainstream Zionists, they 
considered the Arab question as part of the “Jewish question” and last but not  
least,  they strongly criticised nationalism, which they thought might  strike a 
blow to Zionism.
Criticism of political messianism 
As underlined by Amnon Raz-Krakotzkin, Zionist experience raised from 
the  very  beginning  many  problems  for  practising  Jews  who  had  found 
themselves unable to accept the notion of the “return” of the Jews to Israel  
before the return of the Messiah. Thus, on a metaphysical level, exile is not  
ended with the creation of the Jewish state. Indeed, exile is a major constituent 
of  Jewish  identity  and  is  supposed  to  have  a  therapeutic  function,  which 
Zionism endangers in claiming the return to “Eretz Israel”, as only God is able 
to put an end to exile. This particular criticism was of course prevalent among 
the orthodox Jews such as the Haredim, who were not at all comfortable with 
the  use  the  Zionists  made  of  the  Torah  and  the  concept  of  the  Promised 
Land12.
Following their  mentor,  Ahad Haam, who had noticed from the  first  Zionist 
congress that messianism was inherent to Zionist thought, the members of Brit  
Shalom feared messianism, considering a religious interpretation of Zionism as 
dangerous, and believing that redemption had to come “through the prophets 
and not the diplomats”. Furthermore, why create another state, which at its 
11 Ratzabi, Shalom, Between Zionism and Judaism, op.cit., p. 131
12 Rabkin, Yakov, L'opposition juive au sionisme, Quebec 2004, p. 90.
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best would resemble a Balkan country, thus endangering the future of all the 
Jewish people? They considered Zionism as another messianic movement, but 
one  which  might  be  more  dangerous;  unlike  all  the  other  messianic 
movements that had shown up in history, this one did not present itself as a 
religious movement but a political one using the religious concepts of return 
and redemption (in this case, national redemption).
Being Jews – though not practising they believed in the tradition of Judaism – 
they had conflicting feelings about the conscience and the meaning of “being a 
Jew” and a constant fear of accelerating redemption. So, even if they adhered 
to  Zionism,  the  bi-nationalists  took their  ideas and values from the  Jewish 
tradition, which explains their position towards exile.
Negation of Exile
The  analysis  of  the  discourse  on  the  negation  of  exile  among  the 
mainstream  Zionists  and  the  counter-discourse  advanced  by  the  bi-
nationalists,  is  in  many ways  crucial.  As a matter  of  fact,  the aspiration to 
“return”  to  Palestine  and  set  up  a  Jewish  National  Home  or  a  Jewish 
Commonwealth induces an opposition to life in exile; from then on, political and 
territorial Zionism may be seen by definition as being anti-exilic. However, what 
is exile in Jewish and Zionist thoughts? In Zionist thought, redemption means 
the end of exile in which the Jews were sent away by God and the return to 
general history or to the world's history. If one speaks of “return to history”, that 
means that exile not only meant the exile far from the territory but also the exile 
from/outside history and that all the time the Jews spent in exile, they were not 
part of the world's history. In that logic, redemption means a new beginning 
and the erasing of all that had to do with exile. In other words, negating exile13. 
The mainstream Zionists showed themselves very critical towards exile. They 
believed that life in exile would be non productive and weak, inefficient and 
above all not worth talking about. Exile, in their view, was “outside History”; the 
13 See Amnon Raz-Krakotzkin, Exil et souvereaineté, judaïsme, sionisme et pensée binationale, op.cit.,  
pp.26-69. The author devoted two chapters on Negation of exile, redemption and the concept of 
return to history.
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latter ended after the destruction of the temple and started again with Zionism 
and the return to Israel. Zionist thought constantly compares Jews in exile and 
the “returnees”, who incarnated the “new man” who, contrary to the “old man”,  
represented the true pioneer of Israel. Young versus old, strong versus weak, 
healthy versus sick...
Then, the bi-nationalists believed that the Diaspora had to be maintained, as it  
was one of the duties of the Jewish people to live among other nations in the 
world and disseminate its message. In that, they proposed a model that was by 
essence a rejection of separation and exclusion; it opposed the vision of the 
majority of Zionists, who claimed the supremacy of the Jewish State and the 
duty of the Diaspora to move into such a state. They claimed that the objective 
of Israel was the renewal of Judaism and not the normalisation of the Jewish 
people by achieving national sovereignty.  
As Zeev Sternhell, the critical Israeli sociologist explains, the negation of exile 
resides in the basis of Zionism14. Exile in itself is seen as a sickness that can 
only  find  its  cure  when  the  Jewish  people,  once  constituted  as  a  nation, 
achieve sovereignty. Therefore, it does not represent a simple cleavage with 
the bi-nationalists. Exile according to Zionism would, in the long-term lead to 
the  decline  of  Jewish  identity.  Modernity  with  liberalism  had  favoured 
assimilation of the Jews, an assimilation that absolutely had to be totally fought 
and stopped. 
Diaspora endangers the existence of the Jewish nation, so in fact, according to 
that logic, one has to deny the existence of the Diaspora. Denying it means 
rejecting  it,  rejecting  any  explanation  for  exile  and  denying  everything 
produced in exile. As many historians have brought to light, denial of Diaspora 
has led to fighting it by trying to prove that no life was possible in exile. To 
develop the Jewish nation, the Jewish people have to isolate themselves and 
create  a  proper  culture  that  wouldn't  depend  on alien  culture  or  concepts. 
Gershom Scholem, who, though he was a member of  Brit Shalom,  despised 
assimilation  and  wrote  about  solitude.  He  said  that  the  community  seeks 
loneliness. 
“Only common loneliness is able to found a community.  Zion – the  
source  of  our  people  is  common  loneliness,  or  even,  in  an  
14 Sternhell, Zeev, Aux origines d'Israël. Entre nationalisme et socialisme, Paris 2004, pp.97-107. 
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extraordinary  meaning,  identical  to  all  Jews  …  there  wouldn't  be  
another place for such a reunion”15.
He went further and stated that in Diaspora, 
“There cannot be a Jewish community that would have any value in  
the eyes of God”16.
The  “Arab  question”,  majority,  demography  and  transfer  –  
Zionism's touchstone
“The  bride  is  beautiful  but  she  is  married  to  another  man”17.  This 
sentence used by Ghada Karmi as the title of one of her books,  Married to  
another man,  was telegraphed by two rabbis who were sent by the Zionist 
Congress on an expedition to Palestine at the end of the 19th century. From the 
very beginning, the leaders and thinkers of the Zionist movement have been 
aware that Palestine was not an empty country; they did however construct 
their  ideology  with  that  idea,  ignoring  the  Palestinians,  their  history,  their 
culture, their language and their legitimate rights to the land.
We all have in mind the words of Ahad Haam: 
“We abroad are used to  believing that  Eretz Yisrael  is  now almost  
totally desolate, a desert that is not sowed. But in truth this is not the  
case. Throughout the country it  is difficult  to find fields that are not  
sowed. Only sand dunes and stony mountains...are not cultivated”18. 
Ahad Ha'am's view on the subject was shared by other Zionists, notably those 
identified by Yosef Gorny as the “integrative” trend among whom we can cite: 
Yitzhak Epstein19, a Russian born teacher who had settled in Palestine in 1887, 
15 Scholem, Gershom, “Adieu. Lettre ouverte à Siegfried Bernfeld et contre les lecteurs de la revue 
Jerubaal (1918)”, in Le Prix d'Israël, op.cit., pp.31-41.
16 Ibid..
17 Ghada Karmi, Married to another man, London 2007.
18 Quoted in Morris, Benny, Righteous victims, op.cit., p.42.
19 Yitzhak Epstein (1862-1943), Concerned by the attitude of the Jews towards the Arabs, he published 
an article entitled "A Hidden Question" in the Hebrew periodical  Ha-Shiloah. The article is to be 
found on Mazen Qumsiyeh's website: http://qumsiyeh.org/yitzhakepstein/  
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Rabbi Benjamin20, Nisim Malul21 or Yosef Luria22. They advocated integration of 
the Jews to Palestine and the Arabs and condemned the intentional ignoring of 
the Arabs and their  opinion23.  Their  views were to be developed by the bi-
nationalists  who  would  be  among  the  first  Zionists  to  acknowledge  the 
presence of the Arabs and try to translate this into political action.  They were 
also among the first to evoke the existence of an “Arab question” as part of 
Zionism and  the  “Jewish  question”  and  not  outside  of  it;  furthermore  as  a 
central question. Presenting “the “Arab question”, as linked with the future of 
the Jews in Palestine, enabled – as Henry Laurens remarks in La Question de 
Palestine – avoiding the transformation of the “Jewish question” into an “Arab 
question” to be solved independently24. 
At that time, it  was not rare to hear Zionist leaders evoking the non-
existence of an “Arab question”. This way of wilfully ignoring the existence of 
the Arabs was underlined by Gershom Scholem in a note dated from 1931 in 
which  he  answered  to  the  polemics  around  Brit  Shalom and  their  Zionist 
engagement.  In  that  note,  he  quoted  the  president  of  the  World  Zionist 
Organization – then Nahum Sokolow – who in the middle of the Arab riots of 
1929 said that the “Arab question was not part of reality”25. 
Nevertheless, the “Arab question” was not always avoided or silenced, and 
when  it  was  discussed,  it  was  mostly  from the  angle  of  demography.  The 
conflict opposing the Zionists to the Palestinian Arabs had become, from the 
Zionist  perspective,  a  problem  of  “numbers”,  with  a  vocabulary  such  as 
majority and  minority – the minority wanting to become the majority and the 
majority wanting to stay the majority (numerically but also politically). At that 
time, the Arabs constituted an absolute majority and the Zionists a minority 
20 Rabbi Benjamin or Yehoshua Radler-Feldmann (1880-1957), Galicia born journalist and writer who 
settled in Palestine in 1907 after spending a few years in London where he worked for a literary  
journal – Ha Me'orer. He was later to be one of the founding members of Brit Shalom, an association 
advocating Jewish-Arab understanding and the establishment of a bi-national society and state. 
21 Nisim Malul (1892-  ), Tunisian born Sephardi Jew, Journalist and writer. After studying in Egypt 
where his family was based, he went back to Palestine in 1911. There he worked for the Zionist 
Office of Jaffa,  his main role as described by Abigail Jacobson, was to “respond to anti-Zionist  
articles which were published in the Palestinian Arab-Christian newspapers Filastin and al-Karmil”.
22 Yosef Luria (1971-1937), A Romanian-born journalist and teacher who settled in Palestine in 1907. 
He was the editor of  the Zionist  weekly  Der Yid.  Among other things,  he was in  favour of  the 
strengthening of Yiddish in the diaspora. He was later to be active in Brit Shalom. 
23 Gorny, Yosef, Zionism and the Arabs, 1882-1948, A study of ideology, Oxford 1987, pp.41-49.
24 Laurens,  Henry,  Preface  to  Shlaim,  Avi  and  Eugène  L.  Rogan,  La  Guerre  de  Palestine  1948.  
Derrière le mythe, Paris  2002, pp.5-7. 
25 Scholem, Gershom, Le prix d'Israël, op.cit., p. 45.
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who, even on the eve of partition, represented only 20% of the population. The 
Zionist movement asked for the constitution of a Jewish majority, a demand 
that was seen as a threat by the Arabs. This was quite an inextricable situation.  
For their part, and from the very beginning, the bi-nationalists understood that 
to  reach an agreement with  the Arabs,  they had to abandon the idea of  a 
Jewish majority. They advanced three arguments to support their case. First, 
on  a  pragmatic  basis,  they thought  it  was  impossible  to  reach  a  sufficient 
number, as the difference was too important. Second, they logically considered 
that no people in the world would let a foreign population become a majority 
and risk losing, even more than their power in the country – losing their status. 
Third, they wanted to move beyond classical discussions on demography and 
make the principle of parity – whatever the ratio – the core principle. 
However,  demography  had  been  too  long  at  the  core  of  Zionist  thought 
regarding the Arabs and, since the movement’s inception, transfer was inferred 
in that thought, as argued by Nur Masalha26.
A criticism of the nation-state and imperialism
Martin Buber and his colleagues adhered to the definition of nationalism 
according to which it was “the awareness of a lack, a sickness of an infirmity”. 
For the Jews, nationalism was the awareness of the lack of centre (or state). 
However, according to Buber – whose definition of the nation was based on 
perennialism – there were two forms of nationalism. The first, aiming to cure 
and supposed to disappear after having reached its objective. The second, on 
the  contrary,  “a  long  term  and  determining  principle”;  that  form  becomes 
independent and continues to exist by and for itself. This was seen by the bi-
nationalists as very dangerous, as it depended on the supremacy of the nation, 
and was potentially made to last and moreover to express itself aggressively.
Just  as their  identity was determined by their  religious and “cultural”  
belonging, their nationalism took its source in their notion of Judaism. Actually,  
they believed in certain values that could not fit into “traditional nationalism”. 
26 Masalha, Nur,  Expulsion of the Palestinians: the concept of 'transfer' in Zionist Political thought,  
1882-1948, Washington 1992. 
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Moreover, they considered that Zionism had to be ethical to survive. That is 
why, despite their adherence to Jewish nationalism, the bi-nationalists have 
shown themselves very critical towards nationalism. For them, it was out of the 
question to recreate another national movement or, to quote Hugo Bergmann, 
“the objective of Zionism is not to create another nation-state”. That can, in 
substance, very well be the motto of the Zionist bi-nationalists.  Exempt from 
imperialist  objectives,  Zionism  had  then  to  be  different  from  traditional  or 
European nationalism.
In a long and quite informative speech that Buber delivered in Karlsbad, he 
tried to explain why Zionism had to be different from European nationalisms, 
and  he  presented  the  dangers  it  would  have  to  overcome  if  it  developed 
following the European model27. According to him and his followers, Zionism 
was a unique phenomenon, indeed, it had the particularity of being linked to 
and depending on Judaism and as such it had to be different and unique in its 
tools and goals. They feared, as Buber underlined, the corruption of Zionism, 
also that the Jewish nation would become like all other nations, that is to say 
they would aspire to create another state and not a new order,  that  would 
emerge from nature and from organic ties between the members of the same 
people.
Bi-nationalists and especially Magnes – as the pacifist he was28 – opposed the 
military conquest of Palestine; he called such a victory the “Joshua way”29. All 
the bi-nationalists thought the Jewish National Home should not be established 
with “bayonets” and even less if these came from an imperialist country. They 
really tried to avoid the militarisation of Zionism, but in vain.
Adopting the “dogma of the nations' sovereignty” signified, according to Martin 
Buber, no more and no less than accepting assimilation30. 
Martin Buber believed the Jews were the holders of a “supranational 
mission”. However, he felt and feared that this mission had been abandoned in 
27 Buber, Martin, “Nationalism (1921)”, in Mendes Flohr, Paul, A Land of two people: Martin Buber on  
Jews and Arabs, Oxford 1983, pp. 47-57.
28 Goren, Arthur (ed.), Dissenter in Zion, op.cit., pp.157-200.
29 JL Magnes used this expression in an address at the Hebrew University in 1929. This is related in 
Goren, Arthur (ed.), Dissenter in Zion, op.cit., pp. 34-35
30 Martin  Buber,  “Examen  de  l'humanitarisme,  du  nationalisme  et  du  conservatisme  religieux”,  in 
Denis  Charbit  (ed.),  Sionismes,  Textes  fondamentaux,  Paris  1998,  p.  97.  This  was also the view 
Hannah Arendt would later express when writing her famous article “Zionism Reconsidered”, in 
Kohn, Jerome & Ron H. Feldman (eds.), The Jewish Writings. Hannah Arendt, New York 2007, pp. 
343-374.
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favour of the simple existence of the nation as “an end in itself” that would lead 
to the willingness to create an empire. Indeed, Buber and his colleagues from 
Brit Shalom, and later the Ihud, constantly tried to warn against an approach 
too nationalistic to Zionism. They believed that if it was important to set the 
Jewish nation in Palestine, they had to be careful not to fall into “hysteria of 
power” and that it was even more important to accomplish their supranational 
mission of creating a fairer world for all nations and peoples. In a speech on 
nationalism he gave in Karlsbad (Germany) during the 12th Zionist congress, 
he expressed himself as follows:
“The  supranational  task  of  the  Jewish  nation  cannot  be  properly  
accomplished unless – under its aegis – natural life is re-conquered. In  
that  formal  nationalism disclaims  the  nation's  being  based  on  and  
conditioned by this more-than-national task; in that it has grown over-
conscious and dares to disengage Judaism from its connection with  
the world and to isolate it; in that it proclaims the nation as an end in  
itself,  instead  of  comprehending  that  it  is  an  element,  formal  
nationalism sanctions a group-egoism which disclaims responsibility”31.
The departure of Hans Kohn from the Zionist movement and Palestine 
raised a series of questions surrounding Martin Buber's conception of Zionism. 
Hans Kohn had been disappointed by the Yishuv's reactions to the Arab riots 
and was afraid that the Zionism that was developing was not the one he still  
adhered to. The morality of Zionism was replaced by extreme nationalism.
If  Brit  Shalom created  the  theoretical  framework  for  the  bi-national 
thought, it showed itself unable to concretely construct it. There is no record of 
any  continued  contact  between  them  and  the  Arabs.  Indeed,  none  of  its 
members ever sustained regular contacts with the Arabs and the Palestinians, 
nor did they propose a plan. This was one of the reasons why Judah Magnes, 
Hans Kohn and Hugo Bergmann called it a “discussion circle” as late as 1928 
– three years  after  it  implementation.  On this  subject,  one can find a very 
interesting letter sent by Magnes to Ruppin in 1936, over three years after the 
dissolution of the association. Magnes expressed his criticisms as follows:
“It  is  daring  on  your  part  to  state  that  Brit  Shalom  entered  into  
negotiations  with  the  Arabs.  They  were  incapable  of  such  action.  
Furthermore, Brit Shalom was lacking in will and courage to interfere in  
day-to-day political activities. In that respect also, they remained loyal  
31 Buber, Martin, “Nationalism (1921)”, in Mendes Flohr, Paul (ed.), A Land of two people, op.cit., pp. 
47-57.
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to you, their spiritual founder. Brit Shalom remained a discussion circle  
and therefore was condemned to die. […] Brit Shalom has contributed  
much to the clarification of the problem”32.
Indeed,  when  looking  at  the  bi-nationalists  in  Brit  Shalom,  and  in  the 
associations that succeeded it  (the League for Arab-Jewish Rapprochement 
and Cooperation and the Ihud) , it is quite striking that there were only a few 
contacts  with  the  Arabs  and  that  the  majority  as  we  are  about  to  see,  
emanated from Judah Magnes. 
C. Bi-nationalism vs. Jewish State
In search of an agreement with the Arabs, 1929-1939
Whilst  Brit Shalom had posed the theoretical bases for bi-nationalism, 
they had not been very prolific in concrete attempts. Judah Magnes, on the 
other hand, unceasingly tried to reach a basis for an understanding with the 
Arabs. He was one of the rare, if not the only, bi-nationalist to develop contacts 
with members of the high-ranking families of Jerusalem, and to try and gain 
support  from abroad.  He kept  constant  contact  with  the  British  authorities, 
whom he kept informed of his initiatives33. 
The Philby-Magnes episode
Magnes, who had been in Palestine since 1922, had done little else, as 
he was busy with his responsibilities at the University. He also thought that he 
should  not  invest  himself  in  politics.  Indeed,  following  the  principle  that 
university should stay neutral  and independent,  he wrote in his journal that 
Zionist control would make it partisan and sectarian, whereas it should be the 
University of “all the trends within the Jewish people”. In 1929, he returned to 
32 Magnes, Judah Leon, “To Arthur Ruppin”, in Goren, Arthur (ed.), Dissenter in Zion, op.cit., pp. 312-
314.
33 As show the amount of correspondence gathered in Arthur Goren's collection of articles.
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politics, explaining his return as being motivated by the non-improvement of 
the situation in Palestine. The movement did not do anything to come to an 
understanding with the Arabs and it had no plan at all. From the beginning, 
Magnes  had  imagined  that  the  United  States  could  play  a  major  role  in 
resolving  the  conflict,  even  more  so  since  Europe  had  been  involved  in 
constant conflicts. That vision was to gain increasing importance for him, but 
also  for  the  Zionist  movement,  after  the  arrival  in  power  of  the  national 
socialists in Germany. 
Just after the 1929 clashes, which gave him the feeling that it was necessary 
for him to “contribute to the political debate”, he had been trying to contact the 
Arabs  and  conduct  discussions  on  the  future  of  Palestine.  The  events 
reaffirmed for him that the “Arab question” was a test for Jewish nationalism. 
He  explained  that  he  strongly  believed  that  this  went  beyond  the  “Arab 
question”  but  it  involved  Jewish  nationalism,  its  nature  and  essence.  The 
Palestinian  question  –  characterised  in  the  Zionist  discourse  by  the  “Arab 
question” – would determine the value of Zionism and set it apart from other 
nationalisms34.
That same year, Magnes was introduced to Joseph Levi, a correspondent of 
the New York Times in Jerusalem, and to Harry Saint John Philby. Philby was a 
former British diplomat who had served in Mesopotamia from 1915 to 1921, 
then in Transjordan from 1921 to 1924. He had finally left his responsibilities,  
under the orders of the colonial administration, to become the political adviser 
of the King Ibn Saud in Saudi Arabia. Philby, as an Orientalist, spoke Arabic. 
He proposed to Magnes to serve as a link between him and the King and the 
Arabs, and more particularly the Palestinians in the presence of Haj Amin al-
Hussayni.  However,  Magnes  and  Philby  represented  only  themselves  and 
were not accredited by the Zionist movement or the British authorities. 
Philby and Magnes decided to work on a proposal for the Arabs that 
would refer to the Balfour declaration in order to rally (they thought) the Zionist  
movement but also the concepts of self-determination and democracy35. The 
point of departure for Magnes was that Palestine did not belong to anybody in  
particular, neither to the Jews nor to the Arabs, and even less to the British, but 
34 Judah Magnes, Like all the nations, Jerusalem 1930.
35 Menahem Kaufman, The Magnes-Philby negotiations 1929: the historical record, Jerusalem 1998.
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to all the people of the world, and as it was the holy land for two nations and 
three religions, there should be no Jewish State. As a pacifist, he thought that 
an agreement could be reached without the use of bayonets, whether British or 
Jewish.
After a few meetings, Philby and Magnes were able to propose a plan. 
They proposed a Palestinian government with a parliament that would function 
on the basis of two chambers, one that would be democratically elected and 
would  be  controlled  by  the  majority  and  the  other  that  would  be  elected 
following the principle of parity between the Jews, the Arabs and the British 36. 
He sincerely thought that his proposition would prevent the oppression of the 
Jewish people; however it  was without counting the reactions of the Zionist 
leadership, which was aiming for the majority in the country, and would never 
have accepted such a proposition. 
The proposal for an agreement dealt with the status of the country and of its 
inhabitants;  Palestine had to  be for  everyone,  including the elections of  its 
government and the status of the British. Magnes wanted to emphasise the 
rights of both people, the Arabs and the Jews, to live and grow in Palestine; for 
that,  Palestine  had  to  be  independent  and  democratic,  but  the  British 
commissioner would be its head of state. 
Before  gaining  independence,  the  representatives  should  develop  a 
constitution. However, these negotiations were not followed-up, as they were 
considered invalid by the British authorities and the Zionist  leadership.  The 
agreement so wanted by J. Magnes eventually failed to see the light.
At  the service  of  the Jewish  Agency,  negotiating  bi-nationalism in  times of  
partition talks
In the aftermath of the 1929 Arab revolt, the bi-nationalists were facing a 
crisis. Having been unable to propose a clear political programme, some of its 
members joined the ranks of  the  Mapai and when the latter  took over  the 
direction  of  the  Zionist  Organisation  in  the  early  1930s,  Brit  Shalom was 
dissolved.  However,  some  of  the  movement's  loyal  members  along  with 
36 Ibid.
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notables  from the  old  Jewish  families  of  Jerusalem,  as  well  as  Sephardic 
leaders, established Kedma Mizraha, an organisation aimed at rapprochement 
with the Arabs. The founders of the organisation wished it to be “a non-party 
association  whose  aims  are  knowledge  of  the  East,  and  the  creation  of 
cultural,  social  and  economic  ties  with  Oriental  peoples,  and  the  proper 
presentation  of  the  Jewish  people's  work  in  Palestine”37.  The  association 
however disappeared soon after its creation, and according to Aharon Cohen, 
this was due in particular to the lack of funds and the rise of partition as a 
solution in 1937. 
In the meantime, Judah Magnes who had been one of the rare personalities to 
keep contacts with the Arabs continued his efforts to secure an understanding 
with  them.  He  was  to  be  given  an  opportunity  to  arrange  for  discussions 
between the Zionist Executive, then headed by Ben Gurion, and the Arabs in 
1936. The Zionists had just rejected the Legislative council proposed by the 
British  –  that  had  been  accepted  by the  Arabs  –  and,  the  Jewish  Agency 
wished to prove to the British that it was ready to dialogue with the Arabs38. To 
that  end,  in  a  tactical  move  they  contacted  Magnes  to  serve  as  an 
intermediary. The efforts deployed by Magnes to produce a basis on which to 
build  the  discussions  show his  dedication  to  the  task.  So,  by  April  1936, 
Magnes  had  arranged  a  series  of  meetings  with  Georges  Antonius,  the 
secretary of the Supreme Moslem Council in Palestine39. Magnes set as the 
starting point of the discussions, the recognition of the principle of the equal  
rights of “the Jews and the Arabs already present in Palestine”40. However, this 
was not a satisfying basis for acceptable to either Antonius or Ben Gurion, the 
former stressing the need to limit immigration and the latter the fact that the 
question concerned all the Jews and all the Arabs and that the Jews were only 
interested  by  Palestine41.  Ben  Gurion  also  refused  to  give  any  figures  for 
immigration, which complicated the talks.
Magnes  was  still  devoting  himself  to  his  task  when  the  Great  Arab 
37 Cohen, Aharon, Israel and the Arab world, Boston 1976, p. 134.
38 Kotzin, Daniel P., Judah L. Magnes, an American Jewish non-conformist, New York 2010, pp.254-
255.
39 Michael J. Cohen, “Secret diplomacy and rebellion in Palestine, 1936-1939”, International Journal  
of Middle East Studies 8(3), July 1977, pp. 379-404, Mary Ann Fay (ed.),  Autobiography and the  
construction and identity and community in the Middle East, New York 2002, p. 132-134.
40 Michael J. Cohen, “Secret diplomacy and rebellion in Palestine, 1936-1939”, op.cit., 
41 Ibid.
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Revolt started. When the Royal Commission's report was released, it provoked 
intense debates among the three actors on the Palestinian scene. Among the 
spiritual  Zionists,  the  reaction  was  rejection,  and  Judah  Magnes  indeed 
reacted  as  soon  as  the  news  spread  by  sending  his  comments  on  the 
conclusions  of  the  commission  to  the  editors  of  the  New  York  Times42. 
Considering  that  the  analysis  of  the  situation  was  excellent,  Magnes  was 
however critical when it came to the analysis of Great Britain's role. Indeed, for 
him,  its  failure  to  explore  all  the  possibilities  for  a  settlement  and  to  lead 
negotiations, were obvious and the commission's conclusions were too rapidly 
drawn. He stressed the importance of resuming negotiations to at least arrive 
at a first agreement that would then secure the ground for other discussions 
and eventually a long term agreement and recognition43. As for the partition 
itself, he considered that it would only lead to the establishment of two small 
“toy states”, without Jerusalem, as this would be under International rule, and a 
Jewish State without Jerusalem was meaningless to him.  The bi-nationalists 
led by Judah Magnes and their allies, particularly in the United States, decided 
to make their case against partition during the twentieth Zionist Congress. This 
was  the  first  time  Magnes  intervened  as  an  official  delegate  at  an  official  
venue.  In  his  speech,  Magnes  tried  to  compel  the  Zionist  leadership  to 
envisage an agreement with the Arabs and appealed to the Congress to call 
for a bi-national state. However, he was laughed at and his warnings against 
war that would ensue from a partition, were not taken seriously as indeed, the 
Zionist  leadership  already  considered  it  was  at  war44.  Whilst  the  congress 
positioned against partition, it had as we have seen entrusted the leadership 
with negotiating for a more favourable partition scheme45.  So, whereas they 
were already following the road to partition and working on propositions, on the 
6th  of  December  1937,  the  Jewish  Agency  gave  once  again  Magnes  the 
authorisation to continue secretly and non-officially the preliminary discussions 
with  the  Arab  representatives46.  Two  British  diplomats  –  Hyamson  and 
42 Magnes, Judah Leon, “Palestine Peace seen in Arab-Jewish Agreements”, in Goren, Arthur (ed.), 
Dissenter in Zion., op.cit., pp.324-329.
43 Ibid.
44 Kotzin, Daniel P., Judah L. Magnes: an American Jewish non-conformist, op.cit., p.262.
45 See Chapter III.
46 Magnes, Judah, “Judah Magnes to Wauchope”, February 25, 1938, in Goren, Arthur  (ed.), Dissenter  
in Zion, op.cit.,  pp. 347-349
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Newcombe – had worked on a proposition for a bi-national solution and this 
would  serve  Magnes  as  a  basis  for  his  following  proposals,  however  the 
amendments  made  by  Magnes  and  his  Arab  contacts  were  considered 
unacceptable by the Jewish Agency and Magnes' mission finally ended.
Pursuing his search for an agreement with the Arabs, Magnes continued 
to meet with the Arabs that were open to discuss with him the idea of a bi-
national  society.  On  February  6,  1938,  Magnes  met  Browne,  an  Anglican 
Archbishop (Jerusalem), Ezzat Tannous, an Arab physician (Jerusalem) and 
Nuri al-Said Pasha. The latter was opposed to partition, which he feared would 
only result in “increased poverty, a loss of territory and it would lead the Arab 
Jews to leave their countries”. He had been visiting England in 1936 and 1937, 
proposing to  the British authorities and the Zionist  leaders a scheme for  a 
settlement, but in vain47. He was ready to discuss with Magnes the eventuality 
of a bi-national structure and to help him work on a proposal48. He did agree on 
the basis of a text for the discussions but once again, the friction point was the 
immigration clause, which he reviewed with Magnes. The two men were in 
opposition over this matter, indeed, Magnes thought that there should be a 
temporary agreement  over  ten  years.  By the  end of  that  period,  the  Jews 
would constitute a minority with 40%. As for Nuri  al  Said, the Jews had to 
constitute a permanent minority in Palestine but they would have the possibility 
to move to other Arab states. The Zionist leadership would not compromise on 
the immigration question and it wished to keep the partition door open so, it 
rejected  the  proposal  and  recommendations  that  emerged  from  these 
discussions. The latter circulated rumours on Magnes and Browne, according 
to these, the first had accepted to negotiate along a minority status for the 
Jews and the second was in fact an ally of the Arabs. After that episode, the 
Zionist executive repeatedly postponed discussions with Magnes, who finally 
understood  that  the  Zionist  executive  had  no  intention  of  reaching  an 
agreement with the Arabs49. This episode marked the end of Magnes' illusions 
on the Zionist leadership and its will to reach an agreement with the Arabs50. 
47 Magnes, Judah, “Journal entry”, February 6, 1938, in Goren, Arthur (ed.), Dissenter in Zion, op.cit., 
pp. 344-345
48 Ibid.
49 Magnes,  Judah,  “Judah Magnes  to  David  Ben-Gurion”,  March  3,  1938,  in  Goren,  Arthur  (ed.),  
Dissenter in Zion, op.cit., pp. 349-350. 
50 Ibid.
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“Those who control the agency and its executive desire the partition,  
whatever partition and they do not look for an arrangement with the  
Arabs”51.
A critique of the Biltmore Programme's maximalism
The adoption by the British government of the 1939 White Paper, which 
envisaged the creation of an Arab State and limited Jewish immigration, had 
immediately provoked demonstrations of violence in the Yishuv. These events 
led the bi-nationalists from ex-Brit Shalom and Kedma Mizraha, together with a 
few member  of  the  Zionist  movement  to  regroup and to  further  bi-national 
thought  and  make  known their  views  in  the  form of  a  publication:   At  the 
Parting  of  Our  Ways52.  Following  the  release  of  the  book,  the  participants 
decided  to  create  a  large  platform,  the  League  for  Arab-Jewish 
Rapprochement and Cooperation53. They were later joined by the Hashomer 
Hatzair Workers' Party on the basis of the following platform:
(A) The League believes that the construction of Palestine as a  
common homeland for the Jewish people returning to it and the Arab  
people therein residing must be based on lasting mutual  
understanding and agreement between the two peoples;
(B) The principle of the return of the Jews to their historic homeland to  
build their independent national life in it is unequivocal, as are also the  
rights of the Palestine Arabs to their independent national life, and  
their ties with other parts of the Arab people;
(C) The League will carry on its work on the basis of its recognition of  
the right of the Jews to immigrate to and settle in Palestine in  
accordance with its maximum absorptive capacity to an extent that  
shall ensure the growth of the Jewish community in Palestine toward a  
full and independent economic, social, cultural, and political life, in  
cooperation with the Arab people;
(D) On the basis of the immigration principle as defined in paragraph  
B, agreed immigration quotas may be set for a number of years, it  
being understood that the League will oppose any aim to perpetuate  
the position of the Jewish community as a minority in Palestine;
(E) The League considers the basic principles for Arab-Jewish accord  
to be:
51 Magnes, Judah, “Judah Magnes to Sol Stroock, 5 June 1938” in Goren, Arthur (ed.),  Dissenter in  
Zion, op.cit., pp. 351-353.
52 Lee Hattis, Susan, The bi-national idea in Palestine during Mandatory times, Haifa 1970, p.212.
53 Mendes-Flohr, Paul , Introduction to “Et maintenant?”, in Mendes-Flohr, Paul (ed.) ,  Une Terre et  
deux peuples, op.cit., p.182.
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1. Acceptance of the right of the Jews to return to their historic  
homeland, there to build their independent national life; acceptance of  
the rights of Palestine Arabs to their independent national life and of  
their ties with other sections of the Arab people;
2. The non-denomination of one people by the other, regardless of  
their respective numerical strength;
3. A Bi-national regime in Palestine;
4. Positive attitude towards the participation of Palestine as an  
independent Bi-national unit in a federation with neighboring countries,  
when the necessary conditions for this will have been prepared, and  
the basic rights and vital interests of the Arab people living in  
Palestine, will have been secured;
(F) The League shall undertake the following tasks:
1. Campaign within the Jewish community and the Zionist movement  
for a
policy of rapprochement, cooperation, and accord between Jews and  
Arabs.
2. Campaign for the formation of a corresponding Ally within the Arab  
community on central and local activities without, however, requiring all  
of them to belong personally to branches of the League.
3. Strive to improve and enhance Arab economic, social, cultural, and  
political standards.
4. Research.
5. Training people for public work among the Arab population.
(G) The local branches of the League will be centers of activity and  
influence; the parties and groups composing the League will detail  
some of their members to work on central and local activities without,  
however, requiring all of them to belong personally to branches of the  
League”54. 
During the years following the establishment of the League, in a will to 
displace the debate within the Zionist movement and Yishuv, the members of 
the League called for cooperation on all levels and in all fields, in particular 
through  work.  Then,  the  League  would  organise  meetings  with  the  Zionist 
Executive to discuss the idea of cooperation, but above all, they would work on 
a detailed proposition for a bi-national state. 
In the meantime,  WWII was declared and the Zionist  leadership had 
decided to launch an offensive to obtain the annulment of the White Paper. It 
saw only one way to be able to change the balance and that was seeking 
support elsewhere than in Great Britain.  So, the Zionist Executive then turned 
to  the  United  States.  In  this  task,  the  Zionists  were  benefiting  from  the 
discovery by international public opinion of the dramatic fate of the European 
54 Cohen, Aharon, Israel and the Arab World, op.cit., pp. 305-306.
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Jews. As a matter of fact, from then on, Zionism gained supporters all over the 
World and notably among the Jewish organisations in the United States, where 
the  World  Zionist  Organisation  adopted  the  maximalist  “revisionist 
programme”:  the  Biltmore  programme55.  The  Biltmore  conference  had 
advocated  what  most  of  the  Zionist  groups  wished  but  did  not  officially 
demand: the creation of a Jewish State by calling it a Jewish commonwealth. It  
was,  in  many ways,  a  turning  point  in  the  Zionist  Movement’s  history and 
political activity, as it was the first time that its objectives were so clearly set 
out. 
As expected, the programme provoked the opposition of all those who 
had  rejected  Jewish  sovereignty,  in  particular  the  former  members  of  Brit  
Shalom and their sympathisers. The latter were indeed, persuaded that such a 
programme could only be considered as a war declaration by the Arabs56. The 
move  started  by  the  Biltmore  programme,  combined  with  the  still  ongoing 
White Paper, led Judah Magnes, Martin Buber and many of their friends such 
as  Moshe Smilansky,  Henrietta  Stolz,  Ernst  Simon and Haim Kalvarisky to 
establish an independent association which they named Ihud (Unity) in 1942. 
The association became an attempt  to  create a more active movement,  in 
answer to increasingly aggressive Zionist political activity. 
The Ihud's targets were the Zionist movement, the international institutions and 
the Jews abroad. Their  tools were their  writings, which they translated into 
English or even directly wrote in that language. The idea was to share, with as 
many  people  as  possible,  their  ideas  and  their  plans,  which  they  tried  to 
propose to the British authorities, the Zionist movement and to a much lesser 
extent to the Arabs (regardless of who they were). 
The objective of  the association did  not  differ  from that  of  Brit  Shalom,  i.e 
cooperation with the Arabs and the establishment of a bi-national state that 
would be part of a broader Arab federation and in which both peoples would 
enjoy equal  rights.  Thus,  taking into  account  the situation of  the European 
Jews, they proposed a solution to the question of minority and majority and 
their political repercussions. To advance in this direction, J.Magnes once again 
55 Arendt, Hannah, “Zionism reconsidered”, in Hannah Arendt and Jerome Kohn & Ron H. Feldmann 
(eds.), The Jewish Writings, op.cit., pp.343-374.
56 Buber, Martin, “Dialogue au sujet du programme de Biltmore”, in Mendes-Flohr, Paul (ed.),  Une 
Terre et deux peuples, op.cit., p. 212
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contacted  his  American  friends  and  sponsors  to  obtain  funding  for  the 
association. To that end, he published articles in American newspapers and 
magazines57. 
However, the  Ihud's ideas were far from raising a consensus. The actions of 
the  Zionist  Executive  and  the  unification  around  it  of  numerous  American 
Zionist  Federations had succeeded in  marginalising the association and its 
leaders, including J. Magnes. 
Martin Buber would express their fears as to the Biltmore programme by 
setting  a virtual  dialogue between two characters,  the  Traitor  (representing 
them) and the Patriot, and the former would stress:“Because it is impossible for 
any length  of  time  to  build  with  one  hand  while  holding  a  weapon  in  the 
other”58. In Buber's dialogue, the Patriot argues in favour of the programme 
and tries to find out why the latter is opposed to it. The Traitor, for his part,  
argues that the programme as such would only fuel conflicts and transform the 
Arab Palestinian population into a second rate community by depriving it from 
“collective political equality”. According to him, the programme consecrates the 
separation of both peoples, one would become the “people of the state” and 
the other just a people. Such a scheme would inevitably lead to the domination 
of  the  people  of  the  state  over  the  other  people  unless  the  Jewish  state 
decides to behave according to Jewish moral code. Here was the expression 
of one of the major components of bi-national thought: morals.
However, the reasons for Buber's rejection of the programme were not 
only based on moral grounds, indeed, he and his colleagues from the  Ihud 
above all, feared that if the Zionist movement persisted in that direction, the 
British authorities would be pushed into resorting to the old partition scheme. 
With  the  Biltmore  programme,  the  questions  of  numbers  and  demography 
were exacerbated, with  the maximalist trend eventually winning and becoming 
the majoritarian trend within the Zionist movement.  This very question of the 
majority-minority had always been a point of friction between the bi-nationalists 
and the Zionist leadership, the former being in favour of the immigration of the 
greatest number with the assent of the Arabs. This position would not change 
57 Notably: Magnes, Judah, “Towards Peace in Palestine”, Foreign Affairs 21(2), January 1943, pp.239-
249.
58 Buber, Martin, “Dialogue au sujet du programme de Biltmore”, in Une Terre et deux peuples, op.cit., 
p. 212
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during the war as the members of the association considered that the question 
of Palestine was to stay distinct from the question of the European Jews. That 
period saw a number of speeches and articles on the subject and the members 
of the Ihud rejected the idea that Zionism's objective was the establishment of 
a  dominating  Jewish  majority  in  Palestine.  They  underlined  that  the 
cooperation with the Arabs was necessary for the sake of the Zionist enterprise 
and to reach a moral political settlement. 
Martin Buber and Judah Magnes were then both persuaded that educating the 
Jewish masses on moral grounds, would in the long run produce a fair policy. 
Indeed, the idea was that whatever was thought by the leadership, the latter's 
role was to represent the people, so, if the people were educated with Jewish 
moral, the leadership could not possibly go against it. 
Moreover, be it Martin Buber or Judah Magnes, they both distrusted the Zionist 
Executive  and  considered  that  its  maximalist  policy  could  only  lead  Great 
Britain to impose the partition decision. In their criticism, they predicted that the 
leadership would accept such a decision in theory but it would not apply it on 
the ground. The Executive would according to them accept it without accepting 
it and it would provoke an unprecedented misfortune. Buber also knew that the 
Arabs would never accept the creation of a Jewish state even on egalitarian 
grounds. 
Hannah  Arendt  who  had  joined  the  bi-nationalists  (but  was  not  a 
member  of  the  associations)  in  the  late  1930’s  and  1940’s  furthered  the 
arguments against the Biltmore programme with a criticism of the nation and 
nationalism. She had already started to think about her book on the Origins of  
totalitarianism when she joined the movement59. For Arendt, the adoption of 
the concept of nation and nationalism were only the adoption of the concepts 
that led to the marginalization and persecution of the Jews in Europe. She 
thought  that  by making these concepts their  own,  they would generate the 
same mechanisms that would lead to the spoliation of the Palestinians. 
Arendt  was very critical  towards  Zionism and unlike  the  others,  she never 
moved to Palestine and was able to observe the situation and the development 
of  the  Zionist  movement  with  the  required  distance.  She  criticised  very 
59 Raz-Krakotzkin, Amnon, “Jewish Peoplehood, 'Jewish Politics', and political responsibility: Arendt 
on Zionism and Partitions”, College Literature 38(1), Winter 2011, pp.57-74.
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vehemently the adoption of the Biltmore declaration in 1942, but just two years 
after that, the American section of the WZO met in Atlantic City and adopted an 
even more aggressive resolution going beyond the Biltmore programme. Her 
reaction is presented in an article she wrote in October 1944, entitled “Zionism 
Reconsidered”.
Nevertheless, the  Ihud and its members were increasingly laughed at within 
the Zionist establishment,  whose argument in demanding a Jewish majority 
soon became reinforced by the plight of the European Jews. 
Binationalism: a programme 
As we have seen, until Magnes started his contacts with Arab potential  
partners for implementing a bi-nationalist programme, no attempts at contact 
had been made. Moreover, Brit Shalom was a discussion circle not a platform 
for political activism. It was also in order to break with inaction and change 
policy from the inside that the League for Arab-Jewish Rapprochement and 
Cooperation  had  been  established  in  1939.  However,  although  it  had 
elaborated a detailed programme, the League was not really active. This is 
partly why the  Ihud was established, and composed only of  individuals,  its 
scope of action was larger than the League's and besides changing the Zionist 
movement from the inside, the Ihud also aimed at exporting the idea abroad, 
notably among the American Jews. Moreover, the League as large (this is still 
relative) as it was, was subjected to consensus, a limitation that the Ihud did 
not face. 
In 1945, the British government and the United States had decided to 
compromise over the Palestine Question, in order to reach a final  solution. 
Despite the Jewish Agency's initial call to boycott the commission, a boycott 
that it  wished to see respected by all  the fringes of the Zionist  movement,  
Hashomer  Hatzair and the  Ihud nevertheless  continued against  the  Zionist 
leadership's will. The former, which had broken all contacts with the Ihud on 
the question of majority and minority,  presented a memorandum in which it  
spoke  of  the  possibility  of  “the  unification  of  a  Jewish-majority  bi-national  
Palestine with the neighbouring Arab countries, as part of a federation in which 
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the Arabs would be a majority”60. Judah Magnes, Moshe Smilanski and Martin 
Buber  testified on behalf  of  the  Ihud.  They submitted to  the commission a 
report dealing with the questions of immigration, and offered their vision of a 
resolution.  Indeed,  they laid  down the basic  principles that should lead the 
coexistence,  the  political  autonomy,  the  union  of  Palestine  with  the 
neighbouring countries61. 
First, there were, according to them, two principles that had to be at the 
basis of any agreement: on the one hand, there should be no Jewish state or 
Arab state but a bi-national one; and on the other hand, Great Britain should 
authorise the immigration of 100,000 displaced persons. The second step was 
to  allow  the  numerical  parity  whilst  respecting  the  economical  absorption 
capacity, which should mean that the first step would prepare and develop the 
Palestinian  economy.  And finally,  when numerical  parity would  be reached, 
immigration  should  be  discussed  within  a  Palestinian  government  and  a 
regional union. 
Immigration was supposed to follow three periods. Of course the association’s 
members  knew  that  it  would  provoke  opposition  from  the  Arabs  but  they 
considered that they had to intervene in the rescue of the European Jews. 
They also felt that this number of 100,000 could not represent any danger for 
the Arabs, who would still constitute the majority. 
Concerning  political  autonomy,  the  Ihud felt  there  should  be a  progressive 
move from autonomy under the mandatory authorities to a regional tutorship 
through the transfer of the British mandate to the United Nations. The aim was 
to  have a  constitution,  which  according  to  the  Ihud members  had to  be  a 
common project led by the UN. But even such a plan could not function and 
they thought that in case of refusal by one or both parties, the solution should  
be imposed, as it would be the less problematic solution on the long term. The 
plan of the association recommended that eventually Palestine be part of its 
regional environment on a political level in the form of a confederation. 
The committee was rather positive about the solution advocated by the 
bi-nationalists. And this enthusiasm translated into the commission's decision 
60 Gorny, Yosef, From binational to Jewish State. Federal concepts in Zionist political thought, 1920-
1990, Boston 2006, p.140.
61 Ihud,  Arab-Jewish  Unity:  Testimony  before  the  Anglo-American  Inquiry  Commission  for  Ihud  
(Union) Association, London 1947. 
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to include in part the Ihud's demands in its recommendations. For the Ihud, this 
confirmed the accuracy of their analysis. Positive about the conclusions of the 
commission,  the  association's  members  started  preparing  for  the  concrete 
application  of  bi-nationalism and  began  making contacts  with  the  Arabs  of 
Palestine.
Parallel  to  that,  Magnes  was  still  trying  to  get  support  from  Jewish 
institutions abroad and especially in the United States where, since the war, 
popular support for Zionism had grown massively. Even in Great Britain the 
idea of partition was gaining momentum. They thought that it  was the only 
solution that could work. Magnes supposed that as long as neither the Zionists, 
nor the Arabs wanted partition, there still was hope for avoiding it. Magnes who 
revealed himself the most active bi-nationalist, wrote to friends in Great Britain 
and in the United States with the aim of developing groups there. He sought 
financial and political support, however, if on paper many of his friends agreed 
with his ideas, in reality only a few were active. During that period, the  Ihud 
published collective books in English presenting their views and declaring that 
the way to bi-nationalism was still open. However, in the meantime, the British 
had  rejected  the  recommendations  of  the  Committee  and  were studying 
another  plan  with  the  United  States  –  the  Morrison-Grady  plan,  which 
advocated the constitution of Arab and Jewish cantons under British tutelage. 
This plan was in turn rejected by the United States, leading the British to take 
the case to the UN62. 
The  bi-nationalists  had  made  considerable  efforts  promoting  the  bi-
national solution and to find the bases of an Arab-Zionist agreement. But they 
thought that the Zionist leadership was endangering the last chances to find an 
understanding  by  asking  for  a  majority  in  Palestine  or  for  a  state  or 
commonwealth, as it could only push the Palestinians to be on the defensive. 
Finally, before the United Nations, they put forward the same programme in 
substance as the one they had proposed to the Anglo-American Committee.
62 Joseph Heller,  The Birth of Israel, 1945-1949: Ben Gurion and his critics, Gainesville 2000, p.32; 
87.
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D. Arab attitude to bi-nationalism
Bi-national thought had been developing and taking shape for more or 
less a decade when the first contacts with the Arabs in view of transforming the 
idea into a programme took place. These however, never got beyond the first 
stage, i.e. the elaboration of a basis for negotiations. And how could they? The 
Zionist  leadership  put  unrestricted  immigration  and  a  Jewish  majority  as  a 
priority  whereas  the  Arabs  sought  an  Arab  dominated  government  for 
Palestine. 
Although  sources and information about Arab and bi-nationalists encounters 
are scarce  and usually arise from Israeli  sources,  one consistency can be 
noted,  that  the  discussions  with  the  bi-nationalists,  just  as  those  with  the 
Zionist leadership, always came up against the issue of immigration and that of 
the Arab character of Palestine. Thus there could hardly be a strictly bi-national 
basis for discussions. 
The proposals made by both George Antonius and Nuri al-Said63 in 1936 and 
1937, who envisaged the solution to the Palestine Question in its Arab context, 
to allow a certain amount of immigration into Palestine and the Arab countries 
as well as the participation of the Jews in the political life on a proportional  
basis were swept aside. 
The  closest  to  an  agreement  on  a  bi-national  basis  was  the  one  signed 
between Fawzi  al  Hussayni   and four  other  Arab Palestinians representing 
Falistin al jadida and the League for Rapprochement and Cooperation. The 
agreement specified preserving the integrity of the territory, finding a political 
solution  to  the  question  of  Palestine  according  to  the  principles  of  total 
cooperation in all fields between both communities; political equality; Jewish 
immigration  according  to  the  absorption  capacities  of  the  country  and  the 
future alliance of independent Palestine with the neighbouring countries64. Both 
organisations worked to promote the programme. However, the official strategy 
63 Nuri Pasha al-Said (1888-1958), An Iraqi politician who started as an Ottoman officer in 1911 he 
converted to Arab nationalism during WWI after which he participated to the Arab Revolt under the 
Amir Faisal. After Faisal was deposed by the French, Nuri al-Said followed him to Iraq where he 
became prime minister in 1930. Dismissed in 1932. 
64 Al-Khalidi, Kamal, The Arab-Israel conflict: what perspective?, op.cit., p.33; Cohen, Aharon, Israel  
and the Arab world, op.cit., pp. 187-191.
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of the Palestinian national movement, as represented by the Palestinian Arab 
leadership,  was  different  and  Fawzi  al  Hussayni  was  murdered  on  the  23 
November 1946.
So, there were contacts but the discussions never,  even once, went in 
the direction of bi-nationalism. The explanation may lie in the fact that, just as 
bi-nationalism was not taken seriously by the Zionist Executive, neither was it 
considered  a  serious  and  independent  proposition  by  the  Arabs.  The 
Palestinian  Arab  rejection  of  bi-nationalism  would  not  however,  be  voiced 
clearly until the mid-1940s. Indeed, although they believed in the sincerity of its  
bi-nationalist advocates, the Palestinian Arabs considered bi-nationalism just 
as,  if  not  more  dangerous  than partition.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  whilst  many 
contacts  had  been  made  in  the  late  1930s  with  the  Zionist  leadership,  in 
particular  through  the  intermediary  of  Judah  Magnes  and  whilst  the  Arabs 
respected Magnes, they vehemently rejected the bi-national option à la  Brit  
Shalom and Ihud/Hashomer Hatzair. 
The Arab opposition to bi-nationalism was on principle as well  as for 
practical  reasons,  developed  in  the  testimonies  and  written  statements 
provided to  the  Anglo-American Committee  and  the  UNSCOP by the  Arab 
Office65. 
Whilst  bi-nationalism  presented  an  alternative  to  partition,  it  did  not 
respond to the Arab claim: namely establishing Palestine as an independent 
Arab state.  Moreover, bi-nationalism was founded on a basis that the Arabs 
could not accept as they were endangering their own. After all, bi-nationalism 
did not reject Zionism nor its basic assumption that the Jews constituted a 
distinct nation and that they were legitimately, due to their historic and spiritual 
attachment to Palestine, entitled to settle in Palestine. The Arabs were thus 
ready to grant equal individual rights but bi-nationalism meant going further, it  
meant putting the Jewish community on the same level of national rights as the 
Palestinian  Arabs,  and  that  ultimately  meant  accepting  Zionism  and  its 
premises. Furthermore, Zionism was intrinsically expansionist and separatist 
so whether bi-national or not it  would eventually transform the Arabs into a 
minority and establish Jewish rule.
65 The Arab Office, “The Arab case for Palestine: evidence submitted by the Arab Office to the Anglo-
American Committee of Inquiry, Jerusalem, March 1946.
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Moreover, a bi-national state could, in their view, only exist if “underlying 
the national differences there existed a deep sense of common interest and 
common loyalty”66. And such a sense had not developed during the years of 
the mandate, and it was too late for them to develop.
Furthermore, even though they accepted establishing a bi-national entity, they 
were convinced that the outcome would be the same as if they continued with 
the  status quo, that is a Jewish majority leading to the transformation of the 
Arabs into a minority on its own land67.
Beside the principles,  the bi-national  option offered a set  of  practical 
problems that were unlikely to be overcome.
First  and  foremost,  Judah  Magnes  and  his  colleagues  from  Ihud did  not 
represent  a  major  trend  with  the  Zionist  movement,  which  rendered  their 
propositions  marginal  and  more  likely  to  be  manipulated  by  the  Zionist 
Executive.  
“There is one final objection to Doctor Magnes’s plan, which is perhaps  
the most serious of all. Doctor Magnes is a person whose integrity and  
sincerity none of us doubt, but it is clear to me [that] he only represents  
a  very  small  section  of  the  Jewish  community  in  Palestine.  If  his  
scheme  were  carried  out,  it  would  satisfy  Doctor  Magnes  and  his  
supporters,  perhaps,  but  it  would  not  satisfy  the  vast  majority  of  
Zionists.  Perhaps,  if  a  binational  state  were  established,  Doctor  
Magnes  and  his  group  would  be  swept  aside  and  the  majority  of  
Zionists would use what Doctor Magnes had obtained for them in order  
to press their next demands. Doctor Magnes, in other words, might be  
the first victim of political Zionism”68.
One should keep in mind that the Zionist leadership had indeed, authorised 
and even encouraged Judah Magnes to  keep contacts with the Palestinian 
Arabs  in  the  1930s,  but  that  each  time  he  returned  with  a  basis  for 
negotiations,  these  were  unequivocally  rejected.  Magnes  himself  was 
discouraged by the Zionist  leadership's attitude and admitted that it  did not 
seek peace and understanding with the Arabs of Palestine. 
Second, immigration was also at the core of bi-national thought. As a matter of  
fact, although they did not view a Jewish majority as a goal in itself – Amnon 
Raz-Krakotzkin  argued that  the  reason for  that  was more practical  than of 
66 The Arab Office, The Future of Palestine, London August 1947, p.67.
67 Ibid.
68 Ibid.
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principle, as they did not believe such an objective as attainable69 – they were 
in favour of a sustained Jewish immigration into Palestine. And from the Arab 
point of view, that was no different from the Zionist leadership's demand. If 
allowed, it would alter the Arab character of Palestine. 
Analysing the last proposal made by Judah Magnes for the Ihud to the Anglo-
American Committee, Hourani noted that two points were even contrary to the 
principles raised by bi-nationalism. First,  the plan recommended the forcible 
application of bi-nationalism in Palestine, if Jews and Arabs could not reach an 
understanding. A measure which, Hourani argued, was destructive, as the very 
thought of the use of force was contrary to the “moral basis” of bi-nationalism.
Then remained the problem of the 100,000 immigration certificates demanded 
by the Ihud for the European Jewish refugees and which at once introduced an 
imbalance between the Zionists and the Palestinian Arabs.
E. The bi-nationalists in Israel 1948-1967
The decision by the United Nations to implement partition as a solution 
to the Palestine Question was acclaimed by the Zionist leadership and rejected 
by the Arabs. Whilst partition put a de facto end to bi-nationalism by separating 
the political fate of both the Arabs of Palestine and the Jews, the bi-nationalists 
for their part continued to warn against the implementation of the UN decision 
right  up  until  the  establishment  of  Israel.  The  bi-nationalists  appealed  for 
caution, indeed, they considered partition as a suicidal act70. For Buber, who 
wrote that this was “a fundamental mistake that had to be corrected”, there 
was no need for a Jewish State to realise the objectives of Zionism. Moreover,  
he  reminded  that  the  policy  set  up  since  the  Biltmore  programme  had 
progressively annihilated the Arabs' trust. A trust that would be difficult to win 
back, but not impossible. 
However,  violence and the transfer of  thousands of Palestinian Arabs were 
unlikely to enable the Arabs to trust the Zionists and the newly established 
69 Raz-Krakotzkin, Amnon, “Jewish Peoplehood, 'Jewish Politics', and political responsibility: Arendt 
on Zionism and Partitions”, College Literature 38(1), Winter 2011, pp.57-74.
70 Buber, Martin, “Une erreur fondamentale qu'il faudrait corriger”, in Mendes-Flohr, Paul (ed.), Une 
Terre deux peuples, op.cit., pp.284-286.
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Israeli  state.  The reality on the ground was totally altered which made any 
pacifist solution impossible. Nevertheless, even then, Buber recalled the aims 
of Zionism and rejected the idea according to which the normalisation of the 
Jews in a “normal” country could alone provide a satisfactory outcome71. 
Parallel  to  that,  Magnes was  in  the  United  States  doing  his  best  to 
spread the Ihud's platform. The United States under the impulse of the State 
Department – which as mentioned above had been trying to prevent partition – 
had been trying to postpone the application of the partition resolution and as 
underlined  by  Daniel  Kotzin,  Magnes  would  then  started  an  anti-partition 
campaign72.  He and Hannah Arendt would support the American initiative to 
nominate  a  temporary  international  trusteeship  until  the  achievement  of  a 
settlement that would guarantee the rights of the population73.  
After trying to persuade the Israeli government to reverse their march to 
sovereignty, and to envisage the constitution of a federation within the Middle 
East, Buber would eventually reflect on the question of the  Ihud,  its failure, 
objectives and future74. He was in no doubt that the Ihud still had a role to play 
but that it had to adapt to the new situation. The  Ihud had failed but not the 
cause it supported and the Ihud had to review its orientations. From April 1949, 
the  Ihud would express its views in a new magazine:  Ner (Light) and Martin 
Buber  along with  Rabbi  Benyamin  would  remain  the leading figures of  the 
movement.  The  Ihud had abandoned the project  of  a  bi-national  state and 
advocated Arab-Israeli cooperation instead, in view – in the best-case scenario 
– of establishing a federation75. Besides that long-term goal, the association 
would focus on internal Israeli affairs and in particular the policy towards the 
Palestinian Arabs who remained in Israel, but also the need to authorise the 
return of those who were expelled76.  The bi-nationalists had always thought 
that Zionism had a mission of justice, and now considered that that mission fell  
upon Israel. It was in this context that Buber and his colleagues transformed 
71 Buber, Martin, “Deux sortes de sionisme”, in Mendes-Flohr,  Paul (ed.),  Une Terre deux peuples, 
op.cit., pp.287-289.
72 Kotzin, Daniel P., Judah L. Magnes, an American Jewish non-conformist, op.cit., pp.312.
73 Raz-Krakotzkin, Amon, “Jewish Peoplehood, 'Jewish Politics', and political responsibility: Arendt on 
Zionism and Partitions”, op.cit..
74 Buber, Martin, “Après la défaite politique”, in Mendes-Flohr, Paul (ed.),  Une Terre deux peuples, 
op.cit., pp.317-326.
75 Buber, Martin, “Nous avons besoin des Arabes. Les Arabes ont besoin de nous”, in Mendes-Flohr,  
Paul (ed.), Une Terre deux peuples, op.cit., pp.339-346.
76 Buber, Martin, “Après la défaite politique”, op.cit., pp.317-326.
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their action into a struggle for equal civil rights for all citizens and that was to 
remain their last fight as Buber died and so did Ner.  
F. Conclusion
Bi-nationalism emerged as we have seen as a reaction to the Zionist 
move towards  traditional western nationalism at the price of “Jewish morals” 
and the leadership's refusal to acknowledge the Arab presence and rights. The 
advocates of bi-nationalism then developed their thought so as to provide an 
intellectual  tool  to  understand  the  stakes  Zionism  faced  in  Palestine  and 
provide a platform for understanding between Jews and Arabs. However, these 
members of spiritual Zionism failed to understand that the Zionist movement 
had changed since the Balfour Declaration, and would never look back. Also, 
although they failed to acknowledge the profound change in Zionism, and to 
impose their views on the objectives of Zionism and the “Arab question”, they 
thought they could transpose their ideas into action and facilitate the contacts 
between both the Arab and Zionist leaderships. Naturally they failed. Whilst it is 
true  to  say  that  they  did  not  have  a  (strong)  counterpart  among  the 
Palestinians it  would be short-sighted to  consider  that  this  was the unique 
reason of the programme's failure. Indeed, the bi-national option was, from a 
mainstream Zionist perspective, a programme that carried too many limitations 
to be attractive. Moreover, from the moment the idea of partition had emerged, 
the  Zionist  leadership  jumped on the  opportunity  and conceived a strategy 
revolving around it. From the Arab viewpoint, what the bi-nationalists offered 
was not that different from the Zionist mainstream vision, as both required the 
abandonment  of  Arab  sovereignty  over  Palestine  and  could  lead  to  the 
disappearance of  its  Arab character  through the establishment  of  a Jewish 
majority,  by  means  of  sustained  immigration.  Moreover,  none  of  the  bi-
nationalists could claim to represent the views of the Zionist Executive. Neither 
Martin Buber, nor Judah Magnes were representative figures within the Zionist 
movement, and this was fully acknowledged by the Arabs who could not take 
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their propositions seriously. Arab fears were confirmed in 1942 as the Zionist 
movement took the one-way road of the Biltmore programme.
The many attempts by the  Ihud to change the evolution of the Zionist 
project  on  the  internal  level  failed,  leading  its  members  to  advocate  their 
solution  within  the  successive  international  committees  in  the  crucial  mid 
1940s. The advent of  partition was an expected blow to their  project,  ,  the 
principles behind it  however, were still  alive and the establishment of Israel 
displaced the question on the frontiers of Israel where they provided a platform 
for the struggle for equal civil rights.
Beside the “external” factors contributing to their failure, looking carefully 
at  the  writings  of  the  intellectuals  we mentioned earlier,  one can point  out 
numerous internal contradictions and limits.
They  were  essentially  supporting  the  'sake  of  the  Jews'  and  were  very 
concerned with the future of the Jews and the consequences of their actions 
on the “Jewish ethics”. Even their way of approaching what they have called 
the “Arab question” was directed by their Jewish being. In a sense, because 
they were Jews and believed in Jewish morals, for the sake of “Israel” they had 
to be parsimonious with the Arabs.  
In  addition  to  that,  and  what  appears  as  the  most  striking  element, 
although  they  criticised  the  evolution  of  Zionism,  they  never  questioned 
Zionism in itself, and its stated goal in an already populated Palestine. In fact, 
accepting  and  adhering  to  the  general  idea  that  Zionism could  only  have 
positive consequences for the Palestinians and the Arabs, Buber misjudged 
and underestimated Palestinian nationalism. He adhered to the Zionist myth 
according to which the people were manipulated by the landowners77, feeling 
threatened themselves by the “socialist values of the Zionist pioneers”. Here, 
Buber showed himself unable to properly analyse the Palestinian situation and 
the reasons of the “Arab refusal”. However sincere their initiative might have 
been, they were not innocent of Orientalist thoughts. Whereas critical towards 
nationalism and Zionism, they did think that these ideologies were what the 
people made of them and after all adhering themselves to Zionism, they could 
see the Orientalist implications of the thought and the structural discrimination 
77 Buber,  Martin,   “Lettre  à Gandhi (1939),  in  Mendes-Flohr,  Paul (ed.),  Une terre,  deux peuples, 
op.cit.,  p 62.
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it implied.
Maybe one of the most striking examples is presented in an address Magnes 
made at the Hebrew University on November 18, 1929:
“It is one of the great civilizing tasks before the Jewish people to try to  
enter the promised land, not in the Joshua way, but bringing peace  
and culture, hard work and sacrifice and love, and a determination to  
do  nothing  that  cannot  be  justified  before  the  conscience  of  the  
world”78. 
Despite all their flaws, however, the bi-nationalists with their will to find a 
solution based on cooperation and understanding instead of separation and 
partition  as  a  way  to  secure  national  and  territorial  sovereignty,  have 
introduced and developed anti-partitionism as the moral and fair stance. The 
establishment of the State of Israel led them to re-evaluate their action and 
adapt  to  the existence of a Jewish State.  From then on,  the bi-nationalists 
developed  a  discourse  of  civil  rights  in  continuity  of  their  anti-separatist 
engagement. 
78 Magnes, Judah Leon, ”Opening address of the academic year of the Hebrew University”, October  
29, 1939, in Goren, Arthur (ed.), Dissenter in Zion, op.cit., pp. 357- 365.
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Chapter Six: The Democratic non-sectarian State option 
1948-1988
After  the  Nakba,  the  Arabs  of  Palestine  were  thrown  into  limbo. 
Dispersed all over the region, social and political ties were quite impossible to 
safeguard  and  develop.  As  a  consequence,  for  many  years,  no  political  
programme could emerge whatsoever. They did however all share one constant 
goal: return and take back all of Palestine from the Zionists. 
As a matter of fact, after the Nakba and the United Nations' decision to partition 
Palestine, the Palestinians continued to reject the partition officially, until 1988.
This  chapter  examines  the  Palestinian  political  evolution  from  the 
rejection of partition in 1948 to its acceptance in 1988 through the adoption of  
the strategic objective of a Democratic State in all of Palestine.
First, I will present the major political trends within the Palestinian camp 
through two organisations that were to shape Palestinian political thought, the 
Arab Nationalist  Movement  (ANM) and the  Palestinian  Liberation  Movement 
(Fatah). Then, I will focus on the debate over the Kiyan that was to lead to the 
formation of the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO).
Second, I will explore the first years of the existence of the PLO and the 
emergence of the Democratic State objective in the aftermath of the 1967 Arab-
Israeli war.
Third,  I  argue  that  acknowledging  the  existence  of  an  Israeli  Jewish 
community and inspired by the revolutionary processes in the Third World, the 
Palestinians elaborated a one-statist solution under the slogan of “a democratic 
state”.  In  this  shift  in  their  position,  member  organisations  of  the  PLO also 
started to move closer to some very marginal socialist Israeli groups such as 
Matzpen with whom it would start a dialogue in view of launching a common 
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vision.  However,  it  was  only  after  1974,  and the  elaboration  of  the  phased 
programme, that contacts would materialise. 
Finally, after rejecting United Nations resolution 242 for a few years, the 
mainstream  faction  of  the  PLO,  recognising  the  facts  on  the  ground, 
materialised the shift in its objectives from the liberation of Palestine to national 
sovereignty. 
A. The Struggle for the Palestinian Entity (the  Kiyan), 1948-1964  
The Palestinian national movement: Birth and evolution of the major  
political movements
Dispersal of the Palestinians was profound and it deeply altered all the 
components of the Palestinian people, from the largest groups (villages, clans) 
to the smallest ones (the family). All  the national structures that had existed 
before 1948 had disappeared during the course of the war – apart from the 
AHC,  which  was  still  operating  from  exile  –  and  the  political  elites  were 
dispersed.  This  situation  made  it  impossible  for  the  Palestinians  to  deal 
effectively in a Unitarian framework with their fate and, more importantly to form 
a serious political response to the loss of their territory. 
As a result of their situation, and contrary to the much conveyed idea that 
Palestinian nationalism (re-)emerged at best with the creation of the Palestine 
Liberation Organisation, or in other words after the defeat of the Arab armies in 
1967 and through the highly militant and violent attacks led by the Popular Front 
for the Liberation of Palestine – Al-Jabha al-Sha’abiyyah li-Tahrir Filastin (PFLP)  
–  , or Fatah –  Harakat al-Taḥrir al-Waṭani al-Filasṭini –  , the Palestinians were 
already thinking of the recovery of Palestine as soon as they were out of the 
country. From 1949 on, a few “small clandestine groups”, often un-organised, 
untrained and with rudimentary equipment, based in the Gaza strip, Syria and 
Jordan  began  launching  operations  in  Israel1.  Those  who  initiated  such 
1 Quandt, William, Ann Lesch, and Fuad Jabber, The Politics of Palestinian nationalism, London 1974 
p. 50
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operations were called the “infiltrated”, and later, they constituted the first ranks 
of the  fidaiyyun organisations2. Although the  fidaiyyun, proposed no clear and 
formulated political strategy, they had at least the merit of existing, making of 
the Palestinian people – who were lacking a political entity – an existing human 
“entity”. Progressively, new organisations rooted in the refugee camps and their 
new environment came to replace the traditional political elite movements3. In 
reality,  the  Palestinians,  wherever  they  were,  founded  or  integrated  Arab 
nationalist structures, others had also formed new groups specifically based on 
“Palestinianism” just as the General Union of Palestine Students (GUPS) which 
was  officially  launched  in  1959  but  came  to  aggregate  all  the  Palestinian 
students unions that existed since the British mandate or the General Union of 
Palestine Workers (GUPW) in 1963. 
Arab nationalism and Palestine liberation: the case of the ANM
The dominant ideology in the 1950s, and probably until the 1967 defeat, 
was Arab nationalism, in a different form to the one from before 1948. Indeed, 
the majority of the Arab countries had by then, just attained their independence 
or  were  in  the  process  of  attaining  it  and  Arab  states  were  established,  in 
Lebanon, Syria, Jordan and Egypt... Palestine had not and as such, it became a 
central issue in Arab nationalism. 
Among the Palestinian Arab nationalists,  we find two major trends, one that 
sought  Arab  unity  as  the  only  way  to  liberate  Palestine,  and  another  that 
advocated the liberation of Palestine as a prelude to the unified Arab state. The 
ANM was part of the first trend whereas Fatah initiated the second. I will here 
present the first trend.
The Arab Nationalists Movement – Harakat al Qawmiyyn al Arab (ANM) 
was to  be formed shortly after  the war,  in the years 1951-19524.  Among its 
founders were Palestinians as well as Arabs from other countries and as for the 
majority of the movements emerging during that period, they were students or 
young  professionals.  At  the  core  of  the  movement  we  could  find  Georges 
2 Sayigh,  Yezid,  “Reconstructing  the  paradox,  the  Arab  nationalist  movement,  armed  struggle  and 
Palestine, 1951-1966”, Middle East Journal 45(4), Autumn 1991,  pp. 608-629. 
3 Lindholm Schultz, Helena, The Reconstruction of Palestinian nationalism, Manchester 1999, p 43. 
4 Sayigh,  Yezid,  “Reconstructing  the  paradox,  the  Arab  nationalist  movement,  armed  struggle  and 
Palestine, 1951-1966”, op.cit., pp. 608-629. 
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Habash, a Palestinian whose family, originally from Jaffa, was expelled in 1948, 
Hani al Hindi, a Syrian who had volunteered in the Arab armies in 1948, and 
Wadi Haddad5. All  were students at the American University of Beirut (AUB), 
which was to become the base for the ANM. There, they became acquainted 
with the history professor, Constantin Zurayk, and his work, which would define 
their ideological and political development6. 
Moved by Arab nationalism, they considered that Palestine could only be 
liberated through a common effort by the Arab regimes. That meant that there 
needed to be a revolution, a change of regimes that would lead to Arab unity,  
which eventually would help achieve Palestine's total liberation7. 
Georges  Habash  and  Waddi  Haddad  soon  moved  their  medical  and 
political activities to the refugee camps in Jordan where they started training 
future militants and publishing al-Rai, the press organ of the organisation8. 
Until 1956, the ANM focused on the reinforcement of its structure and in  
developing its networks in Lebanon, Kuwait, Iraq and Jordan but later on also in 
Libya,  Yemen and the Gulf  countries9.  By 1956,  the organisation adopted a 
number of resolutions that in substance called for the continuation of the armed 
struggle (which the movement encouraged unofficially and massively and had 
started after  the arrival  of  Habash and Haddad in  Amman in  1951,  through 
infiltrations) and the application of the right of return10. The anti Baghdad-pact 
stance in the Nasserist discourse, the nationalisation of the Suez canal and the 
subsequent attack led by the French, British and Israeli coalition were as many 
founding elements in the rapprochement between the ANM and Gamal Abd al-
Nasser. Nasser whom the organisation’s members saw as the leader of Arab 
5 Hadad was later to become the head of the executive committee of the ANM and as such he had the 
military wing under his responsibility.
6 Baumgarten, Helga, “The three faces/phases of the Palestinian struggle”, Journal of Palestine Studies 
34(4), Summer 2005, pp. 25-48.
Constantin Zuraik,  The Meaning of the disaster, Beirut 1956. First published in Arabic and later in 
English.
7 Georges Habache,  Les révolutionnaires ne meurent jamais, conversations avec Georges Malbrunot, 
Fayard, 2008, p. 33. 
In that, the ANM showed a common view with some Arab regimes and on the first plan with Egypt. 
8 The critical content of the journal towards Glubb Pasha, the British officer at the head of its army and  
as the counsellor of the King, caused the suspension of the organ which was relocated in Damascus 
and Georges Habash followed.
9 Sayigh,Yezid,   “Reconstructing  the  paradox,  the  Arab  nationalist  movement,  armed  struggle  and 
Palestine, 1951-1966”, op.cit., pp. 608-629.
10 Sayigh,  Yezid,  “Reconstructing  the  paradox,  the  Arab  nationalist  movement,  armed  struggle  and 
Palestine, 1951-1966”, op.cit., pp. 608-629.
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unity, a place that would be confirmed by the proclamation of the United Arab 
Republic which gathered Egypt and Syria. However, the collapse of the UAR in 
1961 came as a shock for the ANM which saw the unity between Arabs as the 
only way to  achieve independence in  all  the  Arab lands and of  course the 
liberation of Palestine. One of the repercussions of the failure of Arab Unity, and 
although the ANM was starting to slowly sink into oblivion, was that “in an effort 
to counter the rising competition from the new Palestinian activist groups, a new 
current  had  begun  developing  within  the  ANM  to  refocus  directly  on  the 
Palestine problem”11.  Here again, we see the beginning of the passage from 
Qawmiyya,  pan-Arabism,  as  a  way  towards  the  liberation  of  Palestine  to 
Wattaniyya as a means to reach Arab unity. By mid-1965, the ANM re-centred 
its policy on Palestine and the Palestinians as we can see in the Yearbook of 
Palestine cause12. Indeed, it announced that the struggle for Palestine was “at 
the very heart”  of  the organisation's  struggle “for  the realisation of the Arab 
nation's objectives: unity, liberation, socialism, and the redemption of Palestine”. 
The early 1960s would also set the scene for internal conflict within the 
movement,  between the trend led by Nayef Hawatmeh and Mohsen Ibrahim 
and the one led by Georges Habash and Wadi Haddad. These conflicts already 
announced the future split. In his biography, Habash was to blame them for their 
liberal  ideas,  their  “moderation  concerning  the  armed  struggle”  and  their 
criticism of the organisation's relations with Gamal Abd al-Nasser. Nasser had 
indeed become a central figure in the ANM circles and this was to be the case 
until the 1967 defeat. 
The policy of unity first and liberation thereafter as well as the inherent 
social question, which was conducted by the ANM drew harsh criticism. It has 
been  regarded  as  the  main  reason  for  its  failure  in  becoming  the  leading 
Palestinian movement. That place was taken by Fatah, which was first, since its 
emergence to advocate the liberation of Palestine and had put aside the social  
question. Second, Fatah called for a 'Palestinian struggle for Palestine'. Fatah's 
vision on that point was to gain legitimacy after the collapse of the AUR and the 
defeat of the 1967 war. 
11 Baumgarten, Helga, “The three faces/phases of the Palestinian struggle”, op.cit., pp. 25-48.
12 Yezid  Sayigh,  “Reconstructing  the  paradox:  the  Arab  nationalist  movement,  armed  struggle  and  
Palestine, 1951-1966”, op.cit., p. 619.
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Fatah and the 'Palestine first' slogan
The  group  that  was  to  become  the  Palestine  national  liberation 
movement  (Fatah) made its  debut in the late 1950s and became a dominant 
force after the 1967 war and especially after the Karameh battle in 1968, where 
it  gained  consideration.  The  leaders  of  the  movement  started  their  political 
training  in  the  early  1950s  within  Palestinian  students  unions.  Among  the 
founders, we could cite for example, Yasser Arafat who was the leader of the 
Students Union before founding Fatah, Salah Mesbah Khalaf or Abu Iyad, who 
was to become the chief of Intelligence and Khalil Ibrahim Al Wazir (Abu Jihad), 
who was to become the commander of the Armed branch. 
Just as for the ANM, the Suez war in 1956 constituted a major event in Fatah’s 
development and constitution. The movement developed in the Gaza Strip, first, 
as an underground cell,  then,  its  members studied in  Cairo's  universities to 
finally find employment in the Gulf countries especially in Kuwait, where Fatah 
was officially established in 1959. Like the ANM, Fatah's inspiration came from 
the Suez Canal war, the independence struggle in Algeria led by the FLN (Front 
de Liberation Nationale – National Liberation Front), and the Marxist revolution 
in Cuba. All  these struggles were seen as models of success and played a 
major role in the motivation and then in the development of the movement and 
its  thinking,  as  suggested  in  an  editorial  published  in  Filastinuna  –  the  
organisation's press organ – in 1960: 
“Revolutions all over the world are inspiring us. The revolution in Algeria  
lights our way like a bright torch of hope. When the Algerians took up  
their  revolution in  1954,  they were  only  some hundred Arabs facing  
20,000 French troops and well-  armed settlers [...]  The revolution in  
Algeria  proved to  us  that  a  people  can organise  itself  and build  its  
military strength in the very process of fighting”13.
Nevertheless, unlike the ANM, Fatah was not to take part  in local  or global  
struggles  but  only  take  inspiration  from  them,  although  non-interference  in 
internal affairs of the Arab states was a slogan that did not prevent them from 
publicly criticising the Arab regimes14.
Contrary to  the ANM however,  Fatah called for  a  Palestinian entity which  it  
13 Baumgarten, Helga, “The three faces/phases of the Palestinian struggle”, op.cit., pp. 25-48.
14 Ibid.
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considered as a “basic demand and a legitimate right”15. It was then logical that 
Fatah would also become the first organisation to call for a proper Palestinian 
state.  Helena  Cobban  summed  up  the  objectives  of  the  movement  in  four 
points, the Palestinians had to take their responsibility and organise themselves 
autonomously;  they  had  to  keep  in  mind  the  major  objective  that  was  the 
liberation of Palestine as the pre-condition for the Arab unity; the liberation could 
only be achieved by the means of armed struggle and if the major force in this 
struggle was the Palestinians themselves, they would have to work closely with 
“the other Arab and international forces on the basis of equality to help achieve 
the goal”16.
From 1958 to 1965, Fatah focused on its organisational development and 
numerous  cells  were  created  in  cities  and  villages  of  the  West  Bank,  the 
movement even developed military training sessions for its members. Contrary 
to other structures and on foremost the ANM – that sought the establishment of 
a mass movement as the basis and support tool for the armed struggle – Fatah 
considered the armed struggle as the major tool for the Palestinian people to 
recover its identity and for constituting a mass movement17.
The Palestinian Kiyan and the establishment of the PLO
The  lack  of  solution  for  the  Palestine  problem,  the  establishment  of 
numerous  more  or  less  coherent  Palestinian  groups  in  the  fifties  and  the 
infiltration operations from the neighbouring countries to Israel were all facts on 
the ground that the Arab States and the Arab League had to deal with. And, 
whilst  the Palestinian cause was central  to the Arab governments, the latter 
were  not  prepared  to  enter  a  new  open  conflict  with  Israel,  a  conflict  the 
infiltrations were threatening to precipitate. Parallel to that, since its creation, the 
Arab League had been approaching the Palestine question without success and 
showed itself unable to make any effective decision. 
This is the context in which the question of the Palestinian Kiyan, namely 
15 Shemesh, Moshe, “The founding of the PLO, 1964”,  Middle Eastern Studies, 20,(4),  October 1984, 
pp. 105-141.
16 Cobban,  Helena,  The  Palestine  Liberation  Organization:  people,  power  and  politics,  cited  in 
Kimmerling, Baruch and Migdal, Joel S, The Palestinian People: A History, op.cit., p.244.
17 Picaudou, Nadine, Le Mouvement national palestinien, genèse et structures, Paris 1989, p. 116.
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the Palestinian entity arose in the late 1950s and it was to lead to controversy 
and  conflict  within  the  Arab  League.  In  1959,  the  31st session  of  the  Arab 
League Council (ALC) was held, and was the occasion that the United Arab 
Republic in the person of Nasser chose to raise the question of the Palestinian 
entity. For the record, one should know that Fatah was the first in 1958 to call 
for a Palestinian entity18. The complexity of the question made the ALC call for a 
high-level Arab conference to examine it and redefine the terms of the struggle 
for Palestine19. Until then, the ultimate goal was to liberate Palestine, but there 
was no clear idea of the shape of its political structure20. Not that the term of 
Kiyan was  any  more  clear,  but  it  had  at  least  the  merit  to  state  that  the 
Palestinians constituted a definite entity and that Palestine was theirs. It also left 
the questions of the structure and the framework open. Would it be attached to 
a larger Arab state with Syria and Lebanon? Would it be part of Jordan? Or 
perhaps eventually would it be a Palestinian independent and sovereign state? 
It  was not  yet  decided and when the problem of  the Palestinian entity was 
discussed, it raised great controversy. 
Behind  the  question  of  the  Palestinian  Kiyan,  lay  the  inability  of  the  Arab 
regimes to cope with the Israeli military power in the event they were to enter a 
military conflict, but also a political concern. Indeed, creating that entity would 
remind everyone and constitute a proof of the existence of the Palestinians as a 
people having nationalistic aspirations21. 
General  Abdel  Karim Qassem, president  of  the Iraqi  council,  went  on 
proposing a Palestinian entity under the form of an Arab Republic of Palestine. 
This idea, as much as it pointed to a real and decisive question, also constituted 
a jab at Egypt and Jordan whom he accused of attributing themselves parts of  
Palestine. As expected, Jordan, which considered the western part of Palestine 
as a part of its own territory, considered the Iraqi proposal as a threat to its 
sovereignty  and  as  an  attack.  Egypt,  that  had  made  the  harshest 
18 Shemesh, Moshe, “The Palestinian society in the wake of the 1948 war: from social fragmentation to 
consolidation”,  Israel  Studies 9(1),  Spring 2004, pp. 86-100. The source of the information is an 
unpublished  notebook  on  ideology  and  strategy,  dated  from  1958,  Cairo  and  probably  written 
according to Shemesh by a PLO member.
19 Shemesh, Moshe, “The founding of the PLO, 1964”, Middle Eastern Studies 20(4), October 1984, pp. 
105-141.
20 Shemesh, Moshe, The Palestinian entity 1959-1974. Arab politics and the PLO, London 1988, p.xi-
xii.
21 Ibid.
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condemnations against  Jordan when it  announced it  would  annex the West 
Bank, considered it as a criticism of its regime. 
The  Iraqi  programme  consisted  of  calling  for  a  Palestinian  Republic  and 
creating  a  Palestinian  army  –  in  which  every  Palestinian  would  have  the 
possibility to enrol – which would liberate the country hand in hand with the 
other Arab armies. 
In March 1960,  Nasser announced the establishment of  a Palestinian 
National  Union  (PNU)  that  would  gather  all  the  Palestinians  present  in  the 
United Arab Republic22. The Gaza strip, which was under Egyptian military rule, 
and later Syria were to be bases for mini institutions of the PNU preparing the 
way  for  the  implementation  of  the  Palestinian  entity.  However,  the  UAR 
collapsed in 1961, and the measures taken by Nasser were to be applied only 
in the Gaza strip. The Palestinians in Gaza for example, were even to be given 
a “temporary constitution” in May 1962, a constitution that was to be replaced in 
the future by “the constitution of the Palestinian state”23. 
The  collapse  of  the  UAR was  to  create  a  shock  in  the  fervent  Arab 
nationalist circles and above all within the ANM, which explained the event by 
the inability of the UAR to consult the people. The leaders of the ANM – those 
from the trend of Georges Habash – always thought that the people had to be 
mobilised as only the people could “impose Arab Unity”, and this was eventually 
Nasser's conclusion too24.
In June 1963, the representative of the AHC and former representative of 
the All-Palestine Government died and this raised the problem of Palestinian 
representation. Indeed, the AHC had slowly during the previous years lost its 
representativeness and was regarded as an anachronistic institution, so, what 
was to replace it, who was to be the representative of the Palestinian people? 
This question was to be raised during the ALC meeting in September. Nasser 
and Qassem who had presented competing proposals wanted to facilitate an 
agreement and finally found a consensus. They invited Ahmad al-Shuqayri who 
presented his proposals for a Palestinian entity and Palestinian elections, these 
22 Baron, Xavier, Les Palestiniens, un peuple, Paris 1984, p.83.
23 Shemesh, Moshe, The Problem of the Palestinian entity, 1959-1963, op.cit., p. 7
24 Habache, Georges, Les révolutionnaires ne meurent jamais, Conversations avec Georges Malbrunot , 
op.cit, p.57.
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served  as  a  basis  for  the  discussions.  Jordan  however,  was  against  the 
formation  of  a  Palestinian  entity  and  the  principle  of  Palestinian  elections. 
Despite  the  rejection  by  the  Jordanian  Government,  which  feared  that  the 
Palestinians would claim a territorial sovereignty over the parts of Palestine it 
occupied, the ALC made the decision “to organise the Palestinian people in 
order that this one plays its role in the liberation of its country and can decide of 
its future”25. It passed two resolutions. The first designated al-Shuqayri as the 
Palestinian representative at the ALC and the international institutions – that is 
to say at the UN where until then the AHR represented the Palestinians – until  
the  Palestinians  could  meet  and  elect  their  representatives.  The  second 
underlined the primacy of the Palestinians in their struggle26.
The first Arab Summit conference was held in January 1964 in Cairo, and 
dealt with the representation of the Palestinians, the Palestinian entity and the 
problem of water raised because Israel was pumping the waters of the Jordan 
river.  The Conference approved the two resolutions passed by the ALC and 
confirmed  Ahmad  al-Shuqayri  as  the  responsible  for  the  establishment  of 
Palestinian institutions, thus going further in the nationalisation of the Palestine 
question27. The Palestinians were now given responsibility over their fate and to 
defend their national rights.
Transition 
In the aftermath of the Nakba, the dispersed Palestinians nourished only 
one idea, take back what had been seized by the Zionist militias and find their 
way back home. As we have seen above, they have started to organise despite 
their  dispersion however,  among the multitude of organisations, associations 
and armed groups there seemed to develop no concrete political programme 
and none that clarified the future of Palestine after its liberation from the hands 
of  the  Zionists.  The latter  were  after  all  settlers  who had dispossessed the 
Palestinians and the Arabs from part of the Watan al 'Arabi  and they would be 
fought and eventually they would have to return from where they came. So, the 
25 Kadi, Leila,  Arab Summit Conferences and the Palestine problem (1936- 1950)-(1964-1966), op.cit., 
p.100; Xavier Baron, Les palestiniens un peuple, op.cit., p. 86.
26 Ibid.
27 Kadi, Leila,  Arab Summit Conferences and the Palestine problem (1936- 1950)-(1964-1966),  op.cit., 
p.102.
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situation did not leave any space for thinking a common future with the settlers 
who did not  seem to wish to live with the Arabs anyway. In brief, the Arabs and 
Palestinians were indeed anti-partitionists but the colonial fact would not enable 
them to voice unitarian propositions. The settlers had gained control of part of 
Palestine thanks to  the United Nations and that  despite  the indigenous will, 
then,  they seized by force  part  of  the  rest  of  Palestine  and still  they could 
proclaim their independence without raising any opposition apart from the non 
western countries.  In conclusion, on the one hand,  the dispersion and exile 
themselves rendered impossible the elaboration of such a political programme 
let alone one including a Zionist presence, on the other hand Palestine and the 
Palestinians  had  become  a  mere  humanitarian  issue  in  the  eyes  of  the 
international instances which thus would not consider the political rights of the 
Palestinians. However, the policy of the Kiyan marked the beginnings of a new 
era, one that would consecrate the search for statehood. 
B. The PLO charter and the one-state solution
The decision by the Arab League to provide the Palestinians with proper 
representation  and  institutions  in  order  to  pursue  their  goal  of  liberation  of 
Palestine and establish their future entity would timidly initiate a move towards 
the independence of the Palestinian struggle and eventually of  a Palestinian 
nation vis-à-vis the Arab regimes. However, it would also consecrate the formal 
fragmentation of the Palestinian cause and the separation of the Palestinians 
from the rest of the  A Palestinian Congress was summoned by al-Shuqayri and 
it started working on gathering the numerous and different Palestinian groups 
and associations. A nation was under formation, although it would organise in 
exile. 
In May,  the PLO released a document that was its 29 article national 
covenant defining the Palestinian struggle and its objectives28. After stressing 
the non-religious foundations of the Palestine Question, the covenant focused 
on four main subjects. 
First, the Arab character was a founding principle and as such, it was 
28 The text of the Charter is available at: http://www.un.int/wcm/content/site/palestine/pid/12363
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stressed in the preamble as well as in several articles of the covenant. That 
meant that Arab Unity was an objective common to all the Arabs but also that 
Palestine was a central issue for all the Arabs.
Second, the covenant insisted on the indivisibility of the territory of Palestine (in 
its mandatory boundaries) and the specificity of the Palestinian “personality”. 
Once this was stated, the charter called for the struggle against all threats to the 
unity  and  the  Arabness (al-'Uruba)  of  the  territory  to  the  liberation  of  the 
homeland.
Third,  the  membership  of  the  Jews  of  Palestinian  origin  to  the  Palestinian 
people was regarded as a core principle provided that they were “willing to live 
peacefully and loyally in Palestine”. This is to be read as a setback compared 
the Arab Office's statements regarding the question of the Jews in Palestine in 
1946 and 194729. Furthermore, this instead of proposing a solution to the Zionist 
Question, it  proposed a solution for the non or anti-Zionist  Palestinian Jews 
present in Palestine.
Finally, the covenant rejected the Balfour Declaration and Zionism and refuted 
the  partition  of  Palestine  as  an  illegal  act  committed  by  the  International 
institutions. As such, it was decided to be null and void and they called for the 
de-partition of Palestine, however, no state was yet envisaged.
The first Palestinian National Council, held from May 28 to June 2, 1964, 
gathered 388 delegates, among whom 242 were Palestinians from Jordan and 
146 representatives of Palestinians from Syria, Lebanon, Gaza, Qatar, Kuwait  
and  Iraq.  To  these,  should  be  added  observers  from  Fatah and  the  ANM. 
Indeed,  both  organisations  were  suspicious  towards  the  new  organisation, 
which they considered as too close to the Arab regimes and feared could fall 
under  Jordanian control.  However,  they were  conscious that  they could  not 
leave that space, either for the sake of the cause, or for their  own sake as 
organisations. Fatah and the ANM decided to participate in the conference but 
not in the institutions about to be created30. At the end of the meeting, Ahmad al-
Shuqayri was confirmed as the chairman of the PLO, which to the AHC's regret 
was then officially established. Indeed, in June, the AHC, which understood that 
it would put an end to its existence, announced that it would not recognise the 
29 See Chapter Four, the Arab case presented to the Anglo-America Committee.
30 Habache, Georges, Les révolutionnaires ne meurent jamais, Conversations avec Georges Malbrunot , 
op.cit., p. 66.
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PLO.  However,  all  the  Arab  states  did  recognise  it  as  the  Palestinians' 
representative organisation. It was the end of the old leadership, which saw its 
central office in Iraq closed and left the PLO as the only representative of the 
Palestinian people.
The  creation  of  a  Palestinian  entity/Kiyan and  of  the  PLO  as  the 
Palestinian people's representative, were approved by the second Arab summit 
which took place from the 5th to the 11th of September 196431. Egypt, who had 
carried the initiative of the debate about the Kiyan a few years earlier, reacted 
favourably to the creation of the PLO. One of the main problems faced by the 
PLO and its representative, al-Shuqayri, was the problem of true representation 
and legitimacy.  The Organisation aspired to be the representative organ but 
was facing a huge challenge: it had no territory and the population it sought to 
represent was dispersed all around the Arab world and beyond. The Palestinian 
national movement as incarnated in the PLO had to prove more than any other 
movement  its  representativeness.  In  response  to  that,  the  PLO's  principles 
stated  that  each  Palestinian,  independently  of  gender  or  socio-economical 
background, was a “natural member of the PLO”32. To achieve such a unity, al-
Shuqayri invited all the Palestinian organisations to join him. 
The PLO eventually formed the Palestine Liberation Army (PLA), and the armed 
struggle, one of the pillars of the Palestinian struggle, started in a more or less 
organised fashion33.
The establishment of the PLO and the PLA opened another chapter of 
Palestinian and Arab history, it would prefigure the decline of pan-Arabism, the 
further  development  of  a  “Palestinian  particularism”  and  the  Palestinians' 
struggle  for  the  liberation  of  their  homeland.  But,  it  also  announced  the 
challenges the Palestinian national movement would have to face as the latter 
was engaging on the road to national and territorial sovereignty.
The 1967 Arab-Israeli war, which marked the defeat of the Arab armies 
and consecrated the occupation of all Palestine as well as territories of Syria, 
Egypt  and  Lebanon,  would  lead  the  Palestinian  resistance  organisations  to 
31 Kadi, Leila S., Arab summit conferences and the Palestine problem, (1936-1950)-(1964-1966), op.cit., 
p.127.
32 Baumgarten, Helga, “The three faces/phases of the Palestinian struggle”, op.cit.
33 The first officially recognised operations as we have seen were led by Al Assifa (the Storm) which 
would be known later as the armed branch of the Fatah. Al Assifa launched ten simultaneous attacks 
on the night of the 31st of December 1964. 
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redefine their strategy and objectives. From the crisis engendered by defeat, 
these organisations would decide to reshuffle the PLO and transform it into a 
framework for “national unity”34. This was the occasion to gradually welcome the 
main Palestinian political compounds as well as smaller groups and reaffirm its 
role in the liberation of Palestine. 
Profound  changes  were  then  set  in  the  1968  PLO charter.  Contrary to  the 
previous  charter,  the  new  one  clearly  insisted  on  the  specific  role  of  the 
Palestinians in the liberation struggle and it amended the article on the Jews. 
Whilst until then, only the Jews of Palestinian descent were allowed to stay, the 
1968  Charter  enlarged  the  category  by  including  all  the  Jews  (and  their 
descendants) who were in Palestine “before the Zionist offensive”35. 
Fatah and the elaboration of the democratic state project 
The changes evoked above were made possible by the military defeat of 
1967 which encouraged first Fatah and then the other Palestinian organisations 
to adopt – or in the case of Fatah, to develop – the “Palestine first” slogan. Until 
then,  and  as  mentioned  in  length  above,  Palestine's  liberation  was  closely 
linked with and dependent on Arab unity. 
Whilst  the  liberation  of  Palestine  continued  to  constitute  the  major 
objective  of  the  Palestinian  resistance  movement,  1967  defeat  of  the  Arab 
option had also introduced the need for a more specific political programme. 
The concept of liberation was indeed far too vague to be carried forward and 
communicated about. Fatah was then in contact with many revolutionary and 
liberation movements and its thinking probably benefited from that. Indeed, as 
explained by Abu Hatem, the Fatah representative in Paris at the time, when 
questioned by Alain Gresh, it was further to discussions with Arab and non-Arab 
political forces that the need of an objective, a specific goal emerged36. He also 
explained that the idea of the democratic state then emerged as a logical one 
as it was also part of Palestinian history. So, whilst Fatah had started discussing 
34 Gresh, Alain, OLP, Histoire et stratégies. Vers l'État palestinien, op.cit., p.23.
35 Berque, Jacques and le Groupe de Recherche et d'Action pour le reglement du probleme palestinien 
(GRAPP), Palestiniens et la crise israelo-arabe 1967-1973, Paris 1974.
The text of the 1968 Charter is available at: http://www.un.int/wcm/content/site/palestine/pid/12362
36 Gresh, Alain, OLP, Histoire et stratégies. Vers l'État palestinien, op.cit., p.23.
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the possibility of a democratic state immediately after the Arab defeat of 1967 
and the occupation of the rest of Palestine by Israel, the organisation would wait 
until 1968 to present publicly its programme in the form of three articles which 
insisted  on  the  meaning/significance  of  the  Democratic  State,  i.e.  “the  sole 
progressive humanitarian solution that appeared on the Palestinian scene since 
the racist and colonial Zionist conquest”37. Then, on  January 1, 1969 it finally 
adopted a resolution in that direction38. In the aftermath of the war, the United 
Nations had appealed, in resolution 242, for the restitution of territories captured 
by Israel, thus reaffirming the principle of partition. This marked a setback for 
the Palestinians, as the UN was not referring at all to what had happened since 
1947. So, the resolution passed by Fatah filled two purposes. First, it expressed 
the  rejection  of  resolution  242,  which  ignored  the  national  rights  of  the 
Palestinian people. Second, it stated that the final objective was the “restoration 
of the independent democratic State of Palestine, all of whose citizens will enjoy 
equal rights regardless of their religion”39. Besides, it stated two basic principles. 
On the one hand, it recalled the Arab roots of Palestine which once liberated 
and constituted as a State would contribute to the edification of a united and 
progressive Arab society40. On the other hand, it announced that Fatah did not 
“fight against the Jews as a religious and ethnic community. It  fights  
against Israel as an expression of a colonisation based on a racist and  
expansionist technocratic system, an expression of the Zionism and the  
colonialism”41. 
The resolution of Fatah was “revolutionary” on two levels. First it called for a 
state, the very thing that was consensually opposed by the main factions of the 
resistance organisations and the Arab States. Second, it referred to the Jews, 
all  of  them,  thus  contravening  the  Charter  which  as  mentioned  above  only 
evoked  the  Jews  who  lived  permanently  in  Palestine  “before  the  Zionist 
invasion”.  Fatah's proposal  would open the way to a series of  often heated 
debates between the member organisations of the PLO and their discussions in 
37 Rasheed,  Mohammad,  Towards  a  democratic  state  in  Palestine,  Beirut  (Palestine  Liberation 
Organisation), November 1970.
38 Fatah, “Déclaration du comité central du Fatah”, January 1, 1969.
39 Fatah, “Non à la résolution du 22 novembre 1967, oui à la lutte de libération des peuples, Déclaration 
du  Comité  Central  du  Fatah”,  January 1,  1969,  in  Khader  Bishara  & Naim (eds.),  Textes  de  la  
révolution palestinienne 1968-1974, Paris, 1975 pp. 159-160.
40 Ibid.
41 Fatah, “Non à la résolution du 22 novembre 1967, oui à la lutte de libération des peuples, Déclaration 
du Comité Central du Fatah”, op.cit.
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the framework of the PNC, but also among its own ranks.
C.  Towards   adopting  of  the  Democratic  state  as  the  main   
strategy
On the inter-Palestinian  level,  Fatah’s proposal  did  not  fail  to  arouse 
controversy.  The  discussions  were  lively,  but  it  was  the  principle  of  a 
“democratic society” and not of a “democratic state” in Palestine that was to be 
adopted by the PLO during its fifth congress in September 1969. Indeed, the 
Arab nationalist vision was still very strong and the Palestinian leadership would 
not yet call for a state. From 1970, a number of positions would emerge, affirm 
and contribute to  the debate.  Whilst  different  positions were  to  appear,  it  is 
important to note that all the PLO member organisations did agree on one point 
at least, the refusal of an independent state in the West Bank or the occupied 
territories.
The debates over the democratic and non-sectarian state: A general  
overview
The debate within the PNC reveals that the Democratic State created an 
ideological  rift  between  the  main  organisations,  which  left  space  for  the 
emergence of three major positions. 
Favourable  to  the  objective  set  by  the  Fatah,  and  the  Syrian  Baath 
affiliated  organisation,  the  Saiqa,  immediately  aligned  with  it.  However,  the 
major supporter of the idea was indeed, the Democratic Popular Front for the 
Liberation of Palestine (DPFLP)42. The latter fully supported Fatah's proposal 
and went on to say that this was the only way forward for the revolutionary 
Palestinian national movement. On the occasion of the Sixth NPC, it submitted 
42 The DPFLP as we will see resulted from a secession from the PFLP. The PFLP is itself an organisation 
that  was  created just  after  the 1967 war and is  the result  of  a  merger between three  Palestinian  
Marxist-Leninist groups,  Abtal al-Audah (Heroes of the Return), a commando group established in 
1966 by the ANM, Youth for Revenge, and Palestine Liberation Front led by Ahmad Jibril (who was 
later to split from the PFLP to form the PFLP-GC or General Command).
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a  draft  resolution  in  which  it  rejected  what  it  called  all  “chauvinistic  and 
reactionary” reactions, wherever they came from. It argued that the liberation of 
Palestine, prerequisite to the establishment of the Democratic State, would be 
achieved through armed struggle and finally, not so unambiguously according to 
Alain Gresh43, the DPFLP twice used the term "nationalist " as an adjective to 
describe the Arabs but also the Jews. However, for the DPFLP, the Democratic 
State was above all a way to bring a solution to the Jewish question and the 
way to that state was seen as being the establishment of an Arab unity through 
socialism44. The DPFLP would also prove to be the first organisation to launch a 
dialogue with a small and marginal Israeli organisation, the Socialist Workers 
Organisation better known by the name of its publication, Matzpen.
The  idea  was  opposed  by  the  Arab  Liberation  Front  (ALF)  -  which 
envisaged no settlement outside of the Arab nation45 - and by the  AHC. The 
latter, ousted by the Arab League and replaced by the PLO, which it did not 
recognise as legitimate, published a critical text on the term, on March 12, 1970. 
Combining objective and subjective criticism the AHC stated several reasons 
why a democratic state would be doomed to failure. Including, on the one hand, 
the inherently exclusivist character of Zionism and on the other hand, the Zionist 
claim to a Jewish state in which Palestinians would have no place. It recalled 
that Zionist thought had produced the expulsion of the Palestinians (which was 
a logical outcome). Going further in its reasoning, the AHC continued by stating 
that the demographic data had changed, making the Palestinians a minority if a 
such a state was ever to be established46. 
More  reluctant  than  in  opposition,  other  organisations  accepted  and 
adopted the principle of coexistence but proposed a refinement of the slogan 
Democratic State and questioned the proposed framework. This was the case 
of the PFLP, whose Public Information Office published in 1970, a brochure of 
three  texts  and  interviews  with  the  movement's  leaders,  including  George 
43 Gresh, Alain, L'OLP, histoire et stratégies. Vers l'État palestinien, op.cit., p.64
44 Ibid.
45 Quandt, William, Jaber, Fuad and Ann Moseley Lesch, The Politics of Palestinian nationalism, op.cit., 
p104.
46 Arab Higher Committee for  Palestine,  Statement on the Palestinian democratic  state and the co-
existence with the Jews, Beirut March 12, 1970. (Arabic)
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Habash on the question of the Democratic State47. The publication essentially 
dealt with the struggle against Israel as a state in connexion with Imperialism, a 
struggle that ought to be launched by the Palestinians in connection with the 
Arab masses. Thus, the PFLP proposed to replace the Palestinian question in 
its Arab context through a revolutionary vision. Furthermore, these texts also 
addressed the need to discuss directly with the "exploited and deceived Jewish 
masses" so that they could become aware of their interest in living in peace with 
the Palestinians and the Arabs. What it meant however, was that they rejected 
the  principle  of  separation  and  called  for  dialogue.  For  the  PFLP,  the  term 
"democratic” contained in the term was subject to questioning only to remind 
that "no progressive national liberation movement is responsible for finding a 
democratic solution to a situation of aggression", and therefore the democratic 
solution was in fact a solution to the "Jewish question". Thus, in order to liberate  
the Jews from the imperialist enterprise to which they were subjected, it might 
be worth considering a call  for  the establishment of  a  democratic state,  but 
always in the context of a liberation struggle of all masses of the region48.
In a similar vein, fearing that by adopting the slogan of a democratic and secular 
state,  the  PLO  would  disengage  from  the  Arab  countries  by  providing  a 
Palestinian  solution  to  the  "Jewish  question"  and  creating  a  new  non-Arab 
identity, some members of the Fatah also criticised the term49.
As a consequence of the debates, Fatah started to refine the terms of its 
objectives.  In  an  article  in  Middle  East  International,  Nabil  Shaath  (Fatah) 
offered their  vision of  the Democratic State,  which could be summed up as 
follows.  First,  it  would  be  “on  the  whole  of  Palestine”.  Second,  to  attain 
liberation,  the “Zionist  state must  be destroyed”  leaving its  place to  a “non-
racialist, non-sectarian progressive, secular Palestine that would “be part of the 
Arab  revolutionary  movement  and  future  federated  Arab  land”  not  as  a  bi-
national state but as a unitary one50.
This debate of ideas did reflect on the resolutions of the PNC issued 
between  1969  and  1973.  These  would  sometimes  highlight  the  watchword, 
47 PFLP (Information  Department), Palestine:  towards  a  democratic  solution,  Beirut,  1970,  42pp. 
(Arabic).  The exact  date of  publication is unknown,  however it  was most  certainly after  May as 
indeed, among the documents is an interview dated from May 23. 
48 Ibid.
49 Gresh, Alain, OLP, histoire et stratégies. Vers l'État palestinien, op.cit., p.57.
50 Shaath, Nabil, “Planning for the future”, Middle East International (7), October 1971, pp.32-33.
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sometimes –  and mainly on  issues related  to  the  political  situation  and the 
particularly the situation of the Palestinian resistance Organisations in Jordan – 
they did leave it aside. 
Towards the PNC's adoption of the Democratic State
Willing  to  safeguard  their  historical  rights  and  to  repair  the  injustice 
undergone while taking into account the reality on the ground, the Palestinian 
organisations in their majority claimed the establishment of a Democratic State 
on all the territory of historic Palestine. The adoption of that objective marked a 
major turning point in Palestinian politics. The eighth PNC estimating that the 
political developments related to the Arab regimes had nothing to do with the 
issue  of  Israeli  Jews,  finally  adopted  the  slogan.  Whilst  this  decision  was 
sanctioned by an overwhelming majority, it had gone through different stages 
from the fifth PNC to the eleventh. In this process, Fatah and the DPFLP played 
a major role just as they would play a determining role in the 1973 discussions 
that would lead to the adoption of the phased plan in 1974. Besides placing the 
democratic  state  as  the  objective  of  the  Palestinian  struggle,  the  PNC 
resolutions also stressed the rejection of a Palestinian state in the occupied 
territories, as proposed in the peace plans that emerged after the 1967 war, 
notably the Roger plan. 
The six day war  had in  many ways introduced major  changes in  the 
Palestinian  resistance  movement  and  as  a  consequence  in  the  PLO.  As  a 
matter  of  fact,  the Palestinian resistance organisations and the top ranks of 
Fatah, had taken the opportunity to consolidate their power over the PLO and 
constitute the new charter  in  1968.  The Palestinian resistance organisations 
would eventually take over  the PLO during the fifth  PNC in February 1969, 
which confirmed Fatah's  prominence.  The high representation of  Fatah only 
reflected the low representation of the PFLP which then decided to boycott the 
meeting.  In  the  meanwhile,  Fatah  had  proposed  that  the  PNC  adopt  the 
establishment of a democratic state as the objective of its struggle and in the 
absence of the PFLP which had already voiced its reservations on the idea, it 
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was easily able to pass the principle. The delegates would eventually during 
that meeting introduce and adopt the establishing of a:
“free  democratic  society  in  Palestine  encompassing  all  Palestinians,  
including Muslims, Christians, and Jews ... and rescuing Palestine from 
the hegemony of International Zionism”. 
The next PNC would re-affirm the control of Fatah, with the election of Yasser 
Arafat as chairman of the PLO's Executive Committee, as well as the  DPFLP 
boycott which nevertheless sent an observer. Moreover, the other group that 
expressed its rejection of the Democratic State, the Arab Liberation Front was 
also absent from the discussion. Once again, the debate over the Democratic 
State was conducted without the main opponents to the idea. In the meantime, 
the DPFLP had emerged from an internal crisis opposing George Habash and 
his  followers  and  Nayef  Hawatmeh  and  his.  Indeed,  Hawatmeh  who  had 
already expressed dissenting views,  was now claiming that  the  DPFLP was 
turning into  a “petit  bourgeois” organisation and that  it  should reconsider  its 
evolution to what he considered political  conservatism. Moreover, Hawatmeh 
considered  the  party  focussed  more  than  necessary  on  military  matters 
whereas it ought to develop as a grass-roots movement and concentrate on the 
elaboration of a revolutionary ideology51. He demanded clear engagement with 
what  he  called  the popular  revolutionary  forces  throughout  the  Arab  world, 
which he could not obtain from George Habash. Indeed, the latter argued that 
the  bourgeoisie  was  part  of  the  Palestinian  people  and  that,  although  the 
direction of the party should not be led by bourgeois, the party could not simply 
ignore them52.  Hawatmeh's  trend eventually split  from the  PFLP into  a new 
organisation,  the  Democratic  Popular  Front  for  the  Liberation  of  Palestine 
(DPFLP)53.  The  latter  would  then,  rejoin  the  PLO.  The  DPFLP did  thus, 
participate in the debates of the sixth PNC and it did not come empty handed, 
on the contrary, it made a proposal for a resolution that went even further than 
the one presented by Fatah at the former PNC. Besides bringing back to the 
51 These view were notably developed in the text resulting from the first clandestine meeting (in August 
1968) of the faction led by Hawatmeh: “Organiser la lutte populaire armée, Manifeste du premier  
congrès clandestin”, 1968, in Khader and Naim Bishara, Textes de la révolution palestinienne, op.cit., 
pp.251-259.
52 Georges Habache,  Les révolutionnaires ne meurent jamais, Conversations avec Georges Malbrunot , 
op.cit., p. 78.
53 Kimmerling, Baruch and Joel S. Migdal, The Palestinian people, a history, op.cit., p.256.
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foreground  the  idea  of  an  independent  Palestinian  State (which  had  been 
replaced  by  society in  the  previous  resolution),  it  rejected  “all  chauvinistic 
positions” coming from the western states or from the resistance organisations 
themselves, and most importantly it acknowledged equal national rights to both 
Arabs and Jews:
“a popular and democratic solution to Palestine's and Israel's problems  
[…] such a solution means the establishment of a Palestinian popular  
and democratic state for the Jews and the Arabs who would enjoy the  
same rights. Both Arabs and Jews shall live without discrimination and  
will  be  granted  the  right  to  develop  and  promote  their  respective  
national (watani) culture. [...][The Democratic State] will include Arabs  
and Jews enjoying equal national rights and duties”54.
However, as already underlined by numerous observers, one should take the 
meaning of national rights carefully as indeed, whilst  the  DPFLP recognised 
national rights to the Jews, it would not yet accept the principle of a Jewish 
State. Thus in contravention with its own political background55. Of course, the 
statement  provoked  intense  debates,  far  more  heated  than  before,  notably 
because  of  the  reference  to  national  rights.  Nevertheless,  despite  its 
reservations, the PNC would set the establishment of a Democratic State (and 
no more society) in Palestine as the strategic goal of the PLO. However, the 
regional  situation,  namely  the  growing  tensions  between  the  Palestinian 
resistance  organisations  and  the  Hashemite  government,  would  propel  the 
question  to  a secondary level.  The decision would  then,  develop no further 
during the seventh PNC, which was held in Cairo from May 30 to June 4, 1970, 
although we can note that the PNC gave authority to the Executive Committee 
to set up a commission to further study its content56.
As a matter of fact,  since 1968, the relations between the Palestinian 
resistance  organisations  and  the  Jordanian  government  had  started 
deteriorating. Indeed, although the PLO's charter stipulated abstention from any 
inference in the Arab affairs, the Palestinians who were leading their resistance 
from the Arab countries de-facto interfered in the political  life57.  Furthermore, 
54 Quandt,  William,  Jaber,  Fuad  and  Ann  Moseley Lesch,  The  Politics  of  Palestinians  nationalism, 
op.cit., p104.
55 Alain Gresh explain that marxist-leninist obedience, to which referred the  DPFLP was clear on the 
fact that all the nations should enjoy their right to self-determination and of a state of their own. Alain  
Gresh, OLP, histoire et stratégies. Vers l'État palestinien, op.cit., p.63.
56 Hamid, Rashid (ed.), PNC resolutions, 1964-1974, Beirut 1975, p.162.
57 Khalidi, Rashid, The Iron cage, op.cit., p.146.
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Jordan  was  in  a  particular  situation  as  it  contained  a  large  number  of 
Palestinians, who after all constituted a second Power in place. Then, after King 
Hussein's visit  to  the U.S and Egypt,  he decided to  restrain  even more the 
Palestinian  organisations  activities  in  Jordan,  this,  followed  by  Egypt's  and 
Jordan's acceptance of the Rogers Plan that only advocated Israeli withdrawal 
from the territories occupied after 1967 and the restitution of the West Bank to 
Jordan,  dealt  the  final  blow  and  provoked  violent  clashes  between  the 
resistance organisations and the Jordanian troops. This was to be exacerbated 
by the more aggressive struggle method adopted notably by the PFLP, DPFLP 
and Fatah – including hostage taking and plane hijacking notably on Jordanian 
soil58. The response of King Hussein was rapid: decreeing a military government 
and launching in September 1970, a deadly offensive against the Palestinian 
resistance organisations The offensive did in reality end up with a massacre – 
Black September – and later the expulsion and resettlement of the Palestinian 
resistance organisations in Lebanon. In the meanwhile, the PLO had become 
nearly all-encompassing as the PFLP was re-integrated to the organisation. 
After the stabilisation of the situation (although there still were on-going 
combats  in  north-western  Jordan),  the  eighth  PNC  was  convened  from 
February 28 to March 5, 1971 and among its decisions, it reaffirmed the goal of 
a Democratic State and this time, it was endorsed by all the organisations of the 
PLO. This move eventually consecrated the shift towards the adoption of the 
national sovereignty paradigm.
“The armed struggle of the Palestinian people is neither a racial nor a  
religious struggle directed against the Jews. That is why the future state  
to be established in Palestine liberated from Zionist imperialism is the  
democratic state of Palestine. Anyone interested can live in peace with  
the same rights and the same duties within the aspirations of the Arab  
national  liberation  and  total  unity  [...]  especially  on  the  unity  of  the  
people of both sides of the Jordan”59.
This  plebiscite  for  the  Democratic  State  went  hand  in  hand  with  the 
rejection of all projects to establish a Palestinian State over part of Palestine, 
probably  as  a  response  to  rumours  that  the  United  States  supported  the 
establishment of such a state in the West Bank  and Gaza60 and to the attempts 
58 Khader, Bishara, L'Europe et la Palestine. Des croisades à nos jours, op.cit., pp.226-229.
59 Hamid, Rashid (ed.), PNC Resolutions, 1964-1974, 1975, op.cit., p. 178.
60 Quandt,  William,  Jaber,  Fuad  and  Ann  Moseley Lesch,  The  Politics  of  Palestinians  nationalism, 
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by West Bank local personalities to obtain autonomy or even a Palestinian State 
along side Israel61. Then, the Council also proclaimed the unity of the Jordanian-
Palestinian people. This stemmed from two considerations, first the events had 
proven that the Jordanian people needed to get rid of the regime and establish 
a Democratic government,  second, the very partition between Palestine and 
Jordan was considered as a colonial  fact  and as such it  was artificial.  After 
"Black September", the PNC would of course adopt a harder line  against King 
Hussein.  This  line would be developed further during the ninth PNC, during 
which the DPFLP made a long statement on the necessity of overthrowing the 
Jordanian regime in the face of an increasingly stronger secessionist front62. By 
1972, however, Hussein having heard of discussions between the United States 
and Israel in view of a plan based on the establishment of a Palestinian State in  
Jordan and the West Bank, set up his own plan for a federation between the 
West  Bank  and  Jordan  under  the  form of  the  United  Arab  Kingdom63.  The 
Jordanian  plan  being  based  on  the  informal  recognition  of  Israel,  the 
Palestinians vividly rejected it during the Tenth PNC in April 197264. A rejection 
shared by the Arab States which saw it as a unilateral attempt to find only a 
partial solution to the Palestine Question65. 
Until 1972, the Palestinian resistance movement was rather consistent in 
its refusal of a state on part of Palestine and this was translated notably in the 
decisions of the PNC which simultaneously advocated a Democratic State and 
rejected all the peace plans based on the recognition of Israel and of resolution 
242. However, the 1973 war introduced a change in the course of action and 
the political positions of some of the most important organisations of the PLO 
op.cit., p134.
61 Among  these  personalities,  Aziz  Shihadeh  played  a  major  role,  and  that  directly  after  Fatah's  
announcement of its new strategic goal. See: Shihadeh, Aziz, “Fatah does not speak for democratic  
Palestine: a reply to Yasir Arafat, The New Middle East (6), March 1969.
62 Gresh, Alain, OLP, histoire et stratégies. Vers l'État palestinien, op.cit., p.124.
63 Khader, Bishara, L'évolution du mouvement de résistance palestinienne de 1967 à 1979, Louvain-la-
neuve, 1988-1989, p.11.
Extracts  of  the  speech  of  King  Hussein  in  which  he  presented  his  project  are  to  be  found  in  
“Documents and Source Material: Arab Documents on Palestine February 16, 1972-May 15”, 1972, 
Journal of Palestine Studies 1(4), Summer 1972, pp.165-190.
64 “Reply by the Spokesman of the Executive Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organisation, Mr. 
Kamal Nasser, to King Hussein's Proposed Plan for the West Bank”, Beirut, March 16, 1972, and, 
“Interview with the leader of the Palestine Liberation Organisation, Yasser Arafat”, Published in al-
Muharrir (Beirut), April 27, 1972,  in “Documents and Source Material: Arab Documents on Palestine 
February 16, 1972-May 15”, 1972, Journal of Palestine Studies 1(4), Summer 1972, pp.165-190.
65 Lukacs, Yehuda, Israel, Jordan and the peace process, New York 1997 , pp.119-120.
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and  thus,  introduced  the  debate  over  a  state  on  part  of  Palestine  as  a  – 
temporary – solution to the Palestine question66. Moreover, we can also observe 
a  growing  interest  in  the  affairs  of  the  West  Bank  notably  after  the 
announcement of municipal elections by Israel. Nevertheless, despite growing 
debates, the eleventh PNC that took place in 1973, reiterated once again its 
rejection of a state in the occupied territories67. 
Before analysing the evolution of the positions of the PLO and the main 
Palestinian resistance organisations, I will tackle in more detail the question of 
the Jews in Palestinian revolutionary thought. 
D. Dialogue with Israeli Jews 
The strategic objective of a Democratic State as it had been elaborated 
by Fatah and had come to develop and be accepted within the PLO was about  
civic and political rights. It called for the liberation of Palestine from Zionism and 
the  destruction  of  the  structures  of  the  Israeli  State  for  the  liberation  of 
Palestinians  and  Israelis  alike.  This,  of  course,  raised  sharp  criticism  and 
rejection from Israelis who saw the slogan of a democratic state as no more 
than a tactical move to appease the international community. Thus, Yehoshafat 
Harkabi68 published several articles on the subject in which he warned against 
the sectarian logic that was supposedly hiding behind the terminology. In fact, 
he affirmed, that the Palestinians had in mind to expel the Israelis and that they 
did not aspire to any coexistence but rather to the transformation of the Jewish 
population  into  a  minority  that  would be under  their  control69.  In  the 1980s, 
however,  Harkabi  would  adapt  to  the  changes in  the  Palestinian  camp.  He 
would change his views and become one of the first  Israeli  supporters of  a 
dialogue with the PLO and of the establishment of a Palestinian State along 
66 Hawatmeh, Nayef,  “Les tâches et  les mots d'ordre de la lutte populaire palestinienne dans l'étape 
actuelle”, December 1973.
67 Muslih, Muhammad, “Towards Coexistence: An Analysis of the Resolutions of the Palestine National 
Council”, op.cit., pp. 3-29.
68 Yehoshafat Harkabi was a Former Chief of Israeli Intelligence Services (1955-1959). 
69 Harkabi, Yehoshafat, Three articles on the Arab slogan of a democratic state, Tel Aviv, 1970.
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side Israel70. 
The PLO's project of a democratic state was unnoticed in Europe and the 
United States – except by a few socialist groups – where the existence of Israel 
had  been  long  accepted  and  even  acclaimed  and  the  sole  solutions  they 
proposed  did  not  take  into  account  the  objectives  or  aspirations  of  the 
Palestinians. 
 
The Democratic State and the Jews 
Whilst  by  the  end  of  the  mandate,  the  Arab  Palestinian  proposals 
included  the  Jews  permanently  settled  in  Palestine,  after  the  Nakba,  the 
disarray born out of the transfer of hundreds of thousands of Palestinians and 
the seizure of more than half of the territory attributed to the Arab State by the 
UN, led the Palestinians to  call  for  the return of  the refugees and the total  
liberation of Palestine, meaning also total  liberation from the Jewish settlers. 
The PLO Charter of 1964 introduced a change of policy, the Jews of Palestinian 
descent would be welcome to stay, but the 1968 Charter would enlarge that 
category  and  state  that  the  Jews who  were  in  Palestine  before  the  Zionist 
invasion – and their children – could stay. Gradually the Palestinian resistance 
organisations  would  take  on  the  question  and  in  light  of  the  debates  it 
conducted within its ranks and with intellectuals from all over the world coming 
to meet the  fiddaiyun. Soon Fatah would take a step and mark the difference 
between Judaism and Zionism, a differentiation that had not been made since 
the advent of the Nakba. Fatah would also be the first Palestinian organisation 
to invite the Jews to join them in their armed struggle and the revolutionary 
process71. After the lively debates on the question of the Democratic State in 
1968-1969, Fatah would try to develop and enrich its views. Views that it shared 
in a long article entitled “Palestinian revolution and the Jews” as early as 197072. 
This was the first exercise of its kind and as such it is worth lingering on. 
After recalling that the Jews had lived in peace with the Arabs for centuries, a 
70 Harkabi,  Yehoshafat,  “Israel's  Fateful  Hour”,  An  Interview by Robert  I.  Friedman,  World  Policy  
Journal 6(2), Spring 1989, pp. 357-370.
71 Gresh, Alain, OLP, histoire et stratégies. Vers l'État palestinien, op.cit., p.52.
72 Fatah,  “La  révolution  palestinienne  et  les  juifs”,  March-June,  1970.  Available  at: 
http://etoilerouge.chez-alice.fr/palestine/revpalest1.html
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concrete  experience  that  proved  it  to  be  possible,  Fatah  introduced  the 
principles on which the Democratic State it envisioned would be based. First, 
the future state would have to reject racism (all kinds) and would have to be 
non-sectarian.  Second,  all  Jewish  settlers  would  be  welcome  to  stay,  thus 
making it clear that it considered as obsolete article 6 of the Palestinian National 
Covenant.  Third,  the Palestinians would have to  develop education  and the 
learning of Hebrew as ways of avoiding chauvinistic discourses and attitudes. 
Fourth, contacts would have to be made with progressive Jews who also would 
be invited to participate in the armed struggle. 
Although  the  text  was  ground-breaking,  it  would  only  superficially 
address the  question of  the  coexistence with  the  Jews and the question of 
Zionism as a social given among Israeli population. And this may have been 
one of the greatest weaknesses of the Democratic state project.  It  stayed a 
principled  stand  and  lacked  profound  elaboration  and  thinking  about  the 
imbrication  of  Zionism  within  Israeli  Jewish  identity.  Moreover,  it  failed  to 
address the other dimensions of Judaism, other than the religious one and as 
such it could not provide a satisfactory platform for non Zionist Jews.
The question was then subject to further development when the DPFLP 
adopted the Democratic  State's  objective.  As we have seen in  the previous 
section,  even  though  its  position  was  tainted  with  ambiguity,  the  PLO held 
radical  ideas  compared  to  its  fellow  organisations  in  the  resistance.  In  an 
interview published in 1969 in the organisation's press organ, Nayef Hawatmeh, 
also called the progressive Israeli forces to join them in the struggle against 
Zionism and Imperialism, as without them and the Arab masses there was no 
possibility of victory73.
An  important  step  was  also  taken  by  Fatah  and  the  DPFLP in  seeking  to 
introduce an amendment to article 6 of  the 1968 Covenant dealing with the 
Jews. It wanted to enlarge the right to remain in Palestine to “all Jews liberated 
from colonialist views”. The amendment was however, never made due to the 
political developments. 
Later on, in 1974, Nayef Hawatmeh would even give an interview to be 
73 BDIC,  FD1404/1,  Hawatmeh,  Nayef,  “Interview”,  Al-Hurriya,  November  3,  1969.  (French 
translation)
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published in an Israeli newspaper, calling for dialogue and “peaceful relations 
between  Palestinians  and  Israelis”.  This  would  open  the  way  to  further 
rapprochement with the anti-Zionist  Israelis and to the launching of contacts 
with Zionist personalities who had expressed themselves in favour of a dialogue 
with the PLO and for a peace settlement.
Examples of contacts and collaboration
After  1967, and the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza,  the first  
contacts to take place between Israelis ad Palestinians occurred between the 
Palestinian section of the Jordanian Communist Party in the West Bank and the 
Israeli Communist Party (Rakah) which encompassed an Arab majority74. 
Theory  was  one  thing  and  practice  another,  and  indeed,  whilst  the 
Palestinians in the course defining their strategic objectives had come to vie the 
non-Zionist or anti-Zionist Israeli Jews as potential partners, in reality however, 
contacts were rather difficult to establish. Firstly, the latter only represented a 
tiny part  of  Israeli  population and second,  the resistance organisations were 
based outside the West Bank and Israel. So, contacts and debates were most 
likely to occur outside the region, most notably in Europe and the United States 
in the frame of conferences or meetings with the foreign Socialist organisations 
and peace movements. There, together, they would play a major role in the 
transmission of knowledge about the Palestine Question75.
Matzpen, played an important role in the Palestinian organisations overture to 
Israelis. Indeed, Matzpen, which was created in 1966, was openly anti-Zionist, 
and although it was a very small and marginal group, it became for years public 
enemy number one in Israel. The negative attention it enjoyed there made it 
also  known abroad,  where  its  members  were  invited  by numerous Socialist 
organisations  and  Arab  and  Palestinian  students'  organisations  and  by 
Palestinian  resistance  movements  with  which  they  developed  contacts. 
74 Rakah (acronym for Reshima Komunistit Hadasha – New Communist List) has grown out of Maki, the 
Original Israeli Communist Party from which it split in 1965. Contrary to the other branch of Maki, 
Rakah was anti-Zionist although it was pragmatic and had supported the UN partition resolution. It 
was recognised by the Soviet Union as the official Communist Party in Israel. 
75 Turbiner, Eran, Matzpen, 2003, 53min. (Documentary Film)
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Matzpen however, had its limits, and whilst it called for the de-Zionisation of 
Israel, the return of the Palestinian refugees and condemned the discriminatory 
policy of Israel, it also called the Palestinians to recognise the self-determination 
right of the “Hebrew nation”76.
“In this united and liberated Arab East, recognition will be granted to the  
right  of  self-determination (including the right to a separate state)  of  
each of  the  non-Arab nationalities  living  in  the  region,  including  the  
Israeli-Jewish nation. As part of the struggle for this revolution, Matzpen  
struggles for the overthrow of the Zionist regime and the abolition of all  
the  institutions,  laws,  regulations  and  practices  on  which  it  rests.  
Matzpen strives for a living-together of Arabs and Jews, based on full  
equality;  and  for  the  integration  of  this  country’s  two  peoples  –  the  
Israeli-Jewish  and  the  Palestinian-Arab  peoples  –  in  the  regional  
socialist union, on the basis of free choice. Matzpen works towards the  
development  of  internationalist  consciousness  among  both  peoples,  
which would make such integration possible”77. 
So, before the adoption of the phased or temporary programme, these 
notions were difficult to overcome as they were in direct contradiction with the 
goals of the Palestinian resistance. However, after 1973-1974, contacts were to 
develop with the Israeli “democratic forces”, notably with the Israeli Communist 
Party,  which  had  adopted  a  half-way  position.  Indeed,  although  it  rejected 
Zionism,  Rakah recognised UN resolution 181 and from the mid-1970s on, it 
had  adapted  its  discourse  to  the  facts  on  the  ground  by  calling  for  Israeli 
withdrawal from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and the establishment of a 
Palestinian State along Israel78. The PLO was to meet Rakah officially in 1977 in 
Prague79. 
Thus after 1976, the mainstream wing of the PLO would even start discussions 
with  Zionist  Israeli  organisations,  discussions  that  would  open  the  way  to 
negotiations and de jure acceptance of Israel80. 
76 The Socialist Organisation in Israel (Matzpen), The Palestine problem and the Israeli-Arab dispute,  
May 18, 1967. http://98.130.214.177/index.asp?u=120&p=doc1
77 This forms the twelfth point of the fundamental principles of Matzpen which were adopted in 1973 
and amended in 1978. Available on Matzpen's website: http://98.130.214.177/index.asp?p=principles
78 Rouhana, Nadim N.,  Palestinian Citizens in an Ethnic Jewish State: Identities in Conflict,  Dexter 
(Michigan) 1997, p.103.
79 Baron, Xavier, Les Palestiniens, un peuple, op.cit., p.389.
80 Alain Gresh, OLP, histoire et stratégies. Vers l'État palestinien, op.cit., pp.216-217. 
Actually, members of Fatah had already tried to engage – non-officially – in a contact with Israeli  
officials since 1974. 
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E.  From rejection of the two-state solution to its acceptance:   
the fading of the Democratic State solution
The Twelfth PNC, a turning point
Paradoxically, the 1973 war and the non-defeat of the Arab States led 
some of  the major political  organisations in the PLO to start  envisaging the 
establishment of a Palestinian State on part of Palestine as a step towards the 
ultimate strategic goal, the Democratic State. 
Following  the  October  war,  the  United  Nations  called  for  a  General 
Assembly meeting in Geneva to find a solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict. The 
new  international  developments  required  a  special  attention  from  the  PLO, 
which  wished to  avoid  any settlement  that  would  be reached without  them. 
Indeed,  the  war  and  the  awareness  of  the  Arab  States  and  Palestinian 
resistance limits, combined with the lack of interest for the Democratic State 
notion, and above all the worldwide status of the PLO at the very moment when 
there was an increase in peace efforts at an international level, hindered any 
advance on the diplomatic scene. Furthermore, this meant that it was unable to 
avoid  bilateral  agreements  that  would  without  any  doubt  be  made  at  the 
expense of the Palestinians. To this,  came to be added the demand by the 
Palestinian National Front in the Occupied Territories that the PLO participate in 
the Geneva Conference and demand a national authority in the West Bank81. 
Thus, the PLO was faced with a dilemma: acknowledge the new reality, adapt 
and impose its views on the international scene to avoid any settlement that 
would lead to the “liquidation” of the Palestine question, or reject any external 
political settlement and continue its previous policy. This dilemma was to be at 
the core of discussions between the leading organisations of the PLO between 
October 1973 and June 1974 date of the Twelfth PNC. Once again, the schism 
in  the PLO opposed on the one hand,  the  DPFLP – which  was the first  to 
81 Palestinian National Front in the Occupied Territories, “Letter to the Executive Committee of the  
Palestine Liberation Organisation”, December 1,  1973, in “Documents and Source Material:  Arab 
Documents  on Palestine and  the  Arab-Israeli  Conflict”,  Journal  of  Palestine Studies  3(3),  Spring 
1974, pp. 187-205.
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discuss national autonomy issues – with Fatah and the Saiqa, and on the other 
hand,  the  PFLP,  the  ALF  and  the  PFLP-GC82.  The  latter  would  eventually 
constitute  the  “rejectionist”  front  as  opposed  to  the  “moderates”83,a  schism 
which would reveal to be far more difficult to overcome than previously. 
The “moderates” advocated the position according to which the PLO had 
to  acknowledge  the  new  reality  by  proposing  realistic  solutions,  a  phased 
programme  towards  the  attainment  of  the  strategic  final  objective,  the 
Democratic State, but above all, by refusing to leave the Palestine Question to 
the care of others84. For them, the PLO could maintain its policy of refusal as 
long as the state of war prevailed between the Arabs and Israel, however, that 
state of war they thought would soon end, making urgent the need for a “new 
formula”  that  would enable  them to continue the  struggle although the best 
tactical step at the moment was to prevent the state of war from coming to an 
end85. For Nayef Hawatmeh, such a formula had to avoid what happened with 
the All-Palestine Government, which had become an empty shell. So, for that 
purpose,  it  had  to  propose  a  “concrete  programme  which  would  make  it 
possible to frustrate action involving surrender and liquidation and to frustrate 
the annexationist and expansionist plan whether expansion on the part of Israel 
or annexation on the part of King Hussein”86. This meant that the Palestinians 
had  to  struggle  and  not  surrender  and  unambiguously  demand  a  national 
government in part of Palestine. To them, that struggle had to be conducted at 
the Arab and international levels because the Geneva Conference would not 
give it up. Such a struggle seemed to be more feasible for the time being as the 
idea was to liberate a portion of Palestine, which was indeed only inhabited by 
Palestinians. This, insisted Abu Iyad (Fatah) was not the final objective but a 
stage. There was no intention of choosing a settlement, as it would go against 
82 The PFLP-GC (al-Jabaha al-sha’abiyyah li-Tahrir Filastin-Qiyada al-‘Am) is another group created in 
November 1968, after a split within the PFLP on the matter of Palestinian inference in the Arab States'  
affairs. Headed by Ahmad Jibril, it is considered to be historically close to Syria. 
The PFLP-GC's website: http://www.palestinesons.com/   
To those, we could add the Palestinian Popular Struggle Front (PPSF).
83 Muslih, Muhammad Y., “Moderates and Rejectionists within the Palestine Liberation Organisation”, 
Middle East Journal 30(2), Spring 1976, pp. 127-140.
84 Abu Iyad, “Après octobre, la nouvelle stratégie palestinienne”, in Khader Bishara and Naim, Textes de 
la révolution palestinienne, op.cit., pp.189-194.
85 Interviews with Resistance Leaders  Nayef  Hawatmeh,  Zuhair  Mohsen,  George  Habbash and Abu 
Iyad,  in  “Documents  and  Source  Material:  Arab  Documents  on  Palestine  and  the  Arab-Israeli 
Conflict”, Journal of Palestine Studies 3(3), Spring 1974, pp. 187-205.
86 Ibid.
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the “basic  principles” of  the resistance organisations.  So,  the issue was not 
about the goal of the resistance, which was known and unchanged, but what 
“may be imposed on us and how to confront it, and naturally we shall not accept 
anything that involves surrender”. The idea then, was to draft a programme that 
would address the current problems and hold “fast to the historical right and to 
future long-term problems”87. However, for this to be effective, the programme to 
be adopted should include all organisations of the resistance in order to show a 
united front to Israel. The “moderates” vision was also shared by a growing 
number of organisations and individuals within the West Bank itself where they 
demanded the end of occupation.
For the PFLP, nevertheless, the international move was important but not 
decisive, and it analysed the international powers' rush to reach an agreement 
as a will to preserve their interests that were constantly endangered by the state 
of  war88.  Moreover,  it  considered  that  the  best  that  could  happen  for  the 
Palestinians and the Arabs on the International scene would be a resolution that 
would take on the terms of the USSR's proposal itself based on resolution 242, 
and  this  was  very  unlikely  to  happen  in  view  of  the  Israeli  and  American 
pressure.  And even then,  the  problem would  still  persist  with  the  continued 
existence of Israel. Continuing in that direction, Habash advocated a position 
detached from the USSR's and made known the Palestinian decision to refuse 
to make any concession89.  For Georges Habash and his  courant,  a national 
democratic jurisdiction over the occupied territories presented by factions of the 
PLO  would  be  impossible  without  the  de-facto  recognition  of  Israel,  the 
signature of peace and the establishment of a diplomatic representation and 
thus constitute a deep contradiction with the PLO's rejection of resolution 242. 
Furthermore, even if it decided to go ahead, the PLO would find it impossible 
without  redrawing its  programme (political,  economic and military).  Finally,  it 
rejected this position and underlined that Israel would never withdraw from the 
West Bank unless it could hand over to “a reactionary force or a force that is 
87 Ibid.
88 Habash, George, “Non à la négociation et à un État provisoire”, 1974, in Khader Bishara and Naim, 
Textes de la révolution palestinienne, op.cit., pp.237-244.
89 Interviews with Resistance Leaders  Nayef  Hawatmeh,  Zuhair  Mohsen,  George  Habbash and Abu 
Iyad,  in  “Documents  and  Source  Material:  Arab  Documents  on  Palestine  and  the  Arab-Israeli 
Conflict”, op.cit., pp. 187-205.
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ready to surrender”90. Moreover, Habash was persuaded that the only state that 
would be presented to the Palestinians, if they ever were to be presented a 
state  at  all,  would  be  a  “rump state”,  dominated by the  Arab reactionaries, 
Zionism and Imperialism91. These views were shared by the General Union of 
the Palestinians Students (GUPS), one of the most important organisations of 
the PLO92.
Following these debates, and although no consensus seemed to emerge, 
by February,  Fatah,  the  DPFLP and the  Saiqa signed a common document 
calling for a phased solution as a working basis for the Executive Committee of 
the PLO. Their considerations had been reinforced by the Arab States, notably 
Egypt  –  where  Sadat  even  invited  the  PLO  to  participate  in  the  Geneva 
Conference – and Syria, as well as the Arab Summit in November 1973 which,  
besides  recognising  the  PLO  as  the  sole  representative  of  the  Palestinian 
people, stated that the immediate objective was the liberation of the occupied 
territories93. To that, should be added the influence of the USSR, a PLO ally, 
which as we have seen called for a political settlement. As a consequence of 
the  discussions  on  the  basis  of  the  document  presented  by  the  three 
organisations in favour of a national authority,  and after heated debates, the 
PNC adopted its Ten-Point Programme in 1974. Of particular interest here are 
the following points:
1. To reaffirm the Palestine Liberation Organisation's previous attitude  
to Resolution 242, which obliterates the national right of our people  
and deals with the cause of our people as a problem of refugees. The  
Council therefore refuses to have anything to do with this resolution at  
any level, Arab or international, including the Geneva Conference.
2. The Liberation Organisation will  employ all  means, and first  and  
foremost  armed  struggle,  to  liberate  Palestinian  territory  and  to  
establish the independent combatant national authority for the people  
over  every  part  of  Palestinian  territory  that  is  liberated.  This  will  
require  further  changes  being  effected  in  the  balance  of  power  in  
favour of our people and their struggle.
3. The Liberation Organisation will struggle against any proposal for a  
Palestinian  entity  the  price  of  which  is  recognition,  peace,  secure  
frontiers, renunciation of national rights and the deprival of our people  
90 Ibid.; Habash, George, “Non à la négociation et à un État provisoire”, 1974,, op.cit.,
91 Habash, George, “Non à la négociation et à un État provisoire”, 1974, op.cit..
92 Gresh, Alain, OLP, histoire et stratégies. Vers l'État palestinien, op.cit, p.165
93 Secret Resolutions of the Algiers Summit Conference, AI-Nahar, Beirut, December 4,1973. Available 
at:  http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Foreign+Relations/Israels+Foreign+Relations+since+1947/1947-
1974/19+Declaration+of+the+Arab+Summit+Conference+at+Al.htm
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of their right to return and their right to self-determination on the soil of  
their homeland.
4. Any step taken towards liberation is a step towards the realisation  
of  the  Liberation  Organisation's  strategy  of  establishing  the  
democratic Palestinian state specified in the resolutions of previous  
Palestinian National Councils.
8. Once it is established, the Palestinian national authority will strive  
to  achieve  a  union  of  the  confrontation  countries,  with  the  aim of  
completing  the  liberation  of  all  Palestinian  territory,  and  as  a  step  
along the road to comprehensive Arab unity”94.
The Twelfth PNC was a turning point, and afterwards, the PLO would be 
granted a status of observer at the United Nations. In the meanwhile, the Arab 
States had asked for a session on the Palestine Question with the presence of 
a representative of the PLO, this would produce the famous speech by Arafat 
on November 14, 1974.  A speech during which,  he reiterated that the Jews 
were part of the Palestinian perspective for a Democratic State95. 
Moreover, following the Twelfth PNC, the PLO had been invited by the General 
Assembly  of  the  United  Nations  to  participate  in  its  works  as  an  observer.  
Furthermore,  the  latter  had  voted  resolution  3236  which  recognised  the 
“inalienable rights of the Palestinian people”, its right to self-determination and 
to independence and sovereignty.  From then on, the PLO would call  for the 
International Peace Conference of Geneva and even announced that it would 
participate.  Immediately  after  the  adoption  of  the  Ten-Point  programme,  the 
PFLP had expressed its rejection of it, indeed, the original text it had agreed to 
sign stipulated the rejection of negotiations, a mention that disappeared from 
the  adopted  programme.  Then,  it  was  clear  that  the  PLO's  agreement  to 
participate in the international forum meant the growing acceptance of a political  
settlement at the expense of armed struggle96. As a consequence, the PFLP 
decided to withdraw from the Executive Committee of the PLO although not 
from the PLO itself. 
94 UNISPAL, Political Programme of 9 June 1974, 12th Palestine National Council, June 9, 1974.
95 Speech by Yasser Arafat before the United Nations General Assembly in Geneva:  http://www.monde-
diplomatique.fr/cahier/proche-orient/arafat74-en
96 Muslih, Muhammad, “Towards Coexistence: An Analysis of the Resolutions of the Palestine National  
Council”,  op.cit., pp. 3-29.
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From the Ten Point Programme to  the  Palestinian Declaration of  
Independence
Actually, as argued by Rashid Khalidi, long before 1988, the PLO had 
already endorsed  the  two-state  solution  although not  yet  officially97.  Indeed, 
firstly, the PNC had ruled on the question of “national authority” vs “state” by 
adopting the latter  during its  meeting in  197698,  and secondly,  one episode, 
documented  by  Xavier  Baron,  even  shows  that  as  early  as  1977,  as  a 
consequence of the directs talks that started in 1976, the PLO was ready to 
content  itself  with  sovereignty  over  the  West  Bank  and  the  Gaza  Strip99. 
However,  we  could  highlight  four  main  events  that  would  shape  the  PLO's 
march towards the formal acceptance of partition and of the two-state solution: 
Sadat's visit to Israel and the consequent Camp David agreements, the Fahd 
plan,  the  Israeli  invasion  of  Lebanon  followed  by  the  Reagan  Middle  East 
Initiative and the first Intifada.
Whereas  the  war  in  Lebanon  was  raging,  Sadat  decided  to  start 
negotiating with Israel without any consultation with the Arab States or the PLO. 
His  decision  was  received  as  a  blow  to  Arab  Unity,  and  he  was  rapidly 
condemned, by all the Arab States. Nevertheless, the United States were soon 
to intervene in this new “peace process” that would eventually end up in 1979, 
with the Camp David Agreements, which, beside being based on resolution 242, 
made no mention of the self-determination rights of the Palestinians, nor the 
right  of  return and excluded the Palestinians from the discussion.  Rather,  it  
proposed a” self-government by the Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza 
in  association  with  Jordan”,  meaning  in  the  frame  of  a  confederation  with 
Jordan100. The PLO rejected the Agreements during its Fifteenth PNC. 
The  deterioration  of  the  Palestinians'  situation  in  Lebanon  with  the 
determination of  the Israelis  to  put  an end to  the PLO, led Saudi  Arabia to 
present its own peace plan in August 1981. The latter was introduced as a basis 
97 Khalidi, Rashid, “The Palestinian Dilemma: PLO Policy after Lebanon”, Journal of Palestine Studies  
15(1), Autumn 1985, pp. 88-103.
98 Baron, Xavier, Les Palestiniens, un peuple, op.cit., p.382.
99 Ibid., pp.387-389.
100 “The Reagan peace plan, September 1, 1982”, in Rabinovitch, Itamar and Jehuda Reinharz (eds.), 
Israel and the Middle East, documents and readings on society, politics and foreign relations, pre-
1948 to the present, Lebanon (U.S) 2008, pp.394-398.
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for negotiations, and established a de facto acceptance of resolution 242 and 
181: 
• “Israel  to  withdraw  from  all  Arab  territory  occupied  in  1967,  
including Arab Jerusalem.
• Israeli settlements built on Arab land after 1967 to be dismantled,  
including those in Arab Jerusalem.
• A guarantee of  freedom of  worship for  all  religions in  the Holy  
Places.
• An affirmation of the right of the Palestinian Arab people to return  
to their homes and compensation for those who do not wish to return.
• The West Bank and the Gaza Strip to have a transitional period  
under the auspices of the United Nations for a period not exceeding  
several months.
• An independent Palestinian State should be set up with Jerusalem  
as its capital.
• All  States  in  the  region  should  be able  to  live in  peace in  the  
region.
• The United Nations or Member States of the United Nations to  
guarantee the carrying out of these provisions.101”
The reception of the plan within the organisations of the PLO was mixed. 
Fatah  itself  was  divided  on  the  question,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  its  Central 
Committee's twelve men core supported it whereas the other members of the 
Committee  rejected  it.  This  led  them  to  discuss  the  matter  during  their 
Revolutionary Council  meetings but even then, they could not reach a clear 
position and make a decision. For the PFLP, the proposal implied recognition of 
Israel,  so  it  rejected  it  immediately.  The  traditional  rift  within  the  PLO  was 
insurmountable so that no decision could be made102. This indecision would be 
confirmed during the Arab Summit in Fez in November of that same year103. 
Soon would Israel invade Lebanon – June 1982 – with the stated objective of 
definitively getting rid of the PLO and installing a more favourable Lebanese 
regime104. The chaos and massacres perpetrated in the Palestinian camps by 
Christian militias under  the watch of Israel  would once again prove to  be a 
turning point in the PLO's life and evolution. The leadership would once again 
101 UNISPAL, “Eight Point Peace Plan by Crown Prince Fahd ibn Abd al-Aziz of Saudi Arabia”, August 
7, 1981.
102 Cobban,  Helena,  The Palestinian Liberation Organisation: people,  power and politics,  New York 
1984, pp.13-115.
103 Ibid.
104 Morris, Benny, Righteous victims, op.cit., p.509.
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be expelled this  time to  settle  in  Tunis,  far  away from Palestine.  The crisis 
created by the expulsion from Beirut would inspire the Reagan peace initiative 
and bring back the Fahd plan among the Arab institutions. However, the former 
was only a mere reformulation of the Camp David Agreements with a reiteration 
of the exclusion of the PLO, the rejection of a Palestinian State and a reminder  
of the Jordanian option as it envisaged the merging of the occupied territories 
with  Jordan105.  It  was  thus,  rejected  by  the  PLO  and  the  Arab  States106.  
Responding  to  the  Reagan  Middle  East  initiative,  Saudi  Arabia  re-
submitted the Fahd Plan at the Fez Arab Summit in September 1982107. This 
plan was adopted unanimously by the PLO during its Sixteenth PNC, that same 
year, although it had tried to downplay it, describing it as the "minimum for the 
political  activity  of  the  Arab  states”.  From  the  acceptance  of  the  two-state 
solution to its proclamation there was only a step. And by the Eighteenth PNC, 
the Fahd plan or the Fez Plan, was presented as “the framework for Arab action 
at the international level to achieve a solution to the Palestine question and to 
regain the occupied Arab territories”108.  Then,  the greater colonisation of the 
West  Bank  and  the  situation  it  had  led  to  eventually  gave  rise  to  the  first 
Intifada,  bringing  the  Palestinian  question  back  to  the  forefront  of  the 
international scene, a moment that was then chosen by the PLO to definitively 
break with its objectives of liberating Palestine and establishing a Democratic 
State,  introducing  a  shift  from the  struggle  to  national  liberation  to  national 
sovereignty.  This shift is eloquently expressed in Arabic when considering the 
move  from the  idea  of  Watan to  Dawla,  from Homeland  to  Statehood  and 
Chairman Arafat made it clear when the PLO arrived at the end of the road in 
1988 and accepted the principle of partition:  
“The situation in our Palestinian homeland (Watan) can bear no more  
waiting.  Our  people  and  our  children,  leading  our  march  to  liberty,  
holding aloft the torch of freedom, are being martyred daily for the sake  
105 Khader, Bishara,  L'Europe et la Palestine, pp.240-241, Tessler, Mark,  A history of the Palestinian-
Israeli conflict, p.603.
106 PLO, Report of the PLO Central Council, November 25, 1982, in “Documents and Source Material: 
Documents on Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict”,  Journal of Palestine Studies 12(2), Winter, 
1983, pp. 199-236.
107 Final statement of the Twelfth Arab Summit in Fez, September 9, 1982, in “Documents and Source 
Material: Documents on Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict”, Journal of Palestine Studies 12(2), 
Winter, 1983, pp. 199-236.
108 “Resolutions of the eighteenth session of the Palestine National Council (PNC), Algiers, April 26,  
1987”,  in Quandt,  William B.,  The Middle East.  Ten years  after  Camp David,  Washington 1988, 
pp.480-483.
257
of ending the occupation and laying the foundation of peace in their  
free, independent homeland, and in the region as a whole.
For  this  reason,  the  Palestine  National  Council,  taking  into  
consideration the circumstances of the Palestinians and the Israelis and  
the need for a spirit of tolerance between them, built its resolutions on  
foundations of realism.
The  United  Nations  bears  a  historic,  extraordinary  responsibility  
towards our  people  and their  rights.  More than forty  years  ago,  the  
United Nations, in its Resolution 181, decided on the establishment of  
two states  in  Palestine,  one Palestinian  Arab and the other  Jewish.  
Despite the historic wrong that was done to our people, it is our view  
today that the said resolution continues to meet the requirements of  
International legitimacy which guarantee the Palestinian Arab people’s  
right to sovereignty and national independence”109.
Chairman Y. Arafat's speech at the UN in 1988 is representative of this change 
of  political  position.  When advancing  the  historical  rights  of  the  Palestinian 
people,  Yasser  Arafat  used  the  term  “Watan”;  he  then  operated  a  shift  in 
semantics and used the terms “sovereignty and national independence”. This 
move in semantics tends to reflect the move in the PLO's policy – the shift from 
Watan to Dawla – and represents the end of the official discourse of alternatives 
for a Unitarian solution and a united Palestine, which prevailed until then110. 
F. Conclusion 
After  the  Nakba,  the  idea  of  a  common  state  in  a  united  Palestine 
disappeared. As we have seen in the previous chapter, as soon as the State of  
Israel proclaimed its independence, the bi-nationalists abandoned their idea of a 
bi-national state. As for the Palestinians, they did not measure up to the Zionist  
movement in their lobbying work. For numerous reasons explained above, they 
failed to attract the sympathies of the United States although the Department of 
State  had been  trying  to  keep an  objective  position  driven only  by the  US 
interests. pushed into forced exile and saw their lands fall under  and political 
109 Excerpt from Yasser Arafat's speech at the United Nations General Assembly in Geneva on the 13 th of 
December 1988.
110 Whereas all the parties involved in the PLO traditionally positioned against partition, in favour of a  
Democratic State, with the move towards an acceptance of partition – acceptance sanctioned with the 
advent of the Oslo Agreement – emerged the idea of Palestine united under an Islamic government.
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Neither the bi-nationalists nor the Palestinians' projects of a united Palestine 
with a common state could survive the Nakba. 
While  the  Israelis  were  consolidating  their  power  over  seventy  eight 
percent  of  Palestine and putting the Palestinians that could not  be expelled 
under military rule, the Palestinians and Arabs nourished only one idea, take 
back what had been seized by the Zionist militias and find their way back home. 
As we have seen above, they have started to organise despite their dispersion 
however, among the multitude of organisations, associations and armed groups 
there  seemed  to  develop  no  concrete  political  programme  and  none  that 
clarified the future of Palestine after its liberation from the hands of the Zionist 
settlers. 
So, while the Arabs and Palestinians refused to recognise the de facto partition 
of  Palestine,  the  colonial  fact  would  not  enable  them  to  voice  unitarian 
propositions. 
However, the re-organisation of the Palestinian people notably through 
the  structure  of  the  PLO  from  the  mid-1960s  onwards  would  introduce  a 
qualitative change as it would give back the Palestinians a representative organ 
and open the way to political dialogue and programme elaboration. This, added 
to the conclusions of the debate about the  Kiyan al Falistini in the late 1950s 
among the Arab leaders would lead the Palestinians to search for a clear and 
more pragmatic political programme. Such a programme would start to emerge 
in  the  successive  charters  of  the  PLO in  1964 and 1968.  The PLO's  1964 
charter would reintroduce the Jewish question by stating that the Jews from 
Palestinian  descent  would  be  welcome  to  stay  as  members  of  the  future 
Palestinian  entity.  A step  further  was  taken  when  the  second  charter  was 
adopted in 1968. 
Fatah would shaken the Palestinian political class when it would for the 
first time advocate a democratic state for all its citizens as the only progressive 
solution to the Palestine question. Introducing the idea of a unified independent 
Palestinian Arab state as the frame for Palestinian revolution and considering 
the Jews as possible citizens of such a state,  the movement would open a 
debate  and  polemics  that  would  end  with  the  adoption  by  the  PLO  of  the 
principle of a democratic non-secular state in 1971. Fatah had indeed, been 
followed by the PDFLP, the PFLP and soon the PLO in its entirety endorsed the 
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same objective: the de-partition of Palestine and the raising of a democratic and 
non sectarian state. However, the regional political situation and the absence of 
interest  among the  anti-Zionist  Israeli  fringes  cut  short  the  debate  and   no 
detailed programme could emerge. Nor could the “Jewish question” be properly 
addressed. 
In the aftermath of the 1973 war, the project of a democratic state was 
already  sinking   and  partition  in  view  of  proper  sovereignty  started  to  be 
discussed  as  a  possibility  although  a  temporary  one.  A  possibility  that 
progressively  started  to  appear  as  a  desirable  one  too.  Fearing  that  the 
Palestine question would be discussed and addressed in its absence, all  the 
more with resolution 242 at the core of the discussions, the PLO eventually 
decided to participate to any international  conference that would take place. 
Thus,  it  de  facto  recognised  the  legitimacy  of  Israel  as  a  party  to  the 
discussions. Then after, subject to unbearable pressure from the United States 
at a moment when its ally, the USSR was itself passing through a great crisis,  
the PLO – out of pragmatism – decided to adopt partition as a basis of future 
negotiations. 
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Epilogue
From the “historical compromise” to Oslo
 The historical compromise made by the PLO in 1988, opened the way to 
discussions between  the  PLO and the  United  States,  and later  to  a  secret 
channel of negotiations between Israel and the PLO in Oslo.  The direct talks 
resulted in the Oslo Agreements which made no mention of a Palestinian State 
or  of  the  Palestinians'  rights1.  Moreover,  the   agreement  consecrated  the 
dichotomy between the principle of self-determination and the right of return2 by 
separating  the  Palestinians  into  groups  with  incompatible  rights:  the 
Palestinians  from the  OPT,  the  refugees  whose  fate  lied  in  the  final  status 
negotiations, and the Palestinians living in Israel who were totally absent from 
the talks3. 
The core issues of the Palestine Question, among which the refugee problem, 
the occupation, the territorial borders, Jerusalem and the settlements were left  
for the final status negotiations, supposed to take place within a maximum of 
three years4.
The negotiations led two years later to the creation and recognition of the 
Palestinian  Interim  Self-Government  Authority  in  charge  of  dealing  with  the 
transfer of power issues as well as the  division of the Palestinian territories into 
three areas – A, B, and C. Area A was under exclusive Palestinian control, area 
B was under Palestinian civil authority but Israeli military control and area C was 
under exclusive Israeli control5. 
1 The Oslo Agreements (Oslo I) were reached in September 1993. It contained two parts, the first being 
the mutual recognition between the Israeli State and the PLO in the form of Letters and the second, a  
Declaration of Principles (DoP), which was in fact “an agenda for negotiations on Palestinian self-
government in the OPT (Occupied Palestinian Territories), beginning with Gaza and Jericho” 
2 Nabulsi, Karma, “Justice as the way forward”, in Hilal, Jamil (ed.), Where now for Palestine? , The  
demise of the two-state solution, London, 2007, pp. 233-252. 
3 Massad, Joseph, “Return or permanent exile? Palestinian refugees and the ends of Oslo”, 1998, in The 
Persistence of the Palestinian Question. Essays on Zionism and the Palestinians, New York, 2006, 
pp.114-128.
4 Unispal, A/48/486 S/26560, “Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements”, 
September 13, 1993. 
5 This is known as the Interim Agreement on the West Bank and Gaza Strip or Oslo II which was signed 
in September 1995.
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The peace process in lieu of putting an end to the occupation and colonisation 
in the OPT, accelerated them through its “matrix of control”6. This “matrix” rested 
on the two dimensions that had always driven Zionist and later Israeli policy: 
territory and demography. So that, by the late 1990s, Jerusalem was completely 
encircled by settlements and the West Bank and Gaza were perforated with 
colonies7.  And indeed, the stipulations of the DoP had left  plenty of time for 
Israel to continue its colonisation policy in the West Bank. A policy that was 
without respite, even during the negotiations8.
Extensions of the Israeli territory, the settlements enjoy all the services 
and goods available in every city and this, separately and independently from 
their Arab Palestinian environment. Indeed, the settlements are linked together 
by bypass roads which, as well as being reserved for the exclusive use of the 
settlers, are also a means of confiscating more land, dividing the territory and 
separating villages and cities, leading to cantonisation9. To these, should also 
be added the check-points, which ensure control over the movement of people 
and  goods.  These  measures  grant  Israel  with  total  control  over  the  OPT10. 
Besides  enabling  Israel  to  control  more  land  and  expand  its  territory, 
geographical and territorial control, allowed it to substantiate the fragmentation 
of Palestinian society and thus of Palestinian political life with the inability to 
produce  a  comprehensive  political  and  resistance  strategy.  Cantonised  into 
“ethnic  reservations”11 or  bantustans.  This  is  what  Salah  Abd  al-Jawad  has 
addressed as the sociocide, whilst other political scientists have addressed the 
situation in terms of politicide, spaciocide, apartheid or matrix of control12. 
As a consequence of the situation in the OPT, the Palestinians launched 
what has come to be known as the second Intifada. This was to put an end to 
6 Khalidi, Rashid The Iron cage, op.cit., p.200.
7 Figures and numbers may be found in B'Tselem, “Land Grab: Israel's Settlement Policy in the West 
Bank”,  May  2002,  pp.  16-17.  Document  available  at: 
http://www.btselem.org/download/200205_land_grab_eng.pdf
8 Khalidi, Rashid, The Iron cage, op.cit., p.197.
9 Said, Edward W., “Facts, facts and more facts”, December 1993, in Peace and its discontents. op.cit.,  
pp.26-31.
10 Betselem, “Closure”, January 1, 2012. http://www.btselem.org/freedom_of_movement/closure
11 Leila Farsakh, Interview by Eyal Sivan, Summer 2011.
12 Abdel Jawad, Salah, “A Palestinian sociocide?”, Presentation during the Fourth session of the Russell  
Tribunal on Palestine, New York, October 6-7, 2012.
Abdel Jawad explains that besides the ethnic cleansing of 1947-1949, there has, since 1967, been an 
on-going process of destroying the Palestinians, “not only as a political national group but also as a  
society”.
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the “peace process” but also lead to reinforced colonisation of the OPT. 
Post-Oslo anti-partitionism
The persistence of anti-partitionism has however been largely ignored 
and relegated to the dustbin of History in favour of a solution which has proven 
impossible to implement as it bore within it the reasons and the seeds of its 
failure. Indeed, failing to acknowledge and tackle Zionism as a settler colonial 
movement,  the  international  community,  by  engaging  in  the  partition  of 
Palestine, has legitimised colonialism there. And indeed, more than sixty years 
after the 1947 partition resolution, the colonial fact has come to invalidate the 
geographical  criteria  through  what  Virgina  Tilley  has  called  “the  immovable 
obstacles on the ground”13 and has brought the demographic criteria14 back to 
the forefront. As we are about to see, just as the strategy of Israel is in direct 
continuity of the strategy of the Zionist movement, the arguments of the post-
Oslo  anti-partitionists  mirror  those  of  the  anti-partitionists  both  during  the 
mandate era and after. 
Criticisms of the Oslo Accords and their consequences have led to the 
denunciation of the two-state solution and partition and to the re-emergence of 
anti-partitionist and one-statist reflections as a way of forming a political solution 
that meets the reality on the ground. Today, proponents of the single state are 
essentially to be found in three groups, Palestinian citizens of Israel; Palestinian 
refugees and those in the OPT; and anti-Zionist Israeli Jews. Using reality on 
the ground as a tool to criticise and condemn Zionism as a colonial ideology, the 
anti-partitionists  support  a  return  to  pre-1948  Palestine  as  the  only  way  to 
encompass all  the dimensions of  the Palestine Question and develop a fair 
solution – and not just to end the occupation and colonisation of the OPT. Thus, 
the colonial paradigm becomes the only possible starting point for addressing 
the Palestinian Question15.  Such a return, in itself, highlights the rejection of 
separation and partition, the countering of the demographic discourse and the 
need for de-Zionisation and decolonisation of Israel.
The reality on the ground, as underlined by all the proponents of a one-
13 Tilley, Virginia, The One-state Solution: a breakthrough for peace in the Israeli-Palestinian deadlock, 
Manchester, 2005, pp.19-51.
14 Ilan Pappe, Interview by Eyal Sivan, Summer 2011.
15 Nadim Rouhana, Interview by Eyal Sivan, Summer 2011.
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state solution, is that there is only one ruler in Palestine, the Israeli State, which 
has decision making power not only over everything that happens in Israel but 
also in the OPT, with one Supreme Court, one army and one parliament16. All 
this, making “the Green Line a psychological border rather than a physical one” 
as on the ground the West Bank and Gaza were annexed in 1967 and partition 
experienced  only  on  a  temporary  basis  between  1948  and  196717.  Israel's 
control over all of historical Palestine has led – as we have mentioned above – 
to the disintegration of the Palestinian space, a disintegration that started, as we 
have  seen  in  Chapter  Three,  after  the  1967  war,  but  that  accelerated 
considerably after the start of the so-called “peace process”, thus creating the 
fragmentation  of  the  Palestinian  society  through  a  process  of  sociocide  or 
apartheid18. 
As a consequence, this reality reveals that partition and the two-state 
solution  have  been  for  the  most  part  a  mere  discourse.  As  underlined  by 
Ruchama Marton, one of the present proponents of a common or single state, 
Israel's view of partition, i.e. “what is mine is mine and what is yours is mine”, is  
not partition19. It could not have been otherwise, according to the proponents of 
a  one-state  solution:  Zionism is  inherently  expansionist.  Thus,  the  model  of 
partition  is  seen  by  the  one-statists  as  neither  logical  nor  ethical.  Yehuda 
Shenhav argues that “this model is not moral, it is racist. It does not take into 
account  the  lack  of  correspondence  between  territory  and  population”. 
Following Hannah Arendt, Shenhav's main criticism concerns the lack of critical 
analysis of the concept of sovereignty on which the two-state solution is based. 
“This is a European colonial concept. It permits to cleanse an area from  
its  population  and to  eliminate   purify  an  area of  population  and to  
eliminate a race. […] If the wish is to have a total adequation of the  
territory, the sovereignty and the identity, then there is no other choice  
than transfer. This model leads to transfer.20” 
This is also the conclusion drawn by Amnon Raz-Krakotzkin who explains that 
“partition is based on the separation of the Palestinians into different  
categories. The second-zone citizens of Israel, those who live in the  
demilitarised Palestinian State provided that we can qualify it for a full  
16 Hassan Jabareen, Interview by Eyal Sivan, Summer 2011.
17 Meron Benvenisti, Interview by Eyal Sivan, Summer 2011.
18 Leila Farsakh, Interview by Eyal Sivan, Summer 2011.
19 Marton, Ruchama, Interview by Eyal Sivan, Summer 2011. 
20 Yehuda Shenhav, Interview by Eyal Sivan, Autumn 2011.
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state, and even though we considered it as a state. Finally, there are  
the refugees who have no rights at  all.  Partition implies anyway the  
denial  of  rights.  This  is  what  underlies  it”.  Moreover,  he  continues, 
“Every partition implies transfer. Establishing the State of Israel as a  
Jewish  State,  necessarily  implied  the  expulsion  of  the  Palestinian  
population”21. 
So,  the  focus  on  the  return  to  1948,  also  allows  us  to  address  the 
Question  of  Palestine  as  a  whole  and  reintroduce  all  the  sections  of  the 
Palestinian people into the debate – the refugees, the Palestinians who stayed 
in Israel and those who where reintegrated in the Israeli “matrix of control” after 
1967. This therefore, places the struggle for equal rights and especially for the 
right of return, which was never addressed in the numerous peace agreements 
and discussions, at the centre of the question22. As argued by Ilan Pappe, “there 
is no geographical dimension any more, but a strong demographic dimension. If 
one considers that dimension outside the nationalist, ethnic, religious or Zionist  
perspectives, then the question of the right of return becomes much less thorny. 
It becomes a simple practical question”23. For the Palestinian advocates of a 
one-state  solution,  this  calls  for  a  popular  Palestinian  re-appropriation  of 
reflection on the right of return24 and all other questions so as to create a real 
movement for a common state. 
Once  the  terms of  the  conflict  are  transposed  from a  question  of  territorial 
sovereignty inside a two-state paradigm to a one-state paradigm, through the 
de-Zionisation of Palestine, and the de-partition of the discourse on peace is 
finalised,  then,  and  only  then,  may real  progress  towards  the  unification  of 
Palestine begin. 
21 Amnon Raz-Krakotzkin, Interview by Eyal Sivan, Summer 2011.
22 The  centrality  of  the  right  of  return  is  a  feature  of  all  the  advocates  of  a  one-state  solution. 
Nevertheless, we could quote Hassan Jabareen:  “The conflict revolves around two things. The Law of 
Return and the Right of Return, the rest are footnotes”. Interview by Eyal Sivan, Summer 2011.
23 Ilan Pappe, Interview by Eyal Sivan, Summer 2011.
24 Sandi Hilal, Interview by Eyal Sivan, Autumn 2011.
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Conclusion:  The persistence of anti-partitionism
Developments  on  the  ground  and  the  obvious  failure  of  the  “peace 
process”, besides enabling Israel to continue its seizure of the West Bank and 
the  Gaza  Strip,  also  led  to  the  resurgence  of  an  anti-partition discourse.  A 
resurgence  in  which  Edward  Said  played  a  central  role,  first  through  his 
constant critical analysis of the Oslo agreements and then, in his analysis of 
Zionism as an obstacle to coexistence. He rather advocated the establishment 
of a bi-national Israeli-Palestinian state as the only way to achieve peace. 
“Given the collapse of the Netanyahu Government over the Wye peace  
agreement, it is time to question whether the entire process begun in  
Oslo  in  1993  is  the  right  instrument  for  bringing  peace  between  
Palestinians and Israelis. It is my view that the peace process has in  
fact put off the real reconciliation that must occur if the hundred-year  
war between Zionism and the Palestinian people is to end. Oslo set the  
stage for separation, but real peace can come only with a binational  
Israeli-Palestinian state”1. 
Said addressed the impossibility of finding a solution to the Palestine question 
as long as Zionism prevailed and he supported developing the concept and the 
practice of citizenship as “the main vehicle for coexistence”2. 
Said's  position  was  not  new and  it  finds  some echoes  in  history,  as 
diverse  forms  of  unitarian  anti-partitionist  perspectives  rose  out  each  time 
partition imposed itself on the local, regional and international scene. So, as we 
have seen throughout this thesis, anti-partitionism has always been part of the 
equation from the very first appearance of the principle of partition in the Middle 
East. 
As we saw in Chapter I, as early as 1915, Sharif Hussein was strongly 
opposed to the exclusion of certain parts of the Arab territories of the Ottoman 
Empire – including Lebanon and Palestine – from the McMahon pledges. His 
opposition  that  was  shared  by  the  Arab  Nationalists'  societies  has  the 
particularity to directly stem from a unitarian vision that prevailed before the 
1 Said, Edwards W., “The One-State Solution”, January 10, 1999, New York Times.
2 Said, Edward, “The One-state solution”, The New York Times, 10 January 1999. His arguments would 
find echoes by Azmi Bishara, Omar Barghouti, Leila Farsakh and numerous others.
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colonial  introduction  of  France  and  Great  Britain,  it  was  a  reaction  to  the 
discriminatory and separatist Young Turks policy in the Ottoman Empire. The 
opposition to partition grew further when it appeared after WWI and during the 
Paris Peace Conference,  that the Great  Powers and the League of  Nations 
would not support Greater Syria's independence as a unitary state and would 
instead adopt the principle of partition as a way to secure the colonial aims of 
Great Britain and France together with a Jewish National Home in Palestine. 
Moreover, the Zionist movement's claim over Palestine, supported by the British 
government, had further contributed to the fragmentation of the Arab territorial  
space and this despite great mobilisation in the Arab nationalist movements in 
Syria and the letters of protest from the Arab Muslim-Christian Association in 
Palestine to the OETA and the League of Nations. Once the partition of Greater 
Syria was sanctioned by the League of Nations, the weakened Arabs were left 
with no choice than to acknowledge the colonial fact of partition and to focus on 
their local struggles. 
However, Zionism was a settler colonial national movement and it carried 
in it a separatist ideology as well as a potential for “elimination”3,  which was 
soon expressed in the development of a separate economy and society and the 
conquest of Labour. Separatism was not however, shared by all the members of 
the Zionist movement. In fact, a minority among the movement took a dim view 
of the separatist and maximalist policy of the Zionist leadership. This group – 
the bi-nationalists – were in favour of cooperation with the Arabs as the only 
morally justifiable way of establishing the Jewish National Home. However, bi-
nationalism was  doomed  to  failure,  largely  due  to  the  internal  dynamics  of 
Zionism to which the bi-nationalists continued to adhere (Chapter Five). 
Continuous British attempts to reach an agreement between the Zionist 
movement  and  the  Palestinian  leadership,  and  the  various  proposals  to 
establish a mixed Legislative Council eventually failed, despite the Palestinians' 
readiness  in  the  early  and  mid-1930s  to  participate  in  a  democratic  mixed 
Legislative Council. Indeed, this initiative was rejected by the Zionist movement. 
The on-going Zionist colonisation, the economic and political  development of 
the Yishuv, and the worsening of the Palestinian situation in all fields, led to the 
3 As we have seen in the introduction, for Patrick Wolfe, “Settler colonialism is inherently eliminatory 
but not invariably genocidal”. Wolfe, Patrick, “Settler colonialism and the elimination of the native”, 
Journal of Genocide Research 8(4), December 2006, pp.387-409.
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Arab Great Revolt in 1936 and eventually to the British government adopting 
the principle of partition, as by then it was looking for “a way out”. Partition had 
become desirable to the Zionist leadership as a step towards full sovereignty 
over all of Palestine. By the 1930s, the latter started to study and enquire in 
order  to  propose  to  the  British  government  a  partition  plan  that  would  be 
favourable  to  the  Zionist  territorial  objectives  (Chapter  Three).  However,  the 
Arabs' total rejection of partition and the impossibility of implementing partition 
according to clear lines of separation without contravening the conditions of the 
mandate, led the British government to abandon partition as a solution to the 
Palestine question. It rather went back to its pre-1936 policy and proposed the 
establishment of a unitary state, which would be Arab due to the majoritarian 
position of the Arabs of Palestine, and the Jews would be granted equal civil 
rights  (the  1939  White  Paper  -  Chapter  Two).  Once  again,  this  unitarian 
proposal  was  rejected by the  Zionist  leadership  that  had set  its  mind on a 
Jewish State and advocated partition as a way to reach sovereignty. Despite its 
inability to implement the 1939 White Paper, which would not be revoked until  
the departure of the British from Palestine, the British government would try to 
avoid partition and impose a unitarian solution. As for the Zionist movement, it 
would respond to the White Paper by adopting the Biltmore programme, which 
envisaged the establishment of a Jewish State all  over mandatory Palestine. 
Parallel to its maximalist programme, however, the Zionist leadership would do 
its  best  in  the  international  forum  to  obtain  partition  and  secure  Jewish 
sovereignty.  The bi-nationalists as well as the Arabs of Palestine would fight 
both the principle of Jewish sovereignty in Palestine and that of partition. The 
first proposed a bi-national state where both national communities could share 
equal rights (Chapter Five). The latter proposed establishing a democratic state 
where the Jews would be welcome as individuals – not as a nation, meaning 
that they would not be granted national rights – and would enjoy the same rights 
as  the  other  Palestinians  (Chapter  Three).  Under  pressure  from the  Zionist 
movement and the United States, partition was however, eventually sanctioned 
by the International community. The British government, which viewed partition 
as its own failure, abstained. 
Bi-nationalism as a political project to establish a bi-national state was 
then to slowly disappear, adapting to the new situation by turning its demand for 
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a bi-national state into a demand for equal civil rights (Chapter Five). As for the 
dispersed Arab Palestinians, they would, for a few decades, re-organise and 
call for the liberation of all of Palestine. As a matter of fact, the Arab proposition 
for a unitary state as advanced in the 1940s had faded away in favour of a 
simple will to liberate the watan. It would not be until the late 1960s that the idea 
of  a united Palestine as the home of  all  its  inhabitants,  Arabs and Jews of  
foreign descent would re-emerge. In the meanwhile, the Palestinian resistance 
movement continued to reject all  “peace plans” based on partition that were 
presented by the United States, Israel, the USSR or the Arabs. They notably 
rejected  UNSC  resolution  242  which  overlooked  the  pre-1967  situation  by 
calling  on  Israeli  to  withdraw  from  the  territories  conquered  in  the  “recent 
conflict”. In need for a political programme and in response to the presence of  
the  Israelis  as a fact  on  the ground,  they instead,  developed the  idea of  a 
Democratic State in which all inhabitants could live in peace with equal rights 
and obligations. The major idea was the de-Zionisation of Israel and the Israelis,  
Zionism being analysed as a racist, sectarian and imperialist ideology (Chapter 
Six).  If  the  idea  was  a  strong  and  original  one,  the  Palestinians  were 
nevertheless unable to address questions relative to Jewish identity and culture. 
Furthermore,  they  were  faced  with  at  best  indifference  but  mostly  with 
doubtfulness and rejection from the part  of  the Israelis  even the anti-Zionist 
ones. 
In  the  aftermath  of  the  October  war  however,  the  Palestinians  were 
weakened  and  faced  a  growing  number  of  international  initiatives  to  find  a 
solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict that gave them no direct involvement. This 
led the PLO to consider participating in the Geneva Conference and the United 
Nations debates, thus in discussions with Israel and the United States and in 
considering the question of sovereignty. This was however, opposed by a fringe 
of  the  PLO which  founded the  “rejectionist  front”  and rejected the  definitive 
partition  of  Palestine.  Under  international  pressure  and  the  absence  of  any 
progress in the Palestinian struggle, the PLO eventually recognised Israel, and 
thereby, the principle of partition.
As we have seen throughout this dissertation,  I have defined as anti-
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partitionism the rejection of the principle and practice of partition and separation 
combined  the  proposal  of  unitarian  schemes  and  political  models.  Anti-
partitionism as I have argued, is not recent, indeed, each time there has been 
the expression of partitionism, anti-partitionism had emerged to counter argue 
and  propose  unitarian  schemes.  More  than  a  reaction,  however,  anti-
partitionism has been a political expression of the will of unity that animated the 
Arabs, the bi-nationalists and even the believers in the British empire. Just as 
there are several reasons to propose partition in a given country or territorial 
space,  there  are several  reasons to  reject  partition.  Thus it  means that  the 
expressions  of  anti-partitionism  are  diverse  and  that,  we  have  seen  it 
throughout the previous pages. 
When in the advent of WWI, France, Great Britain and Italy tried to get 
their share of the Ottoman Empire's territories, this was out of greed and the 
motivations behind the partition of the Arab territories were mostly economical. 
Moreover, as argued by Radha Kumar, partitions often happen when there is a 
transfer of power and indeed, transfer of power there was in favour of France in 
Syria and Lebanon, and in favour of Great Britain in Palestine. By that time, the 
Zionist movement favoured partition for its own colonial objectives. Similar in 
means, yet of another nature, the Zionist movement's motivation was to get a 
favourable British administration in Palestine to enable the creation of a Jewish 
National Home.
At the time of this first partition, the Palestinians and Arabs were forced to 
accept it, they did it out of necessity but were not partitionists as such as they 
did not favour it or gain anything from it. They rather viewed it as a wrong for a 
good, as a temporary thing.
After the distribution of the mandates and until the mid 1930s, the three 
actors, this time in Palestine in its mandate borders, would show a common 
anti-partitionist  stand.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  it  is  only  in  the  mid-1930s  that 
partition would emerge in the British ranks as a way out of what it had come to  
consider  as  an  inextricable  situation.  Before  that  however,  the  British 
government had always considered Palestine as an indivisible unit and for that 
purpose it tried to manage Palestine for its best interest. In reality, however, it 
managed the two communities separately thus creating a de facto separation 
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on the ground. While allocating privileges to the Zionist movement and enabling 
it to develop as an autonomous and independent society with its own banks, 
schools, trade unions etc... Thus while it officially considered Palestine as one 
country, Great Britain let communitarianism developed. 
In the wake of the first partition plan proposal, the given changed and 
despite the internal oppositions the Zionist movement adopted partition as a 
favourable outcome in its march towards the seizing of the whole country. The 
conclusions of the Woodhead commission's report led the British government to 
look for a solution that would not include partition. It tried to reach a common 
ground  with  the  Zionist  movement  and  the  Palestinians  leadership,  in  vain. 
Furthermore,  although  reluctant  to  partition,  the  pro-Zionist  members  of  the 
British government were ready to support partition even though it was neither in 
the interest of Britain nor of Zionism according to them. The decision of the 
Zionist  leadership to call  for the partition of Palestine was as we have seen 
opposed by part of the movement on the ground that the Jews could and had to  
live among the Arabs as part of the Jewish endeavour. However, although anti-
partitionists, these were subject to contradictions and limits as they were unable 
to think their projects outside Zionist ideology thus there could be no possible 
collaboration with the Arabs. The former advocated anti-partitionism animated 
by what O'Leary defined as the possibility of bi or multi-nationalism while the 
latter rejected the rupturing of national unity and  believed that partition would 
likely worsen rather than reduce violence4. The former believed in the legitimacy 
of Zionism whereas the latter considered it  as a pure settler movement and 
could not consider the Jews as a nation, they rather proposed to regard them as 
Palestinians. Thus, anti-partitionism as it developed during the mandate era the 
Palestinian and Arab ranks on the one hand and in the Zionist ranks on the 
other  hand  had  no  other  similar  ground  than  the  rejection  of  the  territorial 
partitioning.
In the wake of the Nakba, as developed above, bi-nationalism sank into 
oblivion and so did the democratic state thought by the Palestinian leadership. It  
would  take  nearly  two  decades  for  a  unitarian  anti-partitionist  movement  to 
emerge, and this will be the PLO as the representative of all the Palestinians 
that will advocate and propose it. Revolutionary in many ways, although it failed 
4 See the typology set by Brendan O'Leary.
272
to develop a programme and address some of the major questions related to 
the Jews' rights, the PLO's democratic state has been a unique experience as it  
proposed as stressed by Fatah at the time to unite under one same political 
entity “aggressor” or perpetrator and “victim”. 
To conclude,  the willingness to gain partition as shown by the Zionist 
movement  in  the  1930s  and  1940s  movement  as  for  it  could  however  be 
compared to the Palestinian progressive adoption of the principle of partition in 
the mid 1970s until the late 1980s. As a matter of fact, similar dynamics were at 
work in both movements which had come to look at political sovereignty as a 
priority. 
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